Go to the Home Page
|
|
Royal Naval Records from
the late Seventeenth to mid Twentieth Centuries
- A realistic guide to
what is available
to those looking into
the careers of officers and men in naval service
including the seagoing
reserves
by Len Barnett
|
Go to
Academic Papers on the Royal Navy
|
||
|
Go down to a brief historical essay up to and including the Second World War |
||
Introduction
As a professional maritime researcher, with a sound
knowledge of sources useful to those seeking genealogical information, for
those both in armed and/or mercantile service on British vessels, I receive
enquiries of a great variety. Sometimes only armed with a person’s name,
happily I am able to provide a wealth of information from original documents.
At other times, even with more information to hand no records survive and I
have to tactfully explain that there is nowhere to go.
There is no doubt that genealogy has become a popular
pastime. There certainly seems to be evermore people using the facilities of
museums and archives to trace their ancestors. The media too has realised this.
A number of television documentaries and ‘how to’ programmes have recently been
aired on British screens. Often these tell amazing tales, with polished ease.
For those who have spent days trawling through tens of
thousands of entries, red-eyed and tired, in the vain hope of finding one single
piece of information, it is realised that research can be distinctly hard work! So,
the following is based on years of working on various classes of original
records and is meant as an aid to people who are interested in finding out
about their mariner forebears (in this guide those in the Royal Navy). I cover
the main state documentation of the various boards, as well as the other
principal collections of other classes of records. The more specialist
collections I mention, but do not dwell on.
It must be stressed that there have been strong connections
between the armed navy and those in mercantile service, even if these were not
particularly warm in nature. So, reference to my other guide on merchant
service (if not covered by the internal website links) might be beneficial for
some.
How to use this
web-site
Immediately following is a very brief history of the Royal
Navy and an explanation as to the changing rank and rating structure through
the last few centuries. With this background information the next section,
hopefully, leads readers to the pages relevant to their own research. Some of
the subjects are highly complex and for these there are additional links to
separate pages with more detailed information. I conclude with some basic
advice into further records, that is operational and administrative, as well as
some recommendations for social histories dealing with naval subjects. Please note, not all
classes of records have been dealt with here. Apart from any other reason, the
sheer volume of surviving naval records is staggering. Some of these
require specialist knowledge in their own right (that at this time I do not
necessarily have) but at the same time are essentially esoteric, or are so
fragmentary as to be essentially useless to all but a few. There are also
others that while of great interest to historians cannot be accessed easily for
genealogical purposes.
People within the United Kingdom who are easily able to
travel around the London area may then want to conduct their own searches. As
these often take a considerable time and therefore can cost much in time, money
and effort, people from further away may want to invest in the expertise of a
professional researcher. This is especially pertinent for people from overseas,
where a trip to the U.K. may well cost a great deal of money.
Of course engaging a researcher is a matter of choice and
requires trust. Some of the main institutions mentioned have lists of
researchers. A number of researchers advertise that they are expert in a number
of fields, both military and civil. However, as some of these bodies of records
are immensely complicated personally I find it difficult to believe that these
people can be truly ‘expert’ in all these areas. For this reason even though I
have occasionally looked at records prior to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic
Wars (1793 to 1815) I have little expertise in the intricacies of the earlier
record keeping. Therefore I have decided to decline commissions for work for
the 17th and 18th centuries. In relation to the
Royal Navy I specialise in records dealing with the careers of officers and men
from 1793 until the mid 20th century. I also have an additional
expertise on naval operational documentation of the First World War era, since
this is within my area of personal research and can also tackle other
operational research. I can also research members of the Royal Marines and
Coastguard, but up to now have only done this for already established clients. For
those potentially interested in my services, I can be contacted at len@barnettmaritime.co.uk. Please note that I earn
my living as a freelance researcher and therefore charge professional fees.
The
understanding of naval records is far better than that of mercantile documents.
Even then some conscientious academic studies show that the general perception
of the Royal Navy is frequently far from accurate and the accepted ‘knowledge’
is nothing of the sort when investigated with contemporaneous evidence. Of
course, often it has been propagandists within the navy establishment that have
continued to push all the hoary old myths that are often highly sentimental and
nationalistic.
For such a
popular subject there are surprisingly few research guides. Basically there are
two, written in totally different manners. One, written by N.A.M. Rodger, a
professor and true academic expert (of the 18th century navy) who
spent around fourteen years on the staff of the then Public Records Office,
Kew, is entitled Naval Records for
Genealogists. The current version was
published in Richmond, Surrey through P.R.O. Publications in 1998. This takes
an academic approach, explaining in detail the often Byzantine nature of naval
structures and administration. There are two slight downsides for those not
already au fait with naval records.
The first is that the format is rather truncated, making ready reference not
particularly simple. Secondly, there are some typographical errors that may also cause some real difficulty. The other guide, Tracing Your Naval Ancestors, is by Bruno Pappalardo
and has also been published by the Public Records Office, as of 2002. Bruno is
presently a staff member of the National Archives (Public Records Office) Kew.
This is pitched more at those not necessarily expert in naval affairs and also
covers operational records. In taking a more general approach and attempting to
simplify systems some misunderstandings may arise and some
information is not necessarily absolutely accurate in
a few places - especially arising, once again, from typographical errors. In
conducting this exercise I have also noted further problems though. One, put
simply, is poor cataloguing at the P.R.O. As an example, some records have been
described as having external indexes and even although they have been within
the reach of the general public for literally decades, no apparent checks have
been made to see if the indexes actually refer to these records. (I have
brought any I have discovered to the notice of the relevant officials.) My
online guide is based on the terms used in Professor Rodger’s work although I
have also used Mr. Pappalardo’s work in relation to some elements, such as
lower deck wills, where Bruno is clearer. I would also like to impress on
readers that my guide is merely an overview and does not purport to be an
all-encompassing work.
A brief historical essay up to and including
the Second World War
Many claims have been made as to the origins
of the Royal Navy, including as far back as concurrent with the late 11th
century Norman invasion of southern England. Some people rather incredibly even
regard Anglo-Romano naval activity similarly. Certainly by mediaeval times
there were armed ships belonging to English monarchs and defence commitments
required of the Cinque Ports.
The highly
militaristic Tudor King Henry VIII can be seen as important in the forming of a
true monarch’s (or royal) navy in England. As well as increasing the investment
made by his father Henry VII in royal owned armed merchant ships, building
began on the first three royal dockyards at Portsmouth, Plymouth and Chatham in
the 1540s. What is more a Council for Marine Causes also came into being during
this decade. In many respects the forerunner of the Navy Board (that dealt with
important aspects of shore administration including shipbuilding and repair).
This allowed for something of a standing force, rather than a pure reliance on
ad hoc merchant hulls acquired when wanted. This council apparently also dealt
with matters of Admiralty - that were at this stage purely the appointments of
sea officers and the deployments of vessels. (Incidentally, this should not be
confused with the High Court of Admiralty that had dealt with maritime legal
disputes since at least the 14th century.) Also, even though
admirals had long been placed in command of groups of ships, there was little
of the modern sense of command and control, something that can be seen in the
later Elizabethan operations: especially against the grand Spanish Armada in
1588.
Pre-dating
Henry VIII’s naval exploits as shown above was the formation of an armed Royal
Navy in Scotland under King James IV. With French building expertise this force
was already taking shape by 1502. Although a naval arms race followed with the
English and there was some combat in the earlier
part of the 16th century, relations between the two countries became
less violent. As a result of this, under James V the Scottish Navy withered
away to nothing.
Anyway,
through marriage rather than warfare, in 1603 the Scottish Stuarts eventually
gained the English throne on the death of the barren Protestant Elizabeth I.
Under James VI of Scotland and James I of England, it is often stated there was
less emphasis on naval affairs. If the case, this would not have been entirely
surprising, considering the politics of the era. So the charge of interest
waning at the highest levels leading to indifferent administration and
corruption is not entirely unnatural. Often overlooked was the building of
excellent ships though. His son, Charles I, King of England, Scotland and
Ireland, also oversaw the upkeep of these and improvements in the Royal
dockyards. In relation to operational direction, Lord High Admirals were
appointed: although this position fell into abeyance after 1628 when the
incumbent was murdered.
By 1642 those
on the king’s ships were far from contented, with a number of concerns
including greatly outstanding pay (even by the standards of the era). When the
civil wars broke out that year both ships and personnel of the standing navy,
under the talented Earl of Warwick, went over to Parliament almost in their
entirety - 1st to 6th rated vessels and their commanders. Almost completely forgotten
historically, this force was an important element in Parliament’s victory over
the monarchy. Although disputed by newly raised Royalist vessels, generally
‘command of the sea’ was maintained around these islands in denying the Crown
potential continental military support. And, there was also naval support to
parliamentary military operations ashore.
Although not
free from its own problems by any means, interestingly, for a ‘royal’ navy, it
was through the Puritan Commonwealth (1649-59) that the State’s armed vessels
began to act as a genuinely disciplined seagoing navy though. Not particularly
auspicious during the civil wars, severe reverses experienced
in the First Anglo Dutch War (especially in 1652) required real improvements. Not only was a code of
discipline first promulgated in 1653 (to become the Articles of War in 1661),
so too was a too was the tactical doctrine of fleet action, which was becoming
necessary with the development of ships specifically built for the prosecution
of war. It can be said that the Cromwellian generals sent to sea engendered
something of the spirit of the New Model Army afloat. Even so, there were
retrograde steps as well. Under the military dictatorship that the Commonwealth
effectively developed into, the established boards
of shore administration and admiralty were abolished (although the functions
were subsequently carried out by naval and admiralty commissioners).
With the
Restoration (of the monarchy) in 1660 came a period of far reaching naval
reform: even if not down to Charles II as such. Admittedly through powerful
patronage, Samuel Pepys was instrumental in this. Initially he had been
appointed clerk of the acts to the reconstituted Navy Board that was then the
executive body under James, Duke of York. Later Pepys became the first
secretary to the Admiralty from 1673. A highly important aspect of holding a
naval commission was from 1677 a requirement of professional examinations for
the rank of lieutenant. One of Pepys’ most outstanding accomplishments, this
sprung from his desire to forge a professional officer corps. In particular he
wished to curb the excesses of officers with patronage but little expertise, while
giving ‘tarpaulin’ officers (those skilled but without social advantages) a
better chance for promotion and such examination can be seen as revolutionary
in its day.
Apart from the
trade wars with the Dutch, through the latter half of the 17th
century there had been a number of other hostilities with the main European
players - France and Spain. Often bewildering to anyone other than experts, one
time enemies not only made up their differences, but often then became allies
in conflict against their own past friends as the regnalistic, political,
religious and economic situations changed. These continued through the 18th
century, with Britain never having a period of even twenty years when not
fighting one or more rivals. (In 1707 there had been the final formal Act of
Union between England and Scotland.) By mid century these conflicts were being
conducted across the globe and the Seven Years War (1756-63) can be seen
legitimately in terms of a ‘world war’. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars
(1793-1815) that followed on from all the rest were inherently different in
spirit, but the apparent maximization and utter ruthlessness of these struggles
were merely the end result of military processes that had been growing for a
very long time.
Through these
almost never-ending wars leading to 1815 the Royal Navy had developed greatly.
As well as operating collectively as fleets in battle and blockade, tactics
evolved for evolutions such as cruising and fighting single ship and small
actions. Trade defence had been regarded as highly important and merchantmen
were convoyed to and from the colonies. And, amphibious operations, including
gunfire support operations, were part of the traditional way of war fighting.
(Another, at a political level, was paying allies to conduct land campaigns out
of the direct reach of Britain.) These tactics had been hard learned, often
with reverses and embarrassments in the interim.
Often gunnery
is given pride of place in explaining British naval supremacy. The reality is
actually far more difficult to determine and probably more accurately relates
not to the superiority of the British, but the inferiority (for many reasons
mostly political) of her enemies. Interestingly, recent research by Professor
Michael Duffy into gunnery training prior to the battle of Trafalgar (21st
October 1805), shows that there was not the relentless
practice that has been traditionally claimed. Nevertheless, generally the
British were better trained, employing highly destructive tactics such as
firing into hulls rather than into sails and rigging; employing multiple
shotting causing extreme splinter damage; as well as being capable of firing at
faster rates than their opponents. But, in modern military terms there was also
considerable ‘blue on blue’ at Trafalgar - more readily understood by the
general public as ‘friendly fire’. This caused not inconsiderable British
casualties and while commented on at the time, has not been dwelt upon since.
Ashore, the
administration and direction of the monarch’s ships also developed. While after
the Restoration it was the Navy Board that basically ran the navy, this had
fundamentally altered over a century. Again Lord High Admirals had been
appointed from 1708, but at this time the board of commissioners of the Admiralty
was not seen as necessarily heading the service. But under capable men such as
Admiral Lord Anson by mid century the administrative changes had accumulated,
leading to a form where the Admiralty conducted it’s core of direction of naval
policy and directed the various boards that dealt with specialist aspects. By
this time the Navy Board saw to the, design, building and maintenance of
warships, the running of the royal dockyards and providing and maintaining the
complex naval stores for warships. Naval finance, including the payment of
officers and men was the responsibility of the Treasurer of the Navy. While
nominally a member of the Navy Board acted partially independently in spending
the funds variously acquired, although the offices of this board handled most
of the day-today accounts. Victuals were handled by the Victualling Board that
had its own shore facilities. Guns, ammunition and the like were the authority
of the Ordnance Board. The Commissioners for Sick and Wounded Seamen (or the
‘Sick and Hurt Board’) operated naval hospitals and other medical
responsibilities and also oversaw the keep of Prisoners of War.
As per normal
after major conflict, the Royal Navy was run down after the conclusion of the
Napoleonic Wars. Some organisational rationalisation followed in 1832, with the
Admiralty subsuming all the subsidiary boards. There were periodic departmental
changes subsequently, such as having ordnance controlled by the War Office for
some time later in the century and the addition of new departments, the Naval
Intelligence Department being one. Nevertheless, the organisation remained
relatively constant and unfortunately, many of the ancient ways of conducting
business continued, including the rather convoluted votes system.
Contrary to
popular belief there had traditionally been a keen interest in the employment
of new technology within the navy, one example being the mass machine
production of blocks in the 18th century. In the long period of
peace post 1815 the policy changed to partially that of a watching brief. So,
while there was substantial experimentation, often this was on the back of
trends already developing in the outside world. So, iron-framed hulls necessary
for mounting steam engines, the engines themselves, along with paddles then
screws were introduced relatively rapidly. By mid century ordnance was changing
and experiments were being carried out on wrought iron as armour. The mis-named
Crimean War (1853-56) first indicated how effective mine warfare might be, with
Anglo-French naval actions significantly hindered. The American Civil War
(1861-65) really showed how naval
warfare might develop and not necessarily in favour of the great powers.
Interestingly, in a background of severe budgetary limitations in the 1870s
there was an acceleration in experimentation resulting in numerous warship
hybrids (especially as the French Navy was once again in a position to impinge
on British hegemony). The 1880s brought the British military takeover of Egypt,
a war scare with Russia and political lobbying for increased naval spending
(partially through efforts of some naval officers). This proved effective as
the next decade brought about increased building programmes of battleships and
cruisers: just as the French Jeune
Ecole prophesied the end of large warships
through the use of torpedoes launched from small craft. This however proved
rather premature, as early torpedoes lacked speed and endurance. So, some
varieties of British cruisers and battleships generally became ever larger and
weightier, deploying heavier and heavier weapons in bids to keep ahead of both
the French and Russians. By the turn of the century there was already something
a ‘fusion’ between the large armoured cruisers and smaller battleships:
especially in the mind of Admiral Sir John Fisher. With the continued
building programmes, the ‘all big gun’ warship became inevitable, as
articulated in the Dreadnought battleships and
battlecruisers (although already previously designed and promoted by the Italian
Vittorio Cuniberti). Increased power was required to shift these massive
warships and not only were turbines used in these, oil fuel was beginning to be
used as an auxiliary fuel in a number of types of ships. By this time the main
perceived threat came from the German Imperial Navy. And so the building went
on...
Without
delving too deeply, many other types of war fighting craft had also been
developed. As well as many differing sizes of cruisers required for various
roles, torpedo boat destroyers were aimed to counter the small torpedo craft.
Submarine design had already evolved significantly. Mine
warfare,
both in offence and defence, was also becoming more sophisticated. And, even
aircraft were beginning to be regarded as interesting in some naval quarters before 1914. Even so, big ships
and battle fleets were seen as of overriding importance in maintaining ‘command
of the sea’. By this doctrine, often simplistically associated with an American
naval officer named Mahan but in reality already in vogue, such ‘command’ would
allow for one’s own use of the sea, both military and civilian, while denying
this to one’s opponent(s).
The acid test
of war between 1914 and 1918 proved that there were many basic weaknesses in
the R.N. though. Far from ‘ruling the
waves’ and in spite of a great deal of propagandist rhetoric maintaining
Britannia’s might that still assails the British
public, the performance of much of the Royal Navy can be regarded as barely
adequate and even poor much of the time. In essence, instead of major
‘Dreadnought’ victory followed by a bold exercise of the ‘command of the sea’,
each side assumed strategic defensives, with occasional sweeps and at least
earlier in raids carried out by the Germans. In areas of ‘disputed command’ (a
term used by the British strategist Sir Julian Corbett) all around the British
Isles, throughout the North Sea, in the Mediterranean and the Aegean (as the
main areas of British naval operations) the
fighting was unrelenting. But this was conducted by all sorts of small craft,
from destroyers, through submarines, fishing boats and even motor yachts (never
mind the more esoteric vessels in ‘special service’) and merchantmen. Saliently, it was not the pukkah R.N. that
was involved in the majority of this combat (with the exception of some
destroyer work and air operations later) Instead, this was relegated to
merchant mariners and fishermen both in civilian employ and in the Royal Naval
Reserve, along with the amateurs of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.
One incredibly
important facet of British ‘defence’ policy that had been badly handled from
the mid 19th century through to the war was in trade defence.
Undoubtedly, lessons were learned, but it was not until late in 1916 that the
Admiralty began to take merchant sinkings at all seriously. Even after earlier
periods of unrestricted submarine warfare conducted against merchantmen from
early 1915 onwards, it still took the R.N. a depressingly long time to employ
tactics to effectively combat the sustained U-boat assault from the spring of
1917 onwards. And, it was not really until the final three
months of the conflict that the situation was turned around satisfactorily and
this was brought about just as much from governmental reorganization and
outside pressure than from purely naval input.
The inter-war
period was once again one of retrenchment, both in terms of matériel and tactical thought.
In a world suffering badly from the effects of the mass industrialised
slaughter, not surprisingly there was little interest in lavishing money on
maintaining armed forces and in most countries (not still in conflict) these
were massively cut back. Thus the R.N. in many respects returned to pre World
War doctrines.
With
exceptions, for those of the officer corps that were retained the old reliance
on the battleship continued undiminished. In time the Japanese were regarded as
the principal future enemy, but tactical planning was unrealistic, partially
but not exclusively due to the money available. Air power might have been seen
as the way forward, not just because of the new theories abounding, but also
since the navy had been very active in developing this in the Great War and
this had proved a not insignificant factor in conducting combat operations -
especially against submarines. Of course, this failure to develop sensible air
policy was to a significant degree down to the politics of the era, with a lack
of cooperation with the newly formed Royal Air Force and even when some
responsibilities were returned to a Fleet Air Arm there was not the money to
develop this effectively. (The R.A.F. had it’s own problems though. Seen as a
‘cheap’ way of policing the Empire compared with the army, bombing operations
in Somalia, Iraq and the North West Frontier, otherwise known as Afghanistan,
took up much of it’s resources. But, from the mid 1930s air defence for the
home island started to be taken seriously - finally countering the past
self-fulfilling prophesy of ‘the bomber always getting through’ caused by the
very lack of research and development into air-defence capabilities.)
Amphibious operations, as recently researched by Professor Richard Harding, was
another area that suffered for the same lack of funding and the R.N.’s
inability to interact effectively: primarily with the army there. Even in
relation to anti-submarine warfare there were weaknesses in A.S.D.I.C.,
although as shown by a currently serving naval officer, Lieutenant G.D.
Franklin R.N., these were not anywhere as bad as was maintained post war by the
official naval historian, Captain Stephen Roskill.
For all their
problems the Royal Navy fought fiercely in the Second World War. There were a
number of real disasters down to poor warship design and associated tactical
concepts - the losses of the HOOD, PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE probably being
the most remembered. Stretched to it’s limit and beyond in a war that far from
being conducted close to home and in the Mediterranean (as was basically the
situation during the First World War), was this time on a truly world wide
basis. Really hammered at times, such
as during the battle of Crete in 1941 when German aircraft in particular
inflicted grievous punishment on cruisers and destroyers, somehow they managed
to carry on. And, not all the lessons had been forgotten from the First World
War either (in some parts of officialdom at least). Trade defence this time was
seen as absolutely essential and serious investments were made, in escorts and
aircraft, to keep the flow of goods going. In time both the Italian and German
naval threats were largely negated. (Nevertheless, according to one expert,
Lieutenant-Commander Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones Ph.D., R.N. (Retired), the Germans
were developing very sophisticated submarines that could potentially have
wreaked havoc on Allied convoys.) By May 1945, although recognisable as a
junior partner to the United States’ Navy, the Royal Navy was far from beaten.
Air power was by then an inherent element of the order of battle and the
British had numerous aircraft carriers in the Pacific.
Structures of Ranks and Rates
Naval structures of ranks and rates have always been
complicated and prior to the Victorian era may appear totally alien to
individuals otherwise familiar with the R.N. These in particular require
explanation.
In the days of yore warships, as already mentioned, were
merely mercantile vessels acquired as and when necessary: sometimes with
‘castles’ constructed fore and aft as platforms for soldiers to fight from at
close quarters. Since these became military units captains who were in charge
of the soldiers took overall command. The seamen were there to handle the vessels
and were commanded by ships’ masters.
With the growth of cannonry and ships specifically built
for war, in time, there were fundamental changes in command. An executive
branch evolved, whereby the military commanders were also seamen and these men
held commissions from the monarch of the day. They were known as sea officers.
By the late 18th century these ranks had developed as follows. Flag
officers, that is those commanding fleets or squadrons (at sea) headed the
list. If appointed, the highest rank was admiral of the fleet, followed by
admirals, vice admirals, rear admirals and commodores. This last rank was
temporary, whereby captains were given authority of rear admirals, but did not
contribute to seniority in any way. Captain, or post-captain to quote the
proper term, was next and designated men in command of sizeable warships. The
next in seniority were commanders. As a rank this did not exist officially
until 1794, although many officers held this as a title. All officers
commanding warships were commanders, whether post-captains in first rate
battleships, or at the other end lieutenants in minor vessels such as mortar
ketches. Lieutenants were one rank below that of commander and this was then
the lowest truly commissioned rank. As understudies to commanders such men had
their own pecking order, the first lieutenant often being second in command,
the second lieutenant third in command and so on. As already mentioned
lieutenants could also be in positions of command. In this situation they held
more authority than others with the same rank and consequentially they could be
known as the ‘lieutenant in command’, ‘lieutenant commander’, or ‘master and
commander’.
Even with an executive organisation, a number of essential
specialists were required for the efficient running of men-o-war. These men
held warrants from the various boards and were also sea officers. Although
commissioned officers qualified in navigation, on all but the smallest vessels
an expert navigator was employed. These warrant officers were known as masters
and gained their qualifications from Trinity House, but were responsible to the
Admiralty. They took quarterdeck watches and could even command H.M. vessels other
than warships. Gunners were regulated through the Ordnance Board and looked
after ships’ guns and ammunition. Carpenters were very
important in the ‘wooden world’ and were concerned with the maintenance of
ships’ hulls, masts and spars. Although appointed by the Admiralty, often they
had previously been dockyard workers employed by the Navy Board and were
responsible to this latter board. Boatswains, again appointed by the Admiralty
but responsible to the Navy Board, by this time were in charge of rigging and
ground tackle as well as the storage of sails, cordage and the like.
Surgeons were also warrant officers and were appointed by
the Navy Board until 1796. Before appointment they too were examined until 1745
by the Barber-Surgeons’ Board, then the Surgeons’ Board until 1796. The Sick
and Hurt Board then took over both roles of examination and appointment, at
least temporarily. Pursers were different, inasmuch as they were not
professionally examined. But, as partially State employed businessmen, they had
to put up financial guarantees and were appointed by the Admiralty. Their role
was to deal with supply, particularly of victuals, slops (clothes) and
consumable stores of many (but not all) varieties.
Next, there were ‘inferior’ officer classes and
confusingly, some of these also held warrants, but were rated as petty officers.
Armourers and gunsmiths (the latter in large ships only) were accountable daily
to the gunner and responsible to the Ordnance Board. Masters-at-Arms,
frequently once army or marine sergeants, were warranted by the Admiralty to
instruct in small arms. Sailmakers, worked understandably for ships’ boatswains
and received their warrants from the Navy Board. These specialists had learned
their trade as dockyard artificers and very late in the 18th century
caulkers, ropemakers and coopers also apparently began going to sea in this
way. Cooks were once warranted through the Admiralty, but from 1704 by the Navy
Board. Chaplains and schoolmasters when carried, were
also in this category. Both received their warrants from the Admiralty, the
former being examined by the Bishop of London and the latter by Trinity House
(in navigation).
The other
group of ‘inferior’ officers were also rated petty officer, by ships’
commanders although only through recourse to higher authority. It might be
surprising to some, but midshipmen at this time were within this category. By
the end of the 18th century generally this senior petty officers’
rate was for ‘young gentlemen’ on their way to taking their lieutenants’
examinations, but not entirely. Master’s mate was very similar. As commissioned
officers required knowledge of navigation, often aspiring officers would take
this rate, although many including some ‘young gentlemen’ took warrants as
masters instead. Yet more in this rate did not seek either warrants or
commissions and were merely experienced seamen. Incidentally, both masters’
mates and midshipmen were generally referred to as ‘mates’.
The rest of
ships’ companies were made up of the ‘people’. Some of these were also rated
(and disrated) petty officer by ships’ commanders. Seamen petty officers
included quartermasters and their mates and boatswains’ mates. Idlers, that is
men who did not keep watches, also had petty officer rates such as armourers’
mates, pursers’ stewards and captains’ clerks.
Those without
petty officer rates were often referred to as ‘private men’. Unofficially at
this point, there were others, such as captains of tops, who although only
rated able seamen were in half way positions of authority. Further complicating
matters some of these, such as quarter gunners received slightly more pay. For
seamen, there were then able, ordinary and landsmen rates depending on their
skill and experience. (Please note that there are inconsistencies in published
works as to when the rate of landsman was introduced.) For youngsters, until
1794 there were the rates of captain’s servant, or servant. These ‘servant’
capacities were then replaced by three varieties of ‘boy’. Those in the first
class were rated ‘volunteers’ and were would be officers; Boys 2nd
class were young seamen aged 15 to 17; and Boys 3rd class were those
intended as seamen but still employed as domestics.
As for the
other ‘private men’ who were not watchkeepers, there were all sorts of rates
for those at the bottom of the heap. These included the steward’s mate, cook’s
mate, captain’s cook and yeomen of the boatswain’s store.
Perhaps an
obvious point to some, nevertheless, one
that needs making is that holders of commissions and warrants (not just
‘inferior’ officers either), will have previously spent time as private men of
some variety or other. Also, it should be noted that often there were plenty of
other people onboard. Among these could be wives of some sea officers as well
as their offspring, adding already to the youngsters as part of ships’
companies.
Being an
evolving organisation it should hardly be surprising that inherent changes
occurred from time to time. One of these was in officer entry. So, before going
onto these the situation in the late 18th century should be
outlined. Apart from joining through the patronage of individual commanders
(especially those more senior) as servants (if only in name), there had been
other ways for young gentlemen intent on a life as commissioned officers. As of
1676 there had been volunteers per order, or ‘King’s letter boys’ as they were
known. In 1733 the Royal Naval Academy at Portsmouth came into existence
(renamed as the Royal Naval College in 1806) and this replaced the old system
of ‘King’s letter boys’. On completion of three years studying there,
youngsters then went to sea as midshipmen ordinary. However, this affected a
very small percentage and in 1838 or 1839 the R.N.C. closed. In 1843 a new rank
of naval cadet came into use, altering in nature with changed recruitment and educational requirements through
the century and beyond.
In time other
commissioned officers’ ranks appeared as well (with some terms, such as master
and commander disappearing). Without going into some of the complexities, in
1840 the rank of mate was formally introduced as a commissioned officer rank
below lieutenant. This was changed to sub-lieutenant twenty years later
(re-using a term sometimes used since the 18th century for inferior
officers second in command of vessels so diminutive that their establishments
only allowed for one single commissioned officer onboard). It should also be
explained that the rank mate was resurrected once more in 1912, for ratings
advanced to commissioned status. This differentiation was done away with only
in 1931, when they too were termed sub-lieutenants. A rank between lieutenant
and commander was introduced in 1914 - lieutenant-commander. This was gained
automatically on serving eight years as a lieutenant. Apparently this was to generally
fall into line with army ranks, but it also formalised the half-ring already
worn by ‘lieutenants of eight years or more seniority’. Much further up the
career scale, commodores were put on a better footing in 1805 with two classes
of the rank, although they remained temporary ranks. Sometime post 1945 this
was simplified to one single rank of commodore. Admirals’ ranks also
periodically changed slightly, which is to be expected due to massive
differences in order of battle from one period to the next. One noticeable
change, was in 1805 when an additional rank of admiral of the red was
introduced. In 1864 this disappeared with one of many reorganizations.
The status of
warrant officer ranks altered dramatically through time as well. The first important
act was in 1808 and affected masters, pursers, surgeons and chaplains. Through
this they became ‘Warrant Officers of Commissioned Rank’ and generally allowed
into the wardroom. This began the gentrification of these roles, while at the
same time reducing the status of the others such as carpenters, gunners and
boatswains. In 1843 at least some masters became
navigating lieutenants, only to disappear into the Executive Branch in 1872.
(Entry and promotion within the navigating branch was far more complex than is
commonly understood though. Masters, from the lower-deck were still being
warranted as late as 1866, while there had been navigating sub-lieutenants from
at least 1863 in what would appear to have been through an ‘officer entry’
route.) Pursers were also commissioned in 1843 as paymasters and pursers, with
‘purser’ being dropped from their rank in the 1850s. Surgeons were also
elevated to commissioned rank in 1843. Chaplains were given commissioned status
in 1859, but in time their position was to become rather hazy. On the other
hand, until the end of the Second World War carpenters and boatswains remained
as warrant officers, as the highest ranking ratings
(with carpenters being re-rated as warrant shipwrights in 1918). (It should
also be noted that there were commissioned carpenter ranks as well by the First
World War era.) Gunners fared relatively better, while remaining as warrant
officers, relatively few were to allowed to become commissioned gunners much
later. The ‘inferior’ warrant officers (not already dealt with), either
disappeared completely, or were re-designed more formally within the systems of
petty officer rates devised from the 1860s onwards.
From working
on original documents it has become apparent that, at least in the case of masters
and as late as the mid 1850s, not all had been commissioned. This may also have been the case with other warrant
officers. Also, specialist navigating lieutenants remained in existence for a
considerable period after 1872.
Recruitment on
the lower deck also changed inherently
in the
19th century. Although it is not apparent from some accounts there
had been genuine volunteers for the monarch’s warships. The reasons for such
‘people’ wanting a life at sea on men-o-war were as complex as at any other time,
although sometimes this was due to something akin to modern nationalism (that
did not generally exist in mainland
Europe until mid 19th century). It is clear from some research that
commanders, especially the landed gentry, took large numbers of individuals to
sea from their own localities, or even estates. Whether for the lower deck or
ultimately quarterdeck, this was a way hopefully of increasing numbers of
followers (as part and parcel of the games of patronage and advancement). Of
course, there were large numbers forced into the King’s service, not only
through the press, but also in other schemes such as the Quota.
To explain, during 1795 the judiciary had been authorised to send to warships
‘rogues, vagabonds, smugglers, embezzlers of naval stores and other
able-bodied, idle and disorderly persons exercising no lawful employment and
not having some substance sufficient for their support and maintenance’. Others,
poor young lads who could be orphans, runaways and those just regarded as
‘suspect’ were sent through the Marine Society to merchantmen and warships.
But, for reasons already mentioned in the historical essay, by the 1830s the
old ways were becoming less workable. In relation to this between 1835 and 1857
a whole series of experiments were made by the British State in keeping tabs on
the entire British merchant service, with the aim of
forcing specific classes into the Royal Navy in time of war. These exercises,
normally known as the ‘ticketing system‘
failed for a whole raft of reasons. But, it is clear that the raison d’être for this was becoming non-existent anyway. On
the back on an earlier limited programme (also begun in 1835), increasingly
from 1853 engagements of continuous service for ratings were introduced.
Nevertheless, twenty-five years later this process was still far from complete
and well into the 20th
century there were some groups that were not allowed engagements of continuous
service.
Needless to
say, through the 19th and 20th centuries, as technology
developed new branches were introduced. Again there are lots of anomalies, such
as in the Engineering Branch where officers for a long time were very much
looked down upon by the Executive Branch as social inferiors.
Naval
reserves
also came into being, the Royal Naval Reserve, drawn from professional civilian
mariners as of 1859; and the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, that originally
were interested amateurs from 1903. There was also the Royal Naval Volunteer
Reserve from 1903 and other organisations such as the Royal Fleet Reserve are
also outlined in the above linked page. The Coastguard was also a direct
Admiralty responsibility from 1857 to 1923, although there had been relatively deep ties for some time before.
Tracing individuals and
further research
As has been hinted at from the background information
already given, naval documentation was complicated. (If anything this is
something of an underestimate.) Therefore, as there are a great
deal of records to discuss, this section will be split into three with linked
pages. Also, please note, in order to make this site at least slightly
manageable I have tended to use examples for smaller ships, or stations and
entries with more limited information. Therefore, the information recorded
especially in ‘big ships’ can be far more extensive than
shown. And, although some of the administrative and financial records seem
clearly enough defined in the guides (especially in Professor Rodger’s) when
actually confronted with these ledgers they appear completely mixed up, with
all sorts of entries all higglety-pigglety.
Commissioned
Officers
(and for ease mates, midshipmen and naval cadets) from the earliest surviving
year until the inter-war period forms one sub-section. Standing warrant
officers (when they were sea officers) forms the second; and the ‘people’
or ratings
as they developed into will be the third.
Unless
otherwise stated, all these records are to
be found as part of the National Archives, at the Public Records Office, Kew,
Surrey, Richmond, England. The only other institution of real relevance in this
is the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, but overwhelmingly only for
commissioned and warrant officers of the sail age.
Of course, as well
as the personnel records of prime interest to genealogists, there are also masses of surviving operational and administrative
records. Again a large percentage of these are at Kew, although there are other
collections elsewhere. The National Maritime Museum, Greenwich holds a
substantial collection of papers, not only relating to Admiralty business, but
also of the Navy, Transport, Victualling and Sick & Hurt Boards. (The
N.M.M. also has a small collection of original ‘personnel’ papers catalogued as
‘single documents. These span 1589 to 1958 and relate to holders of commissions
and/or warrants. As well as commissions and warrants, there are also
certificates of service, orders of discharge, tickets of leave, pursers’ bonds,
at least one surgeon’s log, appointments and customs authorisations. Some of
these deal with the famous, such as Drake, Raleigh and Nelson. Incidentally,
not all are for the pukkah R.N. Among these are a handful of R.N.V.R
commissions and warrants. For those getting very deep into the wider subject of
naval administration there are also naval records elsewhere in county records
offices and academic institutions. Locations of these can be found via the
National Register of Archives. Their website is at http://www.hmc.gov.uk. However, a word of warning might be
apposite. Entry to some academic institutions,
such as the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford, can prove very difficult
indeed: even for academics.
There are also
mountains of publications on the Royal Navy, for all levels of study. These
cover all sorts of topics. So, for genealogists wanting to understand something
more of the conditions that their forebears lived in, the following list of
social histories might be of interest and use. Nevertheless, some are better
than others and in my own research I have found that some topics, such as the
introduction of continuous service for the lower deck is not well handled by
those mentioning it.
N.A.M. Rodger: The Wooden World - An Anatomy of the
Georgian Navy (London:
Fontana Press, 1986)
Brian Lavery: Nelson’s Navy - The Ships, Men and Organisation
1793-1815 (London: Conway
Maritime Press, 1990)
Michael Lewis: A Social History of the Navy 1793-1815 (London:
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1960)
Michael Lewis: The Navy in Transition - A Social History
1814-1864 (London: Hodder &
Stoughton, 1965)
Henry Baynham: Before the Mast - Naval Ratings of the 19th
Century (London: Hutchinson,
1971)
Henry Baynham: Men from the Dreadnoughts (London:
Hutchinson, 1976)
John Fabb (Commentaries): Victorian and
Edwardian Navy from old photographs (London:
B.T. Batsford, 1976)
Christopher McKee: Sober Men and True - Sailor Lives in
the Royal Navy 1900-1945 (Cambridge,
Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 2002)
Brian
Lavery: Hostilities Only - Training the Wartime Navy
(London: National Maritime Museum, 2005)
One absolutely fascinating work that I have discovered in
passing relates to poor social conditions on the lower-deck and resentment
towards the quarter deck, largely during the 1940s (but referring back to
earlier times as well). Having myself served as a rating in the 1970s and 1980s
I could see real differences, but unfortunately, also similarities. While the
accommodation had improved substantially afloat and ashore (with exceptions
such as on some small craft and at DOLPHIN where some of us were still billeted
in virtually unconverted stables and other substandard accommodation). The food
was obviously far better by my day (again with exceptions), but other areas
remained as poor as they had been earlier in the century. For instance, the
disciplinary system was still as unfair as it had ever been, such as ratings
judged as guilty on being charged, with little (if indeed any) genuine
chance of proving innocence. Similarly, particular commissioned officers in the
view of the lower-deck frequently were guilty of similar offences as ratings,
but were seemingly never disciplined in any way
- leading to not unnatural resentment. Anyway, the post Second World War title
is:-
Hannen Swaffer: What would Nelson do? (London:
Victor Gallancz Ltd., 1946)
Return to a brief
historical essay up to and including the Second World War
Return to structures of ranks and rates
Return to Tracing
individuals and further research