Footnotes:-
.
.
|
1. |
On trade
protection Archibald Hurd: The Merchant Navy
volume I (London: John Murray, 1921) pp.216-223 and pp.239-252. On defensive
armament experiments ibid. pp.120-121 |
|
2. |
Martin Gilbert: Winston
S. Churchill volume III 1914-1916 Companion (London: William Heinemann,
1972) pp.116-117 - Letter from W.S. Churchill to Sir Edward Grey and Walter Runicman |
|
3. |
Hurd: Merchant Navy pp.228-239 |
|
4. |
On defensive
arming in the Mediterranean see The National Archives: Public Records Office
MT23 (a number of files for 1915) |
|
5. |
On detailed
aspects of the war in the Med see Paul G. Halpern: The
Naval War in the Mediterranean 1914-1918 (London: Unwin
Hyman, 1987) chapters 4 to 8 |
|
6. |
On the economic
aspects see Gerd Herdach:
The First World War 1914-1918 (London: Penguin Books, 1977) p.45 -
citing J.A. Salter: Allied Shipping Control: An Experiment in
International Administration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921) p.361 |
|
7. |
Willem Hackmann: Seek & Strike (London: HMSO, 1984)
p.15 |
|
8. |
In spite of this
there were limited plans for offensive mining: intriguingly there were to be
mined ambushes. See TNA: PRO ADM 137/843 - Secret Packet E. Also note, the
original reason for the mining ops off West Hinder to the Belgian Coast as of
1st October 1914 was a cover for the ‘Churchill’ landings. See
TNA: PRO ADM 137/843 - hand written order to CCML |
|
9. |
Paul G. Halpern: A Naval History of World War I (London:
UCL, 1994) p.296 |
|
10. |
Ibid. p.300 |
|
11. |
Hackmann: Seek & Strike pp.4-10 |
|
12. |
Ibid. p.17 and
p.24 |
|
13. |
Ibid. pp.47-55 |
|
14. |
John Terraine: Business in Great Waters (London: Leo
Cooper, 1989) p.27 |
|
15. |
Ibid. pp.30-31 |
|
16. |
David
Lloyd-George: War Memoirs volume I (London: Odhams
Press, undated) pp.641-642 |
|
17. |
For the
traditional view of the Admiralty War Staff Arthur J. Marder:
From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow volume V (Oxford: OUP, 1970)
pp.313-315. For a revised view, see Nicholas Black: The British Naval Staff in the First World War (Woodbridge,
Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 2009) pp.15-52 |
|
18. |
Halpern: Naval History chapters 11-13 |
|
19. |
One example TNA:
PRO ADM 137/3 - Confidential report of “Convoy of Canadian Expeditionary
Force, October 1914” No.5 by Rear Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss |
|
20. |
From a number of
papers including TNA: PRO ADM 137/1027 - Confidential “Letter of Proceedings”
from Vice Admiral Sturdee No. 42/17 7-20 December
1914. Also see ships’ logs TNA: PRO ADM 53/69709, BT 165/1293, BT 165/1266,
BT 165/1173, BT 165/1138, BT 165/1279, BT 165/1182, BT 165/1272, BT 156/1186,
BT 165/1117 and diary of C.A. Bourne PO(RNR) Imperial War Museum: 85/25/1 |
|
21. |
Halpern: Naval History p.351 |
|
22. |
General points Halpern: Naval History pp.353-356. On aircraft see
Terraine: Business pp.36-38 and p.90 |
|
23. |
Technical
aspects Terraine: Business pp.29-30. On
hunting groups Halpern: Naval History
pp.342-343 and pp.366-368. Details of mine ‘barrier’ operations are
widespread. |
|
24. |
Terraine: Business p.28 |
|
25. |
Ibid.
pp.27-28 |
|
26. |
Arthur J. Marder: From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow volume
IV (Oxford: OUP, 1969) pp.87-88 |
|
27. |
Terraine: Business pp.125-126 |
|
28. |
Halpern: Naval History p.416 |
|
29. |
Terraine: Business p.79 |
|
30. |
Marder: Dreadnought volume IV pp.176-177 and p.215.
Also, Hardach: First World War pp.44.47 |
|
31. |
Halpern: Naval History p.398 |
|
32. |
Marder: Dreadnought volume IV pp.175-181 |
|
33. |
Ibid. volume IV
chapter VIII; and volume V chapter I |
|
34. |
Hardach: First World War pp.48-52 and pp.123-131 |
|
35. |
Marder: Dreadnought volume IV pp.65-66 |
|
36. |
Panikos Panayi (editor): Racial
Violence in Britain in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
(Leicester: LUP, revised 1996) pp.92-111 |
|
37. |
Marder: Dreadnought volume IV p.192 |
|
38. |
The general
suspicions of the RN towards all others of the sea were widespread.
Foreigners were suspect by pure virtue of not being British and consequently,
often information relevant to their safety was deliberately
withheld from them. One example (although in this case the Foreign Office
compounded the problem) TNA: PRO FO 371/2171. Regarding the
British merchant service tow examples follow, one from the beginning of the
war and one at the end. The hostile attitude of Captain Hubert Stansbury RN (Retired), DNTO Southampton, towards
merchant seamen on transport service is clearly shown in dozens of files of
the Admiralty Transport Department - TNA: PRO MT23. Incidentally, complaints
appear in some of this correspondence by merchant officers to their union
claiming incompetence by RN transport officers. Secondly, after all the
shared experience, in the court of enquiry following the very last incident
of merchant loss of the war, naval officers did not believe merchant officers
that their ships (including SURADA) had been torpedoed: rather than having
strayed into the minefield - TNA: PRO ADM 137/3582 and ADM 137/3590. The
relevant volume of Der Krieg zur See clearly
states that UC74 used torpedoes and that all the merchantmen concerned were
well within the swept-channel. Abuse of the
fishing industry was rife during the early stages of the war: the RN
maintaining that enemy mines were being laid by fishing-craft, when in
reality they were not suitable for the task and RN patrolling was not up to
the job. Proof of these attitudes can be found in a great many places.
Subsequently, in areas where it was possible the older men and their vessels,
subject to them not being requisitioned, attempted to fish. All seaworthy
trawlers, drifters and their able-bodied crews basically found themselves in
the RNR(T). Regarding the
reserves both RNR and RNVR, again there is evidence, although one has to dig
deeper to find documentary proof. One example though is in the attitude of
Lt-Cdr. O.M. Stokes RN towards a Cdr. (RNR) onboard OCEANIC. See Len Barnett: An Embarassing Loss
- H.M. Armed Cruiser Oceanic 8th September 1914 (London: Len
Barnett, 2004) |
|
39. |
This is the
figure most often quoted, which equates closely to the number on the memorial
at Tower Hill, London - those with no known grave. However, the total loss
must have been considerably higher, since I have also come across cases of
men buried ashore, who were victims of sinkings. There were also others, such
as one chief engineer, whose health was utterly destroyed in multiple
sinkings and that died ashore in Newport News, in the USA. Apart from ships’
official logs and newspaper reports, it is very difficult to find details of
the wounded, the number that must have been
considerable. |
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