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Helmut Patzig Patzig was younger than the other U-boat
commanders in this study. A native of Danzig, Prussia, he was born in 1890
and so, only joined the Kaiserliche Marine, as a Seekadett,
in April 1910. At the beginning of the Great War he
was a Leutnant zur See on a Deutschland-class battleship, Pommern.
In November 1915 he then transferred to the U-boat Arm and two months later
was a watch officer (Wachoffizier) on UA.
This boat had been in building for the Norwegians, but was
requisitioned in August 1914 and was then put on coastal defence duties.
Notwithstanding his post-war public defence of the late
Kapitänleutnant Walther Schwieger, UA was under the command of Oberleutnant zur See
Karl Scherb and later, in sinking twelve vessels and taking one prize, very
few lives were lost. Even then, the deaths were due to mines laid.
Intriguingly, it is not without the bounds of possibility that Scherb’s
record of not taking life unnecessarily was due to having been a watch
officer on U20 during the Lusitania sinking.
Anyway, it certainly looks as if Patzig that
by then was an Oberleutnant zur See, took more notice of the commander of the
boat that he was next appointed to in May 1916. Newly back from the Black Sea,
Kapitänleutnant
Wilhelm Werner took command
of U55. As a watch officer on this submarine, Patzig
would have been involved directly in Werner’s atrocities and after a
spell back at the U-Boot School, Kiel, from September 1917 to January 1918,
apparently in the role of hydroplanes instructor, Patzig
was appointed in command of U86.
On his way out on his first patrol in command, on January 29th, while
north of Terschelling, one of the two escort vessels, Senator Westphal,
was sunk by two mines. This would not be Patzig’s
last experience of these engines of war, presumably laid by the Americans as
part of the North Sea Barrage.
Having travelled to the outer Bristol Channel around the Shetland
Isles and down the Atlantic Irish coast to the Bristol Channel, a small,
unarmed, British schooner, Bessie Stephens, was sunk by gunfire in the
clear evening darkness of February 14th. Seen shortly before on her port
quarter, at a range of about 100 yards, five rounds were fired
rapidly, but only hit the tiny sailing-vessel twice. All the same, she sank
in five minutes, but luckily, her crew of five managed to abandon in their
lifeboat without casualties and were rescued at 7 a.m. the following morning
by the Carnalea that was one of the
comparatively-few trawlers still in commercial hands.
Next, at 4.50 p.m. on the 17th while south of Ireland, about twenty
miles south east of Mine Head, County Waterford, after missing by torpedo, U86
surfaced and attacked a zig-zagging collier-transport, Pinewood, again
by gunfire. On the steamer’s port quarter, at a range of approximately 9,000
yards, twenty rounds (including shrapnel) were fired by the submarine’s guns,
with many hits, before the steamer stopped and carried out abandonment –
still under fire. Although defensively-armed with a 90 m.m.
gun, due to a technical fault, the Pinewood only managed to respond
with one round and her smoke-boxes did not work either. Continuing to fire
with another thirty-or-so rounds, the merchantman sank at about 6.20 p.m. On
completion, U86 approached one of the lifeboats: striking it on its
stern: possibly with the aim of destroying it. Subterfuge was then employed
successfully by the mate on being interrogated by Patzig,
stating that the master and two gunners were dead. Something similar occurred
with the other lifeboat. Two able seamen had been killed and two other
ratings wounded in the attack though. The survivors were picked up by U.S.
Destroyer Davis at 7.55 p.m.
Working up to the entrance of St. George’s Channel, off Tuskar Rock,
County Wexford, a tiny unarmed British steamer, Wheatflower,
was sunk by gunfire in daylight, on the 19th. Ten rounds had been fired, with
the third setting the little merchantman on fire amidships and damaging her
to the point of settling. So, sensibly, she was abandoned. Another twenty
rounds followed, although only five were registered as hits. Of her
multi-national crew of nine, all but one survived, as did all of her eight
passengers. They were rescued soon after by H.M. Minesweeping Trawler White
Friars that had been endeavouring to come to the Wheatflower’s
aid. U86 made off at an estimated speed of twelve to fourteen knots.
North of Anglesey the next day, at 4.10 p.m., a British
defensively-armed coastal steamer, Djerv, was torpedoed midships
without warning. Thought to have broken in half immediately, she sank in
around 90 seconds, but the abandonment in the last remaining lifeboat was
orderly. The master was blown from the bridge to the after well deck and
badly injured, drowned. A fireman in the stokehold must also have been killed
in the torpedo strike. The survivors were picked up by H.M. Boat PQ63.
Completing this patrol’s tally, northwest of the Isle of Man, shortly
after midnight on the 23rd, Patzig torpedoed an
unidentified vessel without warning. She was a Danish steamer, Ulabrand and sank rapidly, killing all thirteen
onboard.
On this boat’s next patrol Patzig chose to
enter the Irish Sea via the North Channel and in doing so, he encountered a
defensively-armed British steamer, Kafue, ten miles southwest of the
Mull of Galloway, in daylight, on April 30th.
Determined to sink her, both torpedoes and gunfire were used. The
first torpedo hit her aft in number five hold, starting a fire there and in
number six hold and she began to settle. The majority of the crew were sent
away in lifeboats. Rockets and three rounds were fired by the Kafue’s
4.7-inch gun on observing a periscope and when the master, Harold James Abbey
and the volunteers that remained onboard could offer no more resistance, they
too abandoned – anticipating another torpedo. Duly loosed off, it missed the
by then stationary vessel under her stern. Surfacing, around twenty, or
thirty, rounds were then fired at the merchantman in a thirty-minute period. U86
then made for the lifeboats, but smoke on the horizon must have made Patzig think better of this. Soon after, H.M. Destroyer Thorn
rescued all of the Kafue’s crew, with the exception of one horseman
that drowned trying to board her.
Later the same day, at 7.35 p.m., a little British defensively-armed
coastal steamer, Kempock, was attacked by
gunfire, about nine miles off Copeland Island. Fire was opened at
approximately 6,000 yards and around 100 rounds were expended by U86’s
gunners before the Kempock was abandoned. By
then she had been hit about five times, with a fire forward, a magazine fire
aft and the six-pounder gun put out of action. The Kempock
had returned fire when the range was 4,000 yards though and got off 33
rounds: seemingly getting two hits on U86’s casing at the base of the
conning-tower. Another 45 rounds were then fired at her blazing hull, plus
five more at the lifeboat, although they missed. The merchant mariners
managed to pull (row in landsmen’s terms) to Bangor, landing there just after
midnight. A fireman was hospitalised. In time, her master, John Roberts,
received a D.S.C. One of the gunners also received a D.S.M.; with the first
mate and chief engineer both being ‘commended’ in the London Gazette.
Remaining in the same area, in morning daylight on May 2nd, another
defensively-armed British steamer, Medora, was torpedoed without
warning. Struck on the starboard side of number three hold, the hatches were
blown off and seemingly badly damaged, she began to settle. Stopped, she was
then abandoned, but when her master, Daniel Mowatt, began to lead the lifeboats
back onboard, U86’s gunners opened fire from around 2,000 yards, so
they retreated once again. Expending around forty rounds, the Medora
was shelled heavily, setting her on fire. The submarine then pursued the
lifeboats, shelling them and almost ramming one in what they thought was
carelessness. Firearms, including a machine-gun, were trained on the merchant
mariners. Threats and taunts were issued, both by Patzig
and others. Ultimately, her master, a wireless officer and a gunner were
taken prisoner. It was stated that Patzig used a
megaphone, supposedly in poor English, but this was probably his exceedingly
inexperienced first watch officer – Oberleutnant zur See Ludwig Dithmar.
Dispersed, the survivors were picked up later in the day by H.M. Armed Patrol
Trawlers Nellie Braddock and Neptunian.
Venturing south briefly, possibly because she had been attacked by Nellie
Braddock on the 3rd, a small British sailing-vessel, Tommi, was
destroyed by gunfire off the southeastern tip of the Isle of Man during the
first watch of the 5th. She had been under tow by H.M. Armed Drifters Fragrance
and Ocean Gift when U86 surfaced. Firing rapidly, around the
tenth shot hit the little schooner and she sank rapidly by the stem. The two
drifters slipped their tow immediately and made to attack U86, firing
continually, but the latter dived. Of the four sailormen
onboard the Tommi, three were killed.
Shifting northwards again, on the 6th at 5.30 a.m., another British
steamer, Leeds City, was torpedoed without warning about five miles
off the Skulmartin lightvessel, County Down. She
had been part of HS 37, but due to fog in the western Atlantic and her slow
speed, had fallen behind on April 22nd and consequently, followed the convoy
the rest of the way. After passing Malin Head inbound, she was supposed to
return to Loch Swilly, but it was not known if she had ever received the
signal. However, on her torpedoing patrol trawlers and tugs were despatched
to her aid. H.M. Armed Minesweeping Trawler Ceresia rescued the
survivors and took her under tow, but this was unsuccessful and she sank at
8.35 a.m. Also, H.M. Destroyer Grasshopper put in a depth-charge
attack on U86 straight after the torpedoing. A large oil patch
appeared and H.M. Multi-armed Trawler Lewis Roatley
then dropped a depth-charge on this.
Leaving the area completely and travelling south, it was not until the
11th that Patzig found his next target, 100 miles
west of Lundy. According to the official German version, firing two torpedoes
into a convoy, whilst dived, both hit a Norwegian steamer, San Andres.
Although one failed to detonate, she sank in two minutes: with the loss of
two lives. This was not entirely accurate though. She had, indeed, been part
of the inbound convoy HG 37, but along with another merchantman, Norfolk,
was bound for Bristol Channel ports that had been detached, with two
armed-escort trawlers Lord Selborne and Okino,
forty minutes before the attack was made on her at 7.45 p.m. At this time the San Andres was
manoeuvring to take station on the Norfolk’s starboard beam. Okino
picked up the survivors and rejoined the convoy, while, presumably, Lord Selborne remained with the Norfolk.
A day later, a small defensively-armed coastal-passenger steamer, Inniscarra, was torpedoed off Ballycotton
Island, County Cork at 4.20 a.m. The weapon hit her on the port side between
numbers one and two holds and she sank by the head in about seven minutes. In
this short time two proper boats and others that had been converted into
life-rafts were launched. On surfacing U86 closed on the boat with
five men onboard - the master, first mate, quartermaster, one able seaman and
the steward. As well as one gun being manned, the submarine’s bridge was
described as crowded with approximately 15 men, armed with rifles. In light
of the master, Patrick Francis Kelly, having not been identified (or too
injured to leave the boat), the first mate, Stewart Fitzalleyne Swan, was
taken onboard and interrogated by Dithmar. Apart from speaking English poorly
(or alternatively, with a strong ‘foreign accent’); he was said to have
‘fired off a pistol several times over the heads of the men in the boat’; was ‘very excited verging on to madness’; and abusive. This was unlike Patzig
that ‘appeared cool and calculated’. The steward and
the quartermaster were also interrogated. Handing the first mate letters from
the submarine’s prisoners, before allowing him back into the boat, Dithmar
commiserated with him, thinking incorrectly that all onboard had been Irish. U86
departed the scene and in a moderate swell, these five men were picked up by
H.M. Armed-Minesweeping Trawler Rodney III at 7 a.m. She then
proceeded to where the Inniscarra had gone
down and a second, empty boat was found. There were no more survivors, with
28 souls (24 crew, two R.N.V.R. gunners and seemingly two passengers) having
perished.
Perhaps because he still had at least two torpedoes left, he chose to
return through the Irish Sea. Northwest of the Isle of Man, eight miles off Skulmartin, County Down, during a hazy morning watch on
the 16th, another defensively-armed British steamer, Tartary, was
torpedoed, twice almost amidships starboard. She had been one of a handful of
unescorted vessels on their way to an anchorage at Lamlash, Isle of Arran, to
join an outbound convoy. Having gotten
off a distress message, H.M. Destroyer Express, patrol-craft and tugs
were despatched immediately. This SOS SSS may well have saved the stricken
merchantman’s crew, pilot, three cattleman and one passenger that had
abandoned ship, from threats and intimidation at least. U86 had
surfaced and was making rapidly towards them, as the destroyer and trawlers
arrived on the scene. Unfortunately, efforts to save the Tartary by
armed trawlers and a tug failed and she sank at 11.10 a.m. (H.M. Yacht Greta
II and H.M. Armed-minesweeping Trawler Sealark
II did, however, rescue some bulls that were in distress swimming among
the wreckage.) Also, H.M. Multi-Armed Trawler Stalwart II sighted U86
on the surface ‘escaping’ and a hunt was conducted. And, on the 22nd, off the south coast of
Norway, a relatively-small Norwegian sailing-vessel, Meran, was
stopped and set on fire. No information on casualties has been found. On
return to the Fatherland, on May 26th, praise was lavished upon Patzig by Kommodore Andreas
Michelsen, in overall command of U-boats (Befehlshaber
der U-Boote).
It was Patzig’s next patrol that damned him
and not just by the British either. On the way out to Great Britain’s west
coasts a small Norwegian barque, Eglantine, was sunk by gunfire on
June 21st in the North Sea. The brutality shown by U86’s company was
horrifyingly unnecessary. Unarmed, on a shell being fired overhead at 11.
a.m., her crew of nine tried to abandon in their lifeboats. The
shelling continued; two men seem to have gone over the side; and most, or all
the others were wounded by shrapnel, but got away on the life-raft. U86
continued shelling the little sailing-vessel until she sank. One by one,
those on the raft died - but the last was picked up by H.M. Light-cruiser Curacao
ten days later. Understandably, this caused a diplomatic incident between
Norway and Germany. Patzig’s next attack, beginning at 10.30 p.m. on the
25th, did not go entirely to plan. Well into the Atlantic, over 100 miles off
Northern Ireland, two torpedoes were fired into homebound Convoy HH 58. One
hit Leyland’s passenger liner Atlantian on
her starboard side in number three hold, the other missed an escort. This
will have been the U.S. Armoured-Cruiser Rochester, as she was ahead
centrally of the convoy and the Atlantian
was the lead vessel on the starboard wing. A second torpedo had to be used to
finish her off. While it is stated in the German official history that the
‘cruiser’ frustrated U86’s efforts to maintain further contact with
the convoy, there was more to this attack than admitted. Having been damaged
by the first torpedo and settling forward, as most of the crew were gotten
away safely, her gunners fired depth-charges to keep the submarine deep: as
instructed by her master, John Gardner. This they did skilfully, until
ordered to stop. After putting a second torpedo into her at 11.10 p.m., she
sank rapidly. Surfacing approximately thirty minutes later to interrogate the
survivors, the Germans were in a highly nervous state. In going
through the by then normal routine for this submarine’s company, the
merchantman’s chief officer and wireless officer were taken prisoner. This
was, of course, at gunpoint, the officer ‘levelling a revolver at them’ and
threatening to ‘turn the machine gun’ on them if they did not give up the
master. Once again, there were around fourteen submariners on deck that were
all armed and other threats of violence were also bandied about. Anyway, the Atlantian’s survivors were rescued at 4 a.m. the
next by H.M. Destroyer Medway.
After this U86 exited this area and travelled southwards. The
psychological state of the officers, warrant officers, petty officers and men
of this boat can only be speculated upon. As per the German official history,
in a calm sea with good visibility, a large, four-funnelled steamship was
sighted approximately 120 nautical miles southwest of Ireland during the
afternoon of June 27th. Maintaining contact at the limit of visibility, U86
overhauled the steamer on the surface. Diving at dusk, at around 9.30 p.m.,
it was claimed that in the twilight and with the acute angle between
submarine and target, the ship’s lights could not be seen clearly. Two
torpedoes were fired shortly after, with one hit. A ‘second heavy detonation
occurred inside the ship’ and she sank ten minutes later. A later
investigation concluded that Patzig’s ‘doubts about
the character and use’ of this hospital ship, ‘were not substantiated by the
proven facts’. Furthermore, this attack did not
‘comply’ with the operational orders then in force. It should be borne in
mind that this volume of Der Krieg zur See was not published until
1966!
According to the British official history, The Merchant Navy
(and backed by voluminous original reports and sworn statements with
additional information) at 9.30 p.m. H.M. Hospital Ship Llandovery Castle
was inbound to the U.K. from Canada and burning both navigation and hospital
ship lights when torpedoed without warning. Thankfully, she was not carrying
any sick and wounded, but apart from her ship’s company of 164, had 80
members of the Canadian Army Medical Corps and fourteen female nurses
onboard. Struck in number four hold, thereby causing her to begin settling
immediately, her master, Edward Arthur Sylvester, ordered her abandonment.
Unable to shut down her engines, this was carried out while there was still
weigh on and consequently, some of the lifeboats were swamped, with at least
some occupants drowned. Some others could not even be launched due to damage
and so, rafts were also used. Listing heavily to starboard, there was an
explosion and she sank by her stern.
This, unfortunately, was not the end of the survivors’ torment. As had
become the practice on this particular submarine, she surfaced and made for
the lifeboats among the wreckage and people in the water. Coming upon the one commanded by the
master, he was taken onboard the submarine and interrogated by Patzig. On learning that his ‘victory’ had been against a
hospital ship, the German claimed that there were ‘eight American flight
officers’ onboard. Denied, a Canadian medical officer, Major Thomas Lyon, was
then taken onboard, with a similar claim and denial: as well as another about
carrying ammunition. While getting onboard U86 the medic broke one of
his legs, probably due to Oberleutnant Dithmar on the casing. On completion
of this intimidatory action he and the master were allowed to return to the
lifeboat. The submarine then stormed
around the boats, almost hitting them and conducting similar, ridiculous
charades – the Llandovery Castle’s second officer also being quizzed
about the hospital ship carrying ammunition. This was, apparently, because of
the loud explosion that the merchant mariner stated was due to water reaching
her (hot) boilers. After trying to sink lifeboats through ramming, U86
then put a short distance between her and the boats and opened fire with her
primary surface armament. In the darkness, only the master’s lifeboat, with
twenty-four souls onboard, managed to slip away and after a night of
suffering they were rescued by H.M. Destroyer Lysander the next
morning. U86
continued on patrol. According to the German official history, on June 30th Patzig harried an ‘exceptionally heavily guarded’ convoy.
This was OF 41 that was slow, proceeding at 7½ knots and zig-zagging. The
escort at this stage was comprised of an ancient armoured-cruiser, Sutlej;
along with a light-cruiser, Glasgow; two destroyers, Grasshopper
and Nereus; a seaplane-carrier, Engadine;
and also, eight trawlers. The first two attacks were, apparently, attempted
some time before noon and 5 p.m. respectively. In the course of the second an
escort bent the periscope, but was repaired partly and a third attack was
mounted at about 8.30 p.m.: being depth-charged afterwards. U86 had
managed to torpedo one defensively-armed merchantman forward, around number
one hold, in this last attack. She was a Briton, Origen, the lead ship
of the port wing. Stopped and screened by H.M. Destroyer Grasshopper
and two escort/rescue-trawlers, one identified as Franc Tireur, even although most were taken off, there was
also work overnight to save her. However, Patzig
was tenacious in his efforts to sink the damaged merchantman and in the early
hours of July 1st two more torpedoes were expended: but missed. After
recharging her batteries, yet another torpedo attack was made at 2.15 p.m.,
hitting her in and around the stokehold. This did for her immediately:
sinking in two minutes. Although there had been injuries among the crew and
passengers, there was only one fatality. This was not noticed until a last muster
was made and one of the firemen was missing. Patzig closed this patrol operationally with another
attack later on July 1st. During the evening two large merchantmen with a
heavy destroyer defence were sighted about 140 miles west of Brest, France.
Although hindered by the damaged periscope and with only one torpedo left, in
a stern tube, he still attained a hit on one of the steamers. She was U.S.S. Covington
(late German prize Cincinnati) that was trooping. Since she was
returning to the United States the casualties in this sinking were light: at
six dead. As for U86, she it was reported that she was depth-charged
heavily. Patzig and his crew also survived serious damage
received from the North Sea Mine Barrage on July 8th. Although U86 was
helped to get back to port by U53, Patzig’s
performance in dealing with this emergency was impressive. Nevertheless, it
was said that some of his crew regarded this incident as divine retribution
for their sinking of the Llandovery Castle.
Since U90’s commander, Kapitänleutnant Walter Remy, was ill, Patzig took temporary command for his final patrol of the
war. Sailing on August 5th, four days later about 120 nautical miles west of
the Hebrides, one seaman was washed overboard during an action against three
armed-trawlers. Continuing southwards, U90 came into contact with a
convoy of seven merchantmen during the evening of the 14th. It was stated to
have had a heavy escort and its defence included tethered balloons. A ‘double
torpedo shot’ was deployed against one merchantman and on missing, the
escorts depth-charged U90 heavily. Nevertheless, contact was
maintained and wireless was used in order to bring other U-boats into the
attack – without success.
While in westward pursuit of this convoy, a tiny French fishing-boat, J.M.J,
was encountered on the 15th and Patzig had her
destroyed by gunfire. However, an eastbound convoy. HB 8, was sighted later
in the day. Although it seems to have been re-ordered later, there were
sixteen merchantmen in six columns, as per the sailing orders. The lead
escort that was probably well ahead of the central columns and allowed to
pass was an old French armoured-cruiser, Marseille. Patzig was in an ideal firing-position ahead on the
convoy’s port bow and three torpedoes from her forward tubes were fired in
short succession: with two out of three hits. Following the inevitable
depth-charging by U.S.S. Noma (J.J. Astor’s steam yacht), the scene
was investigated by U90. There was only one vessel to be found and so,
the damaged American steamer, U.S.S. West Bridge that had been in the
centre of the convoy, was kept under surveillance overnight. Surfacing,
during the forenoon of the 16th, two more torpedoes were put into her, but still she would not sink. Initially, she was gotten under
tow by Admiralty rescue tug Epic and joined by another, Woonda, as well as French and American comrades
later. Although damaged badly, through their efforts, West Bridge
reached Brest on the 22nd. Four American mariners had been killed though. U90
was kept deep through depth-charging after the second attack and so, the
convoy was lost. But, the other merchantman that had
been the lead ship of number one (port) column was another American, Montanan.
She had been hit port midships in the engine-room and with extensive damage
below the waterline, sank. Five more people were drowned accidentally whilst
abandoning ship. In
the evening of the 16th a new target was found. She was a defensively-armed
Briton, Escrick that was by then sailing
independently, but had previously been part of a convoy that had sailed from
the Gironde on the 15th and dispersed when seaward. Patzig
carried out a surface torpedo attack in moonlight at 10.20 p.m. and the
weapon struck her engine-room. Abandoned ten minutes later in three boats,
she sank at 10.35 p.m. Surfacing and drawing near to the survivors, as they
did not comply with the order to go alongside immediately, as in earlier
events on U86, two pistol shots were fired. Patzig
that was on the bridge was said to have been ‘most anxious to get the Gunners
and Wireless Operator’. Strangely, considering that
only the officers and gunners were white (the majority being Arabs), he only
took the master and had him sent below at once. Releasing the rest to the
vagaries of the open ocean, in time all three boats and their occupants were
found, but they were scattered vastly. Unfortunately, the
fourth-engineer had been killed at the time of the torpedoing, having been on
watch in the engine-room.
Venturing further westwards for more vessels from this Gironde convoy,
an unescorted, defensively-armed, American tanker, Joseph Cudahy, was
sighted before dawn on the 17th. In daylight, she received two torpedo hits,
but refused to sink. Therefore, U90 surfaced and spent 30 minutes
shelling her with her forward 10.5 c.m. gun.
Abandoned, there was only one further fatality.
On her transit back to the Fatherland and having run out of torpedoes,
a British steamer, Helenus, was attacked by gunfire off the west of
Ireland on the 22nd. This was not the first time that this British vessel had
been attacked and on this occasion she managed to
make off unscathed. A Portuguese barque, Graciosa northwest of the
Orkney Isles (that had been a German prize, Margaretha), did not fare
so well two days later. Already under shellfire from U90, another
boat, U67 (under the command of Kapitänleutnant Helmuth von Rabinau) joined in: resulting in her destruction.
Similar to earlier in the year, Patzig
received praise from his superiors. The B.d.U.
reckoned that he had displayed ‘exemplary leadership’ in these two last
patrols.
Post-war, Patzig remained in the Reichsmarine, seemingly being demobilised in
November 1919 and placed on the retired list. It is not clear whether he went
back to Danzig that had become a ‘Free City’ under the oversight of the League
of Nations the same month, although it is thought that he did and remained
there – in safety.
Anyway, in pursuance of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles that
came into force on 10th January 1920, Patzig was on
a list of 897 individuals for possible prosecution for war crimes that was
presented to the German Government on February 1st. Failing to live up to the
recently signed treaty obligations, the new Reich’s Government refused
to hand them over to any foreign powers. Even so, negotiations resulted in
agreement that a much-reduced list of defendants would be tried in the
Leipzig Supreme Court: under German military law. Consequently, this smaller
list of 45, of which seven were presented by the British, was handed over
that May. Patzig was also on this list. The first
twelve trials were conducted from late-May until mid-July 1921, but the
judgments handed down were regarded by the Allied nations as farcical. In
mid-January 1922 the Allied Governments withdrew their observers in protest. In
June the German judiciary took the decision unilaterally that it would carry
on without Allied input. These proceedings staggered on into the 1930s, but
were wound down quietly. Even the dates as to when this occurred are not
clear, although there are snippets related to specific cases.
The British case against Patzig was far
stronger than with other suspects, but because he could not be found, his two
wartime watch officers were tried for murder instead, between 12th and 16th
July 1921. In spite of Dithmar and Boldt refusing to account for themselves
to German governmental officials, testimonies from the Llandovery Castle’s
survivors and also past members of U86’s company had been taken beforehand.
The judgment makes fascinating reading. ‘Patzig
recognised the character of the ship which he had been pursuing for a long
time, at the latest when she exhibited at dusk the lights prescribed for
hospital ships by the Tenth Hague Convention’. In
order to make this pursuit U86 must have been surfaced and even if
trimmed down, to lessen the probability of counter sighting, it is difficult
to believe that her officers and lookouts had not identified the character of
this target long before dusk. Coupled to the orders that Patzig should have been operating under, this can
be regarded as a premeditated attack on a hospital ship. Articulating
the ideas that some Kaiserliche Marine officers held of the Allies
shifting troops and munitions onboard hospital ships (of which there is virtually
no proof and even then, only of empty shell cases shipped home on a few
occasions), the judges could not ascertain why there would be any American
aviators onboard. While diplomats, consular officials and others abroad had
managed to get some shipping movements to the Fatherland, along with not
ineffective Signal Intelligence operations, it is difficult to conceive as to
how German submarine commanders could have known even general
identities of Allied vessels’ passengers.
A sober and considered assessment of the sinking and immediate
aftermath followed. According to this there would have been three lifeboats
afloat, two together near U86 and the captain’s boat further away on a
significantly different bearing. Two shells only were said to have been fired
at the captain’s boat that went overhead and then twelve to fourteen in
another direction. At face value, unless those responsible on the submarine’s
bridge and casing thought that they had destroyed the captain’s boat with
these two rounds, it is difficult to understand why they would have allowed
it to escape – even in darkness.
Evidence from ex-U-bootsmänner stated
that apart from Patzig, all, except the two watch
officers had been sent below. Whether Oberbootsmann
(Chief Boatswain’s Mate) Meißner had been sent below
and then up top again is immaterial. This senior rating had been a gunlayer, but had died before the trial. Also, it was the
8.8 c.m. gun, abaft the conning tower that was
used. Information from one rating, Popitz, is of
particular interest. Although described as a mere helmsman (in the English
language version) he was not only acting as the third watch officer, but
also, seemingly, the navigating warrant officer. Below while the firing was
going on, ‘he took it for granted ... that the lifeboats were being fired at’. Another witness, Hans Knoche that was the Chief
Engineer also made this assumption. Patzig’s
mindset during and after these events, when he tried to ensure the silence of
his crew and even the two Prisoners of War, were speculated upon by the
judges. They considered that he may well have decided to kill all the
survivors to cover up this atrocity. However, even although the two accused
were guilty in assisting their commander’s illegal orders, their ‘deliberate
intention’ in killing was not, in the judges’ opinion, proven. Consequently,
they could only be punished as ‘accessories’ and hence, received sentences of
four years imprisonment. Also, since Dithmar had still been a serving officer
at the time of the trial, he was dismissed from the Reichsmarine
and Boldt lost the ‘right to wear officer’s uniform’.
Within six months both Dithmar and Boldt were free, having been sprung by
right-wing extremists from separate prisons.
Little has been uncovered about Patzig’s
activities during the interwar period – especially early on. Apparently, the
first heard of him by German authorities was in early May 1926 when a written
statement was received from ‘abroad’. This claimed that the late gunlayer Meißner was the only
one given a direct order, operating the gun by himself and that Dithmar and
Boldt had merely been lookouts. Patzig also stated,
illogically that he reckoned that the two officers were convinced that these
killings had been a case of military necessity. Justification was then made
in claiming that the second explosion had to have been ordnance
detonating. Two months later applications were presented to Leipzig’s Supreme
Court to revoke Patzig’s arrest warrant and reverse the guilty verdicts for
Dithmar and Boldt. Creatively, Patzig’s defence
lawyer argued that his actions had been politically motivated and so, could
not be regarded as criminal. All of this was accepted that July, but a low
profile was kept: so as not to cause international criticism. In a closed
session of the Reich Court in May 1928, Dithmar and Boldt had their
convictions overturned and were acquitted. The former returned to the Reichsmarine and the latter went back to Colombia
where he had been living post-war (committing suicide in 1931). It was not
until May 1930 that Patzig’s case was discontinued
though.
An important point needs making about Patzig’s
statement of Meißner operating U86’s 8.8 c.m. gun by himself. Apart from a spotter, most likely on
the bridge, in this case Patzig, a minimum of three
were required to operate such weapons. The gun-trainer controlled the
bearing; the more skilled gun-layer controlled the elevation; and one more
hand was needed as the loader. Since comparatively few rounds were fired on
this occasion, it is likely that these came from the ready-use containers
fitted around the base of the conning-tower.
Even then, the shells themselves had to be removed from additional
watertight cases, before loading. If these containers had been emptied, more
ammunition would have had to have been manhandled to the gun from a magazine
below, through a hatch – requiring more hands. So, the reality would have
been that Dithmar and Boldt were active in the act of killing the Llandovery
Castle’s survivors.
According to one source, after the rise of the Nazis to power Patzig joined the N.S.D.A.P.: in November 1933. It was
not until September 1937 that he joined the Kriegsmarine though, as a
Kapitänleutnant der Reserve zur Verwendung
(available for appointment) with seniority backdated to October 1929. At some
point and for reasons undiscovered, he also changed his surname to Brümmer-Patzig.
Although he had been promoted to Korvettenkapitän der Reserve in
December 1939, he did not receive an appointment until February 1940. This
was to the submarine schools Neustadt and Pillau.
However, in April he was put on the staff of the Commander of Submarine
Operations, Kiel. This was also short-lived, as a month later he was made
available for employment at the new western French base at Lorient. Following
September, possibly on leave, he was transferred to the base at Königsberg,
East Prussia. Shunted around again, in November he was appointed to a
captured Dutch submarine in Rotterdam, commissioning her in January 1941 as UD4. He then remained in command until that
October, without any patrols. Next, he was the Gunnery Director of the 25th
Submarine Flotilla, Memel, until February 1943. (According to another source
seen, he was described as the senior torpedo attack instructor.) Settling
down somewhat, he became the Chief of the 26th Submarine Flotilla, at Pillau and Warnemünde, on
Germany’s Baltic coast. In February 1944, he was promoted Fregattenkapitän
der Reserve. As the Russians advanced and the Germans retreated, he was sent
for employment by the Commanding Admiral of Submarines, Kiel in mid-April
1945 and was pensioned off at the end of the month. Brümmer-Patzig then appears to have fallen into total
obscurity again. It is said in one, unconfirmed, source that he gave an
interview in the early 1980s. Supposedly, he then claimed that no
deliberate attempt to kill the Llandovery Castle’s survivors had been
made either by him, or those under his command. Anway, it is stated variously
that he died in March 1984. |
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Mariners’ War Kapitänleutnant Rudolf
Schneider Kapitänleutnant
Walther Schwieger Kapitänleutnant
Otto Steinbrinck Kapitänleutnant
Max Valentiner Kapitänleutnant
Wilhelm Werner |