1. Marder: Fear God volume I p.248
  2. Mackay: Fisher pp.260-263

  3. Charles H. Fairbanks Jr: ‘The Origins of the Dreadnought Revolution’ in the International History Review (University of Toronto Press, 1991) pp.255-256

  4. Sumida: Naval Supremacy pp.43-45; and Fairbanks Jr: ‘Origins’ pp.256-258. Also, Holger H. Herwig: ‘The German Reaction to the Dreadnought Revolution’ in the International History Review (University of Toronto Press,1991) p.276

  5. Sumida: Naval Supremacy pp.45-46; and Fairbanks Jr: ‘Origins’ p.276. Also, Herwig: ‘Luxury’ Fleet p.26 on German BRANDENBURG class, pp.54-55 on Japanese semi-Dreadnoughts SATSUMA and AKI and American MICHIGAN and SOUTH CAROLINA

  6. This is a major concept running through Sumida’s: Naval Supremacy and taken up by Fairbanks Jr in his ‘Origins’. Mackay in

    7. Fisher almost comes to the same view, but seems to have given a certain credence to Fisher’s ‘confusion over "fusion-types"‘. Also, see D.K. Brown: Warrior to Dreadnought (London: Chatham Publishing, 1997) p.187

  7. Mackay: Fisher p.319
  8. Herwig: ‘German Reaction’ pp.277-279; and Sumida: Naval Supremacy p.279
  9. Herwig: ‘Luxury’ Fleet p.59; and Sumida: Naval Supremacy p.279
  10. Sumida: Naval Supremacy tables 1 and 3

  11. Beatty, in numerous letters to his wife between 1904 and 1913, was highly critical of the unrealistic nature of exercises. These covered tactics; fleetwork and admirals’ lack of practice; and of particular interest to this essay, gunnery. These can be found in Rear Admiral W.S. Chalmers: The Life and Letters of David, Earl Beatty (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1951) p.97, p.99, p.105, p.118-120 & pp.126-126. See also Sumida: Naval Supremacy pp.251-252

  12. I base this not on the negative evidence on the reading list, but on viewing a fair number of midshipmen’s journals and senior naval officers’ papers in the Imperial War Museum library. A particularly good example is of an engineering officer R/Adm Owen W. Phillips R.N. However, high standards of midshipmen seem not to have been uniform. See Chalmers: Life and Letters p.95

  13. Chalmers: Life and Letters p.115
  14. Mackay: Fisher pp.379-380
  15. Sumida: Naval Supremacy p.48

  16. The Pollen fire-control system is the major subject dealt with in Sumida’s: Naval Supremacy, but the salient points on Fisher are on p.120 & p.135. The new evidence relating to Dreyer and Pollen can be found in the Ph.D. thesis of Dr. John Brooks. A shortened version of this formed the subject of a lecture for the Society for Nautical research at King’s College, University of London on 20th February 2003

  17. Sumida: Naval Supremacy pp.252-253
  18. Marder: Fear God volume I pp.281-282; Jonathon Crane: Submarine (London: BBC, 1984) pp.123-126; and M. de Lanessan: ‘The French Naval Programme of 1900-1906’ in the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution (London: J.J. Keliher, 1903) volume XLVII pp.p.1405

  19. Mackay: Fisher pp.377-388 N.B. This scheme could not have been completely cancelled as there were offensive minelaying operations from October 1914 onwards. See Frank C. Bowen: History of the Royal Naval Reserve (London: The Corporation of Lloyd’s, 1926) p.94

  20. Fisher is known to have had a friendship with Sir Marcus Samuel, of Shell and to have spent weekends at Samuel’s home. See Robert Henriques: Marcus Samuel - First Viscount Bearstead - founder of ‘Shell Transport and Trading Company’ (London: Barrie & Rockliff, 1960). Opinions in the oil-man’s massive biography (that are incorrectly stated as fact) are virtually identical to those in Winston Churchill’s The World Crisis volume I. Highly simplistic (and obviously only part of the equation if checked with technical publications), these carry all the hallmarks of Fisher’s thinking. Additionally, regarding the sourcing of oil as fuel, Fisher seems not really to have understood the strategic complexities of this and it was Churchill who took it forward with the Anglo-Persian deal. Not only that, as stated in the main text Fisher was not at the Admiralty when the important decisions were taken. Having been Controller, it was not until late 1897, after Admiral ‘Willie’ May had taken over that the first realistic experimentation was begun. And, it would appear (especially from one document in the Selborne papers) that it was under Admiral the Lord Walter Talbot Kerr, as First Sea Lord, that fuel oil was sanctioned for use in larger men-o-war in an ‘auxiliary’ source. This decision would appear to have taken place in mid July 1904 - before Fisher’s return. The latter aspects have been researched by me and will be published in my main work on the First World War - in time.

 

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