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How
successfully did Britain respond to German Unrestricted U-boat warfare in 1917 & 1918? |
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There is an
immensely complex series of inter-related subjects in dealing with this
question. Due to the extremely limited space allowed, by necessity these can
only be touched on. Nevertheless, in order to understand the response by the
British during the final two years of the war at sea in regard to the enemy’s
intensified Handelskrieg, the situation leading to this period needs
outlining. Moreover, for ease subjects are dealt with separately: although in
reality, all obviously ran together.
SITREPS
LEADING TO FEBRUARY 1917
Mercantile Shipping - Defence, loss and
replacement
.
Merchant ship
casualties began from day one of the war, whether through seizure in port; by
cruiser and armed-merchant cruiser; minelayer; and within three months, by
submarine. The losses of the early months were slight, by ‘state’ terms.
Pre-war planning
in relation to merchant protection against surface raiders revolved around
Royal Naval cruiser patrols of areas of concentration of shipping routes. Masters
were left almost entirely to their own wits, with patchy support as to
intelligence and routing from diplomatic representation abroad. (1) Through limited pre-war experimentation a tiny
percentage of merchantmen could theoretically be defensively armed.
Interestingly, at least one call for convoy was made by shipping sources, as
early as September 1914, but was unequivocally rejected by the Admiralty. (2) Mercantile confidence was to be maintained
predominately by the War Risk Insurance Scheme: whereby the general taxpayer
would foot eighty per cent of the cost of hull and cargo. (3)
When submarines
took over the mantle of trade destruction as of February 1915, the RN’s
attitude did not change materially. Around the focal points of Great Britain,
Ireland and in the Mediterranean, patrolling mostly by destroyers and
small-craft was conducted. From October 1915 the Mediterranean was particularly
dangerous to merchantmen, where defence was complicated by often sterile
relations and little co-ordination between the three Allied naval powers
(Britain, France and Italy). Largely this comprised of a number of half-thought
out schemes of dispersion and patrolled fixed-routes, poorly implemented; some
defensive arming of freighters as they entered the Mediterranean (with the
antiquated weapons being recovered as they exited); (4)
re-routing via the Cape; and prohibiting insurance from vessels entering the
Med (unless holding a specific licence). Fundamentally, there was a permanent
shortage of Allied destroyers and patrol craft and which remained until the
end. (5)
Regarding the
shipbuilding industry, in the prevailing political mood no measures had been
taken to organise this: it was merely under the auspices of the Board of Trade.
Despite record prices for new hulls, newly built tonnage decreased dramatically
from pre-war levels: from approximately 142,000 tons gross per month in 1914,
to 53,000 per month in 1916. (6) This can partly
be explained as the lessening of available capacity, both from increased
government requirements and restrictions imposed on merchant
shipbuilding. (7) The result was a continuing
decrease of tonnage available for shipping.
.
Anti-Submarine measures
.
In accordance with
RN doctrine, anti-submarine activities were regarded in terms of the offensive,
even in inherently defensive measures. In the first two years these were
overwhelmingly ineffective.
A variety of
physical barriers across the Dover Straits, the North Channel and the Adriatic
were of relatively limited value: although effectiveness in some areas would in
time, rise. Apart from known inherent difficulties arising from underwater
currents, swell, bad weather, etc., etc., few pre-war resources had been
devoted to underwater warfare. (8) Not only were
projects too ambitious, such as stringing a steel net from Folkstone
to Cape Griz-Nez, but, the technology was just not up
to the job. Saliently, compared with German versions, British
contact mines suffered from a number of faults. Similarly, considerable
efforts with towed indicator nets, were with a handful
of exceptions, fruitless: as were those of the much vaunted modified-sweep and
not forgetting the lance-bomb. (9)
Britain’s response
to a threat to BEF supply in November 1914 (one operation off Le Havre by U-21)
was the Q-ship and allied types. With so much operational documentation
missing, unfortunately it is not possible to make a definitive analysis of
decoy-ship operations. However, it is evident that after the initial surprise,
these were weapons of diminishing returns. (10)
.
Technological research and development
.
Apart from the
occasional success when enemy boats were mined; torpedoed by British opposite
numbers; or forced to surface and subsequently rammed or destroyed by gunfire;
there were two problems in bringing U-boats to combat. Firstly, the position
and movement of dived submarines could not be determined. Secondly, even if
located, no efficient ship borne weapons system was available for deployment.
Between 1882 and
1903 there had been experiments within the RN to deal with other underwater
concepts, in the form of ‘hydrophones’ (civilian interest ranged back to at
least 1838). However this technology was not considered during pre-war
experiments to develop A/S techniques, from 1904 onwards. (11) As of July 1915 the Board of Invention and
Research (BIR) should have brought civilian scientific competence to
bear on disparate naval efforts: but, relations were far from conducive to
effective work. (12) RN exertions however,
produced the ‘drifter’ non-directional hydrophone in the closing months of
1915. Although great store was laid in this, it was of indifferent value.
Lacking prior fundamental understanding of the physics and dealing with
numerous, complex technical dilemmas, through 1916 BIR experiments were making
headway in bringing a more useful directional hydrophone into being. (13)
As for A/S weapon
systems, by mid 1916 the D-type depth charge had been developed, but as in
British mines, there were problems with the firing pistols. Additionally, by
early 1917 production was far below ordered numbers, resulting in severe
rationing. (14)
.
Intelligence and Signal interception
.
Within various
intelligence gathering operations, by the end of 1916 two separated areas of
expertise were gaining real importance; crude direction finding of enemy
wireless transmissions (leading to limited positioning by cross bearings); and
elsewhere, large-scale penetration of enemy code and cypher systems. (15)
.
Political and Admiralty considerations
.
The changes of
late 1916 in both the Cabinet and Admiralty meant that there was the possibility
of making improvements in the conduct of the war. The first of these were
already in place by February 1917.
With the dynamic
David Lloyd-George as Prime Minister, a Ministry of Shipping was formed: with a
prominent shipowner, Sir Joseph Maclay, as
Controller. Within five months this took executive command of the mercantile
industry. Also of import, Lord Devonport headed the newly created Ministry of
Food. (16)
With Admiral Sir
John Jellicoe’s appointment as First Sea Lord, there was a partial clear-out in
London. Although the traditional view of the Admiralty War Staff being full of
the nondescripts, retired, sick and hurt has been proved to be false, overall staff
work improved. This would seem to have been the result of numerous factors,
including structural reorganisations. Most important of these was the formation
of the Anti-Submarine Division (ASD), bringing some of the scattered and
uncoordinated A/S efforts together. (17)
1917
and 1918
With Germany’s declaration of all-out
submarine warfare as of 1st February 1917, the enemy operated
considerably more boats than earlier. By April merchant shipping losses (of all
nations involved and not just British) had become so severe that Britain
was within months, in danger of being totally deprived of all outside goods and
thereby forced into surrender. It was by sheer necessity therefore, that the
Admiralty resolved to maintain mercantile movements as one of the highest
priorities.
.
Convoys
.
As of April 1917
the decision to experiment with convoy meant the adoption of a sensible policy
at last: while admitting that such changes took time, this was still piecemeal.
It was inevitable that if inbound ocean convoys were escorted, the unterseebooten
would resort to sinking unescorted outbound vessels: as rapidly transpired.
Moreover, if there were still substantial areas where merchantmen were left
undefended, around the coasts of Britain, enemy activity would naturally move
there: as happened from October 1917. The introduction of coastal convoys in
June 1918 was not then before time. Furthermore, the complicated situation in
the Mediterranean, with a lack of co-operation and different procedures
implemented by the British and French in different areas within, also
inevitably led to confusion. Unsurprisingly, this was lucratively exploited by enemy commanders, German and Austrian: until finally
convoys were instituted there as well. (18)
It was not as if
convoy was a new concept. Used widely in past centuries for defending
mercantile trade in war, by this decade they were only accepted as necessary
for safeguarding troops, in some naval operations, or, when coerced politically.
Escorted convoys for colonial troops had been in force since 1914 (at the
insistence of the colonial governments), as had those to Gallipoli and
Salonika: where a great deal of relevant experience had been gained. (19) The RN itself had also recently used convoys,
such as from the Abrolhos to the Falklands in late
1914: with colliers, oilers and store-ships. Dispersed by heavy weather and
with an escort commander unsure of his role, much could have been learned from
this particular occasion. (20) Additionally, under
pressure from Allied and neutral governments, convoys in specific cases had
already been constituted in the North Sea. Small groups had been escorted to and
from the Netherlands since July 1916 and colliers supplying France from
England’s North East had similarly been organised since the closing months of
the same year. In the martial operations there had been no losses, in the
civilian few. (21)
Closely linked was
the idea of the actual size of convoys. Naval staff officers tended towards
pessimism. They automatically believed that formations would be found by the
enemy, when in reality the concentration of merchantmen meant that large
tracts of sea were entirely empty and convoys remained undetected. (Mahan had pointed this out in 1905 citing past British Napoleonic
experience.) But this negative thinking permeated further. They reasoned
that the larger the convoy, the more merchantmen would be sunk: which just
did not reflect reality. Generally U-boats could no longer attack on the
surface and were therefore subject to the number of torpedoes already loaded in
their tubes. Re-loading torpedoes at was a major, difficult and time-consuming
exertion: as any (intelligent) submariner could have told the Admiralty
planners.
Another stumbling
block had been over escorts. A less than competent understanding of the
requirements for shipping had led to a massive over-estimation of the numbers
of warships needed for convoy defence. When resolved, older battleships,
cruisers and armed-merchant cruisers were used for ocean duties; while
destroyers and small-craft, including new types such as sloops, remained nearer
the shores (backed by rising numbers of fixed wing aircraft and airships). (22) It was in the use of the latter surface craft
(sloops) that, undoubtedly, was the reason that coastal convoys took so long to
be introduced. Even so, with resources stretched so widely, often convoy escort
was more in name than substance. Allied aid, particularly from the Americans
and Japanese, was welcome: but their naval doctrines were similar to Britain’s
and also favoured offensive action.
It may have been
subconscious, but with the all-pervading mantra of aggression, the RN
simply did not realise that defending merchantmen was ultimately far more
important than sinking U-boats. As long as the enemy units were not
destroying friendly vessels, they were not only failing in their warlike tasks,
they were also using up their own precious resources. Pointedly, the
continuation of the very war itself by the Allies depended on the cargoes of
the merchantmen.
.
Direct anti-submarine measures
.
Apart from the
actual discovery of much of the physics in underwater accoustics
that were required, considerable technical problems needed to be solved, before
practical underwater listening devices could be developed successfully for ship
borne systems. There were no shortcuts to this (although co-operation with the
French and Americans brought elements forward significantly). Undoubtedly
hydrophones of this era were very much over-rated, with strenuous efforts
expended both by units manning the mined barriers and in dedicated ‘hunting’ operations.
While there was some success in destroying enemy submarines, at the time
these were judged far higher than later study has proved. Nevertheless, this
can be seen as part of a learning curve and possibly necessary in evolving
superior systems: not only were hydrophones becoming directional, but by the
end of the war the first forms of ASDIC were about to become operational. (23)
The more
sophisticated manner of deploying the type-D depth charges in patterns was an
improvement and definitely resulted in kills, but only when an U-boat’s
position was closely pinpointed. Even so, in order to cause enough damage to
smash hull-valves, or cause actual structural failure to a submarine’s pressure
hull, it was estimated that the charge had to explode within fourteen feet. (24) Other serious harm such as sheering lines,
puncturing bottle-groups or cracking multiple cells, thereby leading to
emergency surfacing, would also require charges to detonate close by.
Even with
increased industrial production (from an exceedingly low base) and if escorts
were armed with the full issue of 35 charges, there simply were too few to make
the depth-charge a significant submarine destroyer. Also, howitzer issue was
far from ubiquitous: with an additional drawback of delivering a small-charge,
effectively only useful for surface attack. (25)
Mine-development,
especially in conjunction with the Dover barrage was more successful however (even
in curtailing the movements through the English Channel of the UB and UC
minelaying submarines of the Flanders Flotillas). The copying of the superior
German contact mine (designated as Mark H-2), with production as of autumn
1917, also meant that offensive mining was a more realistic proposition:
including deep mining. (26) Due to scale of
production, the Northern Barrage project was largely an American scheme and was
by no means near completion by the armistice: but it is debatable whether the
level of expense and effort would have justified results in the long run.
Aircraft of
various types and in differing roles were beginning to make useful appearances.
This was particularly relevant during the first six months of 1918 when the sea
war moved inshore.
While actual
offensive operations against seaborne submarine submarines were largely
unrealistic, both from the capabilities of the aircraft themselves and from the
lack of a suitable air-launched weapon, there were other uses. Land-based
aircraft were used intensively in coastwise patrolling up to twenty miles to
seaward; sea-planes and flying-boats were utilised more distantly for multiple
duties such as in the ‘spider-web’ patrolling, convoy work, spotting for
hunting-groups etc.; and airships were used primarily for convoy escort deeper
still. (27) The escort protection work in
particular can be judged as profitable, the remainder making secondary
contributions.
.
Indirect anti-submarine measures
(operations against submarine bases)
.
All the undertakings against the Flanders base of Bruges
and exit points of Ostende and Zeebrugge can be
reasonably judged as failures. During the Third Battle of Ypres the BEF did not
achieve the required breakthrough, so was in no position to overrun the
submarine base. Anyway, had the opportunity arisen to advance accordingly, at
least some of the submarines could have retired to German bases. The spring
1918 attempts by the RN to block the harbours were bold in conception, but to
have worked would have needed absolute precision and in both ports: not a
likely prospect under combat conditions. It seems that the actual results were
merely a temporary hindrance to the Germans. (28)
Similarly, smaller-scale proceedings by monitor and aircraft were bound not to
have succeeded. In the former the targets needed exceptional indirect gunnery
results and in the latter, the concrete shelters were in effect bombproof.
This can also be
said to be the case in air raids on the submarine bases in Germany proper.
However, more was attained in operations against the same in the Adriatic
locations at Pola and Cattaro: leading to genuine disruption. (29)
.
Changes within the Admiralty machinery
.
The personnel
changes of late 1916 were only necessary first steps. Bringing the highly
competent civilian Sir Eric Geddes into the Admiralty, initially as Third Sea
Lord and Controller in May 1917 was highly beneficial. This enabled naval and
mercantile shipbuilding to be organised and in time, to be turned around.
Nevertheless it was a daunting task. Even with massive buying of foreign hulls
and considerable improvements in shipbuilding performance, it was not until the
closing months of the war (under Sir Alan Anderson, late of the Orient Line) that total tonnage out-stripped losses by
enemy action. (30) Not only was the British
standard ship programme the answer, however. US hulls under their
own government’s emergency shipbuilding programme were also essential to
this success.
Other reforms were
well overdue. Bringing Room 40 within the organisation of the Naval
Intelligence Division was one. (31) With the
normal provisos of security, dissemination and signal paths, the more
systematic approach paid off handsomely in the re-routing of shipping away from
submarine threats and even in kills of U-boats.
Also, the
simplification of Sea Lords’ duties, in taking away the business management
aspect and thereby freeing them to act rapidly in more pressing matters, should
have been beneficial. Its failure was essentially due to the attitudes of these
same senior naval officers. (32)
Geddes taking over
as First Lord in July 1917 marked a real turning point. With
dissatisfaction from the Prime Minister; more reorganisation of roles followed;
posts changed hands; new divisions were formed; and with much criticism from
officers of the Grand Fleet; it was inevitable that Jellicoe would have to go
in time. Accordingly with his removal in December (and Oliver soon after) the
Admiralty under Vice Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss (and
using his staff to advantage) was in a far better state to prosecute the war
efficiently. (33)
.
Other major elements in beating Handelskrieg
.
As this was truly
a war of agrarian and industrial attrition, other measures were important. Two
years into the fighting there were still few controls regarding food (with the
exceptions of the commissions for sugar and wheat, plus imported meat via the
Board of Trade). However, December 1916 brought the beginning of an Allied
system of state purchase, import and distribution. By 1918 food imports were
down by about a third of pre-war levels: from approximately 16.7 million tons
to 11.9 million tons. Shipping distances were shortened as far as possible,
North America gaining considerably from this process: with subsequent political
problems with the Empire, particularly Australia and New Zealand. Also, with
the long-term run down in British arable agriculture, there was substantial
scope for higher home-production, with more land coming under the plough: but
only having an appreciable effect in 1918. Other commodities were also subject
to official scrutiny, such as cotton and around ninety per cent of all goods
imported became directly controlled by government bodies.
For a variety of
reasons voluntary rationing as of February 1917 failed to work. So, from the
summer both price-fixing and rationing began to be introduced: growing in scope
to cover most foodstuffs. Linked to the state control of import, wholesalers
and retailers acted in their normal capacities. There is a tendency to maintain
that there was no rationing in Britain during the First World War. Perhaps this
is down to one factor: the staple diet of the less well-off, bread,
remained on open sale. (34)
Additionally,
through the Ministry of Shipping throughput was improved in a variety of ways.
Habitual clogging of ports was alleviated; and cargo discharge was accelerated
by better use of manpower and machinery. (35)
An immensely
complex series of subjects by themselves, at the risk of generalising
massively, the final two years marked a more sensible attitude towards manning
as well. More types of workers were seen as essential to the war effort and
therefore, not subject to conscription, although paradoxically men of the
mercantile marine still were called up. Importantly, the merchant service was
not the preserve of the young (even if during this time lads as young as
fourteen served), men into their seventies remained at, or even returned to,
the sea. Nevertheless, even in peacetime overall up to thirty per cent of those
signing onto British freighters were foreigners. Of necessity large numbers of
black and Asian sailors from the Empire were recruited (although anti-black
riots in 1919 resulted in death and injury of some, with wholesale arrest and
deportation of these hapless mariners). (36)
CONCLUSIONS
Answering the
question head-on, the only relevant direct British response made to the German
declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare of February 1917 was convoy.
Utterly essential to keeping Britain in the war, nonetheless some naval
quarters tenaciously remained opposed to trade defence long after its
implementation. (37) Admittedly Jellicoe was
forced by events into the gradual adoption of this protection, but it seems
unlikely that this would have come to pass at all under his predecessor, Sir
Henry Jackson. That Jellicoe could not oversee subsequent necessary
organisational changes within the Admiralty is not too much to his
detriment: he made important initial moves.
However, it is
also clear that the changes already being put in place by the government of
Lloyd-George were instrumental in the necessary shake-up. The importation of
civilians of undoubted organisational flair into positions of responsibility,
whether in old posts, or newly created ones was crucial. For the most part
self-made men, they brought expertise and fresh attitudes to areas sadly
lacking. This is particularly the case of the Admiralty under Geddes. And, the
reformed divisions allowed for a more efficient defence of merchantmen and the
general prosecution of the sea war.
Nevertheless, the turn around came very late in the conflict: around
June 1918 and the U-boats themselves never were beaten at sea. It took the
British establishment far too long to become at all efficient and the Royal
Navy’s attitude towards all the nations’ merchant navies, the fishing fleets,
RNR, RNR(T) and RNVR was often less than co-operative.
This in itself occasionally even added to the casualties. (38)
In the final
analysis, apart from the avoidable death of at least some of over 13,300
merchant seamen and fishermen; (39) failing to
defend Britain’s mercantile marine adequately was potentially disastrous to the
conduct of the war (after all absolutely everything the Army on the Western
Front needed, was supplied courtesy of merchant ships). In the longer term it
also added to the gargantuan monetary cost of the war; and ultimately allowed
for the contraction of British business post-war (since with the
non-availability of British goods and tonnage, countries outside the conflict
developed their own).
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Copyright: LEN BARNETT 1999 Revised slightly 2004 |
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