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Royal Naval Records from
the late Seventeenth to mid Twentieth Centuries
- A realistic guide to
what is available
to those looking into the
careers of officers and men in naval service
including the seagoing
reserves
by Len Barnett
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Academic Papers on the Royal Navy
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Go down to a brief historical essay up to and including the Second World War |
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Introduction
As a professional
maritime researcher, with a sound knowledge of sources useful to those seeking
genealogical information, for those both in armed and/or mercantile service on
British vessels, I receive enquiries of a great variety. Sometimes only armed
with a person’s name, happily I am able to provide a wealth of information from
original documents. At other times, even with more information to hand no
records survive and I have to tactfully explain that there is nowhere to go.
There is no doubt that
genealogy has become a popular pastime. There certainly seems to be evermore
people using the facilities of museums and archives to trace their ancestors.
The media too has realised this. A number of television documentaries and ‘how
to’ programmes have recently been aired on British screens. Often these tell
amazing tales, with polished ease.
For those who have
spent days trawling through tens of thousands of entries, red-eyed and tired,
in the vain hope of finding one single piece of
information, it is realised that research can be distinctly hard work! So,
the following is based on years of working on various classes of original
records and is meant as an aid to people who are interested in finding out
about their mariner forebears (in this guide those in the Royal Navy). I cover
the main state documentation of the various boards, as well as the other
principal collections of other classes of records. The more specialist
collections I mention, but do not dwell on.
It must be stressed
that there have been strong connections between the armed navy and those in
mercantile service, even if these were not particularly warm in nature. So,
reference to my other guide on merchant service (if not covered by the internal
website links) might be beneficial for some.
How to use this
web-site
Immediately following
is a very brief history of the Royal Navy and an explanation as to the changing
rank and rating structure through the last few centuries. With this background
information the next section, hopefully, leads readers to the pages relevant to
their own research. Some of the subjects are highly complex and for these there
are additional links to separate pages with more detailed information. I
conclude with some basic advice into further records, that is operational and
administrative, as well as some recommendations for social histories dealing
with naval subjects. Please note, not all classes of records have been
dealt with here. Apart from any other reason, the sheer volume of surviving
naval records is staggering. Some of these require specialist knowledge
in their own right (that at this time I do not necessarily have) but at the
same time are essentially esoteric, or are so fragmentary as to be
essentially useless to all but a few. There are also others that while of great
interest to historians cannot be accessed easily for genealogical purposes.
People within the
United Kingdom who are easily able to travel around the London area may then
want to conduct their own searches. As these often take a considerable time and
therefore can cost much in time, money and effort, people from further away may
want to invest in the expertise of a professional researcher. This is
especially pertinent for people from overseas, where a trip to the U.K. may
well cost a great deal of money.
Of course engaging a
researcher is a matter of choice and requires trust. Some of the main
institutions mentioned have lists of researchers. A number of researchers
advertise that they are expert in a number of fields, both military and civil.
However, as some of these bodies of records are immensely complicated
personally I find it difficult to believe that these people can be truly
‘expert’ in all these areas. For this reason even though I have occasionally
looked at records prior to the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1793 to 1815)
I have little expertise in the intricacies of the earlier record keeping.
Therefore I have decided to decline commissions for work for the 17th
and 18th centuries. In relation to the Royal Navy I specialise in records
dealing with the careers of officers and men from 1793 until the mid 20th
century. I also have an additional expertise on naval operational documentation
of the First World War era, since this is within my area of personal research
and can also tackle other operational research. I can also research members of
the Royal Marines and Coastguard, but up to now have only done this for already
established clients. For those potentially
interested in my services, I can be contacted at len@barnettmaritime.co.uk. Please note that I earn my living as a freelance researcher
and therefore charge professional fees.
Please
note that some that the basic classes of records are increasingly being put
online. As these projects are ongoing and ever-changing I have not mentioned
when and where these classes are. Due to the ‘politics’ within individual
institutions this in itself has become complicated: hideously so in the case of
state records once the responsibility of The National Archives, Kew.
Nevertheless, I can and do discuss this with clients.
The
understanding of naval records is far better than that of mercantile documents.
Even then some conscientious academic studies show that the general perception
of the Royal Navy is frequently far from accurate and the accepted ‘knowledge’
is nothing of the sort when investigated with contemporaneous evidence. Of
course, often it has been propagandists within the navy establishment that have
continued to push all the hoary old myths that are often highly sentimental and
nationalistic.
For
such a popular subject there are surprisingly few research guides. Basically
there are two, written in totally different manners. One, written by N.A.M.
Rodger, a professor and true academic expert (of the 18th century
navy) who spent around fourteen years on the staff of the then Public Records
Office, Kew, is entitled Naval Records
for Genealogists. The current version was
published in Richmond, Surrey through P.R.O. Publications in 1998. This takes
an academic approach, explaining in detail the often Byzantine nature of naval
structures and administration. There are two slight downsides for those not
already au fait with naval records.
The first is that the format is rather truncated, making ready reference not
particularly simple. Secondly, there are some typographical errors that may also cause some real difficulty. The other guide, Tracing Your Naval Ancestors, is by Bruno Pappalardo and has also been published by the Public
Records Office, as of 2002. Bruno is presently a staff member of the National
Archives (Public Records Office) Kew. This is pitched more at those not
necessarily expert in naval affairs and also covers operational records. In
taking a more general approach and attempting to simplify systems some
misunderstandings may arise and some
information is not necessarily absolutely accurate in
a few places - especially arising, once again, from typographical errors. In
conducting this exercise I have also noted further problems though. One, put
simply, is poor cataloguing at the P.R.O. As an example, some records have been
described as having external indexes and even although they have been within
the reach of the general public for literally decades, no apparent checks have
been made to see if the indexes actually refer to these records. (I have
brought any I have discovered to the notice of the relevant officials.) My
online guide is based on the terms used in Professor Rodger’s work although I
have also used Mr. Pappalardo’s work in relation to
some elements, such as lower deck wills, where Bruno is clearer. I would also
like to impress on readers that my guide is merely an overview and does not
purport to be an all-encompassing work.
A brief historical essay up to and including
the Second World War
Many claims have been made
as to the origins of the Royal Navy, including as far back as concurrent with
the late 11th century Norman invasion of southern England. Some
people rather incredibly even regard Anglo-Romano naval activity similarly.
Certainly by mediaeval times there were armed ships belonging to English
monarchs and defence commitments required of the Cinque Ports.
The
highly militaristic Tudor King Henry VIII can be seen as important in the
forming of a true monarch’s (or royal) navy in England. As well as increasing
the investment made by his father Henry VII in royal owned armed merchant
ships, building began on the first three royal dockyards at Portsmouth,
Plymouth and Chatham in the 1540s. What is more a Council for Marine Causes
also came into being during this decade. In many respects the forerunner of the
Navy Board (that dealt with important aspects of shore administration including
shipbuilding and repair). This allowed for something of a standing force,
rather than a pure reliance on ad hoc merchant hulls acquired when wanted. This
council apparently also dealt with matters of Admiralty - that were at this
stage purely the appointments of sea officers and the deployments of vessels.
(Incidentally, this should not be confused with the High Court of Admiralty
that had dealt with maritime legal disputes since at least the 14th
century.) Also, even though admirals had long been placed in command of groups
of ships, there was little of the modern sense of command and control,
something that can be seen in the later Elizabethan operations: especially
against the grand Spanish Armada in 1588.
Pre-dating
Henry VIII’s naval exploits as shown above was the formation of an armed Royal
Navy in Scotland under King James IV. With French building expertise this force
was already taking shape by 1502. Although a naval arms race followed with the
English and there was some combat in the earlier
part of the 16th century, relations between the two countries became
less violent. As a result of this, under James V the Scottish Navy withered
away to nothing.
Anyway,
through marriage rather than warfare, in 1603 the Scottish Stuarts eventually
gained the English throne on the death of the barren Protestant Elizabeth I.
Under James VI of Scotland and James I of England, it is often stated there was
less emphasis on naval affairs. If the case, this would not have been entirely
surprising, considering the politics of the era. So the charge of interest
waning at the highest levels leading to indifferent administration and
corruption is not entirely unnatural. Often overlooked was the building of
excellent ships though. His son, Charles I, King of England, Scotland and
Ireland, also oversaw the upkeep of these and improvements in the Royal
dockyards. In relation to operational direction, Lord High Admirals were
appointed: although this position fell into abeyance after 1628 when the
incumbent was murdered.
By
1642 those on the king’s ships were far from contented, with a number of
concerns including greatly outstanding pay (even by the standards of the era).
When the civil wars broke out that year both ships and personnel of the
standing navy, under the talented Earl of Warwick, went over to Parliament
almost in their entirety - 1st to 6th rated vessels and their commanders. Almost completely forgotten
historically, this force was an important element in Parliament’s victory over
the monarchy. Although disputed by newly raised Royalist vessels, generally
‘command of the sea’ was maintained around these islands in denying the Crown
potential continental military support. And, there was also naval support to
parliamentary military operations ashore.
Although
not free from its own problems by any means, interestingly, for a ‘royal’ navy,
it was through the Puritan Commonwealth (1649-59) that the State’s armed
vessels began to act as a genuinely disciplined seagoing navy though. Not
particularly auspicious during the civil wars, severe reverses experienced in the First Anglo Dutch
War (especially in 1652) required real improvements. Not only
was a code of discipline first promulgated in 1653 (to become the Articles of
War in 1661), so too was a too was the tactical doctrine of fleet action, which
was becoming necessary with the development of ships specifically built for the
prosecution of war. It can be said that the Cromwellian
generals sent to sea engendered something of the spirit of the New Model Army
afloat. Even so, there were retrograde steps as well. Under the military
dictatorship that the Commonwealth effectively developed into, the established boards of shore administration and admiralty were
abolished (although the functions were subsequently carried out by naval and
admiralty commissioners).
With
the Restoration (of the monarchy) in 1660 came a period of far reaching naval
reform: even if not down to Charles II as such. Admittedly through powerful
patronage, Samuel Pepys was instrumental in this. Initially he had been
appointed clerk of the acts to the reconstituted Navy Board that was then the
executive body under James, Duke of York. Later Pepys became the first
secretary to the Admiralty from 1673. A highly important aspect of holding a
naval commission was from 1677 a requirement of professional examinations for
the rank of lieutenant. One of Pepys’ most outstanding accomplishments, this
sprung from his desire to forge a professional officer corps. In particular he
wished to curb the excesses of officers with patronage but little expertise,
while giving ‘tarpaulin’ officers (those skilled but without social advantages)
a better chance for promotion and such examination can be seen as revolutionary
in its day.
Apart
from the trade wars with the Dutch, through the latter half of the 17th
century there had been a number of other hostilities with the main European
players - France and Spain. Often bewildering to anyone other than experts, one
time enemies not only made up their differences, but often then became allies
in conflict against their own past friends as the regnalistic,
political, religious and economic situations changed. These continued through
the 18th century, with Britain never having a period of even twenty
years when not fighting one or more rivals. (In 1707 there had been the final
formal Act of Union between England and Scotland.) By mid century these
conflicts were being conducted across the globe and the Seven Years War
(1756-63) can be seen legitimately in terms of a ‘world war’. The Revolutionary
and Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815) that followed on from all the rest were
inherently different in spirit, but the apparent maximization and utter
ruthlessness of these struggles were merely the end result of military
processes that had been growing for a very long time.
Through
these almost never-ending wars leading to 1815 the Royal Navy had developed
greatly. As well as operating collectively as fleets in battle and blockade,
tactics evolved for evolutions such as cruising and fighting single ship and
small actions. Trade defence had been regarded as highly important and
merchantmen were convoyed to and from the colonies. And, amphibious operations,
including gunfire support operations, were part of the traditional way of war
fighting. (Another, at a political level, was paying allies to conduct land
campaigns out of the direct reach of Britain.) These tactics had been hard
learned, often with reverses and embarrassments in the interim.
Often
gunnery is given pride of place in explaining British naval supremacy. The
reality is actually far more difficult to determine and probably more
accurately relates not to the superiority of the British, but the inferiority
(for many reasons mostly political) of her enemies. Interestingly, recent
research by Professor Michael Duffy into gunnery training prior to the battle
of Trafalgar (21st October 1805), shows that there was not the relentless practice that has been
traditionally claimed. Nevertheless, generally the British were better trained,
employing highly destructive tactics such as firing into hulls rather than into
sails and rigging; employing multiple shotting
causing extreme splinter damage; as well as being capable of firing at faster
rates than their opponents. But, in modern military terms there was also
considerable ‘blue on blue’ at Trafalgar - more readily understood by the
general public as ‘friendly fire’. This caused not inconsiderable British
casualties and while commented on at the time, has not been dwelt upon since.
Ashore,
the administration and direction of the monarch’s ships also developed. While
after the Restoration it was the Navy Board that basically ran the navy, this
had fundamentally altered over a century. Again Lord High Admirals had been
appointed from 1708, but at this time the board of commissioners of the
Admiralty was not seen as necessarily heading the service. But under capable
men such as Admiral Lord Anson by mid century the administrative changes had
accumulated, leading to a form where the Admiralty conducted it’s core of direction of naval
policy and directed the various boards that dealt with specialist aspects. By
this time the Navy Board saw to the, design, building and maintenance of
warships, the running of the royal dockyards and providing and maintaining the
complex naval stores for warships. Naval finance, including the payment of
officers and men was the responsibility of the Treasurer of the Navy. While
nominally a member of the Navy Board acted partially independently in spending
the funds variously acquired, although the offices of this board handled most
of the day-today accounts. Victuals were handled by the Victualling Board that
had its own shore facilities. Guns, ammunition and the like were the authority
of the Ordnance Board. The Commissioners for Sick and Wounded Seamen (or the
‘Sick and Hurt Board’) operated naval hospitals and other medical
responsibilities and also oversaw the keep of Prisoners of War.
As
per normal after major conflict, the Royal Navy was run down after the
conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars. Some organisational rationalisation followed
in 1832, with the Admiralty subsuming all the subsidiary boards. There were
periodic departmental changes subsequently, such as having ordnance controlled
by the War Office for some time later in the century and the addition of new
departments, the Naval Intelligence Department being one. Nevertheless, the
organisation remained relatively constant and unfortunately, many of the
ancient ways of conducting business continued, including the rather convoluted
votes system.
Contrary
to popular belief there had traditionally been a keen interest in the
employment of new technology within the navy, one example being the mass
machine production of blocks in the 18th century. In the long period
of peace post 1815 the policy changed to partially that of a watching brief.
So, while there was substantial experimentation, often this was on the back of
trends already developing in the outside world. So, iron-framed hulls necessary
for mounting steam engines, the engines themselves, along with paddles then
screws were introduced relatively rapidly. By mid century ordnance was changing
and experiments were being carried out on wrought iron as armour. The mis-named Crimean War (1853-56) first indicated how
effective mine warfare might be, with Anglo-French naval actions significantly
hindered. The American Civil War (1861-65) really
showed how naval warfare might develop and not necessarily in favour of the
great powers. Interestingly, in a background of severe budgetary limitations in
the 1870s there was an acceleration in experimentation
resulting in numerous warship hybrids (especially as the French Navy was once
again in a position to impinge on British hegemony). The 1880s brought the
British military takeover of Egypt, a war scare with Russia and political
lobbying for increased naval spending (partially through efforts of some naval
officers). This proved effective as the next decade brought about increased
building programmes of battleships and cruisers: just as the French Jeune Ecole prophesied the end of large warships through the use of
torpedoes launched from small craft. This however proved rather premature, as
early torpedoes lacked speed and endurance. So, some varieties of British
cruisers and battleships generally became ever larger and weightier, deploying
heavier and heavier weapons in bids to keep ahead of both the French and
Russians. By the turn of the century there was already something a ‘fusion’
between the large armoured cruisers and smaller battleships: especially in the
mind of Admiral Sir John Fisher. With the continued
building programmes, the ‘all big gun’ warship became inevitable, as
articulated in the Dreadnought battleships and
battlecruisers (although already previously designed and promoted by the
Italian Vittorio Cuniberti).
Increased power was required to shift these massive warships
and not only were turbines used in these, oil fuel was beginning to be
used as an auxiliary fuel in a number of types of ships. By this time the main
perceived threat came from the German Imperial Navy. And so the building went
on...
Without
delving too deeply, many other types of war fighting craft had also been
developed. As well as many differing sizes of cruisers required for various
roles, torpedo boat destroyers were aimed to counter the small torpedo craft.
Submarine design had already evolved significantly. Mine
warfare,
both in offence and defence, was also becoming more sophisticated. And, even
aircraft were beginning to be regarded as interesting in some naval quarters before 1914. Even so, big ships
and battle fleets were seen as of overriding importance in maintaining ‘command
of the sea’. By this doctrine, often simplistically associated with an American
naval officer named Mahan but in reality already in vogue, such ‘command’ would
allow for one’s own use of the sea, both military and civilian, while denying
this to one’s opponent(s).
The
acid test of war between 1914 and 1918 proved that there were many basic
weaknesses in the R.N. though. Far from ‘ruling the
waves’ and in spite of a great deal of propagandist rhetoric maintaining
Britannia’s might that still assails the British
public, the performance of much of the Royal Navy can be regarded as barely
adequate and even poor much of the time. In essence, instead of major
‘Dreadnought’ victory followed by a bold exercise of the ‘command of the sea’,
each side assumed strategic defensives, with occasional sweeps and at least
earlier in raids carried out by the Germans. In areas of ‘disputed command’ (a
term used by the British strategist Sir Julian Corbett) all around the British
Isles, throughout the North Sea, in the Mediterranean and the Aegean (as the
main areas of British naval operations) the
fighting was unrelenting. But this was conducted by all sorts of small craft,
from destroyers, through submarines, fishing boats and even motor yachts (never
mind the more esoteric vessels in ‘special service’) and merchantmen. Saliently, it was not the pukkah
R.N. that was involved in the majority of this combat (with the exception of
some destroyer work and air operations later) Instead,
this was relegated to merchant mariners and fishermen both in civilian employ
and in the Royal Naval Reserve, along with the amateurs of the Royal Naval
Volunteer Reserve.
One
incredibly important facet of British ‘defence’ policy that had been badly
handled from the mid 19th century through to the war was in trade
defence. Undoubtedly, lessons were learned, but it was not until late in 1916
that the Admiralty began to take merchant sinkings at all seriously. Even after
earlier periods of unrestricted submarine warfare conducted against merchantmen
from early 1915 onwards, it still took the R.N. a depressingly long time to
employ tactics to effectively combat the sustained U-boat
assault
from the spring of 1917 onwards. And, it was not really until the final three months of the conflict
that the situation was turned around satisfactorily and this was brought about
just as much from governmental reorganization and outside pressure than from
purely naval input.
The
inter-war period was once again one of retrenchment, both in terms of matériel and tactical thought. In a world suffering badly from the
effects of the mass industrialised slaughter, not surprisingly there was little
interest in lavishing money on maintaining armed forces and in most countries
(not still in conflict) these were massively cut back. Thus the R.N. in many
respects returned to pre World War doctrines.
With
exceptions, for those of the officer corps that were
retained the old reliance on the battleship continued undiminished. In time the
Japanese were regarded as the principal future enemy, but tactical planning was
unrealistic, partially but not exclusively due to the money available. Air
power might have been seen as the way forward, not just because of the new
theories abounding, but also since the navy had been very active in developing
this in the Great War and this had proved a not insignificant factor in
conducting combat operations - especially against submarines. Of course, this
failure to develop sensible air policy was to a significant degree down to the
politics of the era, with a lack of cooperation with the newly formed Royal Air
Force and even when some responsibilities were returned to a Fleet Air Arm there
was not the money to develop this effectively. (The R.A.F. had it’s own problems though. Seen as
a ‘cheap’ way of policing the Empire compared with the army, bombing operations
in Somalia, Iraq and the North West Frontier, otherwise known as Afghanistan,
took up much of it’s
resources. But, from the mid 1930s air defence for the home island started to
be taken seriously - finally countering the past self-fulfilling prophesy of
‘the bomber always getting through’ caused by the very lack of research and development
into air-defence capabilities.) Amphibious operations, as
recently researched by Professor Richard Harding, was another area that
suffered for the same lack of funding and the R.N.’s inability to interact
effectively: primarily with the army there. Even in relation to anti-submarine
warfare there were weaknesses in A.S.D.I.C., although as shown by a currently
serving naval officer, Lieutenant G.D. Franklin R.N., these were not anywhere
as bad as was maintained post war by the official naval historian, Captain
Stephen Roskill.
For
all their problems the Royal Navy fought fiercely in the Second World War.
There were a number of real disasters down to poor warship design and
associated tactical concepts - the losses of the HOOD, PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE
probably being the most remembered. Stretched to it’s limit and beyond in a war that far from being
conducted close to home and in the Mediterranean (as was basically the
situation during the First World War), was this time on a truly worldwide basis.
Really hammered at times, such
as during the battle of Crete in 1941 when German aircraft in particular
inflicted grievous punishment on cruisers and destroyers, somehow they managed
to carry on. And, not all the lessons had been forgotten from the First World
War either (in some parts of officialdom at least). Trade defence this time was
seen as absolutely essential and serious investments were made, in escorts and
aircraft, to keep the flow of goods going. In time both the Italian and German
naval threats were largely negated. (Nevertheless, according to one expert,
Lieutenant-Commander Malcolm Llewellyn-Jones Ph.D., R.N. (Retired), the Germans
were developing very sophisticated submarines that could potentially have
wreaked havoc on Allied convoys.) By May 1945, although recognisable as a
junior partner to the United States’ Navy, the Royal Navy was far from beaten.
Air power was by then an inherent element of the order of battle and the
British had numerous aircraft carriers in the Pacific.
Structures of Ranks and Rates
Naval structures of
ranks and rates have always been complicated and prior to the Victorian era may
appear totally alien to individuals otherwise familiar with the R.N. These in
particular require explanation.
In the days of yore
warships, as already mentioned, were merely mercantile vessels acquired as and
when necessary: sometimes with ‘castles’ constructed fore and aft as platforms
for soldiers to fight from at close quarters. Since these became military units
captains who were in charge of the soldiers took overall command. The seamen
were there to handle the vessels and were commanded by ships’ masters.
With the growth of
cannonry and ships specifically built for war, in time, there were fundamental
changes in command. An executive branch evolved, whereby the military
commanders were also seamen and these men held commissions from the monarch of
the day. They were known as sea officers. By the late 18th century
these ranks had developed as follows. Flag officers, that
is those commanding fleets or squadrons (at sea) headed the list. If appointed,
the highest rank was admiral of the fleet, followed by admirals, vice admirals,
rear admirals and commodores. This last rank was temporary, whereby captains
were given authority of rear admirals, but did not contribute to seniority in
any way. Captain, or post-captain to quote the proper term, was next and designated
men in command of sizeable warships. The next in seniority were commanders. As
a rank this did not exist officially until 1794, although many officers held
this as a title. All officers commanding warships were commanders, whether
post-captains in first rate battleships, or at the other end lieutenants in
minor vessels such as mortar ketches. Lieutenants were one rank below that of
commander and this was then the lowest truly commissioned rank. As understudies
to commanders such men had their own pecking order, the first lieutenant often
being second in command, the second lieutenant third in command and so on.
As already mentioned lieutenants could also be in positions of command.
In this situation they held more authority than others with the same rank and
consequentially they could be known as the ‘lieutenant in command’, or ‘lieutenant
commander’.
Even with an executive
organisation, a number of essential specialists were required for the efficient
running of men-o-war. These men held warrants from the various boards and were
also sea officers. Although commissioned officers qualified in navigation, on
all but the smallest vessels an expert navigator was employed. These warrant
officers were known as masters and gained their qualifications from Trinity
House, but were responsible to the Admiralty. They took quarterdeck watches and
could even command H.M. vessels other than warships. In this
case they were known as ‘master and commander’. Gunners were regulated through
the Ordnance Board and looked after ships’ guns and ammunition. Carpenters were
very
important in the ‘wooden world’ and were concerned with the maintenance of
ships’ hulls, masts and spars. Although appointed by the Admiralty, often they
had previously been dockyard workers employed by the Navy Board and were
responsible to this latter board. Boatswains, again appointed by the Admiralty
but responsible to the Navy Board, by this time were in charge of rigging and
ground tackle as well as the storage of sails, cordage and the like.
Surgeons were also
warrant officers and were appointed by the Navy Board until 1796. Before
appointment they too were examined until 1745 by the Barber-Surgeons’ Board,
then the Surgeons’ Board until 1796. The Sick and Hurt Board then took over
both roles of examination and appointment, at least temporarily. Pursers were
different, inasmuch as they were not professionally examined. But, as partially
State employed businessmen, they had to put up
financial guarantees and were appointed by the Admiralty. Their role was to
deal with supply, particularly of victuals, slops (clothes) and consumable
stores of many (but not all) varieties.
Next, there were
‘inferior’ officer classes and confusingly, some of these also held warrants,
but were rated as petty officers. Armourers and gunsmiths (the latter in large
ships only) were accountable daily to the gunner and responsible to the
Ordnance Board. Masters-at-Arms, frequently once army or marine sergeants, were
warranted by the Admiralty to instruct in small arms. Sailmakers, worked
understandably for ships’ boatswains and received their warrants from the Navy
Board. These specialists had learned their trade as dockyard artificers and
very late in the 18th century caulkers, ropemakers
and coopers also apparently began going to sea in this way. Cooks were once
warranted through the Admiralty, but from 1704 by the Navy Board. Chaplains and
schoolmasters
when carried, were also in this category. Both
received their warrants from the Admiralty, the former being examined by the
Bishop of London and the latter by Trinity House (in navigation).
The
other group of ‘inferior’ officers were also rated petty officer, by ships’
commanders although only through recourse to higher authority. It might be surprising
to some, but midshipmen at this time were within this category. By the end of
the 18th century generally this senior petty officers’ rate was for
‘young gentlemen’ on their way to taking their lieutenants’ examinations, but
not entirely. Master’s mate was very similar. As commissioned officers required
knowledge of navigation, often aspiring officers would take this rate, although
many including some ‘young gentlemen’ took warrants as masters instead. Yet
more in this rate did not seek either warrants or commissions and were merely
experienced seamen. Incidentally, both masters’ mates and midshipmen were
generally referred to as ‘mates’.
The
rest of ships’ companies were made up of the ‘people’. Some of these were also
rated (and disrated) petty officer by ships’ commanders. Seamen petty officers
included quartermasters and their mates and boatswains’ mates. Idlers, that is men who did not keep watches, also had petty
officer rates such as armourers’ mates, pursers’ stewards and captains’ clerks.
Those
without petty officer rates were often referred to as ‘private men’.
Unofficially at this point, there were others, such as captains of tops, who
although only rated able seamen were in half way positions of authority.
Further complicating matters some of these, such as quarter gunners received
slightly more pay. For seamen, there were then able, ordinary and landsmen
rates depending on their skill and experience. (Please note that there are
inconsistencies in published works as to when the rate of landsman was
introduced.) For youngsters, until 1794 there were the rates of captain’s
servant, or servant. These ‘servant’ capacities were then replaced by three
varieties of ‘boy’. Those in the first class were rated ‘volunteers’ and were
would be officers; Boys 2nd class were young seamen aged 15 to 17;
and Boys 3rd class were those intended as seamen but still employed
as domestics.
As
for the other ‘private men’ who were not watchkeepers, there were all sorts of
rates for those at the bottom of the heap. These included the steward’s mate,
cook’s mate, captain’s cook and yeomen of the boatswain’s store.
Perhaps
an obvious point to some, nevertheless, one
that needs making is that holders of commissions and warrants (not just
‘inferior’ officers either), will have previously spent time as private men of
some variety or other. Also, it should be noted that often there were plenty of
other people onboard. Among these could be wives of some sea officers as well
as their offspring, adding already to the youngsters as part of ships’
companies.
Being
an evolving organisation it should hardly be surprising that inherent changes
occurred from time to time. One of these was in officer entry. So, before going
onto these the situation in the late 18th century should be
outlined. Apart from joining through the patronage of individual commanders
(especially those more senior) as servants (if only in name), there had been
other ways for young gentlemen intent on a life as commissioned officers. As of 1676 there had been volunteers per order, or ‘King’s letter
boys’ as they were known. In 1733 the Royal Naval Academy at Portsmouth
came into existence (renamed as the Royal Naval College in 1806) and this
replaced the old system of ‘King’s letter boys’. On completion of three years
studying there, youngsters then went to sea as midshipmen ordinary. However,
this affected a very small percentage and in 1838 or 1839 the R.N.C. closed. In
1843 a new rank of naval cadet came into use, altering in nature with changed
recruitment and educational requirements through
the century and beyond.
In
time other commissioned officers’ ranks appeared as well (with some terms, such
as master and commander disappearing). Without going into some of the complexities,
in 1840 the rank of mate was formally introduced as a commissioned officer rank
below lieutenant. This was changed to sub-lieutenant twenty years later
(re-using a term sometimes used since the 18th century for inferior
officers second in command of vessels so diminutive that their establishments
only allowed for one single commissioned officer onboard). It should also be
explained that the rank mate was resurrected once more in 1912, for ratings
advanced to commissioned status. This differentiation was done away with only
in 1931, when they too were termed sub-lieutenants. A rank between lieutenant
and commander was introduced in 1914 - lieutenant-commander. This was gained
automatically on serving eight years as a lieutenant. Apparently this was to generally
fall into line with army ranks, but it also formalised the half-ring already
worn by ‘lieutenants of eight years or more seniority’. Much further up the
career scale, commodores were put on a better footing in 1805 with two classes
of the rank, although they remained temporary ranks. Sometime post 1945 this
was simplified to one single rank of commodore. Admirals’ ranks also
periodically changed slightly, which is to be expected due to massive
differences in order of battle from one period to the next. One noticeable change, was in 1805 when an additional rank of admiral of
the red was introduced. In 1864 this disappeared with one of many
reorganizations.
The
status of warrant officer ranks altered dramatically through time as well. The
first important act was in 1808 and affected masters, pursers, surgeons and
chaplains. Through this they became ‘Warrant Officers of Commissioned Rank’ and
generally allowed into the wardroom. This began the gentrification of these
roles, while at the same time reducing the status of the others such as
carpenters, gunners and boatswains. In 1843 at least some masters became navigating lieutenants, only to
disappear into the Executive Branch in 1872. (Entry and promotion within the
navigating branch was far more complex than is commonly understood though.
Masters, from the lower-deck were still being warranted as late as 1866, while
there had been navigating sub-lieutenants from at least 1863 in what would
appear to have been through an ‘officer entry’ route.) Pursers were also
commissioned in 1843 as paymasters and pursers, with ‘purser’ being dropped
from their rank in the 1850s. Surgeons were also elevated to commissioned rank
in 1843. Chaplains were given commissioned status in 1859, but in time their
position was to become rather hazy. On the other hand, until the end of the
Second World War carpenters and boatswains remained as warrant officers, as the
highest ranking ratings (with carpenters being
re-rated as warrant shipwrights in 1918). (It should also be noted that there
were commissioned carpenter ranks as well by the First World War era.) Gunners
fared relatively better, while remaining as warrant officers,
relatively few were to allowed to become commissioned gunners much later. The ‘inferior’
warrant officers (not already dealt with), either disappeared completely, or were re-designed more formally within the systems of petty
officer rates devised from the 1860s onwards.
From
working on original documents it has become apparent that, at least in the case
of masters and as late as the mid 1850s, not all had been commissioned. This may also have been the case with other warrant
officers. Also, specialist navigating lieutenants remained in existence for a
considerable period after 1872.
Recruitment
on the lower deck also changed inherently
in the
19th century. Although it is not apparent from some accounts there
had been genuine volunteers for the monarch’s warships. The reasons for such
‘people’ wanting a life at sea on men-o-war were as complex as at any other
time, although sometimes this was due to something akin to modern nationalism
(that did not generally exist in mainland
Europe until mid 19th century). It is clear from some research that
commanders, especially the landed gentry, took large numbers of individuals to
sea from their own localities, or even estates. Whether for the lower deck or
ultimately quarterdeck, this was a way hopefully of increasing numbers of
followers (as part and parcel of the games of patronage and advancement). Of
course, there were large numbers forced into the King’s service, not only
through the press, but also in other
schemes such as the Quota. To explain, during 1795 the judiciary had been
authorised to send to warships ‘rogues, vagabonds, smugglers, embezzlers of
naval stores and other able-bodied, idle and disorderly persons exercising no
lawful employment and not having some substance sufficient for their support
and maintenance’. Others, poor young lads who could be orphans, runaways and
those just regarded as ‘suspect’ were sent through the Marine Society to
merchantmen and warships. But, for reasons already mentioned in the historical
essay, by the 1830s the old ways were becoming less workable. In relation to
this between 1835 and 1857 a whole series of experiments were made by the
British State in keeping tabs on the entire British merchant service, with the aim of forcing specific
classes into the Royal Navy in time of war. These exercises, normally known as
the ‘ticketing system‘ failed for a whole raft of
reasons. But, it is clear that the raison
d’être
for this was becoming non-existent anyway. On the back on an earlier limited
programme (also begun in 1835), increasingly from 1853 engagements of
continuous service for ratings were introduced. Nevertheless, twenty-five years
later this process was still far from complete and well into the 20th century there were
some groups that were not allowed engagements of continuous service.
Needless
to say, through the 19th and 20th centuries, as
technology developed new branches were introduced. Again there are lots of
anomalies, such as in the Engineering Branch where officers for a long time
were very much looked down upon by the Executive Branch as social inferiors.
Naval reserves also came into being,
the Royal Naval Reserve, drawn from professional civilian mariners as of 1859;
and the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, that originally were interested amateurs
from 1903. There was also the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve from 1903 and other
organisations such as the Royal Fleet Reserve are also outlined in the above
linked page. The Coastguard was also a direct
Admiralty responsibility from 1857 to 1923, although there had been relatively deep ties for some time before.
Tracing individuals and further research
As has been hinted at
from the background information already given, naval documentation was
complicated. (If anything this is something of an underestimate.) Therefore, as
there are a great
deal of records to discuss, this section will be split into three with
linked pages. Also, please note, in order to make this site at least slightly
manageable I have tended to use examples for smaller ships, or stations and
entries with more limited information. Therefore, the information recorded
especially in ‘big ships’ can be far more extensive than
shown. And, although some of the administrative and financial records seem
clearly enough defined in the guides (especially in Professor Rodger’s) when
actually confronted with these ledgers they appear completely mixed up, with
all sorts of entries all higglety-pigglety.
Commissioned
Officers
(and for ease mates, midshipmen and naval cadets) from the earliest surviving
year until the inter-war period forms one sub-section. Standing warrant officers (when they were sea officers) forms the second; and
the ‘people’ or ratings as they developed into
will be the third.
Unless
otherwise stated, all these records are to
be found as part of the National Archives, at the Public Records Office, Kew,
Surrey, Richmond, England. The only other institution
of real relevance in this is the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, but
overwhelmingly only for commissioned and warrant officers of the sail age.
Of
course, as well as the personnel records of prime interest to genealogists,
there are also masses of surviving operational
and administrative records. Again a large percentage of these are at Kew,
although there are other collections elsewhere. The National Maritime Museum,
Greenwich holds a substantial collection of papers, not only relating to
Admiralty business, but also of the Navy, Transport, Victualling and Sick &
Hurt Boards. (The N.M.M. also has a small collection of original ‘personnel’
papers catalogued as ‘single documents. These span 1589 to 1958 and relate to
holders of commissions and/or warrants. As well as commissions and warrants,
there are also certificates of service, orders of discharge, tickets
of leave, pursers’ bonds, at least one surgeon’s log, appointments and customs
authorisations. Some of these deal with the famous, such as Drake, Raleigh and
Nelson. Incidentally, not all are for the pukkah R.N.
Among these are a handful of R.N.V.R commissions and warrants. For those
getting very deep into the wider subject of naval administration there are also
naval records elsewhere in county records offices and academic institutions.
Locations of these can be found via the National Register of Archives. Their
website is at http://www.hmc.gov.uk. However, a word of warning might be apposite. Entry to some academic institutions, such as the Bodleian
Library, University of Oxford, can prove very difficult indeed: even for
academics.
There
are also mountains of publications on the Royal Navy, for all levels of study.
These cover all sorts of topics. So, for genealogists wanting to understand
something more of the conditions that their forebears lived in, the following
list of social histories might be of interest and use. Nevertheless, some are
better than others and in my own research I have found that some topics, such
as the introduction of continuous service for the lower deck is not well
handled by those mentioning it.
N.A.M. Rodger: The Wooden World - An Anatomy of the
Georgian Navy (London:
Fontana Press, 1986)
Brian Lavery: Nelson’s Navy - The
Ships, Men and Organisation 1793-1815 (London:
Conway Maritime Press, 1990)
Michael Lewis: A Social History of the Navy 1793-1815 (London:
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1960)
Michael Lewis: The Navy in Transition - A Social History
1814-1864 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1965)
Henry Baynham: Before the Mast -
Naval Ratings of the 19th Century (London:
Hutchinson, 1971)
Henry Baynham: Men from the
Dreadnoughts (London: Hutchinson,
1976)
John Fabb (Commentaries): Victorian and
Edwardian Navy from old photographs (London:
B.T. Batsford, 1976)
Christopher McKee: Sober Men and True - Sailor Lives in
the Royal Navy 1900-1945 (Cambridge,
Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 2002)
Brian
Lavery:
Hostilities
Only - Training the Wartime Navy (London:
National Maritime Museum, 2005)
One absolutely
fascinating work that I have discovered in passing relates to poor social
conditions on the lower-deck and resentment towards the quarter deck, largely
during the 1940s (but referring back to earlier times as well). Having myself served
as a rating in the 1970s and 1980s I could see real differences, but
unfortunately, also similarities. While the accommodation had
improved substantially afloat and ashore (with exceptions such as on some small
craft and at DOLPHIN where some of us were still billeted in virtually
unconverted stables and other substandard accommodation). The food was
obviously far better by my day (again with exceptions), but other areas
remained as poor as they had been earlier in the century. For instance, the
disciplinary system was still as unfair as it had ever been, such as ratings
judged as guilty on being charged, with little (if indeed any) genuine
chance of proving innocence. Similarly, particular commissioned officers in the
view of the lower-deck frequently were guilty of similar offences as ratings,
but were seemingly never disciplined in any way
- leading to not unnatural resentment. Anyway, the post Second World War title
is:-
Hannen
Swaffer: What would Nelson do? (London:
Victor Gallancz Ltd., 1946)
Return to a brief
historical essay up to and including the Second World War
Return to structures of ranks and rates
Return to Tracing
individuals and further research