Otto Steinbrinck

Otto Steinbrinck was one of the Kaiserliche Marine’s most successful officers by tonnage sunk and a hero to Germans, with a not inconsiderable amount written about him. In the sterile way that these have been produced, there is little relating to his character, even if in one lengthy piece he was described as ‘chivalrous’.

He was born in Lippstadt in Westphalia, in late 1888, the son of Carl, a privy counsellor and secondary school (Realgymnasium) professor. Entering the Kaiserliche Marine as a Seekadett in April 1907, he was in the same ‘Crew’ as Claus Lafrenz that he would serve with later during the Great War. Following time on a light-cruiser, Bremen and in Kiel in the 1st Naval Division (I Matrosendivision), he went into submarines. He had already been a watch officer on U15 and U8 and by September 1914 had gained command of U6. Appointed to a torpedo-boat, S122 that December, this was short-lived and within weeks returned to U6. He may also have been in command of UB1 at some time in early 1915.

It might be said that Oberleutnant zur See Steinbrinck’s war began properly in taking command of UB10. Constructed in sections in Bremen, this tiny submarine was then transported to Antwerp by rail and re-assembled. Commissioned on March 14th, UB10 was the first boat in the Marinekorps Flandern, although she did not conduct the first patrol from this new base.

Steinbrinck’s first ‘victory’ was over a steamer in the evening twilight of April 14th, having sailed earlier that day. While dived and without warning, he torpedoed a steamer near the North Hinder Lightship, in the southern North Sea, close to the European coastline. Incidentally, in the cramped conning-tower position, Steinbrink will have been assisted by the boat’s navigating warrant officer. According to German accounts, this vessel was suspicious, especially through course alterations and so, regarded as hostile. But, this two-thousand-ton Dutchman, Katwijk, was at anchor, in order to enter Rotterdam in daylight: as instructed. She was burning an anchor light and also ‘two large electric lamps for illuminating the sides of the ship’. These surfaces were painted with Dutch flags 15 x 10 metres and also her ship’s name and port of registration between these national marks of identification. Additionally, she was flying the Dutch flag, her company flag and signal letters. It took about twenty minutes for the Katwijk to sink and there were no fatalities. After she went down UB10 surfaced, but no assistance was given to the survivors in their lifeboats. Understandably, this caused a diplomatic incident with the Netherlands Government. Although not rebuked in public, Otto Steinbrinck was, apparently, disciplined in a manner unstated. It is worth pointing out that it was said later that he had always studied all relevant intelligence reports in his pre-patrol planning after this affair.

Following the Katwijk sinking, Steinbrinck had, along with the other UB-boats that were being commissioned, been exploring in and around the Thames Estuary north as far as the Galloper Lightvessel in Suffolk. Commercially busy waters, the majority of the traffic seen were neutral and attempts to attack were only made on steamers flying no colours. Even then, until around the end of May all were unsuccessful. This was at least partly due to the submarines being difficult to handle in these confined waters in some weather conditions.

Anyway, during the evening of June 7th, while in the vicinity of the Elbow Buoy and Tongue Lightship and in a calm sea, four steamers were sighted astern. Three were neutrals, but the fourth was a Belgian, Menapier and so, was torpedoed midships by Steinbrinck, without warning while dived. Carrying 3,400 tons of iron ore, she sank in less than a minute and hardly surprisingly, there were seventeen fatalities.

Steinbrinck’s next four patrols, were from German perspectives, unproductive. The first had been to the Thames in mid-June; the second to the English south coast between Beachy Head and Dungeness from late June to early July; the third further north to the Shipwash, off the Suffolk coast in mid-July; and the last to the northern end of the Downs later in July Nevertheless, while the weaknesses of these boats, particularly their lack of mechanical power, were becoming all too apparent, their commanders were learning how to use them.

Those making the very first attacks on East Coast smacks, in June, operated slightly differently from each other, although once close to their victims, the procedures were much the same. The fishermen were ordered to abandon ship peremptorily through hailing and go alongside the submarines in their lifeboats. (The time given was almost always five minutes – both for diminutive fishing craft and also, for the record, larger merchantmen. This meant that few, if any, possessions could be taken with the hapless mariners.) Having complied with these demands, the fishermen were then ordered onboard the submarines while German demolition parties used their boats, boarded the fishing-boats and set charges, before returning and releasing the temporary prisoners. Prior to getting close Oberleutnant zur See Hans Valentiner, commanding UB16, had sought to intimidate the fishermen that he encountered, if only in a minor way, by having a few rifle shots, or rockets, fired. On one occasion during one of these actions, a red ensign was taken by a member of the demolition party and given to his commander: probably as a souvenir. Instead, Oberleutnant zur See Werner Fürbringer, of UB2, favoured conning his boat close to the smacks without any preamble. Flags and pendants were seen to have been taken more than once. Interestingly, none of the fishing craft’s papers seem to have been taken in these first few patrols.

UB10 sailed from Zeebrugge next on July 29th for the furthest reaches of Suffolk. In the vicinity of Smith’s Knoll, off Lowestoft, the next morning and forenoon, eight smacks, Achieve, Athena, Coriander, Fitzgerald, Prospector, Quest, Strive and Venture that were almost all becalmed, were stopped and sunk by one charge put on each. By this time both sides had learned from June’s attacks. On the part of the Germans, it must have been judged that no threats from firearms were needed and apart from continuing to steal flags, pendants etc., searches were made for the fishing boats’ certificates of registry and such like. On sighting a surfaced submarine, the English skippers would burn papers including recent Notices to Mariners and customs clearance permits. It would seem that a certain amount of stealth was attempted on the part of Steinbrinck, as in the early morning light his boat had small lug sails rigged, but once the assaults began, it must have been pointless retaining this disguise.

Even although traffic north of Yarmouth was heavy on the 31st, a dived torpedo attack on a steamer flying a red ensign failed. However, a British coasting-steamer, Fulgens, was torpedoed in her number four hold and bunker (aft) on her port side, during the next day’s forenoon: sinking in five minutes. Miraculously, the only casualties were two Arab firemen that were injured. Also, another Lowestoft smack, Alert, was stopped that afternoon and set on fire with paraffin found by the demolition party. It was reported by the Alert’s skipper that UB10 had a fish head painted on her bow. The act of decorating UB-boats’ bows seems to have begun by Werner Fürbringer, with a pair of eyes, as mentioned by the Edward’s skipper in June and it is also known that Hans Valentiner copied Fürbringer.

Steinbrinck’s next patrol began on August 7th. Two more smacks, were destroyed similarly the following day, during the afternoon. The curiously named Xmas Rose was on her way to the fishing grounds and for reasons unknown, after the destruction her lifeboat was towed for some way, although the fishermen still had to pull for twenty minutes further to reach a merchantman. The Arbor Vitæ had two tons of fish in her hold, but it would appear that none were taken by the Germans.

On the 9th Steinbrinck tried unsuccessfully several times to get within torpedo range of steamers. According to German accounts although there was thick fog, a British steamer, Rosalie that grossed well over four-thousand tons, was torpedoed without warning and sunk on the 10th. Shortly afterwards, another British steamer survived a torpedo attack. This is not supported by British records. The Rosalie had passed Blakeney eastward buoy when at 6.10 p.m. she was struck aft on her port side by a torpedo. No sign of her attacker was seen, except for a second torpedo that missed: fired about ten minutes later. Even although she was taking water ‘freely’ in her engine-room, stokehold, cross-bunkers and number four hold, with the aid of six minesweepers, the Rosalie was beached on Weybourne shore, Norfolk. Whether Steinbrinck wrote up his war diary as two attacks to avoid criticism for missing a stationary and sinking merchantman, or not, cannot be determined from the sources to hand.

Shortly before midnight UB10 began attacks on ten more smacks: nine off Haisborough Lightvessel and another one that was off Smith’s Knoll. The Esperance had her nets down, with her crew below and the first that they knew of what was going to happen to them was when the submarine struck her stern and on venturing up top, found a German seaman onboard. Without time to destroy her papers, the official certificates were taken. The rest of these assaults were carried out in a not dissimilar manner. Dispensing with having the smacks crews abandon in their lifeboats before putting demolition parties onboard, UB10 went alongside them – colliding with another. If skippers had time, they burnt their papers, normally with the exception of their certificates that were taken. By the end of the Germans’ exertions, they had also destroyed the George Borrow, George Crabbe, Humphrey, Illustrious, Ocean’s Gift, Palm, Trevear, Welcome and the Young Admiral. Chronologically, the last was the Humphrey that was off Smith’s Knoll with her hands hauling up her nets at 4 a.m. (of the 11th), when UB10 surfaced near her and went alongside. It is not unimportant to note that the Germans took a ‘quantity of fish’ and told the crew to pull for a Dutch steamer, before blowing up the smack.

It was stated in the German official history that in two of the early patrol reports that Steinbrinck had claimed that most of these fishermen had been friendly towards their attackers: sometimes even giving them fish and flour. It may have been that Steinbrinck mistook civility for friendliness, but there is a hint in British post-war analysis that he and his company were merely talkative.

Anyway, orders to exercise caution in stopping small vessels were issued at flotilla level following British employment of decoy-smacks off East Anglia’s coast in early to mid-August. At first, this did not affect Steinbrinck, as his boat was deployed overwhelmingly in the Thames’ outer waters again: with little success even in surface torpedo attacks at night. In fact, it was not until the night of December 20-21st that he had any more victories. These, however, were under entirely different conditions.

Sailing from Zeebrugge early on the 20th, Steinbrinck had been instructed to make a short foray into the English Channel, but with fine weather and a full moon, he decided to make for Boulogne, to attack transports. Having negotiated the nets and patrols, on the surface in Boulogne Roads he made his attacks cooly. Two of the seven merchantmen at anchor in the roads were torpedoed and sunk. The Huntly was a ‘one-thousand tonner’ transport that had been a German prize (Ophelia) was carrying petroleum in 28,000 cases, but the smaller Belford, on Belgian government service, had a cargo of 560 tons of patent fuel. Two, a greaser and the donkeyman, were killed on the Huntly. Since both torpedoes had been expended, UB10 returned to base. Command was then turned over to Oberleutnant zur See Reinhold Saltzwedel.

Steinbrinck received command of UB18 that was the first of the new, more powerful UB-II boats that the Marinekorps Flandern received. The first of two short patrols to northern France was carried out in late February 1916. German accounts claim that Steinbrinck torpedoed and sank a French armed paddle-steamer during the afternoon of February 26th, but British analysis reckoned that there was no hit. However, Au Revoir, a paddle-minesweeper was, indeed, torpedoed and sunk the next day.

The second of these patrols in March differed in that large mercantile vessels were torpedoed. Off Boulogne on the 3rd, Harmatris, a British ammunition ship of well over six-thousand tons loaded with shells and shell cases (or, shell cases, oats and 5,000 tons of hay), was sunk while at anchor waiting for the tide and a berth. Four were killed in this attack. Six days later, in Le Havre Roads, a French steamer, Louisiane that was over five-thousand tons and a Norwegian barque, Silius, at fifteen-hundred tons, were despatched in evening moonlight while dived. They too had been at anchor. At about 9.30 p.m. a ‘loud explosion and terrible shouting and screaming’ was heard by the Silius’ helmsman on watch. This must have been the torpedoing of the Louisiane and one person was killed in this attack. A ‘heavy alarm’ was then heard at about 10.20 p.m. on the Norwegian barque, followed by a ‘terrible explosion’ a few minutes later. The Silium sank by her head, with her crew abandoning as best they could. They were rescued by a French patrol-boat around 45 minutes later, but three had been killed. The port was closed briefly, with merchantmen being diverted accordingly.

Returning to Le Havre’s Roads, Steinbrinck found the port open again on March 22nd. As midnight approached, a British steamer of just over four-thousand tons, Kelvinbank, was waiting to go alongside and discharge bullocks and probably oats. She was sunk with two torpedoes, with one mariner killed. After midnight, a Norwegian steamer, Kannik, was also sunk. As may have been the case earlier, nothing was seen of UB18.

At the end of the month Steinbrinck received the Pour le Mérite. He was only the third in the Kaiserliche Marine and the first in the Marinekorps Flandern to gain this highly sought after recognition.

In the former of two patrols in April UB18 returned to Le Havre once again. Arriving in the evening of the 4th, no targets were found. This was because the port had been closed again until this date, with the French Ministry of Marine appealing to the British for net-drifters. (Twenty were sent subsequently.) However, another Norwegian steamer, Baus that was steering for port was sunk by torpedo, in a surface attack, during the early hours of the 5th. Le Havre having been re-opened, an unsuccessful surface torpedo attack was also mounted on an unknown steamer during the morning of the 6th. Cutting his losses, Steinbrinck then crossed the English Channel, where a small French sailing vessel, Jeanette, was stopped and destroyed by charge off the Isle of Wight. Nearby after dark, a steamer without markings was also torpedoed. It was later established that she was a Dutchman, Eemdijk that was towed into a British port. And, while on passage back to Belgium, a small British brigantine, Clyde, was stopped and sunk by charge on the 7th. The demolition party took the ‘bell clock, weather glass, binnacle top’ and the ‘ship’s papers’.

In a period of numerous sweeps and counter-sweeps by both sides’ major surface units in and around the North Sea, UB18 sailed on April 23rd, as part of an outpost line in the southern North Sea that was to cover a short, but heavy bombardment of Lowestoft on the 24th. UB18’s position had been twenty miles east of Yarmouth and along with the other UB-boats, at a predetermined time on the 25th, shaped an east-south-east course. This brought the German submarines into contact with British light-forces initially and then British submarines, midway between the English and Dutch coasts, during the forenoon. H.M. Submarine E26 that was one of four surfaced boats in line ahead, sighted UB18’s periscope at approximately 11 a.m. G.M.T. and very nearly rammed her: grazing UB18’s net-cutter. Forty minutes later at a range of 350 meters, H.M. Submarine E22 was then torpedoed by Steinbrinck. At this point E26 was three miles away and dived, while UB18 surfaced and rescued the two survivors from E22. All 31 others from this boat perished.

Incidentally, there is a tale of this sinking in a modern German book, purportedly told by an American that knew a British submariner that may well have been highly embellished – by Steinbrinck himself. Apart from anything else it claims that British naval officers ‘feared and respected’ Steinbrinck greatly, but this is not particularly believable, as it can be seen in Naval Intelligence records that next to nothing was known of him!

Anyway, during UB18’s homeward passage, a British smack, Alfred, was stopped and sunk the following morning off Lowestoft. This Ramsgate boat’s crew comprised of two elderly men and two twelve-year-old boys and Steinbrinck had their boat towed all the way to the North Hinder Lightship: taking almost nine hours. It is worth pointing out that prior to this not exactly kindly act that as well as taking fish and ice, her skipper had been threatened, presumably by Steinbrinck, with a pistol.

The order issued from on high on April 24th to conduct attacks primarily on warships and auxiliaries limited the UB-boat commanders significantly. Not only were warships, especially light-draught monitors, difficult to torpedo, they were, increasingly, also armed with depth-charges. So, in time the Marinekorps Flandern submarine commanders reverted to their destruction of small civilian sailing vessels in the southern North Sea and up England’s East Coast.

In Steinbrinck’s case, from a range of one mile, without warning, a shell was fired at a British smack, Research, on May 17th, off Cromer, Norfolk. Although abandoning immediately the shelling continued and while getting into the lifeboat the cook was killed, with the skipper and one other hand wounded. Also, rather than using a demolition party, on this occasion a bomb was thrown onboard and she blew up as UB18 drew up to the survivors. No flag was flown by the submarine and the fishermen were informed that they should ‘clear off’.

It was not until mid-July that Steinbrinck could continue this. Off the coast of Sunderland two small neutral sailing vessels, with pitprops, were attacked on the 15th. One, a Dutchman, Dina, was sunk, while the other, a Norwegian, Bertha, was made derelict and towed back to port, but was judged a total loss. Two days later, on her return passage, six smacks, Gertrude, Glance, Loch Nevis, Loch Tay, V.M.G. and Waverley were sunk with charges near Smith’s Knoll and Haisborough, Norfolk.

All except the Loch Nevis were held up with pistol, or rifle shots, during the late morning and forenoon watches. In almost every case the demolition parties stole the copper side-lights, flags and food. Less often other gear, including cordage and rigging, were also taken. Few of these smacks’ papers were captured, especially since the more important tended to be kept ashore safely. The destruction of the Loch Nevis differed slightly. This began at 8 p.m. with a shell landing in the sea very close indeed. Unlike earlier in the day when there was some communication, even if only in demands, the skipper stated afterwords that ‘no words’ had been spoken by the Germans. Also, while there were more thefts, it could not be seen by the fishermen what they consisted of. And, none of the reports mentioned Steinbrinck or his crew offering any assistance to the fishermen.

Although the military High Command’s July demand for action against transports in the English Channel could not be met by Steinbrinck in an exploratory foray, he took it upon himself to begin holding-up steamers more generally again. Arriving off Le Havre on August 2nd, having been depth-charged by H.M. Destroyer Syren the day before, he found calm conditions not conducive to submarine operations and decided instead, on carrying out Handelskrieg to the west, before returning there. Acting in accordance with the Prize Regulations, two small British sailing-vessels were sunk off Cape d’Antifer on August 2nd, before UB18 shifted to off St. Catherine’s Point, Isle of Wight later in the day. (The positions as reported give a slightly false impression, as the sinkings of British vessels are as bearings from the English south coast, while French ones are as bearings from their north coast. These were actually mostly mid-channel.) Anyway, there between the 2nd and 3rd another two small British sailing-vessels were attacked, although in the case of the Ivo the charge failed and she was towed into port. Although an American steamer was stopped and released, two British steamers were also sunk. The Badger was tiny, but the Sphene was considerably larger: at 740 tons. A small French sailing-vessel was also scuttled off Cap de la Hague on the 3rd. Two small British sailing-vessels carrying stone, probably of the Portland variety, were consigned to the bottom on the 4th.

Another British steamer, Spiral, was also sunk on this day. She was much larger, at 1,342 tons gross and was stopped by a shell that went overhead and landed about twenty feet away. On the master stating that he did not have his ship’s papers with him in his lifeboat, a pistol ‘was pointed at his head and he was told by the commander not to be reckless’. On this occasion the Germans stole ‘various provisions and clocks and barometers’. The Spiral did not sink after the first charges were detonated and a second boarding was required.

Since the sea had risen UB18 returned to Le Havre, but repeated attempts to torpedo escorted steamers over three days proved unsuccessful. This was, apparently, because Steinbrinck could not identify his targets positively as transports. Abandoning these efforts on the 9th, over two days UB18 sank four steamers, two that were French and two Norwegian, as well as two small French sailing-vessels. Three of the steamers were less than one-thousand tons, but the Sora, was over this tonnage. Even although UB18’s demolition parties must have been experienced, the Sora took about thirty minutes to sink after the charges were set off.

Following Steinbrinck’s patrol aimed at hitting transports, at national level Handelskrieg was still in abeyance, but permission was given locally in mid-August by Admiral à la suite des Seeoffizierkorps Ludwig von Schröder commanding the Marinekorps Flandern, for this to resume in accordance with Prize Regulations in the western English Channel. Nevertheless, it could not be acted upon immediately, as all the boats were required for Vizeadmiral Reinhard Scheer’s major operation on August 18th. They were deployed in two lines in the southern North Sea, in the hope of catching British units making for the still powerful elements of the Hochseeflotte aiming to bombard Sunderland.

UB18 was one of four boats let loose in the English Channel in early September. Slipping on the 1st, Steinbrinck’s first ‘victories’ on this highly successful patrol were over two small British steamers, Netta and Teesborough, off Beachy Head on the 3rd. Continuing transit to her intended patrol area, two days later east of Barfleur, another small British steamer, City of Ghent and a much larger Belgian, Marcel, were stopped and destroyed.

In the early afternoon of the 7th (as the times on the British and German accounts do not tally), ten miles south of the Lizard, UB18 opened fire on a small brigantine from 2,000 yards/1,800 metres. Although becalmed H.M. Special Service Vessel Helgoland (Q17) returned fire. Both sides claimed hits on each other, but the submarine dived. Notwithstanding differences in the accounts, according to excerpts of UB18’s war diary, she re-surfaced and engaged in a gunnery dual at a range of 4,000 metres. This was, seemingly, only after Steinbrinck had tried to carry out a torpedo attack that failed. The gun-battle was broken off eventually, by Steinbrinck, as the ‘standby’ ammunition had been expended and the British shots were getting close. A British account reckoned that this latter action was carried out by another, larger submarine. Intending to attack the decoy again by torpedo at dusk, this was thwarted by a Perseval-type airship’s arrival. Later the in the evening, during the first watch, Steinbrinck embarked on another torpedo attack. A German account stated one was fired from 400 metres, while the British said two ‘passed under her amidships’: due to her shallow draught. Contact was then lost in the fog.

Having reached the South West Approaches, a large Swedish steamer of more than two-and-a-half thousand tons, Gamen, was stopped and sunk during September 8th. She had been outbound with coal from Cardiff for Algiers. The German official history then lists two small French sailing-vessels, Georges Andre and Myositis and also a larger Norwegian steamer, Lodsen, all sunk on the 9th in the vicinity of the Scillies. It does not mention another run-in with a British decoy vessel though.

As per more excerpts of Steinbrinck’s war diary, during the evening three steamers were sighted. Two were small, deeply-laden Norwegians and they were in company with a suspicious-looking black-painted vessel of approximately 3,000 tons. Surfacing, a signal was made for the steamers to stop, but after doing so the large one then turned and ran. Chased, fire was opened by the submarine at about 3,000 metres and in 25 rounds fired, six hits were recorded. Seemingly at 2,400 metres, on fire the steamer then ran up a white ensign, turned towards UB18, opened return fire and pursued her at high speed. Diving, Steinbrinck tried, but failed, to torpedo this adversary that proved later to have been H.M. Decoy Vessel Carrigan Head (Q4). British sources are not insignificantly different in detail. Apart from witnessing the Lodsen being abandoned, there was no mention of other vessels. The signal could not be read, but as she was under fire from both of the submarine’s guns, hove to, with the off-watch stokers instructed to lower a boat to give the impression of leaving the ship. It was then that she affected her sham bid to escape. Two rounds were hits, wounding three, one of whom died later. UB18’s fire becoming accurate, Carrigan Head stopped and began to lower two lifeboats, while still under fire. Both vessels were then stationary about 1,500 yards apart. In the decoy vessel’s subsequent counter attack, not only were speed and guns deployed, so too, were two depth-charges. It was not until about 90 minutes later that UB18 surfaced and sank the Lodsen.

Outbound from Newport, Monmouthshire, a Norwegian steamer, Furu, came under shellfire in the Southwest Approaches off the Scillies, at 6.20 a.m., on the 10th. The first round falling ahead, she was stopped immediately, but two further rounds fell close by her. UB18 ran up an international flag-signal, T.A.F. that meant ‘Bring your papers on board’. So, her master was taken to the submarine in the starboard lifeboat, but as soon as he was onboard the flag-hoist was changed to A over B - ‘abandon the vessel as fast as possible’. As was the normal routine, a demolition party went onboard the merchantman in the starboard lifeboat, while the Furu’s crew abandoned her in the port lifeboat. (The starboard lifeboat was dashed against the submarine’s casing and sank later.) Soon after, the charges blew holes in the ship’s sides that ignited the cargo and she burned for four hours before sinking. As there was a heavy swell and the wind was freshening, the Furu’s master requested Steinbrinck to tow the boats nearer the shore, but he refused. Seemingly, after the detonations, another Norwegian steamer, Polynesia, hove into view at 8.15 a.m. and UB18’s company turned their attention towards her. Grossing over four-thousand tons, she was inbound from New York for London with a valuable cargo of paraffin in barrels and petroleum in tanks. The Polynesia was destroyed routinely after an initial shelling and after she had sunk, the two merchantmen’s lifeboats met. Since there was spare room in the Polynesia’s boats, some of the Furu’s crew transferred. The second merchantman’s master had also asked Steinbrinck to aid the survivors and was told that he dared not tow them, but would endeavour to find another vessel to do this. So, on seeing a barque, as the weather was too bad to sail, the survivors pulled towards her. The identity of this vessel has not been found. However, it would not seem to have been the French Marechal De Villars that was also sunk by UB18 that day: but not until the afternoon. Although the survivors’ boats lost contact, they were all rescued eventually.

Three more neutral steamers were sunk in the same area the following day. One was a Greek, Assimacos, of almost three-thousand tons gross register with coal. The other two, a Norwegian, Kong Ring and a Spaniard, Luis Vives, were inbound from Spain: the former stated as carrying fruit and the latter fruit and vegetables. The Kong Ring’s master protested to Steinbrinck that he was a neutral, his cargo was not contraband and that he had been stopped by a German submarine previously and released. Steinbrinck, claimed, apparently that the orders had changed.

Still undisturbed, UB18 intercepted and sank the Antwerpen on the 12th. She was a tanker of almost eight-thousand tons on her maiden voyage, with 10,300 tons of petroleum from New York for London. Possibly not wishing to push his luck any further, Steinbrinck took his boat towards the French coast, where, according to German accounts, one tiny French sailing vessel, Ariel; two Danish colliers, Hans Jensen and J.N. Madvig; and a Norwegian steamer, Tolosa; were all sunk during the 13th.

A Norwegian report on the loss of the Tolosa stated that the aftermath of the two Danish steamers was witnessed and at least some of the survivors were rescued by this vessel. Although efforts were also made to avoid the submarine that was in sight, UB18 had, effectively, overhauled her at 5.30 a.m. One shell initiated the event. Stopping, the usual routine was gone through. The Tolosa’s crew abandoned at 6.15 a.m. and fifteen minutes later, 15 rounds were put into her bows and stern. An hour later another five rounds were fired into her and yet another seven into her engine-room just before she sank: bows first at 8.20 a.m.

The last sinking of this patrol was the next day: September 14th. Roughly twenty miles off the Casquet Lighthouse, Alderney, at 6.15 a.m., a shot to starboard was heard onboard yet another Norwegian steamer, Ethel. Shortly after her crew abandoned approximately 30 rounds were put into the merchantman, before she began to sink. A German account also said that they had tried to sink her with the last torpedo, but it ran underneath her. Holed by the last remaining shells, theatrically, a rating then swam over to her and opened her hatches and one Kingston-valve.

The patrols of these four boats were deemed very successful by the Marinekorps Flandern’s higher leadership. So, until the Kaiser allowed a return to unrestricted action and as attacking transports was difficult, this form of Handelskrieg was to be continued.

Steinbrinck’s last patrol on UB18 in October, while nowhere near as spectacular the month before, was respectable from German perspectives. Sailing for the Southwest Approaches on the 19th, three small, seemingly unarmed British steamers, Cliburn, The Marchioness and The Duke were sunk in daylight while mid-Channel on the 20th.

The first destroyed was The Duke during the forenoon that stopped after a shell was fired from about a mile. Three more three rounds came rapidly, with one hit, before her company abandoned. Due to the heavy weather, she was not boarded, but the master was interrogated by ‘one of the Junior officers’ in good English. Interestingly, he asked whether the lifeboats were ‘provisioned’. Three more rounds were then used to sink this transport. Ironically, she had only been taken up for government service as a cross-Channel store ship on the 15th and had not complied with instructions as to only sailing in the dark hours. In the case of The Marchioness, mid-way through the afternoon watch, a shell fired from about a mile having fallen short, her master turned to ram the submarine. However, after a minute, or two, he thought better of this and had her stopped. On abandoning, UB18 closed on the lifeboats, wanting the ship’s papers, but her master said that he had left them onboard. No efforts were made to retrieve the papers that in fact, had been thrown overboard as per regulations. Instead, UB18 fired nine rounds into the merchantman that sank in ten minutes. Into the first dog watch, although firing was not seen, a shot from miles away ‘struck water’ across the Cliburn’s bows, beginning the abandonment and demolition with charges.

Northwest of the Casquets on the 21st, during the morning and forenoon watches, UB18 sank four vessels in short order. Two small Norwegian steamers, Fulvio and Rabbi, with cargoes of coal, were first. On the Fulvio’s master requesting a certificate for the destruction of his command, Steinbrinck said that he was too busy, as he had another vessel to deal with. But, the Rabbi’s master was issued with such a certificate. Shortly after, a reasonably-small French sailing vessel, Condor was consigned to the deep. So too was a French barque, Brizeaux, outward bound from Le Havre. Another Norwegian steamship, Tempo, rescued the Rabbi’s crew, but she too came under the scrutiny of UB18. Luckily, a large, defensively-armed steamer, Matiana, happened on this scene, opened fire on the submarine, thereby driving her off: temporarily. UB18 then pursued the Matiana, but could not match the steamer’s eleven knots.

The weather was absolutely foul over the next few days, but Steinbrinck took his boat over to the Scilly Isles. Seemingly during this passage, there was another run-in with a British decoy vessel on the 22nd. While twenty miles off the Bishop Rock, during the forenoon of the 24th, another French barque, Cannebiere, was held up and scuttled. In one of his occasional acts that may, or may not, have been of decency, he had the two lifeboats towed nearer to the shore and British patrol-craft. Returning to base via the Casquets, another steam-driven Norwegian collier, Pan, was sunk by gunfire with twelve rounds on the 26th. A request for the Germans to tow this merchantman’s lifeboats resulted in a refusal though: said to be because they did not have the time and were intent on more sinkings. This was, however, the last of this patrol and on return, he handed over command to Oberleutnant zur See Claus Lafrenz.

Steinbrinck was back in Germany briefly, to commission a brand-new UC-II minelayer, UC65, on or about November 10th in Hamburg. She then arrived at her Marinekorps Flandern base on 3rd February 1917 and sailed on her first patrol three days later.

Almost entirely off the metaphorical leash operationally, with the newly declared re-imposition of unrestricted Handelskrieg and with this capable boat, the sheer scale of his sinkings is daunting: even if he did not prevail every time. He also seems to have taken his operation orders literally, with no discrimination whatsoever, as some of his ‘victories’ continued to be over tiny fishing craft: one of only seventeen tons!

Venturing westwards on February 6th, while on transit two small vessels, one British and the other French, were stopped and despatched off Trevose Head, on the northern Cornish coast. In all likelihood in the dark hours, three mine barrages (of eight, four and six) were laid off Milford Haven, Pembrokeshire on the 9th. Unless difficulties were encountered, it will only have taken minutes to lay each barrage. Free of these tricky weapons, Steinbrinck was able to return to his already practiced ways of destroying vessels. Shifting into St. George’s Channel and the northernmost part of the Bristol Channel, over six days UC65’s tally comprised of nine steamers and two fishing smacks: all Britons. Apart from the Lycia, a defensively-armed steamer of 2,715 tons gross that put up resistance on the 11th, all were small and so, easy targets. Even then, the Lycia’s armament was only an old Russian 10-pounder that mis-fired ‘several times’. UC65 opened fire at 3,000 yards, hitting the merchantman first time, wrecking the bridge and its environs and wounding two. Ceasing return fire, stopping and abandoning, only then did the submarine’s guns also cease their rapid fire. All in all, four were wounded: one seriously. On this occasion Steinbrinck was courteous when interrogating the master, while the German demolition party did its work.

Of potential wider importance, Pinna, an unarmed tanker of over six-thousand tons on commercial service, with 7,800 tons of petroleum, was shelled and torpedoed twice by Steinbrinck on the 12th, but she failed to sink and was beached at Milford Haven. Three shells hit her early on. H.M. Yacht Lady Blanche that was with armed-trawlers that had gone to the Pinna’s assistance, dropped a depth-charge: even if ineffectively.

Later that same day Steinbrinck suffered another defeat. Firing on a defensively-armed transport, Gleneden, at a range of 400 yards around dusk, the merchantman’s master had his vessel turned stern-on and open counter-fire. UC65 lost her in the growing dark and also had to dive, as she was within the Milford flotilla of indicator net-drifters.

In all likelihood beginning her home leg, UC65 was off Hartland Point, on the northern Devon coast, on the 16th. The first attack of the day was on a French steamer, Ville de Bayonne that was stopped and sunk with charges. The second was on a British defensively-armed steamer, Sheerness, but she turned stern-on and although only with a six-pounder, forced the submarine to dive. The last, late in the forenoon, was against a by then un-armed transport, Queenswood and UC65’s shelling killed three mariners. The first shot went overhead, the second struck the fiddley and killed two apprentices and a fireman, with another apprentice wounded. After the third and fourth shots went into the officers’ accommodation, she was ordered stopped by her master. Another British merchantman, The Princess, hove into view and UC65 opened fire on her as well. Small although this latter Briton was, at just over six-hundred tons, fire was returned with her six-pounder – forcing another dive. Surfacing again with the intention of boarding the Queenswood, since a British destroyer, Orestes and an armed-minesweeping trawler, St. Elmo, were not far off, Steinbrinck had another sixteen rounds put into the merchantman, sinking her: before diving once again.

The following day UC65 may have stopped a small Greek steamer, Alexandros, but was upset by an armed-minesweeping trawler, Yokohama that opened fire from a mile off. Before diving, this submarine loosed off a torpedo at the trawler without result. It may also have been UC65 that was in a long-range gun-duel with another armed-minesweeping trawler, Gavina that afternoon. It was not until she was off the northern French coast on the 19th that her sinkings resumed. The first was a miniscule Belgian fishing-vessel of sixteen tons, Justine Marine, off Dieppe. Next, during the late forenoon a relatively-small Norwegian steamer was stopped and sunk with charges, with a small British steamer, Brigade, sunk by gunfire shortly after. Three French fishing-vessels, two of which were also very small, were the last, before UC65 arrived back at Zeebrugge the next day.

Added to Steinbrinck’s sinkings for this patrol, three vessels were lost on one of the three mine-barrages. There was one fatality on a British steamer, Inshowen Head, on February 14th and another four on a small British sailing-vessel, Hannah Croasdell, on the 26th. But, the death toll on the large British steamer, Drina, on March 1st, was far higher at fifteen.

Steinbrinck and his crew embarked on their next patrol on February 24th, only really having time to re-load, re-fuel and take on victuals. In one respect this can be regarded as rather surprising as although UC65 will already have had a short workup, as well as passage down to Belgium, it is likely that the first patrol would have shown up all sorts of mechanical problems requiring maintenance. Nevertheless, this rapid return to sea may have been an operational decision, in keeping as many boats at sea in the first month of the new unrestricted campaign as possible. It was of a lesser duration and only as far as the waters off Portland, Dorset. Two mine-barrages of six were laid near the Owers Lightship, off Sussex and the Nab Lightship, east of the Isle of Wight, late on the 25th, with another barrage of six near the Needles, on the western extremity of the Isle of Wight, late on the 26th G.M.T. (shown as in the early hours of the 27th in German accounts).

Most of the sinkings on this patrol that included a dozen French fishing-craft, were carried out routinely enough against those without naval protection. However, a Norwegian steamer, Sjøstad, was torpedoed without warning ten miles northwest of Cap la Heve, just before noon the 28th. She had been in a convoy of three colliers, escorted by two French torpedo-boats. Nine had been killed in this attack, but there were more lives lost through mines. A British steamer, Algiers, was the first to be sunk, near the Owers Lightvessel, on the 26th, with eight fatalities. Another of these mines destroyed H.M. Armed-Minesweeping Trawler Evadne the following day – killing twelve of her fourteen crew. And, although H.M.H.S. Glenart Castle struck another of these mines on March 1st, thankfully there were no fatalities in her ship’s company, medical staff, or patients. In the final mining, of a Norwegian steamer, Thelma, on April 6th, there was one death though.

There was also at least one gun-battle with a defensively-armed merchantman. The Huntscape (ex-German prize Pindos) that was a transport on her way north across from Le Havre to Portsmouth, sighted UC65 on her starboard beam, at 9.30 p.m. on February 8th. Turning away, the submarine followed, opening fire and hit the transport twice. Fifteen minutes later, Huntscape’s six-pounder returned fire at a range of 150 yards. Before UC65 was lost from sight, the transport’s gunners got off ten rounds. Incidentally, it is stated in the German official history that the Briton escaped through ‘superior speed’, but it looks more likely that the submarine dived.

Anyway, UC65 returned to Zeebrugge after this combat, arriving there on March 2nd. But, this was not before shelling and sinking a small French steamer, destroying numerous defenceless fishing-boats and damaging a crane of some sort.

Following a break that must have included maintenance, UC65 sailed for a patrol as far as the waters off the Isle of Man, in the Irish Sea, on March 18th. Without sinking anything in transit, the first mine barrage, of six, was laid off Liverpool on March 22nd. A small barrage, of three, was then laid late on the 23rd, or early 24th. Shifting westwards to a band between Carnarvon Bay and County Dublin, on a beautiful summer’s day Steinbrinck and his company sank five small vessels, British, French and Norwegian: by bomb and shell.

The 25th began similarly, with a small French schooner, during the middle watch. Early in the morning watch off the North Arklow Lightvessel, a British defensively-armed transport, Adenwen, with a cargo of sugar, was torpedoed on her starboard side by her engine-room, in the dark and mist: sinking in less than five minutes. Virtually all of her company was abandoning in the one surviving lifeboat that was being launched when the ship sank, capsizing it. Six drowned. Another four were Somaliland ‘Arab’ firemen that succumbed to exposure while on life-rafts. H.M. Yacht Kethailes heard gunfire and in investigating, found the survivors. Shifting southwards, less than four hours later, UC65 stopped and sank a two-and-half-thousand-ton Greek steamer, Poseidon. This time, H.M. Yacht Hecate sighted the submarine but, five miles away, was unable to stop this sinking, but pursued UC65 for approximately an hour. Exiting northeast, a Spaniard, Ogono, was chased later in the day, but a small British barque, Brandon, was stopped and scuttled off the Codling Bank, County Wicklow. According to a German source, all four onboard must have died after getting onboard their lifeboat.

Three more small mine-barrages, of three, were then laid off Liverpool Bar in the dark hours of the 27th. Having left the area, the following forenoon she was off the Arklow Lightvessel, County Wicklow, when she torpedoed a fair-sized British steamer, Snowdon Range. The merchantman managed to stay afloat for 45 minutes and also transmitted a distress message, but four of her crew were killed. To the north, a small Russian sailing vessel was sunk by gunfire next. However, UC65 then returned to the Arklow Lightvessel that afternoon and destroyed more vessels. Three were easy pickings and dealt with by shell and charge. A British account stated a British steamer, Annan, was torpedoed within sight of this lightvessel around 5 p.m., but she is not shown in German accounts. Undisputed, a British collier transport, Wychwood, was torpedoed in the same area one hour later: sinking immediately.

On transit back to base UC65 was said to have been seen on the surface by one of Milford Haven’s armed net-drifters, Kilmany, at 11.10 a.m. on the 30th, but the submarine dived before she could open fire with her 6-pounder gun. There was, most definitely, an action with H.M. Special Service Vessel Peveril (Q36) 30 miles southwest of the Lizard that began shortly after though. In heavy rain and hail with a ‘fairly rough short sea’, she came under shellfire that continued during the sham abandonment. Unfortunately, probably due partly to inexperience, there was an accident and five ratings were drowned from one of the two decoy’s lifeboats. UC65 was estimated to have fired between 30 and 40 rounds over an hour, slowly and precisely as she came on: possibly also firing deliberately once at the still afloat starboard lifeboat and its occupants. Another three ratings of the port 12-pounder crew went over the side, in circumstances that could only be speculated upon and were drowned. One more rating was killed by shellfire. Damaged considerably, since she advanced to half-a-mile and then dived, it is highly likely that UC65 had run out of ammunition and so, could not finish Peveril off. Anyway, UC65 reached Zeebrugge safely on April 1st.

The mine barrages laid off Liverpool were the first laid off this important port in the war. A British steamer, Kelvinhead, was unfortunate in encountering one of those laid on the 27th within a few hours. Two more vessels, both passenger liners of considerable size, were mined on April 7th and 9th, but managed to reach port. Unfortunately, two were killed on the former, a Briton, Lapland. Unsurprisingly, the latter, New York, was American.

On his next patrol Steinbrinck pushed even further up the Irish Sea, almost into the Firth of Clyde and North Channel. Unlike the last time, Steinbrinck conducted attacks on shipping during his transit. Having sailed on April 25th, off the Owers during the following forenoon a small British motor barge was destroyed. Later, two small fishing vessels, one British and the other French, were, similarly, done away with off Alderney. UC65 encountered a French flying-boat off the Scillies on the 27th. Apparently, it was driven off by machine-gun fire and the submarine was forced deep by a destroyer. The Burrowa, a large barque that was a detained German prize, Carl Rudgert Vinnen and requisitioned by the Australian government, was stopped and scuttled that evening. In St. George’s Channel the next day, a Spanish two-thousand tonner steamer, Alu Mendi, was sunk off Tuskar Rock, County Wexford.

Over the night of April 30th to May 1st UC65 laid five small mine-barrages. The first was slightly south of the Isle of Bute and Little Cumbrae; the second off Ardrossan, Ayrshire; the third off the east coast of the Isle of Arran; the fourth southeast of Arran; and the last off Turnberry, Ayrshire. Discovered early, the area had been swept by the 9th. Unfortunately, H.M. Armed-minesweeping Trawler Merse blew up off Garroch Head, Isle of Bute, while escorting H.M. Battleship Ramillies. There were no survivors of the seventeen onboard.

Shifting south to less constricted waters, over two days UC65 sank twelve vessels. Overwhelmingly, these were of small British steamers, but two were larger. UC65 was sighted by a Norwegian barque, Ivrig, shortly before 8 p.m. of May 1st roughly ten miles off Port Patrick, Wigtonshire and was shelled. Abandoning safely, the submarine’s gunners continued to shell the barque until she capsized and sank thirty minutes later. The other was the Taizan Maru, a mid-sized Japanese steamer. Having been stopped in the morning darkness of the 2nd with a blank shot, the merchantman’s crew were given twenty minutes to abandon. As well as setting charges, two, or three, shells were also then fired into her hull. Later in the morning watch, with the Taizan Maru’s crew onboard, H.M. Armed Minesweeping Trawler Trojan engaged in a short, but intensive gunnery action with the submarine.

Steinbrinck then exited the area and loitered around St. George’s Channel. While off Strumble Head, Pembrokeshire, on the 4th, two British smacks, one rather inappropriately named Victorious, were dealt with routinely. So too, was another little schooner off South Bishop Light. Across the channel, close into Tuskar Rock, County Wexford and within sight of Milford Haven-based net-drifters, a British defensively-armed four-thousand tonner, Pilar de Larringa was torpedoed and sunk by Steinbrinck that evening: with the loss of twenty lives. Hit in the stokehold, she sank rapidly. Travelling north again, on the 7th a small British schooner, Maude was destroyed off Bardsey Island, Carnarvonshire. It would appear that Steinbrinck had decided that it was time to return to base, as his last action on this patrol was in torpedoing a large defensively-armed tanker, San Patricio, off Trevose Head, Cornwall, on the 8th that was under escort. The damage was to her port bow and while action was being taken to lighten her forward, her gun’s crew aft opened fire, seemingly on her periscope – at a range of 90 yards. Ultimately, this attack failed and although damaged her cargo of oil fuel, less 1,795 tons, was delivered. UC65 was back at Zeebrugge again four days later.

No information has been found explaining why the newly-promoted Kapitänleutnant Steinbrinck’s next patrol did not begin until June 15th. He also had a different area to operate in. The first task was to lay mines in the channels off Boulogne and this was attained variously on the night of the 16-17th, with one more small barrage off Cherbourg. Minesweeping off Boulogne on the 17th, at 4 a.m. H.M. Armed Trawler Fraser was lost with thirteen hands out of her sixteen killed. Also, H.M. Destroyer Tartar, in company with Afridi, struck another mine at 4.12 p.m. the same day, killing 45 (or possibly 50) of her ship’s company. Although the fore-part was blown off, with the assistance of two French tugs Tartar was towed to Dover for repair.

Meanwhile, UC65 proceeded westward, a British ketch was stopped and destroyed 30 miles from les Hanois Lighthouse, Guernsey, on the 18th. Later, off Ushant during the first watch, Steinbrinck fired a torpedo into a coastal convoy. Missing his target, it carried on running and hit a Danish steamer, Baering, sinking her. Around a day later, UC65 was in a two-hour gunnery dual with a British defensively-armed merchantman, Rorinier. This action was broken off on night falling. Late in the following forenoon UC65 opened fired on a sailing-vessel at a range of three miles. Giving the impression of abandoning, H.M. Special Service Vessel Mitchell opened counter-fire on the submarine closing to 800 yards. Seventeen rounds in total were fired from the Q-ship’s one twelve and two six-pounders, before UC65 dived. The British thought that they had gained hits, but this is not mentioned in the German official history. In the morning darkness of the 24th Steinbrinck found another French coastal convoy of eight steamers and two trawlers off Cape Ferrat. Two Greek steamers were sunk by torpedo and another Greek and Norwegian by shellfire. The latter, at least, was conducted at exceedingly short range, at around thirty meters! Sworn statements by survivors from the Norwegian, Kong Haakon, show this to have been an utterly savage attack, with no chance of the crew abandoning in safety: having to do this the best they could while under shellfire. Nineteen of her crew were killed.

A day later, on the 25th, Steinbrinck came across another eleven steamers in convoy, southwest of Contis. This resulted in the torpedoing of another Greek steamer: grossing over three-thousand six-hundred tons. And, on the way back a small British schooner, mid-channel, was stopped and sunk. UC65 arrived back at her base on June 30th.

Having proceeded to sea once again on July 18th, UC65 was bound initially for the western Solent: specifically, the Needles. There, three small mine-barrages were laid during the early hours of the 20th. Early in the first watch of the same day Steinbrinck torpedoed a British transport, Fluent, off St. Albans Head, near Swanage, Dorset. Continuing westward two more small mine-barrages were laid off Portland, Dorset on the 21st. According to the German official history, UC65 returned early to replenish torpedoes, due to the calm state of sea and weather: arriving back in Zeebrugge on the 24th.

However, Steinbrinck’s own patrol report, as quoted elsewhere, shows context behind this unconvincing claim. This excerpt began with a convoy with a trawler escort in sight in the evening darkness of the 23rd. Although moonless, there was too much light for a surface attack and not enough for a dived one (using her periscope). Following a tactical discussion, the boat was trimmed so that the bridge structure would show only 80 centimetres above the flat sea. Steinbrinck and the watch officer, Oberleutnant zur See Otto Bernhard Rogge, remained crouching on the bridge with the upper conning-tower hatch slightly open, but the submarine became heavy aft and as the bridge flooded, Steinbrinck tried to secure the upper conning tower hatch, but could not as the boat slipped deeper. Consequently, he was taken to the surface in bubbles. (Steuermann Gewald inside the conning tower hung onto the inside upper-hatch wheel, to stop the tower and possibly the boat, if the lower lid had not been shut, flooding.) The nearest convoy escort having passed within a few hundred metres and continued on her way unaware, UC65 surfaced slowly, with Rogge found hanging onto her net-cutter! So, it is hardly surprising that with the two officers retrieved a course was shaped for home.

The reason why Steinbrinck sailed again on the 25th is not known, but might have been to convince himself and others that his recent scrape had not affected him adversely. Anyway, close to the Royal Sovereign Lightvessel, off East Sussex, the next afternoon, UC65 torpedoed H.M. Minelayer Ariadne at 2.22 p.m. G.M.T. A twenty-year-old cruiser, she had only been converted for this role a few months before. According to a British account she was ‘almost worn out’ and among mechanical shortcomings ‘her boilers and engines gave continual problems’. She had been under escort of two destroyers, Norman and Peregrine and not three as stated by Steinbrinck in a published excerpt of his log. It was also said that they had been zig-zagging in Steinbrinck’s version, but this is at variance in British analysis – although on passing the lightvessel, they made a sharp course alteration, which was acknowledged by Steinbrinck. The torpedo was fired from 1,000 meters and struck Ariadne on her port side, breaching C boiler-room that flooded rapidly, causing a 15° list. Apart from the helm having been jammed, all communications between the bridge and engine-rooms had been knocked out and as B and D boiler-rooms were also flooding, all the machinery spaces were evacuated. Unfortunately, while the starboard engine was shut down, the port one was not and she circled for 25 minutes: before coming to rest. Steinbrinck maintained that a ‘very strong escort gathered around the cruiser in a short time’. However, in the British analysis, although there were four paddle-sweepers and three trawlers in the area, only one paddle-sweeper approached. She was in the process paying out a towline, when, at 3.12 p.m., a second torpedo struck Ariadne’s port side, fired from 600 meters and it exploded abreast B boiler-room. She capsized in four minutes, with the loss of 38 of Ariadne’s company. All the efforts by Norman and Peregrine to locate and attack UC65 proved ineffective and nothing was seen of the submarine.

It should be noted that Steinbrinck left the scene and continued westwards. Approximately two hours into the next day, July 27th, he torpedoed a fair-sized British collier-transport, Bellagio, off the Owers Lightvessel. Unescorted, she was safe to shell, with UC65’s gunners expending around thirty rounds, making twenty hits and killing one of her crew. But, the merchantman remained afloat and was towed and beached successfully. Once again, Steinbrinck failed to follow up on his initial attack, although he torpedoed another Briton two hours later close by. Grossing well over 6,000 tons, the defensively-armed Candia was also unescorted. Struck on her starboard side aft of her well deck, the only fatality was of a Lascar seaman that was on lookout on deck forward.

Intriguingly, Steinbrinck then decided to return to Flanders, but on the way, torpedoed a small French steamer, Saint Emilion, off Dungeness, Kent, during the late evening of the 28th. Reaching Zeebrugge the next day, he had turned over command of UC65 to Kapitänleutnant Max Viebeg by August 1st.

It has not been discovered whether giving up command of the minelayer was planned, or if it was decided that Steinbrinck should have a break. There is a snippet in British interrogation reports that would seem to indicate that it was the latter: his health having broken down. Nevertheless, he was given the command of a newly commissioned UB-III boat: UB57. It is not known when he actually joined her, but she sailed on her first patrol on October 6th.

In next morning’s moonlight, off Dungeness, a small British kedge-rigged sailing-vessel, Alcyone, was closed to fifty-yards. In order to make the sailor heave to, fire was then opened up with the (heavy) machine-gun in three short bursts: ahead and astern. Subsequently, three charges sank her. Only one German officer was seen, described as approximately six-feet tall, heavily pock-marked and with a ‘red moustache’. This ‘sub-lieutenant’ (Leutnant zur See) was in charge of the detonation party and threatened the master with a pistol. Victuals, reckoned to be 28 lbs (pounds) of sugar and four tins of condensed milk, as well as brass-work from the cabin, were stolen. Four days later, west of the Isle of Wight, an even smaller British ketch, Joshua was done in – with the death of all three of her crew. As per the German official history, on the evening of the 12th Steinbrinck decided to return to base, due to ‘persistent bad weather’.

Sailing once again on October 18th, UB57’s operational area had been changed to the North Sea: meaning that the increasingly heavily-defended Dover Straits did not need to be navigated this time. At dawn on the 20th a Norwegian steamer, Nitedal, was torpedoed within the War Channel off Flamborough Head, Yorkshire, without warning. Hit in the engine-room, she sank in three minutes, killing twelve. Steinbrinck’s sinking of another Norwegian steamer, Leander, supposedly at dusk, was not dis-similar. According to a Norwegian report, when four miles off Flamborough Head, the torpedo struck her amidships on her starboard side at 11.15 p.m. On abandoning ship, one man was missing, thought to have been killed in the explosion that wrecked her starboard side. Unusually, UB57 surfaced after the attack, seemingly around 3 a.m., ordered the lifeboat alongside and ten of the survivors to go onboard the submarine. This order was countermanded, although an officer seems to have interrogated the Norwegians in English cursorily, asking if there had been any fatalities. No help was offered and the survivors were left to pull for shore. Interestingly, the Leander did not sink until 3 a.m.

It may have been that Steinbrinck did not have the Leander finished off by gunfire in order not to draw attention from British patrol-craft, since UB57 remained close by. A Danish steamer, Novillo, was sunk by torpedo during the 22nd. Four lives were lost in this assault on neutral shipping.

Two British steamers were also sunk by torpedo on the 23rd. One was a defensively armed collier transport, Tredegar Hall that had missed a convoy and had not caught up. Hit in the port side of her engine-room, at 6.40 a.m., she sank rapidly. Two engine-room staff, the second-engineer and an Arab trimmer, were killed in the explosion and one other mariner was thought to have drowned. The other, Seistan, another defensively-armed collier transport, attacked at 3.50 p.m., was said in the German official history to have been in a convoy of twenty steamers that was ‘protected by about 20 trawlers, motorboats, and destroyers’. While manoeuvring to conduct another attack on this convoy, UB57’s periscope was hit, presumably by an escort and she was then depth-charged, without further damage.

British records show the Seistan’s sinking to have been different. There was no convoy, although there were numerous vessels in this stretch of the War Channel and among these were drifters, minesweepers and H.M. Patrol Boat P52. She was struck on her starboard side midships in her bunker and engine-room and began to settle at once. The third-engineer and four stokehold Lascars were killed, with five more Lascars wounded. Anyway, although this powerful submarine should have still been capable of carrying out surface attacks with her 8.8 c.m. gun, due to the inoperability of the periscope, Steinbrinck took his boat back to Zeebrugge.

UB57 sailed on patrol once again on November 15th, this time for the Southwest Approaches. Five days later, two torpedoes were fired at a cruiser, but they missed through the target altering course. Shifting to the waters off the Lizard, another Norwegian steamer, Krosfond, was sunk by torpedo at 9.30 p.m. on the 22nd. She was then five miles off the Manacles and about to anchor, when hit between numbers three and four holds on the starboard side. Sinking immediately, most of the survivors ended up in the water and struggled to live. Overnight, fifteen mariners were killed in the explosion, or succumbed in the sea. Nothing was seen of the submarine.

Even so, UB57 was still in the area until late on the 24th, when Steinbrinck torpedoed a British defensively-armed collier transport, Nyassa. Striking her near the waterline in number three hold, blowing in her port side, there were no fatalities on this occasion. But, by the 27th UB57 had shifted eastward to Dodman Point. On this day he torpedoed two defensively-armed British merchantmen. The Almond Branch was sunk at 8.15 a.m., hit just abaft her engine-room in number four hold. The master would seem to have been interrogated by one of his watch officers: with only a ‘fair knowledge of English’. The Eastfield was another Admiralty collier transport that had been within sight of six other steamers, when struck between the cross bunker and stokehold at 10.40 a.m. Settling rapidly, the submarine did not surface this time. Each of these vessels suffered one mariner killed.

UB-III boats were capable of carrying ten torpedoes (one complete reload of her five tubes), but Steinbrinck returned to base having, seemingly, only expended six on this patrol. Zeebrugge was reached on November 29th.

Notwithstanding all the usual claims of submarine commanders being popular with their companies, Steinbrinck might not have been for venturing back to sea on December 19th. This was a return to southern Cornish waters and his first ‘victory’ this time was over yet another British defensively-armed collier transport. The Mabel Baird was as usual by then, sunk by torpedo without warning, four miles off the Lizard, during the morning watch of the 22nd. Five were killed.

The Vellore, a Norwegian (full-rigged) ship grossing 1,672 tons, had been towed out of Falmouth in the forenoon of the 23rd and after a delay caused by an examination boat, proceeded around the Lizard and westward under almost full sail. She seems to have been sighted by UB57 at some time in the afternoon or dog watches and pursued her: presumably on the surface. A German account states that she was stopped by rifle-fire at dusk, but a Norwegian version gives the impression that the three rounds fired were from a weapon of a heavier calibre. Anyway, on heaving to, the Vellore’s crew abandoned in two lifeboats. The master was then taken onboard UB57, where a submariner communicated with him in Swedish. Although neutral and in ballast, possibly because she was on a voyage between two belligerent nations (France and the United States), Steinbrinck told the protesting master that he intended sinking her. After having some of the Norwegian seamen set the sails, a temporary prize crew, commanded by Steuermann Gewald, took her away from the well frequented steamer routes and sank her on the 24th: partly, at least, with charges. The position of this destruction appears to have been between 30 and 50 miles west of the Scillies.

UB57 was next known to have travelled back to the southern coast of Cornwall, around nine miles south of Dodman Point, during the afternoon of the 26th. There a large outbound ocean convoy, OF 18, was attacked. An account in the German official history that was based on Steinbrinck’s log, claimed three victories in two attacks, west of Eddystone. This was on a very well-defended convoy, in a long line leaving Falmouth that included an unidentified British steamer of six-thousand tons in the former. According to this version, one was sunk in the first action in the early afternoon: a large British steamer, Tregenna. The other, another British steamer, Benito, was damaged initially in the latter attack, during the first dog watch. Under tow by trawlers, she was sunk by torpedo, in a separate attack in the moonlit morning of the 27th though.

British records while confirming some detail, provide a substantially different version. Due to as yet un-swept German mines (seemingly from two large and widely scattered barrages that had been laid by UC64 over October and November), the escort and merchantmen proceeded slowly in single-line ahead out of the boomed and netted port area - along a temporarily lengthened swept channel. (Nine trawlers were screening along the starboard side of the line.) At six knots, this was so that the merchantmen could form up in their columns once clear. Aware of the dangers, on sailing the escort consisted of two destroyers, Laurel and Pasley, twelve trawlers (two of which, Sea Sweeper and W.H. Hastie, were, apparently, travelling with the convoy out to Gibraltar) and also two airships and one seaplane: everything available. The times in reports vary, but those made by the Tregenna’s master are likely to have been more accurate than others. The lead destroyer, Laurel and first eight (or eleven) merchantmen had cleared the swept channel, when the Benito that was the fifth merchantman in line, was torpedoed at 2.47 p.m. This weapon blew away her stern-post and rudder and two trawlers were ordered to stand by her. A torpedo passed ahead of the Tregenna that was directly astern of the Benito at 2.49 p.m. Unfortunately, the next one struck her just forward of her bridge a minute later. She healed over and settled soon after. Pasley that had been taking up the rear dropped depth-charges that did not detonate in what was thought an appropriate position. Laurel also made a search in conjunction with the seaplane that dropped bombs in the general area of where the submarine was thought to have been. UB57’s second attack was made later, seemingly at 3.30 p.m. By that time the convoy had formed up properly and was zig-zagging. The torpedo was seen onboard the Asiatic Prince and she altered away: with the torpedo passing ten yards astern. Incidentally, as per Lloyd’s Register she grossed as 2,887 tons gross. C23A that was one of the airships, saw this torpedo run and dropped two 100 lb. bombs along its track.

Leaving this area and going west again, UB57 sank yet another British collier transport, Clara, close inshore off Runnelstone, south of Gwennap Head, late on the 28th. As usual, this was entirely without warning, by torpedo.

The last sinking of this patrol was during the morning watch of the 29th, off the Lizard. (German and Norwegian accounts differ as to where this occurred.) A moonlit surface torpedo attack, this weapon struck the steamer Tiro on her port side slightly aft of number two hatch and she sank in three or four minutes. Abandoning was difficult as she still had weigh on. In total eight were killed, including the stewardess. UB57 drew close to the survivors, merely asking the nationality of the vessel – before leaving the scene of destruction. This should have been self-evident, as one deponent stated that the Tiro’s sides were painted with her name in white.

A German account claimed that on the return passage a British destroyer appeared out of the mist and with no torpedoes left, Steinbrinck ‘offered his astonished enemy a New Year’s greeting’. This and UB57’s immediate turnover of command to Oberleutnant zur See Johannes Lohs, on getting alongside in Zeebrugge on 1st January 1918, begs all sorts of questions.

German accounts state that Steinbrinck was physically exhausted and that was the only reason why he was taken off seagoing duties in January 1918. It can be seen that ever since the diving accident in July 1917 Steinbrinck made hardly any surface attacks. And, although he was already, seemingly, beginning to become more discriminate in his torpedo attacks, making these on larger targets, his combat efficiency can be seen to have deteriorated in the late summer and autumn of 1917: especially with patrols broken off prematurely. Even so, there is the appearance of some improvement on his final patrol. So, it can be wondered if he had been carrying out these latter attacks, or if it had been his 1st Watch Officer.

There is another possibility and that is that he could have gone down with neurasthenia. This can be seen in British naval officers, especially those on small-craft that had been blown up by mines. Service records of these men show that not infrequently that they gave no immediate source for concern, but broke down later. Nothing has been found on how the Kaiserliche Marine dealt with their mental cases, but there is an in-depth study of how German soldiers were treated. In getting to grips with large numbers of such cases, those of the lower orders were subjected to ‘suggestive’ procedures, some of which were not only invasive, but brutal. Officers, on the other hand, were treated much better, being sent to ‘rural sanitoriums or spas for recuperation’. An excerpt of a letter sent by Steinbrinck to Claus Lafrenz, in March 1918, stated that after being brought ashore against his wishes, he had been ill, but by then was enjoying spring weather and recovering. This was written from a villa in Berchtesgaden, Bavaria. In spite of the claimed rehabilitation of vast numbers of German military mental cases during the Great War, very few were considered fit for further frontline service.

Otto Steinbrinck never returned to command at the ‘Front’. Instead, in April he was appointed the 1st Staff Officer to his old flotilla commander, Korvettenkapitän Karl Bartenbach. It can wondered how active Steinbeck was professionally by this time though. (It has been opined that he had actually been the motivating force behind the Flanders submarines, rather than Bartenbach.) Another letter from Steinbrinck, penned in early September 1918, shows that he was back in the Bavarian mountains, in Mittenwald, with his wife. He reckoned that he was ‘finally getting fully fit for combat again’. It can be seen that he was in no rush to return to Flanders, as he planned to be in München at the end of the month. On the evacuation to Germany of the last remnants of the Marinekorps Flandern’s submarines, following orders on the last few days of September, Steinbrinck was shown to have been appointed to the U-Boat Inspectorate, Kiel. Prior to his demobilisation in November 1919, at least for some time, he served in a capacity with the Armistice Commission. It is also worth noting that Steinbrinck himself stated later that he had been given a leave of absence in the spring of 1919.

It can be seen from multiple sources that to fellow submarine officers of the Marinekorps Flandern, Steinbrinck, had been a good comrade. To seafarers of other nations that he encountered during the war, his attitudes varied. Occasionally, he would engage in small acts of what might have been kindness. Overwhelmingly, he was cold though and towards the end, callous, such as in not even helping neutral civilian mariners in any way that were in danger of dying on the open sea. Also, after his period of indiscriminate sinkings, for reasons not known, he attacked Norwegian merchantmen with a peculiar frequency.

Before outlining Steinbrinck’s post-war activities, one-point needs clearing up. In pursuance of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles that came into force on 10th January 1920, Steinbrinck was on a list of 897 individuals for possible prosecution for war crimes that was presented to the German Government on February 1st. Failing to live up to the recently signed treaty obligations, the new Reich’s Government refused to hand them over to any foreign powers. Nevertheless, negotiations resulted in agreement that a much-reduced list of defendants would be tried in the Leipzig Supreme Court – under German military law. After consideration a smaller list of 45, of which seven were from the British, was handed over that May. The first twelve trials were conducted from late-May until mid-July 1921, but the judgments handed down were regarded by the Allied nations as farcical. In mid-January 1922 the Allied Governments withdrew their observers in protest. However, in June the German judiciary took the decision unilaterally that it would carry on without Allied input. These proceedings staggered on into the 1930s, but were wound down quietly. Even the dates as to when this occurred are not clear, although there are snippets related to specific cases. Steinbrinck had been thought, incorrectly, to have sunk the French passenger steamer Sussex, but even towards the end of the war, British Naval Intelligence was doubtful. Following correspondence with German authorities, by the end of 1920 the British seem to have been satisfied that Steinbrinck was not involved. The French disagreed and during the occupation of the Rhineland, caused by serial German intransigence relating to reparations for their wartime damage, arrested him in Düsseldorf in March 1923. He was, apparently, released six weeks later.

Even although he had no discernible background in the iron and steel industries, he became associated with their oversight as early as 1920. If statements made later on the first three years, or so, are to be believed, he had intended going into the study of ‘railway traffic management at the technical academy’. While there he had, instead, been employed by the Association of German Iron Steel Industrialists, initially as a ‘scientific assistant’ and then as a ‘legal adviser [Syndikus] and deputy manager’. Within three years he was working within Friedrich Flick’s group in Linke-Hofmann-Lauchhammer and at a time as yet undiscovered, came to Flick’s attention. Promoted rapidly, in 1925 he joined the steel magnate’s personal secretariat and became his deputy within another five years. As time progressed, he also held seats on myriad heavy-industrial companies’ boards.

In early 1932 Flick that had already supported right-wing causes financially, was introduced to Adolf Hitler, who needed money for the upcoming presidential election. On his part, Flick needed political protection and so, each used the other and Steinbrinck that had already had contact with the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, was the day-to-day link between the industrialist and the higher echelons of this political party. In the autumn, Steinbrinck was also invited to join what later became known as Heinrich Himmler’s Freundeskreis Reichsführer (Circle of Friends of the Reichsführer). Himmler, through associates, also wanted money from Flick and other industrialists. On the electoral success of the N.S.D.A.P. that brought it to power in March 1933, Steinbrinck joined the party on May 1st. Thirty days later he also became a member of the Schutzstaffel (Protection Squadrons) with the rank of SS-Standartenführer on an ‘honourary’ basis. Although financially fragile, Flick added coal to his portfolio and cannily, also wanted into arms production. Steinbrinck, the past naval war hero, was utilised in securing arms deals. As of 1937, Flick and Steinbrinck became highly active in the ‘Aryanization’ of German heavy industry. Steinbrinck is now also known to have made what would appear to have been an extremely anti-Semitic remark to a victim of this process. Whether this reflected an anti-Semitic attitude, or merely sheer callousness, cannot be ascertained.

Continuing on his upward political trajectory, he had been promoted SS-Oberführer in April 1935 and was also appointed Wehrwirtshaftsführer (Defence Economy Leader) for the Kriegsmarine in April 1938. Further recognition from Himmler followed in January 1939, particularly with promotion to SS-Brigadeführer on Steinbrinck’s fiftieth birthday. But, his relationship with Flick had soured severely, as he realised that he would never be the industrialist’s successor. This ended with Steinbrinck resigning in December 1939 and throwing his lot in completely with the government, in the management of the confiscated Thyssen properties.

Aggressive German expansion westward in the spring of 1940 brought more responsibilities, such as the Reich Plenipotentiary General for the Steel Industry, relating to assets in Luxembourg, Belgium, Northern France and Longwy until March 1942. He then became the Reich Commissioner for Coal in the Occupied Western Territories in the Netherlands, France and Belgium (Bekowest) from March 1942 until September 1944. At least on paper, he was also recalled to naval service in May 1940, as a Korvettenkapitän: presumably with a reserve commission. He was further promoted to Fregattenkapitän zur Verfügung (available for appointment) in September 1942, but released from the Kriegsmarine in August 1943 though. As per his own admission, he was merely at the Naval High Command’s ‘disposal’ in relation to Germany’s Four-Year Economic Plan. In May 1944 Steinbrinck requested to be commissioned in the Waffen-SS, but seems to have been turned down. With the Nazi Thousand-year Reich contracting following the Allied invasion in Normandy, he acted as liaison between Army Group B and the Ruhr’s heavy industries from December 1944 and April 1945. He then went home to Lippstadt, said in a long article in German to have been ‘mentally and physically exhausted’.

Otto Steinbrinck was arrested on 30th August 1945 and interned. Eventually, he appeared as a defendant before an American Military Tribunal in Nürnberg, along with his one-time boss, Friedrich Flick. A long and complex affair, it began on 19th April 1947. He had been indicted on five charges. The first related to war crimes and crimes against humanity in the deportation and enslavement of civilians from countries under German control and also concentration camp inmates that were used as slave labourers. The second also related to war crimes and crimes against humanity in the plundering and spoilation of occupied territory and also the seizure of industrial plant. The third was on crimes against humanity over the persecution of Jews and the ‘Aryanization’ of their businesses. The fourth was on the membership of the N.S.D.A.P. and the ‘Circle of Friends of Himmler’. And, the fifth was on the membership of the S.S. that had already been deemed a criminal organisation.

Steinbrinck’s defence was similar to that of many Germans and it is fascinating to note that his defence counsel began in claiming falsely that the Nazis seized power in early 1933. There was also a strong inference that even at this time Steinbrinck was afraid of the Nazis, while also stating that he had no reason to think that the S.S. might engage in criminal activity. (The S.S. had originally been a tiny part of the Sturmabteilung whose ‘Brownshirts’ had been infamous for extreme street violence for over a decade by 1933.) He maintained that he had not been politically motivated at all, only associating with the Nazis as professional ‘insurance’ against both the extremes of the left and right. Apart from the already known contact with the N.S.D.A.P., Steinbrinck admitted to having voted previously for the German National People’s Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei). (Unlike the N.S.D.A.P. that in social policy was a left-wing party, the D.N.V.P, was a real right-wing party and many of its supporters became ardent Nazis.) Denying that he had been actively involved in Nazi matters, even at best this cannot be regarded as strictly accurate. It is known that Steinbrinck was not the only recipient of the Pour le Mérite that Himmler had on his personal staff, so too was Wilhelm Werner and they attended events in uniform. Evidence presented also explains that Steinbrinck’s temporary Kriegsmarine commission and his application for a Waffen-SS commission was over uniform-wearing. More evidence proved that he had been in contact with many of those at the top, but he reckoned unconvincingly that he did not really know any of them. Also, he maintained that not only had he no knowledge of high-level policy, he was only vaguely aware of the existence of concentration camps and had no idea of what fates opposition politicians might have suffered. And, although holding high-ranking positions, at times Steinbrinck made out that he had no executive power, although also claiming at other times that he had ensured good treatment of workers under his control. But, yet again, he denied that he knew anything about how labour was allocated. As might be expected, Steinbrinck was portrayed by his defence counsel and witnesses as a humane man; a Christian; and a chivalrous hero of the Great War that had continued to live in a soldierly manner. It was the latter that made him cooperate with the foreign owners of the steel and coal companies, in order to maximise distribution for the good of all. In doing so, it was said that he took risks in confronting others and this is why he lost his steel plenipotentiary’s post. All of these, however, might be characterised as power struggles, partly in protection of collaborators.

Steinbrinck’s defence counsellor, Dr. Hans Flächsner, proved generally more than a match for the prosecutors and the poor standard of the American judges made matters even worse for the prosecution. (By that time the U.S. Government had lost its zeal for prosecuting Nazi criminals and had not allowed judges from the federal system to serve on these military tribunals. Instead, they were state judges, with little, if any, understanding of European law, culture and events.) Working primarily from documents, it looks as if the prosecutors were overwhelmed with reams of complex technical data presented by the defence that could not be challenged easily.

Sentencing took place on 22nd December 1947. On count one the prosecution could not prove that Steinbrinck had any responsibility for the employment of slave labour, since it was claimed that this was done at the lower company management level, so he was found not guilty. Not only was the evidence on plunder and spoilation presented by the prosecution relating to count two, weak, the judges believed the claims that Steinbrinck fought for good treatment for the various plants’ workforces. Consequently, Steinbrinck was acquitted. Although much time and effort were expended by both prosecution and defence counsels, the judges did not seem to have any interest in the ‘Aryanization’ of German heavy industry: as per count three. Legal arguments made by the defence, especially as the actions that Flick and Steinbrinck were involved in occurred largely before 1st September 1939, were utilised. These acquisitions through intimidation were judged to be outwith the remit of the tribunal. Therefore, this charge was also dismissed. It was not easy for counts four and five to be shrugged off though. Found guilty on both charges, Steinbrinck was characterised as small fry within the Nazi regime. He was sentenced to five years in jail, from the date of his arrest.

Due for release on 30th August 1950, Steinbrinck died in the prison hospital in Landsberg am Lech on 16th August 1949. A modern German article chronicled his time after sentencing in detail, maintaining that this hero was treated ‘harshly’ by the prison authorities.

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Kapitänleutnant Claus Lafrenz

Oberleutnant zur See Helmut Patzig

Kapitänleutnant Rudolf Schneider

Kapitänleutnant Walter Schwieger

Kapitänleutnant Max Valentiner

Kapitänleutnant Wilhelm Werner