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An
Assessment of Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Fisher’s Achievements and
Limitations as a Naval Reformer |
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Narrative up to
and including the Anglo-German Naval Race
In 1863 Lieutenant
Fisher briefly joined the WARRIOR: the world’s first iron-hulled and armoured
battleship and response to a French similar but wooden-hulled vessel. Already
armour-plate had shown itself to be susceptible to modern artillery pieces.
Accordingly greater speed was required in order, per the thinking of the Surveyor
of the Navy, Captain Sir Baldwin Walker, to elect a suitable longer gunnery
range against all other warships and minimize the shortcomings of plate. (1)
On the staff of
the gunnery-school EXCELLENT for much of this decade, Fisher was involved in
practical research, particularly into mining. Already in a position of
authority he favoured controlled mines, but had a lesser opinion of contact
mines. Though not fully responsible by any means, he had a not insignificant
part in the Royal Navy not adopting the Hertz-type mine. (2)
By now a Commander
he returned to Portsmouth in 1872, this time to experiment with the
recently-adopted Whitehead torpedo: aboard VERNON. Also, as a member of the
Committee on Torpedoes (1873-6), some of its conclusions are interesting. (3)
Gaining his fourth
ring, as a Captain he headed EXCELLENT (1883-6). The development of the
torpedo-boat, brought about anxiety in the whole
concept of the battleship: so much so that Britain built comparatively fewer
than other countries. Saliently, a shortage of public funds also contributed to
this though. In this period, even if the relative numbers of ships were less
than desired, upgrading artillery in line with a great many technical advances,
including breech-loading, was seen as essential. Fisher and his staff worked
closely on this with technical experts: Sir William Armstrong and Josiah Vavasseur. (4)
A natural
progression, he became Director of Naval Ordnance in late 1886 (attaining Rear
Admiral in 1890). In an effort to be cost effective and save duplication, all
Britain’s ordnance had since the Crimean War been dealt with by the War Office;
but with the increasing complexities and large-scale adoption of breech-loaders
since 1879; hold-ups were becoming intolerable. In all likelihood on the orders
of the Admiralty, (5) Fisher immediately sought
to wrench control away from the Army. In 1888 this was in part accomplished,
with the R.N. maintaining its own budget. (6)
Nevertheless, Fisher’s overwhelming contribution as D.N.O. was in pushing
forward the re-arming.
Stormy political
relations with France allowed for a modest building plan in 1888. With public
agitation (partially stoked up from within the R.N. itself) (7) the Naval Defence Act of 1889 began a new
intensity in competition with the French and a stated commitment to the
‘two-power standard’. Technical shortcomings in battleships had been overcome
with the introduction of triple-expansion engines and nickel-steel armour;
these permitted better value for money and an improved fiscal state meant an
availability of increased funding. (8)
In defence against
torpedo-boats smaller-calibre quick-firing guns had evolved. Even so, French
large-scale deployment of these boats across the English Channel required
attention. Already aware, Fisher devoted resources to this problem from 1892,
when he became Controller. In close conjunction with William White and two
civilian shipbuilding companies, Yarrows and Thorneycrofts,
the result was the torpedo-boat destroyer. Importantly, new water-tube boilers
proved highly successful in these. (9)
His other input
regarding Belleville water-tube boilers was less noteworthy however. In time
these would prove better than the old cylindrical boilers; but Fisher made the
dangerous assumption that because these were suited to small ships such as
torpedo gunboats, they would be fine in large ships.(10)
After other duties
and further promotion to Vice-Admiral, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief
Mediterranean in 1897. All through the 1890s the major powers had constructed
evermore powerful battleships and armoured-cruisers (consequently with larger
ships’ companies). However, in spite of massive improvements in theoretical
firepower, the British fleets had been left totally unsupported by the gunnery
school in practical terms. At least some officers had been experimenting
(prior to Fisher’s arrival), the most notable being Captain Percy Scott.
Developing a “continuous-aim” with the more easily controlled quick-firing guns, Scott’s hitting capacity at the then normal range of
1,600 yards was impressive. Fisher increased the range for target practice in
his command, possibly to 3,000 or 4,000 yards for main armament. (11) The Rear Admiral’s flagship, RAMILLES, is known
to have conducted shoots at 6,000 yards. Men like Scott were the exception
though and Fisher’s term was marked by changes in attitude. Less time was
devoted to social aspects and pointless cleaning; more to training and there
was an emphasis on speed, fighting efficiency and evolving tactics; with
officers encouraged to make submissions. Additionally there were numerous
organisational changes and recommendations: although Lord Charles Beresford may
have actually been behind many of these. (12)
Meanwhile, far
from being deterred (13) the foreign competition
just kept on building and more importantly, developing technological
improvements: especially the French. Quick-firing guns with capped
armour-piercing rounds had been proved to be devastating to medium armour at
short range, so battleships required heavier plate protection (because ranges
had not yet opened up for main armament). Similarly, to counter each others’
designs, cruisers became ever larger and armoured almost overall: with
attendant cost implications.
Turning the
century, in 1902 the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Selborne,
pushed for and received approval for “equality plus a margin” over the combined
French and Russian fleets. (14) And, exacerbating
the situation even further, by this time Germany had also embarked on a major
naval programme (even if at this stage not particularly noticeable in Britain).
The overwhelming strategic reason behind this was a coming perceived change of
colonial power (supposedly to be in Germany’s favour): ergo a powerful naval
weapon in which to force diplomatic concessions out of Britain. On a tactical
level, it was estimated that a main battle-fleet two-thirds the size of
Britain’s combined (allied to large-scale use of torpedo-boats, superior
warships, superior training etc., etc.) would be required, plus further forces
for colonial defence. However, there was also a social element to this. It was
estimated by Tirpitz that the gargantuan industrial activity caused would
mollify democratic politicians and the general populace, leading them away from
more constitutional reform. (15)
Anyway, by now a highly
controversial figure, on leaving the Mediterranean Fisher was made Second Sea
Lord (unusually as a full admiral) in 1902. Selborne
had already been in contact with Fisher (16) and
it may be that even at this stage that he secured this position in order to put
into commission his personnel reforms and efficiencies - as a precursor to far
more grandiose plans. (17)
Over one hundred
pages detailing proposals were presented and after opposition these were
announced on Christmas Day 1902. It is worth pointing out that only the less
realistic ideas were Fisher’s. (18) Central to
this was an emphasis on education and all-round training for officers entering
naval and marine service, producing officers technologically able to fight
these increasingly complex engines-of-war. Fitting in with the public school
system and creating better facilities ashore for the young-gentlemen; as well
as normal school-work aspirants would study equally as seamen officers,
engineers and marines (the latter soon to be discarded). After sea-time
specialisation as lieutenants was to be the norm, with the option to later
become purely executive officers (originally intended to include engineer
officers). Also of import, in a socially elitist organisation, engineers were
to be given a better status within the officer classes: assuming the
rank-structure and allowing the same dress and marks of rank as seamen
officers. (19) Other aspects of officer training
may have also been improved, such as in navigation.(20)
A second scheme
was drawn up in 1903 but was not put into operation until 1904, after Fisher
had moved on to another appointment. This was primarily a rearrangement of
rating personnel. On ships out of commission or in long-refits they were to be
replaced by dockyard workers and instead drafted to the Fleet Reserve (not to
be confused with the Royal Fleet Reserve that was something else entirely).
Two-fifths of normal ships’ companies plus “principal officers and specialists”
were to be put onboard vessels near or ready for sea-duty, forming a “nucleus”
for mobilisation. (21) Incidentally, this was a
French procedure.
On returning to
the Board of the Admiralty on Trafalgar Day 1904, as First Sea Lord, Fisher
immediately began reforms of a most controversial nature. With Britain’s
overseas empire widely dispersed, her naval forces tended to be the same.
Single or small units; often ancient or of dubious value; found in all sorts of
out of the way places. Again not entirely his own idea; concentration of effort
in five fleets would enable the regions of importance to be covered; allowing
for units to be despatched as necessary for localised tasks; importantly
enabling a great many of the inefficient warships to be de-commissioned and
their personnel deployed more usefully. Additionally, less important foreign
naval stations were shut. Based on his earlier opinions, the new emphasis was
to be placed on the Mediterranean, in Fisher’s mind the prime overseas
strategic areas to be defended in order to maintain the Empire. The main
threat he saw was France. Germany did not at this time figure in the
re-organisation.(22) (I am aware that there
is evidence that there had already been concern in senior positions of the R.N.
over Germany by this time, by officers such as Sir Reginald Custance.
This is the subject of a Ph.D. thesis currently in its final stages.)
Fisher can be
quoted over a long period as having a simplistic belief in superior speed and
gunnery-range and this had now become apparent as a way of primarily countering
French strengths and past tactics; and also taking the Russians into
consideration in the event of the two nations joining forces in the Med.(23) Using current gunnery-ranges with batteries of
the more efficient medium-calibre quick-firing guns (over slower firing larger
calibres); and while staying out of torpedo range it was thought that fast
armoured-cruisers could get the better of the slower, heavier armed and
armoured battleships. Some classes of battleships had actually gone over to
quick-firers as their main armament, something that Fisher favoured as late as
1902. So, the differences between the types had significantly closed in the
minds of many.(24)
Anyway, early in
1905 at Fisher’s behest a committee was appointed, in order to produce new
designs for major warships. Reporting the same spring it is now clear that the
committee did not entirely share Fisher’s views. The good admiral was of the
opinion that submarines (in coastal defence) made battleships utterly obsolete,
but that fast armoured-cruisers with uniform-calibre armament were the way
forward. At some point in the interim he had also begun to think in terms of
using the newly developed turbine engine for speed and artillery in heavier
calibres.
However, the
committee came up with two designs. The DREADNOUGHT class battleship was driven
by Parsons’ turbines (design speed 21 knots); with a main armament of ten
twelve inch guns: an increase in fire-power which normally numbered four
pieces. Not entirely original in concept, it is a moot point whether any other
nation had seriously thought of building similar vessels in any numbers at
least, if only on a basis of cost. (25) The
INVINCIBLE class armoured cruiser (later to be designated battlecruiser) again
turbine-driven (design speed 25 knots); had an offensive capability of eight
twelve inch guns, plus some lesser four inch weapons.
It is now safe to
conclude that for a time Fisher wanted to build the new battlecruisers only,
with Lord Selborne’s blessing. Simplification by
standardisation amply shows up in copious writings throughout his career: with
the specific aim of good value for money. The fast battlecruiser able to act
both as a battleship-killer and super defender of trade routes was therefore
the ultimate: the inference being that all types of smaller cruiser would be
superfluous and the next variety in his preferred order of battle would have
been the large destroyer. Although highly expensive as individual units, per
this thinking overall spending on building should have been brought under
control: especially with the debts of the recently fought Boer War to contend
with. (26)
Anyway, the
construction of one battleship initially, followed by three battlecruisers went
ahead: the former completed in late 1906 and the latter during 1908. By the
time they were in service the Conservative-Unionists had fallen from power (in
December 1905), replaced by the Liberals. Not only had the international
situation changed significantly, the new government was committed to social
reform and had a number of internal problems. Consequently, for a spell the armers within the R.N. had to temper their ambitions.
Even before the
new designs committee had been formed, the original strategic and tactical
problems in war with France had been resolved: the British had ended their
differences in the Entente Cordiale in April 1904. Secondly, the Russian
navy had been utterly thrashed by the Japanese at Tsushima in September 1905.
Unfortunately, this did not usher in a new period of peace and understanding,
especially since the Germans were concerned at the Royal Navy’s intentions
against them also. (27)
Berlin had learned
basic details of the DREADNOUGHT one month even before she was laid down.
Inherently disrupting Tirpitz’s building programme; without recourse to any
offices of his government he had within weeks decided to match the British.
Already there was a colossal strain on the finances of the Reich and
initially, redesigning of battleships in building was carried out. (28) Genuine opposition from the Treasury was
defeated, but it was not until mid 1907 that the first German Dreadnoughts were
laid down. (29) Other nations responded in their
own time.
Perceiving a real
threat from across the North Sea, Great Britain, of course, responded with
increased battleship building once more (and to a certain degree social
reform was put on a back-burner). With huge naval spending, taking a quarter of
all government spending, (30) British government
attempts even to negotiate a slow-down with the Germans failed.
Wider analysis
of Fisher’s reforms
As an
administrator Fisher can claim some kudos. His time as D.N.O. can be judged as
highly successful, with large-scale modernising of weaponry capabilities: if
only in theoretical terms. Similarly, his efforts to inject realism within his
command as CinC Med can generally be seen as of worth:
if only localised and transitory. (31) The
reforms of junior-officers’ training appear to have been beneficial. (32) The more esoteric ideas, such as suggesting
that Commanders (E) could somehow metamorphosize into
commanding sea-officers, were reasonably dropped in time. However, attempting
to break down the social wall between line and engineering,
was in my opinion, admirable as well as eminently sensible. (In time this has
been successful.) Rearranging rating manpower for the Fleet reserve, on paper
at least, seems to have been perfectly practical: it remains to be seen how
these ratings were actually employed in their new drafts. (33) Again, scrapping of old and dispersed units and
re-deploying their ships’ companies can be regarded as useful: with two
provisos. The first is in the nature of support to isolated colonial
governments and the second, there should have been regard for keeping adequate
home-waters flotillas and other miscellaneous craft (which proved problematical
in 1914). Little space is given to the closure of the lesser naval bases. Other
reforms regarding the lower-deck (also not mentioned up to now) can be viewed
as highly edifying, whilst cost effective. (34)
However,
technology changed fundamentally many times through Fisher’s career and with
ensuing complexities it is all too apparent that he (like most line officers)
did not have an in-depth understanding of the concepts involved. On his own, he
was not apt to see the true potential in new devices: as a young man -
the contact mine. However, it is obvious he could work well on projects with
men of technical ability: on gun-mountings, torpedo-boat destroyers etc., etc.
but, a certain impatience in proper testing shows
itself from the debacle over the Belleville boilers.
As an admiral
putting through far-reaching reforms, this lack of understanding however, became far more important. A prime example
of this was in relation to the all big-gun ships. While CinC
Med, gunnery exercises conducted at 5,000 to 6,000 yards were not unsuccessful
when fired as salvoes and the results observed; the process of controlling this
centrally became known as ‘fire-control’. (35)
But this was not the full story by any means. As distance increases the
problems of one moving ship hitting another moving ship with artillery fire
become very much greater. Both ships are liable to be subject to pitch, roll
and yaw. The relevant bearings and ranges will in most occasions be changing
and not necessarily in an uniform manner. Plus, with
increased distance the projectiles spend a longer time getting to the target
and as a result, have to be vectored onto where the target will be judged to be
on the point of impact (and not on the point of firing). The full extent of
these variables were not generally realised by naval officers, even after an
interested civilian, Arthur Pollen, repeatedly attempted to persuade the R.N.
to develop a series of devices for working out the solutions mechanically. In
spite of promising trials, Pollen’s system was only partly taken up and only
after bitter recriminations. Recent research has shown that although Pollen’s devices
were superior is some ways, the cheaper systems devised partially by a naval
officer named Dreyer were not so flawed as has been generally thought. Fisher’s
input in this was cursory - brief support for the Pollen experiments waned.
Although cost implications may have been a factor, this author is not in a
position to judge. (36) That British gunnery
fire-control systems were not entirely thought out (even if the modern gear was
fitted) was not seen by senior naval officers necessarily as problematical. In
1914 it was thought that German systems were inferior to that of the British -
which proved not to be a particularly accurate assessment. (37)
The potential
tactical (and ultimately grand strategic) use of submarines was another area
where Fisher clearly had not thought through the implications: until late.
While clearly encouraging experimentation, his own
doctrine of using these in purely coastal defence, allied to hostility and
disinterest within the upper echelons, held back tactical development
significantly. It was not until after his forced-retirement, that in 1912, he
realised the threat to merchant shipping from the submarine: something that had
been staring him in the face since at least 1903, when he wrote of sinking
transports. Nevertheless, when war came in 1914 a majority of British
submarines were deployed as coastal patrol craft, while enemy boats were
ranging abroad causing severe upset. (I now believe that Fisher could have made
his famous comment on sinking enemy transports in the wake of a translation of
then French tactical thinking translated into English within the journals of
the Royal United Service Institution.) (38)
On mining: having
earlier in his career had little confidence in contact mines, by 1905 Fisher is
said to have found favour in these, in the offensive role of blockading enemy
ports at least. Nonetheless, budgets were just not provided for the requisite
stocks, or vessels to lay them. Less than three years later, even this was all
but cancelled. It is recorded that Fisher was highly optimistic over the ease
of minesweeping. (39) Unfortunately, as Britain
was to find out in the coming war, this confidence was dangerously misplaced.
With Fisher’s
quest to squeeze every knot of speed out of his men-o-war, to a degree he was
associated with the changeover from burning coal to oil. Even though one of his
nicknames was the ‘oil maniac’ in reality he was on the periphery and was not
at the Admiralty when the important decisions were taken. (40) Also, Fisher’s interest in large diesel-driven
turbines should be viewed with some skepticism.
One action which
could have potentially identified and dealt with these and other technological,
tactical and strategic concepts, was the formation of a naval General Staff.
Fisher is definitely known to have advocated such an organisation, (41) but when he reached a position where he could
have brought about its creation, to his discredit, did not. This could have
simplified other matters Fisher was involved with; including the strategic
roles of army and navy; and economic warfare. (42)
The limited work begun in the winter of 1906-7 by the War College in the Fisher
era was simply insufficient. (43) Although, this
was rectified, to a degree, with the formation of the Admiralty War Staff in 1912,
this was not a General Staff in the accepted understanding. Instead, it was far
more limited in scope.
In the antiquated
and shared system of power within the Royal Navy, Fisher can be said to have
been highly active. In the decision-making process of committees, he sat on and
later set up many (manipulating where possible). Regarding patronage, he both
sought and gained this: allowing juniors to have their ideas taken on by
Fisher. However, he also alienated and was spiteful: making powerful enemies. This
strained loyalties and split the officer class. (44)
Sometimes cunning and devious, he could nevertheless openly express opinions
better left unsaid. A prime example of this was in relation to comments on a
pre-emptive attack on the German fleet in 1904, echoing earlier press articles
and confirming German insecurities. (45)
In conclusion, for
all of Fisher’s efforts he was not powerful enough to carry through his dreams
and I believe he let the Royal Navy down in crucial respects. Perhaps this
failure was just as well; bearing in mind his inherent weakness in strategic
and tactical thought; and some opinions regarding types of ships.
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© LEN BARNETT 2001 (amended slightly in 2003, 2004 and more
significantly in 2010) |