21.Marder: Fear
God volume I p.248
22.Mackay: Fisher
pp.260-263
23.Charles H.
Fairbanks Jr: ‘The Origins of the Dreadnought
Revolution’ in the International History Review (University of Toronto
Press, 1991) pp.255-256
24.Sumida: Naval
Supremacy pp.43-45; and Fairbanks Jr: ‘Origins’
pp.256-258. Also, Holger H. Herwig:
‘The German Reaction to the Dreadnought Revolution’ in the International
History Review (University of Toronto Press,1991) p.276
25.Sumida: Naval
Supremacy pp.45-46; and Fairbanks Jr: ‘Origins’
p.276. Also, Herwig: ‘Luxury’ Fleet p.26 on
German BRANDENBURG class, pp.54-55 on Japanese semi-Dreadnoughts SATSUMA and
AKI and American MICHIGAN and SOUTH CAROLINA
26.This is a
major concept running through Sumida’s: Naval Supremacy and taken up by
Fairbanks Jr in his ‘Origins’. Mackay in Fisher
almost comes to the same view, but seems to have given a certain credence to
Fisher’s ‘confusion over “fusion-types”‘. Also, see D.K. Brown: Warrior to
Dreadnought (London: Chatham Publishing, 1997) p.187
27.Mackay: Fisher
p.319
28.Herwig: ‘German
Reaction’ pp.277-279; and Sumida: Naval Supremacy p.279
29.Herwig: ‘Luxury’
Fleet p.59; and Sumida: Naval Supremacy p.279
30.Sumida: Naval
Supremacy tables 1 and 3
31.Beatty, in
numerous letters to his wife between 1904 and 1913, was highly critical of the
unrealistic nature of exercises. These covered tactics; fleetwork
and admirals’ lack of practice; and of particular interest to this essay,
gunnery. These can be found in Rear Admiral W.S. Chalmers: The Life and
Letters of David, Earl Beatty (London: Hodder
& Stoughton, 1951) p.97, p.99, p.105, p.118-120 & pp.126-126. See also
Sumida: Naval Supremacy pp.251-252
32.I base this
not on the negative evidence on the reading list, but on viewing a fair number
of midshipmen’s journals and senior naval officers’ papers in the Imperial War
Museum library. A particularly good example is of an engineering officer R/Adm Owen W. Phillips R.N. However, high standards of
midshipmen seem not to have been uniform. See Chalmers: Life and Letters
p.95
33.Chalmers: Life
and Letters p.115
34.Mackay: Fisher
pp.379-380
35.Sumida: Naval
Supremacy p.48
36.The Pollen
fire-control system is the major subject dealt with in Sumida’s: Naval
Supremacy, but the salient points on Fisher are on p.120 & p.135. The
new evidence relating to Dreyer and Pollen can be found in the Ph.D. thesis of
Dr. John Brooks. A shortened version of this formed the subject of a lecture
for the Society for Nautical research at King’s College, University of London
on 20th February 2003
37.Sumida: Naval
Supremacy pp.252-253
38.Marder: Fear
God volume I pp.281-282; Jonathon Crane: Submarine (London: BBC,
1984) pp.123-126; and M. de Lanessan: ‘The French
Naval Programme of 1900-1906’ in the Journal of the Royal United Service
Institution (London: J.J. Keliher, 1903) volume
XLVII pp.p.1405
39.Mackay: Fisher
pp.377-388 N.B. This scheme could not have been completely cancelled as there
were offensive minelaying operations from October 1914 onwards. See Frank C.
Bowen: History of the Royal Naval Reserve (London: The Corporation of
Lloyd’s, 1926) p.94
40.Fisher is
known to have had a friendship with Sir Marcus Samuel, of Shell and to have
spent weekends at Samuel’s home. See Robert Henriques:
Marcus Samuel - First Viscount Bearstead: founder
of ‘Shell Transport and Trading Company’ (London: Barrie &
Rockliff, 1960). Opinions in the oil-man’s massive
biography (that are incorrectly stated as fact) are virtually identical to
those in Winston Churchill’s The World Crisis volume I. Highly
simplistic (and obviously only part of the equation if checked with technical
publications), these carry all the hallmarks of Fisher’s thinking.
Additionally, regarding the sourcing of oil as fuel, Fisher seems not really to
have understood the strategic complexities of this and it was Churchill who
took it forward with the Anglo-Persian deal. Not only that,
as stated in the main text Fisher was not at the Admiralty when the
important decisions were taken. Having been Controller, it was not until late
1897, after Admiral ‘Willie’ May had taken over that the first realistic
experimentation was begun. And, it would appear (especially from one document
in the Selborne papers) that it was under Admiral the
Lord Walter Talbot Kerr, as First Sea Lord, that fuel oil was sanctioned for
use in larger men-o-war in an ‘auxiliary’ source. This decision would appear to
have taken place in mid July 1904 - before Fisher’s return. The latter aspects
have been researched by me and will be published in my main work on the First
World War - in time.