The Reservists’ War

1914

Great Britain’s naval reserves were called out by proclamations on 3rd August 1914. Those in the mainstream Royal Naval Reserve that were currently ashore, reported to the Registrars at regional Customs and Excise Headquarters, before being despatched by train to barracks in the three naval manning ports: Portsmouth, Devonport and Chatham. There, over weeks many thousands were appointed, or drafted, mostly to men-o-war of the Second and Reserve Fleets, many of which were being made ready for sea in the Royal Dockyards.

Naval life, especially on large warships (often referred to as ‘big ships’ by those in the Service), was highly proscribed. Routines had evolved over centuries and most activities, whether at sea, or in harbour, were covered ... or at least, were supposed to. These differed greatly, depending on rank, or rating, but everyone from captains down to the lowliest boys 1st-class were supposed to know their stations – literally and metaphorically. Therefore, the reservists on large men-o-war and Armed Merchant Cruisers had to fit into this ordered existence, assuming such existed. Getting warships out of dockyards and ready for sea has always been chaotic and can be seen from contemporary records to have been no different in 1914.

Most officers, petty officers and men in the R.N.R. serving on the liners that were to be taken up as A.M.C.s were in not dis-similar situations. If alongside in early August, their vessels’ conversions into warships of sorts were conducted as rapidly as possible in commercial ports, such as Southampton and Liverpool. As and when other vessels returned to port, they and elements of their crews began their own transitions. Apart from the arming that would have included constructing magazines and associated electrical circuits, a lot of the fittings, particularly wooden, had also to be removed. Even so, there is evidence of at least one Cunarder remaining far more luxurious than any warships. In getting these A.M.C.s to sea, most of their peacetime officers of all branches that did not hold commissions were retained – with temporary commissions R.N.R. Others, such as their boatswains and chief stewards, became R.N.R. warrant officers: again on temporary lists.

The A.M.C. crews were also stiffened with R.N. officers, as well as some senior and junior rates – the latter often pensioners of the Royal Fleet Reserve. The bulk of the lower deck were still merchant mariners though: newly employed under ‘T’ forms. Nevertheless, they were all to operate under naval routines.

Of course, there were others in the R.N.R. at sea when war was declared. Some were officers on merchantmen that were taken up for government service as transports. They tended to be left to remain on their vessels, regarded as useful for their new duties. Other reservists just worked their way back to the U.K. as and when they could.

The Royal Naval Reserve (Trawler Section) had its own, distinct organisation and the fishermen and their craft that were part of the peace-time scheme not at sea mustered in ports previously assigned. Without wireless, when the other trawlers that had been at sea returned, those in the R.N.R.(T) were detailed off as necessary.

The Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve was also called out on August 3rd and these civilians went to their divisional headquarters. There they remained for over two weeks, although a small minority of signal ratings, electricians and other tradesmen were drafted to sea rapidly: since there was a desperate shortage of these specialists. On orders being received finally, instead of joining men-o-war, to their disappointment and resentment these reservists were to form the majority of a Naval Division and first sent to tented camps at Walmer, near Deal, in Kent. The rest of these formations came from the Royal Fleet Reserve (one-time naval ratings); many Royal Naval Reserve personnel that were not required at sea; and a large number of ‘Kitchener’ volunteers. Re-organised, but still under strength, they became the Hawke, Benbow, Drake and Nelson battalions (1st Brigade) and Anson, Hood, Collingwood and Howe battalions (2nd Brigade). There was also a Royal Marine Brigade, formed from the R.M.R. and raw recruits.

Split up again by brigade for equipping, storing and training, this had only begun when they were deployed to Belgium, in a precipitant bid to hold the fortress city of Antwerp that was under siege. The marine brigade had preceded the two naval brigades, joining other disparate British units. Transported across the English Channel to Zeebrugge and Ostend, the R.N.D. arrived in Antwerp on October 6th – in time to act as the rearguard for the retreating Belgian Army. In pulling out themselves a few days later and under very trying conditions, most of the Hawke, Benbow and Collingwood battalions, along with the 1st Brigade staff strayed accidentally into The Netherlands and were interned. On return, the surviving battalions were scattered across southern England. After the camp on windswept high ground comparatively near Blandford, Dorset, was completed in late November, the majority of the surviving division (excluding the marines) were despatched there over the space of a few months. New battalions of the same names, to replace those lost, were raised in December at the newly-opened Crystal Palace barracks, London, as part of a fundamental reorganisation. Divisional troops (engineers, field ambulances, train, small-arms ammunition column, cyclist company, signal sections, – but no artillery), were also recruited variously. Some of the original officers and men, such as those with sea experience, were appointed and drafted elsewhere.

The Royal Navy’s grand strategy was in gaining the command of the sea through the defeat of the German Hochseeflotte (High Sea Fleet) by battle. So, paradoxically the Germans had to be tempted out from their bases to engage in this, by hemming them in. Accordingly, the First Fleet, to be dubbed the Grand Fleet, with the most-up-to-date battleships and battlecruisers, as well as cruisers and destroyers in screens to protect the heavies, were deployed north of mainland Britain: primarily based from the large anchorages of Scapa Flow, in the Orkney Isles. To the Germans the Grand Fleet had disappeared and this mystified them. Submarines reconnoitred all along the British east coast and to the north on ‘blockade lines’. Nothing was learned. The one submarine that made contact did so literally. While the Grand Fleet was on a sweep in the North Sea on August 9th, U15 was run over and sunk with all hands, by the cruiser Birmingham.

The Second, or Channel, Fleet with few modern warships was deployed in the English Channel and surrounding waters mostly to keep the Hochseeflotte from getting into the English Channel and causing mayhem. Although British mining of the Eastern English Channel that began off the Belgian Coast in October had the effect, in time, of funnelling all surface vessels through the Downs, in the early months elements of the Second Fleet patrolled in the southern North Sea, known to the British as the Broad Fourteens and the Europeans as the Hoofden. Passing through this area on September 12th to intercept transports in the English Channel, U9, under the command of Kapitänleutnant Otto Weddigen, encountered the British patrol. The aged cruisers Aboukir, Hogue and Cressy were sunk easily within an hour. There were almost fourteen hundred dead, mostly reservists: R.F.R. and R.N.R. Even if these cruisers’ commands did not realise that the threat had been from a submarine, rather than mines, this patrol was known darkly as the ‘live bait squadron’. Generally, the patrols were routine though, stopping merchantmen and checking their papers. However, part of Cruiser Force G (12th Cruiser Squadron) escaped this boredom for a while. Four of its number comprised the escort for the first divisions of the Canadian Expeditionary Force that were convoyed across the Atlantic in early October.

Law in relation to the conduct of war had not kept pace with changing technology, so while a commercial blockade was also imposed later in August, it was not declared as such. Since modern weapons, especially mines and submarines, meant that traditional blockades could not be ‘effective’ legally as per the Treaty of Paris 1856 and the Declaration of London 1909, sensibly, the British conducted a ‘distant’ blockade of Germany. Enforcing this in the English Channel and South West Approaches, largely relating to Dutch tonnage, was one of the secondary duties of the Second Fleet.

However, the other main effort, relating mostly to Scandinavian tonnage, was to be maintained by Cruiser Force B (or Northern Patrol Force), then made up of elderly Defence Act Edgar-class cruisers (of the 10th Cruiser Squadron), with a few A.M.C.s and a gunboat. Although with R.N. nucleus crews, the majority were again reservists of the R.N.R. and R.F.R. On arrival in its area of operations in bits and pieces from August 6th onwards, Cruiser Force B was to patrol ‘between the Shetlands and Norway to the East and between Shetland and the coast of Scotland to the Southward’. Wartime conditions meant operational changes. One of these arose from the September disaster on the Broad Fourteens, the Edgars being ordered to cease ‘stopping to examine merchant vessels’ - sending boarding parties to investigate while the cruisers remained under weigh. One A.M.C., Oceanic, had already been wrecked through a navigational error on September 8th, but Hawke was torpedoed by U9 on October 15th: with very heavy loss of life. By mid-November it was realised that the Edgars were utterly unseaworthy in the conditions then prevailing though. A month later the Admiralty decided to withdraw the Edgars completely and reconstitute Cruiser Force B with 24 A.M.C.s (as the 10th Cruiser Squadron). This was done as they were taken up for service, refitted and crewed.

It is worth pointing out that the Straits of Gibraltar was also used for the blockade of the Central Powers. Before Italy came into the war on the Allied side in 1915, the Germans made real and creative efforts to use this as a route for imports, such as from the United States.

Of course, in August 1914 there were also numerous German cruisers (light and heavy) and A.M.C.s loose in the vast seaways of the world. The exploits of both the Germans and Britons involved in the struggles through to the end of the year are well known and so, there is little need to visit these in this. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that reservists were in these forces – on both sides. As an example, there were many from Scottish crofting and fishing communities on the old armoured cruisers Monmouth and Good Hope that were lost with all hands at Coronel, as well as the A.M.C. Otranto that escaped this carnage.

The war in the Narrow Seas that the R.N.R.(T) was part of began almost immediately. Strict definitions are hard to come by, but the Minesweeping Service became part of the Auxiliary Patrol.

Through autumn the Auxiliary Patrol grew exponentially. Trawlers and drifters were requisitioned, by local Senior Naval Officers, in large numbers, lightly-armed as weapons became available and almost always, their crews remained with them – as reservists. Skippers became temporary warrant officers R.N.R. The craft were organised as small groups (normally of four), under the command of naval officers of sub-lieutenant rank. A tiny minority of them were in the R.N., but possibly only on the paddle-steamer minesweepers that entered service in December. The vast majority of these R.N.R., or R.N.V.R., officers also held temporary commissions. Following short technical courses, these junior officers (in naval terms at least) had to learn their new professions, almost always in waters unknown to them, through practical experience. Pensioner R.N. petty officers were also drafted, one per boat, to oversee all sorts of matters.

As might be expected, life in warships smaller than destroyers (generally known as ‘small ships’) even normally was substantially less proscribed than larger ones. This was made more so since the greater number of crews were fishermen that had outlooks absolutely alien to that of the navy. Consequently, this led to all sorts of clashes of culture, some recorded that were hilarious and that obviously drove the more brittle-minded insane. Other requirements, such as sailing in strict formation, were more important – in fact, for minesweeping essential. Far more has been written on the minesweepers early on, but situations on patrol craft must have been not dissimilar. Under continual pressure, most craft spent most of the time at sea: in all weathers. Even when in harbour in good weather (when not buffeted mercilessly in anchorages) and not on five minutes notice to sail, apart from coaling and storing, boilers had to be blown down regularly, along with other maintenance. Leave tended only to be given during short refits, or when new equipment was being fitted.

Anyway, sailing even before Great Britain’s ultimatum ran out, Hilfstreuminendampfer B, a requisitioned auxiliary minelayer, laid a minefield in the King’s Channel, in the Thames Estuary, on August 5th. Later the same day, a light-cruiser, Amphion, was destroyed by two of these mines, with heavy loss of life. An area was announced by the Admiralty as ‘dangerous’, to Britons at least. Unfortunately, two Scandinavian merchantmen, the Maryland and Christian Broberg were also lost to this field weeks later. (For in-depth analysis of these events, see a slightly different version of a paper of mine that appeared in The Mariner’s Mirror volume 89 number 2, in May 2003.)

The next German mining operation occurred over the night of August 25-26th, off the Tyne and Humber: carried out by the light-cruisers Albatross and Nautilus respectively. Once again, following marine casualties, the Admiralty ‘blocked off’ these areas and trawler minesweepers were sent in to clear the northern field on the 27th. Within hours, two, Thomas W. Irvin and Crathie, were destroyed with seven dead and more craft damaged. Under the supervision of the fleet minesweeper Speedy, ten steam-drifters that had been requisitioned shortly before, went into the Humber field on August 31st. The next day the drifter Eyrie had her entire after-end blown off by a drifting mine: killing six. Resuming work on September 3rd when weather allowed, not only was a drifter, Lindsell, sunk, so too was Speedy – about fifteen minutes later. In total six were killed: amazingly only one R.F.R. pensioner on the fleet sweeper.

Investigation brought changes. Due to their deep draughts, it was realised that fleet minesweepers, trawlers and even drifters were too vulnerable to tethered contact mines that were thought to be floating only feet from the surface when tides were low. So, in late September it was decided to minimise the danger. Sweeping known German-laid fields was abandoned, with harbours and a limited coastal channel (that evolved into the War Channel within months) were to be swept by trawlers when tides were higher.

These rules were, however, not followed and it can be seen that drifters continued to be used as sweepers as required. Drifters were also used in patrolling and for other purposes, such as in marking channels.

A disparity in objectives caused the loss of another two trawlers in early October. The R.N. had begun to offensively-mine the Belgian coast, with the intention of sealing the Germans in. Under the impression that the approaches to Zeebrugge had already been mined, two minesweeper groups were ordered to clear the way for British transports with the R.N.D. onboard. Seven were employed in this task, but Princess Beatrice and Drumoak never returned. Twenty-one were killed.

Later that same month a new minefield laid by Hilfskreuzer C (an A.M.C. fitted as a minelayer) off Tory Island, County Donegal, was regarded as a threat to the Grand Fleet that had retreated to northern Irish and western Scottish waters temporarily. Having sunk the modern battleship Audacious on October 27th, the Northern Channel needed clearing and so, a trawler minesweeper group was tasked for this.

Tactics developed with hard-learned experience and experimentation with new gear was also carried out, although it could not be guaranteed to work in all circumstances. An incident on November 5th is a case in point. Two days before, the Germans had conducted another mining operation, off Yarmouth, Norfolk, by the light-cruiser Stralsund. At this time Smith’s Knoll was the northern exit of the coastal route and so, an attempt was made to sweep these waters. One trawler, Mary, was lost: with seven killed. Had the weather not been so foul, she would have had a newly-invented Ellison ‘bow-catcher’ rigged that may well have saved her. No further attempts to clear this large field were made and the mines exploded eerily during the winter storms.

The last German mining operation of the year was off the Yorkshire coast, as part of the famous battlecruiser raid of December 16th. Dozens of mines were laid within the coastal route, by the light-cruiser Kolberg. Consequently, sweeping had to be carried out by all craft available. On the 19th three fleet minesweepers on their way north, made one sweep from Flamborough Head to Hartlepool. One, Skipjack, was ordered to close on a trawler unit working off Filey. In five minutes, the trawlers disturbed 18 mines. Among the numerous detonations, one trawler, Orianda, was sunk and two others, Star of Britain and Passing, were damaged. Miraculously, only one man was killed. While this was going on, the first of the newly-converted light-draught paddle steamers, Brighton Belle, arrived on the scene. The shipping lane was closed later that day. Unfortunately, pressure seems to have been exerted on the Admiralty by shipping interests to have the route reopened. There had already been further casualties, but Christmas Day’s losses, mostly but not exclusively mercantile, in terrible weather, were heavy.

Among these along this stretch of coastline was an armed trawler of the Auxiliary Patrol, Garmo, on December 20th, with six killed. She was, apparently, the first patrol trawler to have been destroyed by enemy action.

Steam yachts were also a part of the Auxiliary Patrol. Unlike the vast majority of craft that were hired or requisitioned, wealthy owners that were also keen yachtsmen volunteered to loan these to the state for the war effort. Temporary commissions in the R.N.V.R. assured these individuals command, although it is known that some gained R.N.R. lieutenancies instead. No explanation has been found as to why this occurred, as they were not entitled to R.N.R. commissions. These yachts were used as senior vessels of patrol units.

Destroyers had maintained general patrolling of the U.K.’s coastal waters since August. Not the first reorganisation, in late December it was decided that the destroyers were to be re-deployed as warship escorts and so, coastal defence was passed entirely to the Auxiliary Patrol. By then it consisted of ‘74 yachts and 468 trawlers or drifters, aided in more sheltered waters by motor boats’. (It is not clear whether this included the Minesweeping Service and there appears to be no real way of investigating this.) In total, it was ‘a large fleet of imperfectly disciplined craft, the affairs of which were administered in the Admiralty by a newly created department called Yacht Patrol’. (Also, over the coming months officers on yachts with R.N.R. commissions had to hand them back, with R.N.V.R. ones issued in their stead.) The order of battle changed, with units of ‘six trawlers or drifters and a yacht, at least one trawler having wireless apparatus’. The relevant official account admitted that many drifters had not been armed, due to a shortage of weapons, so the only way for these small-craft to take the fight to enemy submarines was in ‘attempting to ram them’!

There were also experiments with two railway company steamers as decoy, or ‘Q’ ships, late in the year. The Victoria was commissioned as a special service vessel and operated in the English Channel between Southampton and Le Havre. No contact with German submarines occurred and she was paid off in early January 1915. The second was Vienna that resumed her normal commercial run between Harwich, Essex and the Hook of Holland. Security was, apparently, poor and her new role had become known in Rotterdam, so she was withdrawn, refitted and renamed Antwerp, for further naval service. (Decoy ships’ companies varied substantially, but many reservists served on them.)

Finally, there was also another group that ended up in the Royal Naval Reserve, although few, if any had any time in merchant service. These were retired admirals that were not given appointments as flag officers, but were commissioned as Commanders R.N.R. instead. In the expanding administration ashore, they were appointed accordingly.

1915

Following the Battle of the Falkland Isles, on 8th December 1914, the world’s oceans were largely free of German warships and A.M.C.s. Consequently, these were mopped up in the months following and changes in the order-of-battle were made, shifting assets as required. As it turned out, some including the battleship Canopus that famously had defended Port Stanley, were sent to the Eastern Mediterranean. Others, however, remained patrolling the vast spaces, such as H.M. A.M.C. Calgarian on the North America and West Indies Station.

In the changed conditions, the new 10th Cruiser Squadron, was deployed north and west of the Shetland Isles to the Faeroes and between the Faeroes and Iceland. Initially, seventeen liners thought to be able to withstand the rigours of the North Atlantic had been requisitioned. In the last few days of 1914, the squadron comprised of H.M. A.M.C.s Alsatian (Flag), Teutonic, Cedric, Columbella, Mantua, Virginian, Otway, Orpesa, Hilary, Hildebrand, Patuca, Calyx and Ambrose: with others joining within days. Since Swarbacks Minns, in the Shetland Isles, was rejected as their coaling base, they had to go all the way to Liverpool: with prizes sent into Kirkwall, in the Orkney Isles. This meant that at any one time, half of the squadron’s vessels were off station.

Life for those, especially on the smaller A.M.C.s, was utterly miserable during the winter. The weather was permanently dreadful and even when off watch, when there should have been some respite from the snow and hail for the seamen, little rest could be gained as their vessels pitched, rolled and yawled violently. A fair proportion of both officers and men, the former including some in the R.N.V.R., were comparatively elderly and this cannot have helped. It must have been even worse for the boarding parties though, not only because of the inherent danger of this work in bad weather, but also because some of their ships’ boats were unsuitable.

The first casualty was H.M. A.M.C. Viknor that disappeared in heavy weather on her way to Liverpool: probably on January 13th. It is possible that she was destroyed by a mine laid by Hilfskreuzer C, but there is not enough evidence to state, with any certainty that this was the case. But, both wreckage and bodies were washed up at Portrush, County Londonderry. The next occurred on February 3rd. After an exchange of signals, nothing more was heard of H.M. A.M.C. Clan MacNaughton that had been west the Hebrides. There had been reports of drifting mines in this area – the British having begun defensive mining in Scapa Flow the December before. There was no doubt as to the cause of H.M. A.M.C. Bayano’s loss though. On her way from the Clyde to rejoin the squadron, pre-dawn she was attacked on the surface by torpedo and sunk by U27, off Corsewall Point, Wigtonshire: with very heavy loss of life. Later in the day U27 attacked another A.M.C., Ambrose, three times off Oversay Island, Argyll. Ambrose claimed a hit on the submarine’s conning tower, but this encounter is not mentioned in the German official history.

Due to a tightening of the blockade, the workload increased in March and with greater threat of submarine attacks (by U-boats on their way to and from the west of Britain and Ireland) and also longer hours of daylight, patrol areas were shifted northwards and further eastwards towards Norway. Having had all sorts of shortages over winter that included officers and men of the armed guards taking suspect merchantmen into Kirkwall, reinforcements were needed. Six larger, sturdier and handier vessels, Ebro, India, Alcantara, Orcoma, Andes and Arlanza were requisitioned.

Into summer, clashes with U-boats on their transit to the Mediterranean occurred. However, after reconsideration, a coaling base for the squadron was established at Swarbacks Minn in June that allowed for the range of patrols to be extended as far as the Lofoten Islands. And, the distinctly dangerous transits to and from Liverpool and the Clyde were largely discontinued. (This was reversed with the end of the first campaign of Handelskrieg mit U-booten in September though. Coaling was conducted at all three locations.)

With increased German submarine activities over the summer, armed guards put onboard neutral vessels had found themselves in difficult situations sometimes. Experiences were varied and often adventurous, but, the unlucky had their prizes ‘sunk under them by submarines’, or ended up as Prisoners of War.

One A.M.C. was lost in August. India had been ordered to intercept merchantmen carrying iron ore for Germany in the Vestfjord, in northern Norway and U22 had the task of countering this British effort. Torpedoed on the 8th, India sank in five minutes, but 189 survived. This was surprising, as most of her boats were swamped. Most were interned in Norway.

As might be expected the shorter hours of daylight meant tactical changes once again. Even so, the liners of this squadron continued on their hazardous and uncomfortable patrols, as well as picking up further duties. Returning from a detached mission to Archangel, in the White Sea, Arlanza hit a mine on October 22nd and was towed into the Kola Inlet: badly damaged.

The mine that Arlanza had been unfortunate to detonate had been one of many laid by an ex-British merchantman converted into a Hilfskreuzer (auxiliary cruiser) and renamed Meteor. Even in June, the weather was foul, but Meteor had still managed to lay ten ‘barriers’, averaging between 27 and 32 mines in each, over a large area: with six barriers on the main steamer route. Since this was the shorter of only two sea routes open to the western Allies with Imperial Russia, six armed-trawlers with sweep-gear fitted, Bombardier, Granton, Lord Denman, Saint Cyr, Sir Mark Sykes and T.R. Ferens, were sent up there later in the month: to ensure safe passage for transports carrying war materiel. This intensely difficult work began immediately on arrival on July 6th and large numbers were dealt with over the months. Unfortunately, T.R. Ferens was mined c. July 13th. Two more trawlers, along with a collier (possibly partly also used as a depot ship) arrived in August. Lord Denman was sunk on September 14th through collision and another, as yet unidentified, trawler was also lost to a mine on November 10th, as the ice drew in and halted operations. Four of the trawlers returned to the U.K. the following month.

In view of the stalemate on the Western Front, the totally ill-conceived Dardanelles and Gallipoli campaigns happened, in large part, because of a few strategically and tactically inept politicians. As pointed out politely, but obliquely, by the flag officer in theatre, Vice-Admiral Sackville Hamilton Carden R.N., in January 1915, the reduction of the Ottoman forts would require both much time and ammunition. Admiral Sir Henry Jackson R.N., in London that was instructed to study this problem in detail was far more explicit. Although not a gunnery officer, he stated that there was only one way of forcing the Dardanelles and even if this was possible, it would result in very heavy casualties in ships and men. Ignored, especially by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, his personal manipulation and pressure resulted in the great do-or-die attack of March 18th that failed miserably. As can be seen from post-war analysis, even if the Allied warships had managed to get into Sari Sighar Bay and the likelihood of that was slim, the still surviving Allied warships would have been obliterated – as this was a well-prepared killing ground and the Ottoman forts were not short of ammunition. (Also, in Jackson’s study, a substantial naval force would have to have gotten through to the Sea of Marmora for dealing with the German and Ottoman warships, along with troops for landing in Constantinople.) Unwilling to accept this major set-back, the War Cabinet was persuaded by Churchill (and backed by others, particularly Lloyd-George and Kitchener), to agree to commit whatever troops were available for landings on the Gallipoli Peninsula, to enable the clearance of the Strait and then move on to Constantinople and then further glory in the Balkans. Consequently, hurried plans were made in theatre, utilising troops that were being shipped there, partly on a temporary basis and these first landings on the Peninsula followed on April 25th. In many but not all ways shambolic, the cost in life on day one was very heavy and set the tone for the rest of this entirely predictable fiasco that ended in complete and embarrassing defeat later in the year. Since the naval assets deployed were overwhelmingly older men-o-war, along with trawler-minesweepers and the R.N.D., many reservists suffered and died afloat and ashore there.

British and French destroyers and submarines had been stationed off the western entrance to the Dardanelles for months, had been joined by elements of Vice-Admiral Carden’s squadron in the Eastern Mediterranean in early January. (With responsibilities for other operations as well, the squadron’s strength in the Aegean varied.) Under political pressure from London, the long-range reduction of the outer Ottoman forts began on February 19th, in spite of the naval reinforcements not even being assembled in full until March 1st. Also, with the exception of the brand-new battleship Queen Elizabeth and battlecruiser Inflexible, the rest scraped up were elderly battleships with deficient fire-control systems and gun-mounts without the elevation to operate at longer range. Also, along with various other technical complexities in shore bombardment, excepting the Queen Elizabeth there were shortages of ammunition: especially Lyddite (high explosive) shells.

Although by March 10th the outer forts had been dealt with by shelling and shore demolition parties, resistance from the Ottoman forces increased seriously from howitzers, even before they got into the outer Strait. Once there, Ottoman mobile artillery also proved difficult even to locate, never mind knock out. Saliently, the minefields were covered by Ottoman forts, howitzers and mobile artillery and the Allied minesweepers were unable to operate in daylight: whether covered by battleships, or not. (The British trawlers should, theoretically, have been powerful enough to sweep against the current easily enough. Unfortunately, decisions by R.N. officers that probably knew nothing of minesweeping, seem to have weighed them down so much that they struggled to do two knots.) Repeated efforts were made by night between March 1-2nd and 12-13th: but were driven off repeatedly by Ottoman shellfire. On the night of 10-11th Manx Hero was blown up and sunk, with two unnamed trawlers also hit by 6-inch shells. Patronisingly, for the attempt on the 13-14th the reservist crews received ‘stiffening’ from the R.N. This was a disaster. Even although no sweepers had been sunk, every single boat had been hit by Ottoman shellfire: some having been absolutely hammered. Incredibly, there were only three deaths on the trawlers. On Star of the Empire it was one of her crew: a deck hand. However, a mate and a pensioner reservist petty officer from the battleship Ocean were killed while on Fentonian. Others, possibly seven, are known to have been wounded, but the number cannot be confirmed. Sweeping continued until the night of the 17-18th. The later official excuse from the Dardanelles Commission for the day assault of March 18th was that it was all down to the trawler crews having an aversion to coming under fire.

As the forenoon of the 18th drew on, the first forward element that comprised the most powerful British men-o-war advanced up the Strait ever so slowly, in line abreast and in stages. While stationary they fired upon the Ottoman forts, with the intention of keeping them occupied enough for the minesweepers to advance and clear a path through to the Narrows. The battlecruiser Inflexible that was on the immediate right took a severe battering and had to retire temporarily while on fire and still under fire. In time the French battleships passed through the British line and with the Ottoman fire diminishing somewhat in the relatively early afternoon, the minesweepers were sent forward. As the French battleships retired, in line ahead, through the manoeuvring area in Eren Keui Bay, the Bouvet was hit by a large shell and then detonated a mine in short order and sank with exceedingly heavy loss of life. The next line of older British battleships replaced the French. Shortly after 4 p.m. the battlecruiser Inflexible was damaged, once again, by a mine and had to retire. In the manoeuvring same area, the old battleship Irresistible hit another mine around fifteen minutes later and receiving further damage through shellfire, was abandoned. Ordered to tow the Irresistible away, the Ocean was also shelled heavily and just after 6 p.m. she too was mined and abandoned. Both sank. And, the French battleship Gaulois had also been beached, due to shellfire damage to her bows.

All of that afternoon’s minings in Eren Keui Bay had been due to the Ottoman minelayer Nusret. She laid a long line in daylight, during a storm, on March 8th and they had remained undetected. It might have been sensible to sweep this area immediately beforehand – if it was possible. Even if the Allied minesweepers engaged in this task could have withstood the shelling from the Ottoman artillery, quite simply, there were not enough of these craft to do everything.

Contrary to numerous claims made both by naval officers (particularly Roger Keyes then the chief-of-staff in theatre as a commodore) and Winston Churchill, the minesweepers did all that was asked of them that afternoon. This is absolutely clear from the operational records, sketchy though they are. It can, however, be seen that they had no chance whatsoever of success, since the battleships and battlecruiser were withdrawn and so, provided no covering fire. Even the one sweeper that was said to have ‘bolted’, Star of the Empire, may only have retired due to her winch having become defective and so, being in no state to sweep. Saliently, these crews were among the most experienced in British naval service, including one crew that had been off the coast of Belgium months before when it was realised that trawlers sweeping in daylight under fire was not practicable. There are, however, signs that these reservists were not only exhausted by then, but also less than impressed with the Royal Navy’s prosecution of the campaign. Interestingly, in spite of all the slurs thrown at the reservists by officers of the pukka navy, no courts-martial followed!

It is astounding that for all the punishment inflicted on the British warships of all sizes, the loss of life was so slight. Inflexible’s company came off worst, with 31 that were killed on the day and one that died the day next: with the possibility of one more later in hospital in Malta. Of these, six were in the R.N.R. and one in the R.F.R. The Irresistible had 11 killed on the day and another death on the 19th. None were reservists. Despite the extremely dangerous last task that the Ocean had to carry out, she had one single fatal casualty that was a fleet reservist. And, the Majestic also had one fatality that had been in the R.N.R. There would appear to have been no deaths whatsoever on the destroyers that were active later in the day, or the trawler minesweepers. Any fatalities on the tiny picket-boats that were exceedingly exposed would have been recorded as per the ships they belonged to.

Among the troops committed for fighting on the Gallipoli Peninsula was the still only partly-trained and understrength Royal Naval Division: by this time with considerably fewer that had come from the R.N.R. and R.N.V.R. While two companies of marines were in the force at Y Beach during the landings of April 25th; and also elements of the Anson Battalion (2nd Brigade) at V, W and X Beaches; most of the division were involved in a feint to the Bulair lines in the Gulf of Xeros. The Ansons in the vicinity of V Beach were involved in saving life in the monstrous slaughter on and around the River Clyde that day though.

Landed in the south of the peninsula on the 26th, Drake Battalion (of the 1st Brigade) that was attached to the 87th Brigade (of the Regular Army’s XXIXth Division), was in action two days later: in one of many attempts to get up to Krithia and then to dominate Achi Baba above. While this attack was being put in, the remainder of R.N.D.’s 1st Brigade and the R.M. Brigade were landed north of Gaba Tepe (to the north) and these four battalions reinforced the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. Back in the south, on the night of May 1-2nd the Anson, Hood and Howe Battalions (of the 2nd Brigade) were thrown into the line to counter a major Ottoman attack ... and so it went on.

Having covered the landings as best they could, when not engaged in naval gunfire support for the troops ashore, the warships operated off the peninsula and elsewhere, as directed: occasionally taking hits from Ottoman artillery. However, it was one of their destroyers, Muâvenet-i Milliye, under the German tactical command of Kapitänleutnant Rudolf Firle that torpedoed and sank one of the elderly battleships at anchor in Morto Bay, in the early hours of May 13th. An audacious attack, skilfully carried out, the Goliath went down very rapidly, engulfed in smoke and fire. Although there were 181 survivors, 498 of her company were killed that night. Among them were 118 in the R.N.R., of which most were seamen ratings, but 27 were stokers and there was also an assistant paymaster and a lieutenant. In regards to the R.F.R. there were 109, of which the majority of 74 were stokers, including 11 senior rates; and rest were seamen, including 16 senior rates. Also, there were four signalmen in the R.N.V.R.

U21, commanded by Kapitänleutnant Otto Hersing that had been despatched from Germany in view of the Allied buildup in the Aegean, sank two more elderly battleships in two days. Off Gaba Tepe, the Triumph had been conducting naval gunfire support on May 25th, while under weigh and surrounded by small craft. On sighting a periscope, it was fired upon. Unfortunately, too late, a torpedo went straight through a deployed anti-torpedo net, detonated and caused a massive explosion. Sinking in fifteen minutes, a majority of her company were rescued. Even so, 55 were killed, but because she had come from the China Station and had not been back to the U.K., there were few reservists within the list of dead. Four were in the R.N.R. and another four in the R.F.R. Screened by destroyers while continuing in gunfire support for the troops ashore, the Majestic was torpedoed on the 27th. Once again, the anti-torpedo nets failed and there was another major explosion. Rolling over nine minutes later, 42 of her company were killed. Eight were in the R.N.R., six seamen and two stokers; while of the 15 of the R.F.R. dead, there were slightly more stokers than seamen and one senior rate in both branches.

Various shallow-draught warships were sent out to the theatre, in view of the submarine danger. Also, by early summer a defended port had been constructed at Port Kephalo on Imbros.

Meanwhile for the R.N.D. ashore, just like the Tommies, Anzacs, other colonial troops, Poilus and the Ottomans, they suffered all the many privations in foul conditions, including the sweltering heat of the summer and they all took many casualties both through combat and disease. In August the R.N.D. was concentrated in the XXIXth Division’s sector. By mid-October it had been reduced to an effective strength of only 3,200. Unsurprisingly, discipline slipped and in late November the first snow fell, followed by a gale and sub-zero conditions. Eighty per cent had no roofed accommodation and froze in the open. On the weather relenting, their trenches flooded. December saw two changes of sector, the latter French whose trenches, accommodation and supplies all proved far superior to that of the British. After local troop redeployments in the closing weeks, the careful evacuation of all the surviving British troops on the southern tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula was carried out between the night of the 7-8th and the first eight hours of 9th January 1916. As with the two earlier evacuations at Suvla Bay and Anzac Cove, there were no further casualties from Ottoman action.

Also, Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary in May and so, joined the Western Allies ... partly. Following agreement in late August, 60 British drifters were despatched to Otranto and arrived throughout September, to be based there: with no logistical backup. (Eighteen, however, were re-deployed to Mudros for work related to the Salonica operation.) Organised into groups of eight, their patrols across the Strait began with the aim of harassing German and Austrian submarines based at Pola and Cattaro. It was not until then that they also started to be armed, with a variety of light guns. This was not completed until November 8th. Further drifters were detailed off for this service in mid-November: possibly 42 in number. Once again in batches, they arrived in theatre through the month of December from the 7th and were despatched to Brindisi. (Some of these were then sent to the Dardanelles. These may have been eighteen that were, ultimately, for Salonica.) Apparently, it was not until late November that the Germans had even heard of the Otranto Barrage’s existence and this was hardly surprising, as it had no resemblance to a barrier. Skirmishes with far heavier-armed transiting U-boats were frequent, with little success for the Allies. U39, under the command of Kapitänleutnant Walther Forstmann, approached Restore on October 12th. Unarmed, except for rifles, resistance having been encountered, the drifter was hit by a shell and sank: with two killed. U39 then came under fire from a yacht and left the scene. Another, Lottie Leask, was also sunk by this same submarine: on December 18th. She was recorded in the German official history inaccurately as Italian and once abandoned was destroyed: presumably by shellfire. All of the drifter’s company was saved. Also, by then numerous nets had been lost, mainly due to bad weather that had meant that the drifters were not infrequently forced to find shelter.

The first German offensive action of the year in British home waters was, once again, off the Humber, on the night of January 14-15th. Encountering extremely heavy weather, the minelayers’ destroyer escort had to turn back, but the light-cruisers Stralsund and Strassburg laid 120 mines fifty miles off the estuary. Although one of these charges exploded in a trawler’s net, sinking the boat, this field was not discovered by minesweeping forces until June.

February brought the German declaration of Handelskrieg mit U-booten that began, in practical terms, later in the month. This coincided with a new use for steam-drifters in government service. After trials in January, within a month thirty drifters were ‘riding to their nets’ across the Straits of Dover, as an anti-submarine measure. Not a particularly new idea, 100-yard sections of steel net fitted with ‘indicators’ were produced for the drifters on an experimental basis. At a time with no effective anti-submarine weapons, it was, therefore, hoped that transiting U-boats would be entangled, forced to the surface and dealt with by surface units. It was termed, grandiosely, the Dover Barrage. Heavy weather that damaged the nets was not the only practical problem encountered, but it had a temporary practical effect. Following the loss of U8 in a destroyer action on March 3rd; the disappearance of U37 as of April 1st (later found to have been mined); and a minor incident off Gris Nez when U33 snagged a net on April 7th, but escaped none the worse, Hochseeflotte submarines were ordered, temporarily, to discontinue using the Dover Strait.

Another net barrage was deployed in the Northern Channel, between Northern Ireland and the Kintyre Peninsula in western Scotland. The simplistic aim was to keep U-boats dived long enough to exhaust their batteries, so that they could be dealt with on the surface in heavily patrolled areas. (Merchantmen were restricted to a coastal route, in daylight hours, past Tor Point and inshore of Rathlin Island.) Similar and different problems were experienced by these drifters. Additionally, other net defences were installed rapidly for naval anchorages and ports: as well as occasional deployments in English east-coast seaways.

Around late February two drifters were fitted with newly-developed microphone detectors, to work with the net drifters of the Dover Barrage - in detecting submarines. Another went to the Firth of Forth in early March.

A third decoy vessel, Lyons that had been a small salvage Mercantile Fleet Auxiliary entered service in February. Efforts were also made for procuring more vessels, as the only potentially effective anti-submarine weapon then available.

A belief by senior R.N. officers had arisen by February that German submarines could not possibly have been operating from their German bases and they had to have supply ships at sea and secret bases in Scotland. So, much time and effort were expended by patrol craft in seeking out these non-existent assets.

British records regarding the Auxiliary Patrol for the first three months of 1915 are rather sketchy and there are comparatively few reports of patrol craft in the German official history as well, but patrolling and minesweeping went on all the same. This alone can be seen from the losses of two trawlers mined and another six wrecked: presumably by the weather. Also, a drifter sank through collision. And, few German submarines were then armed with even one surface gun, so it would have been prudent for them to have kept clear of the armed trawlers.

Off Zeebrugge on April 3rd three armed-trawlers, Anworth, Silanion and Columbia, attacked two German patrol vessels that were escorting a submarine. (It is likely that this was one of the first small, torpedo-armed UB-boats of the Marinekorps Flandern that had been commissioned, but were still on pre-patrol trials.) Anyway, on the British craft retiring, they were, in turn, attacked by four German seaplanes.

On April 8th, two paddle-steamers, Prince Edward and Queen Victoria, with a destroyer escort, intended deploying nets off Ostend: but this exploit was not particularly successful. It is worth pointing out that these and other paddlers’ companies included R.N.R. officers, at least. In the same general waters on the 17th, Anworth sighted a submarine that dived. (She might have been UB5.) Minor actions in these waters became routine.

Underwater-warfare was expanding into the deeper waters of the North Sea as well, with more minefields laid by both sides. As parts of sorties by the Hochseeflotte, large minefields were laid by its usual light-cruisers on the Swarte Bank (east of the field previously laid in January) early on April 18th and again on May 17-18th. These two fields were intended to destroy the Grand Fleet during a periodic sweep south and could well have succeeded.

As an aside, all British Auxiliary Patrol craft that were within range of war signal stations in the southern North Sea had been recalled by wireless half-way through the last dog watch (7 p.m.) of May 17th. These signals were intercepted and broken by the Germans, but this was not taken as a clear sign that their codes and cyphers had also been broken by the British.

Anyway, following the earlier, April, minelaying, the German efforts were discovered on the 20th and nine days later trawler and paddler-minesweepers conducted a recce there. Work began in earnest to clear this in early May. By the time that the latter field was laid, the earlier one had already been dealt with. Since a Norwegian merchantman, Maricopa, was mined on May 20th, the trawlers, paddlers and also available gunboat-sweepers got to work again. This was completed in mid-June and working landward, the January field was located and swept later in the month.

Far to the north, U23 that had by then been armed with a gun for surface action, was attacked by two patrol trawlers, Limewold and Vigilant, off Peterhead, Aberdeenshire on May 16th. Off Kirkwall later that day she was also harassed by Orkney’s Auxiliary Patrol craft.

Two armed-trawlers Hawk and Oceanic II that were off Peterhead had a real success on June 3rd though. Operating within Aberdeen’s fishing fleet, they sank U14 by gunfire and ramming. Even so, it was a mistake onboard the submarine, whereby her forward vents were not opened rapidly enough that made this possible. All, except her commander, were rescued.

And so, small-scale struggles between U-boats and Auxiliary Patrol craft in eastern Scottish waters continued. In most the mere presence of patrols denied the submarines temporary freedom of action. If detected, submarines had often, temporarily, to go deep. Sometimes there were short, sharp mêlées though. While off St. Abb’s Head, Berwickshire on June 22nd, U6 fired a torpedo at the armed yacht Salvator at close range. Missing, the yacht then turned and rammed the submarine that bent the periscope severely, forcing her to return to base.

The first time that a decoy, or Q-trawler, Taranaki (attached by a telephone line to the unseen H.M. Submarine C24), made its appearance known to the Germans was on June 23rd. She was approximately 60 miles east of the Firth of Forth, when approached by U40. This ruse proved effective, with C24 torpedoing and sinking U40. Only the commander, officer-of-the-watch (Wachoffizier) and one rating survived. A second Q-trawler-submarine combination was employed successfully against U23 on July 20th. On this occasion, part of the gun’s crew, some on the conning tower and surprisingly, two from the control room managed to escape and were rescued by the then surfaced C27. There was at least one other Q-trawler at the time. She was Quickly that worked out of the Forth. The Hochseeflotte’s submarine commanders not only became wary of trawlers that summer, un-armed or not, they may well have taken a much harder line against them.

Yet another form of decoy vessel became known to those onboard UB6 on August 11th. While off Yarmouth and having already despatched the tiny sailing-smack Leader in the usual manner, by inducing the fishermen to abandon and then destroying their craft by explosive charge, she then approached another close by. Three rounds from her three-pounder gun were gotten off by H.M. Armed Smack G & E before UB6 managed to dive: apparently none the worse. Reporting this, UB-boat commanders of the Marinekorps Flanders were ordered to be cautious, as smacks were to be assumed to be armed. However, UB4 had already left port on the 13th and encountered H.M. Armed Smack Inverlyon two days later. In mist and at the extremely short range of thirty yards and closing to ten, a very short and intense one-sided action took place, with the submarine sunk with all hands.

There were also other sinkings of U-boats by decoy vessels around this time. One incident on Baralong’s destruction of U27 on August 19th in the South West Approaches became infamous: rightfully so. And, this was not the only atrocity committed by British decoy ships’ commands and crews either. Earlier, on July 24th in the Atlantic west of the Orkney Isles, Princes Charles shelled U36 to destruction. Having abandoned their sinking submarine, many, but not all of the Germans in the water were shot dead. Also, under new command, on September 24th Baralong sank U41 and attempts to murder the few survivors were made by those onboard this British special service vessel. Incidentally, around this time medals began to be awarded to decoys’ officers and men – seemingly in higher proportions to others in hazardous service. In the case of Prince Charles her captain, Lieutenant Mark Wardlow R.N., received a Distinguished Service Order, while two Distinguished Service Medals went to ratings.

Meanwhile, it was not just along the Eastern English Channel and up England’s East Coast where mines were being laid by UC-submarines that needed sweeping. 374 mines were laid by Meteor well to seaward of the Moray Firth in a large loop off the Moray Firth during the night of August 7-8th. The aim of this operation was to destroy a significant element of the Grand Fleet that was then at Invergordon, Ross & Cromarty, as well as interrupting the shipping lanes from the Pentland Firth to Peterhead, Aberdeenshire. It was during a routine morning (or forenoon) sweep on the 8th that a trawler discovered part of the two and ‘widely separated’ fields. All available minesweepers (including suitably-fitted destroyers) got to work. One patrolling destroyer, Lynx, was sunk with heavy loss of life and the bows of two of the new minesweeping sloops, Lilac and Daliah, were blown off. Initially, a north channel was swept to let the heavies out and then 200 mines were removed in the south. The rest were left as a ‘defensive barrier’. Incidentally, Meteor did not survive this raid. Pursued by British light-cruisers off Horns Reef on the 9th and signalled by Zeppelin L7 of their approach, she was scuttled to avoid capture.

An Admiralty minesweeping trawler, Jasper, was also blown up and lost in this area on the 26th. Eight were killed, but unusually, the injuries of the four survivors were reported on. All were said to be ‘suffering from shock and cuts’, with the R.F.R. petty officer serious, with a ‘broken leg and internal bleeding’. This shock may, or may not, have had further effects. Sometimes these were short term, but not always. It was not unusual for those blown up to contract one, or other mental disorder. Officers holding commissions (and occasionally warrants) were diagnosed with neurasthenia, whereas the rest were regarded as having hysteria. It is difficult to belief that these fundamentally different disorders could have broken down by rank so neatly, but medical attitudes towards mental disease betray the reason.

Although the first unrestricted Handelskrieg mit U-booten would end later in September, a sustained mining campaign by the UC-boats of the Marinekorps Flandern began earlier that month. Barrages were laid in the Eastern English Channel, the Downs and the Thames Estuary between the 6th and the 30th. Almost sealing off the Thames, the paddlers of the Dover Command were ordered to help the sweepers of the Nore Command on September 9th. However, they could not then put to sea, as their boilers were being cleaned: having just returned from supporting British naval forces bombarding the Belgian coast. Until cleared, where possible, traffic was diverted. Apart from numerous British and neutral merchantmen sunk during this period, among the losses in the Auxiliary Patrol on the 18th the armed-trawler Lydian that was standing by a damaged oiler, San Zeferino, when mined. She sank in ten seconds with eight fatalities of her company of twelve.

Six UC-boats continued in October, laying their barrages in 16 locations between Lowestoft, Norfolk and Portsmouth, Hampshire. One of their Auxiliary Patrol casualties was the paddle-minesweeper Brighton Queen on October 5th when a mine detonated under her paddle-box. Another was the armed patrol-drifter Frons Olivae, sunk on the 12th off the Elbow Buoy, Ramsgate and five of the eleven killed were from the Newfoundland R.N.R. Later, on the 19th, the patrol trawler Erin II struck a mine off the Nab Light Vessel, east of the Isle of Wight. The six killed were all in the R.N.R. Net drifters tried to locate this field and one of these engines of war in Star of Buchan’s net exploded, resulting in another seven men dead. Also, in the Edinburgh Channel, in the Thames Estuary, the armed-trawler Scott was destroyed on the 20th: seemingly with no fatal casualties though. Incidentally, new motor launches that were commanded by R.N.V.R. officers and crewed with reservists, were used in the Thames at this time for directing maritime traffic. On the last day of the month a barrage off the South Foreland was particularly effective. In going to the aid of a steamer named Toward, the armed yacht Aries was lost to another mine – with 22 of her 31 ship’s company killed. And, one of the trawler-sweepers, Othello II trying to deal with this threat was also mined, with only one survivor from ten. And, there were more.

A frustrating problem for the minesweeping defenders was that the submarine-laid fields were so small – often with less than half a dozen mines placed skilfully. Therefore, areas could be swept, but they were occasionally missed. Also, with the tactics of the time, mines could be dragged significant distances by the sweepers before they disengaged unseen: leaving threats in new places.

In November only thirteen places were mined by these UC-boats and not all were in British waters. But, with bad weather that both resulted in small-craft wrecked and also mines adrift, it became difficult attributing causes to sinkings. Adding to the woes of all concerned, the UB-boats of the Marinekorps Flandern became active in the southeastern English coastal waters once again.

December was much quieter as few U-boats ventured into British waters, but the routine work continued. U67 was in the Peterhead area from the 20th to 25th, but the weather was so foul that she was forced back to her base. During her time on station British patrols had been observed, but the submarine was not. Far to the south, on closing a merchantman near the Outer Gabbard, off Suffolk on the 30th, a patrol drifter, Adele, was fired upon with a small gun. Pursuing the errant vessel, the drifter then encountered a minefield: probably laid by UC5.

1916

January brought particularly arduous experiences for some of the 10th Cruiser Squadron. In the severe westerly gales that were bad enough for those on the patrolling liners, armed guards onboard sailing vessels for taking into Kirkwall, were in danger of ending up in internment in Norway. Interestingly, those that were blown into Norwegian waters were not detained after all. Also, although obviously frowned upon by the naval authorities, labour troubles in Liverpool and other west coast ports meant additional time off station for some and perhaps the mariners concerned were thankful for their temporary reprieve.

As February drew to a close, searches were conducted by elements of the Grand Fleet for a German decoy vessel thought to be loose and H.M. A.M.C. Alcantra was ordered to remain on patrol and keep a look out. Warned too late on the 29th of a ‘suspicious vessel’ by H.M. A.M.C. Andes, a boarding party was already in the process of being sent to a Norwegian steamer named the Rena, when the latter opened fire on Alcantra. In a confusing action the British A.M.C. was sunk and the other vessel that was also damaged badly and abandoned, was later sunk by a light-cruiser and destroyer. The Rena had been a newly-commissioned Hilfskreuzer named Greif. Casualties on both sides were heavy. The Germans may have had 187 dead, while of the 72 Britons and Newfoundlanders, the vast majority were reservists – R.N.R., R.N.V.R., R.F.R., R.M.R. and also in the Mercantile Marine Reserve. Curiously, there were only three commissioned officers killed - a probationary surgeon R.N.V.R. and two engineer sub-lieutenants R.N.R.

No other A.M.C.s of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were lost in 1916. Even so, the hazardous and uncomfortable work was continuous and sometimes frustrating. The last can be seen clearly in the breakout to the open Atlantic of Möwe, Wolf and Seeadler that were all Hilfskreuzer, late in the year.

The momentous two-day Battle of Jutland (or Skagerrak), over May 30th and June 1st, resulted in the principal squadrons of the Hochseeflotte remaining in their base ports permanently: even if its submarines and smaller warships continued to venture forth regularly. (Generally unknown, there was one further major foray on August 18-19th, but there was no major fleet action though.) Unfortunately, the British losses, both in ships and men at Jutland, were considerably higher after this fleet action than those for the Germans. Among over 6,000 officers and men in Britain’s naval service killed in this protracted action were reservists. Barring errors and omissions, there were 370 that were in the R.N.R.; 213 in the R.N.V.R.; and 168 in the R.F.R.

Within days there was another loss and this could not be tempered with any thought of victory. Unknown to the British, in late May one of the long-range minelaying submarines, U75, had laid a field off the west of the Orkney Isles in a hardly visited stretch of coastline. In very heavy weather on June 5th, H.M. Armoured Cruiser Hampshire was lost to one of these mines, with a terrible loss of life. Apart from the Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener that was on his way to Imperial Russia, of the 749 souls onboard 737 did not survive. Among them were 38 that had been in the R.N.R.; 17 in the R.N.V.R. and two in the R.F.R.

Although the largest operation for the Auxiliary Patrol in the Mediterranean theatre in this year was the Otranto Barrage, there were other craft scattered thinly throughout. According to one daily situation report in January the total strength was as follows:-

Covering the Western Med at Gibraltar were seven yachts and nine lightly-armed patrol-trawlers. In the Central Med, at Malta, were twenty-five mostly heavier-armed patrol-trawlers and six trawler-minesweepers. Defending Egyptian waters and the northern end of the Suez Canal were six armed-patrol trawlers and eleven motor boats. Still at the Dardanelles, but probably actually based at Mudros, were two yachts, twenty-five mostly lightly-armed patrol-trawlers, thirty-one net-drifters, forty-seven trawler-minesweepers and five motor boats. At the complete opposite end of this theatre were eighteen net-drifters at Salonica. Finally, at Taranto were eighty-one net-drifters.

In the first three months, six drifters of the Otranto Barrage were lost to mines. On January 8th there were two, Freuchny and Morning Star, seemingly at the same time. Of the twenty on these two craft, there were only three survivors. The next was on February 20th, when Gavenwood was sunk, but seemingly with no fatal casualties. All three were due to the efforts of UC14. Six days later, Lily Reaich was mined off Durazzo, Albania. There was only one survivor out of her eleven ship’s company. Boy Harald was the next, on March 3rd: with seven killed. And, on the 8th Enterprise II was also destroyed, along with eight men. These latter three losses were caused by UC12.

As far as the German and Austro-Hungarian submariners of the large ocean-going boats were concerned, this ‘barrage’ continued to be of negligible consequence, although care was required. (At a depth of 13 fathoms, U34 ran into a net during the night of May 13-14th, but escaped by an increase in speed.) It is worth pointing out that there were also Italian and French surface warships and even aircraft in the vicinity, but not necessarily in support of the barrage, or continuously. So, while the U-boats could sometimes make surface transits at night, they might also have to dive for periods. German and Austrian sources often identified the drifters as trawlers and Georg von Trapp (then a Linienschiffsleutnant in the Austro-Hungarian Kaiserlich und Königliche Kriegsmarine) thought that those on the drifters must have had a ‘boring’ existence. The smaller UB-boats that became operational in the summer were not overly inconvenienced either. All the same, the British patrols were occasionally stronger and in July there were German requests to the Austrian Staff for destroyer attacks on the barrage.

Rear-Admiral Cecil Thursby R.N. that was then in command of British assets in the Adriatic, had requested another ‘forty or fifty’ drifters and the same number of motor launches from the Admiralty, in April, but all were difficult to come by. It looks as if only ten drifters were found, but 24 were detached, in May, to aid the French in shifting the Serbian army to Salonica. There was, however, one success on May 13th, when the Austrian U6 was entangled in the nets and destroyed. Revenge was visited upon the drifters on June 1st, when in an Austrian raid H.M. Drifter Beneficient was sunk by gunfire: with eight fishermen killed. A few days later the 24 drifters that had been working with the French returned, along with six French destroyers. Unfortunately, another two drifters, Astrum Spei and Clavis, were sunk and two more damaged by the Austrian cruiser Novara in another Austrian raid on July 9th. Apart from four reservists that were killed on Clavis, another nine were taken as Prisoners of War. Yet another drifter, Rosie, was blown up by an enemy seaplane on August 26th, but seemingly without any fatalities. With one of the periodic shifting of their patrol areas, in late summer or early autumn, they were based at Taranto again.

The political games and petty jealousies of senior officers came to the fore at an ‘Allied’ conference on the Otranto Barrage in October. Rear-Admiral Mark Kerr R.N. that was Thursby’s relief, continued to retain British control of the ‘barrage’, but not without a struggle with French and Italian admirals and their backers. He also managed to have the Admiralty send reinforcements around the close of the year – even if only of approximately ten drifters.

Completing the tally of losses from the Otranto Barrage in 1916, H.M. Drifter Finrose was wrecked near Gallipoli in the Adriatic, on November 26th. Also, Motor Launch Number 149 was destroyed by fire, at Taranto, on September 10th.

As for elsewhere in the Mediterranean theatre, small craft were hardly ever mentioned in the German official history. There were a few skirmishes with yachts that were assumed to be armed naval units and a minesweeper was named once. Also, while not part of the Auxiliary Patrol, there were also a couple of brushes with Q-ships, mentioned briefly.

The first loss for the Auxiliary Patrol in home waters in this year, was H.M. Armed Trawler Mediator on January 2nd. This was off Hornsea, in Yorkshire’s East Riding, where she hit a mine that may well have come adrift in foul weather. Another, Courtier, was also mined slightly further south off Kilnsea, on the northern edge of the Humber, four days later. The cost was also in eleven dead. The wrecking of H.M. Yacht Hersilia on Eilean Chuai, in the Hebrides, again on January 6th, was also in terrible weather. Due to a report of a submarine seen in the Stornoway area on January 2nd and the transit of the battleship Saint Vincent to Liverpool, an extensive search was made. The series of gales of the winter of 1915-1916 were regarded as ‘specially heavy’. Consequently, by the end of January, as well as making the A.P.’s work particularly onerous, most of the heavy booms and other anti-submarine obstructions defending the main naval anchorages in Scapa flow had been destroyed. So, twelve trawler-minesweepers were scraped together, including four from Yarmouth that were already busy in trying to counter the UC-boats, to replace the smaller, less capable drifters in Scapa’s boom defence.

On the smack Acacia escaping from UB16 off Lowestoft, on January 17th, two motor launches were sent out specifically to search for the submarine. Two patrol-trawlers were also despatched to the local fishing grounds for an extra four-day patrol. Two days later, when the crews of three more smacks reached Lowestoft, not only was another patrol-trawler ordered to search for the submarine, so too was a yacht. Also, since the assaults on these tiny sailing craft had ceased months before, the decoy smacks had been paid off. But, these events caused another four, Energic, Fame, Foam Crest and Telesia, smacks and two drifter-trawlers to be commissioned locally. Armed and supplied with naval guns’ crews, they were tasked to ‘fish with the smack fleet’. One of the drifter-trawlers, Kentish Knock, snagged a submarine (that could well have been UB17) in her trawl-wire on February 1st and she surfaced fifteen yards away. Three rounds were gotten off, two failing to detonate and although the third hit the base of the conning tower, causing her to heel over, no German submarine was lost on this day.

Two armed-trawlers in the Lowestoft area, Kingfisher and Cantatrice, had another role – in anti-aircraft defence. Signals intelligence provided information on an upcoming Zeppelin raid for the night of January 31st to February 1st. Kingfisher managed to sail and deploy the seaplane she carried, but fog hampered the search. Cantatrice was unable to sail. Even although eight Zeppelins reached England, they too experienced their own problems that night.

Meanwhile, the minelayers of the Marinekorps Flandern were also busy on the south coast of Kent. Although the marine casualties were mostly mercantile, with the grievous loss of 122 people on the P&O liner Maloja on February 21st, a barrage newly laid by UC6 also destroyed a patrol-trawler, Carlton the same day: with another eight reservists killed. Two trawler-minesweepers, Angelus and Weigelia, were also lost on the 28th to another barrage laid nearby, by UC5. Three more reservists were killed, two on Angelus and one on Weigelia.

It was not an entirely one-way street though. Earlier, during the middle watch of January 11th H.M. Yacht James Fletcher rammed a submarine and it was thought that she had sunk it. However, UC6 had only been damaged and as already recorded, continued to operate sowing death and destruction.

The Senior Naval Officer, at Larne, had requested reinforcements to defend the North Channel against raiders (such as Meteor) getting into the Clyde Estuary and Irish Sea. Extremely short of small ships, he was turned down by the Admiralty.

However, on March 22nd H.M. Decoy Ship Farnborough sank U68 in the Atlantic, off the coast of County Kerry. This was the submarine’s first war patrol. As well as employing gunfire, three depth-charges were dropped – there were no survivors. Farnborough’s R.N.R. officers and crew received shares of £1,000 for the destruction of a submarine, but her captain, holding a R.N. commission, was not allowed a share. He did not go unrewarded though. Lieutenant-Commander Gordon Campbell R.N. was promoted to commander and received a Distinguished Service Order. Two other officers were awarded Distinguished Service Crosses and three Distinguished Service Medals went to lesser mortals. Incidentally, Farnborough was one of four decoy vessels that were based in Queenstown, County Cork, by mid-April. The others were Zylpha, Vala and Penhurst.

By March there was an anti-submarine defence in Saint George’s Channel: between County Wexford and Pembrokeshire. In good weather, at least, it consisted of 44 miles of nets towed slowly by drifters that were ‘studded’ with electrically-controlled mines. It would appear that U-boats evaded this barrage though.

One of the patrol-trawlers’ duties was in escorting transports that were judged to be of particular importance by the Admiralty. The Vennacher, an oiler (tanker) in ballast that was outbound for Key West, Florida, was torpedoed, without warning by U22, on April 6th: approximately 30 miles westward of Skerryvore, south of the Hebrides. Damaged, the two armed patrol-trawlers that were in attendance, one of which was Lord Lister, escorted her into Lough Swilly, County Donegal and may have deterred further attack. Since Kapitänleutnant Bruno Hoppe was a relatively experienced commander, it is difficult to see what more the trawlers could have done in the circumstances.

There were, nevertheless, very few contacts between the ocean-going U-boats of the Hochseeflotte in operations in the Southwest Approaches and the Auxiliary Patrol that spring. This was because the submarines were well out to sea and the small-craft tended to remain within forty miles of the coasts.

Slightly differently, the smaller submarines of the Marinekorps Flandern continued as before. The UB-boats recommenced their attacks on the Lowestoft fishing fleet in early March. H.M. Armed Smack Fame was active, especially on March 6th: even if it transpired later that her attacks did not result in any German submarine losses. (Contrary to analysis in a British staff monograph, it appears that UB16 was the only boat in these waters on this date.) Another action proved less successful than thought at the time occurred again off Lowestoft, on March 30th. H.M. Armed Smack Energic towing an indicator net with a mine attached detonated. A submarine that had been seen to dive shortly before, then surfaced, ‘rolled over’ and appeared to sink. (In all likelihood this was one of the early UB-boats then at sea, but it has not been possible to identify which one.) And, these incidents continued. A decoy-smack, Cheero, with a portable hydrophone and a mine-net was one of two operating off Smith’s Knoll on April 23rd. A submarine was heard approaching before two detonations and then ... nothing was heard from the hydrophone. (No German loss can be attributed to this though. UB13 did not leave her base until the evening of this day.)

Of course, the UC-boats tended not to be seen, as they operated, as far as possible, at night. Even so, the net-drifter flotilla at Le Havre, comprising of Comrades, Endurance, Pleasance, Pleiades, Stately and Welcome Star were instrumental in the destruction of UB26 on April 5th. Three days later Comrades caught another, unidentified, submarine in her net, but it escaped.

A flotilla of net-drifters that were under the guard of H.M. Armed Patrol Trawler Olivine, were in the Thames Estuary on the night of March 31st to April 1st, when they encountered Zeppelin L15. Damaged variously by anti-aircraft forces across southeast England, just after midnight, the airship landed in the middle of the drifters and Olivine opened fire briefly – bringing about the surrender of the crew. (The official German account was far more exciting, with the fatally damaged airship plunging 800 metres into the water, but with all but one of the crew surviving.) Two days later, during a week of Zeppelin raids, some of the Lowestoft patrol trawlers that had been armed with anti-aircraft guns, fired at a returning airship: with no apparent effect. Also, the seaplanes from Kingfisher and Cantatrice were airborne throughout this week, but had no success.

In the latter half of April, patrol craft were involved in another unusual action. This was in intercepting a vessel with cargo primarily of 20,000 Russian rifles, ten German machine-guns and ‘associated ammunition’ (possibly one million rounds) that the Germans were trying to smuggle ashore to County Kerry, in support of the Irish Nationalist Easter Rising. Having been ordered to bring a merchantman flying Dutch colours into Fenit for examination, around 5 a.m. on the 21st an armed patrol-trawler, Setter II, stopped this vessel that appeared to have been a Norwegian named the Aud (also described as Aud OR and Aud Norge) in Brandon Bay. Since her papers seemed to be correct with a port of discharge of Cardiff and as a cursory investigation of her cargo also found nothing suspicious, she was allowed to proceed. The freight covering the arms, such as baths and wooden doors, were both heavy and bulky. (The tale of this voyage in the German official history is one of derring do and gross British stupidity is not particularly convincing: especially as there are glaring errors. Incidentally, the information for this was probably furnished by Leutnant zur See der Reserve des Seeoffizierkorps Karl Spindler that had been her captain. Spindler’s 1921 published accounts were even worse and those of 1931, while corrected in some ways, remained lacking in credibility.) Anyway, regarded as suspicious by coastal stations that had been keeping surveillance on her variously since the night before, on orders from the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Coast of Ireland that afternoon, Setter II and another patrol-trawler, Lord Heneage that had also been shadowing her overnight, located her again well out to sea steaming seaward and carried out pursuit for as long as they could. Under wirelessed orders, two sloops, Zinnia and Bluebell, intercepted the suspicious vessel shortly after 6 p.m. and the latter was ordered subsequently to take her into Queenstown, County Cork. Since there was a not inconsiderable swell running, a boarding party was not put onboard. Overnight, the sloop was reinforced by destroyers, before the latter left at daylight. However, during the forenoon of the 22nd, while nearing Queenstown and still in company with Bluebell, two German ensigns (or alternatively, one ensign and a pendant) were hoisted on the vessel and she was then scuttled by her Kaiserliche Marine crew: using explosive charges that were probably only carried for such an eventuality. Originally, she had been the Wilson Line steamer, Castro, taken as a prize in Cuxhaven before the outbreak of war, before seemingly being condemned in Hamburg’s Prize Court and renamed Libau for German service as a so-called Hilfskreuzer.

Some of the new UB-boats coming into service in the spring of 1916 went to the Hochseeflotte, rather than the Marinekorps Flandern. One of these, UB27, operated successfully off the Firth of Forth on April 28th before moving south to the Tyne, initially without any possible interference from the Auxiliary Patrol. This had happened, unfortunately, because signals intelligence had implied that the Hochseefleet was to be at sea the night before and all the small-craft were kept in harbour. No contact was made with the submarine that continued sinking merchantmen until May 2nd: when ordered home.

Inconclusive clashes continued off Britain’s east coasts. One (or two) of these occurred during the evening of May 18th in the Smith’s Knoll area. It was thought that one of two armed smacks, Hobbyhawk, had sunk a submarine during a confused, short-range action, since on disappearing nothing could be detected on the smack’s hydrophone. A second submarine then, apparently, tried to torpedo her thirty minutes later: but missed. However, it looks as if the submarine had actually lain on the bottom in the interim. In another, on May 27th, British analysis contended that U74 had been destroyed by the Peterhead Auxiliary Patrol. This was in error. German records do not support submarine sinkings in any of these incidents and it is interesting to see that those concerned in the Admiralty were all too keen to believe that sinkings had taken place, awarding money and gongs. It certainly looks as if the British naval establishment (without relevant experience) clung tenaciously to the idea that submarines were fragile.

Hampshire was not the only loss to U75’s mines off Birsay. In better weather, on June 22nd, seven net-drifters with H.M. Yacht Evening Star, intended sweeping a large area to the west, but had not been given clear routing instructions. Unfortunately, H.M. drifter Laurel Crown ran over a mine and exploded: sinking almost instantly with all hands.

By this time not only were the new long-range minelayers of the Hochseeflotte operating as far as Skerryvore, the UC-boats of the Marinekorps Flandern continued their long-running campaign around England’s southeastern coasts. Among losses to the latter in June were three minesweeping-trawlers, Kaphreda, Hirose and Whooper and a patrol trawler, Tugela. These were all between Corton Lightvessel and Aldborough Napes in Norfolk and consequently, another 35 reservists were killed.

Unit 34, Albatross, Consort, Editor, Glamis Castle and Martin of the Peterhead Auxiliary Patrol had a very busy time with at least two submarines on July 7th and 8th. The identity of these U-boats has not been discovered from records seen, but one may have been damaged. Anyway, a serious and pointed attack followed in the same area soon after. Operating in company, U24, U52 and U69 sank Nellie Nutten, Onward and Era, part of Unit 30, that had been with Aberdeen’s fishing fleet. Heavily outgunned, each of the submarines was probably still armed with two 8.8 c.m. guns (22-pounders), while Nellie Nutten and Era only had single three-pounders and even Onward only had a twelve-pounder. (Within months this class of submarine were being re-armed with 10.4 c.m. guns.) Nellie Nutten’s crew managed to to get onboard a Dutch trawler, but the other two boats’ crews were taken as Prisoners of War. No fishing craft were destroyed on this occasion.

Efforts were made almost immediately to improve the protection of fishing fleets, not just in northeast Scotland, but also along Britain’s east coast and in the English Channel. This even included a limited number of destroyers as guards in August. Unfortunately, assets were so stretched, they could not guarantee any success.

U79, one of the long-range minelayers that on August 18th was on transit home off the west coast of Ireland, came into contact with a decoy ship, Farnborough. Trailing the surfaced submarine overnight, during the morning watch she dived and Farnborough dropped a depth-charge. Continuing the pursuit throughout the day, U79 dived once again during the last dog watch and tried to torpedo her persistent follower. Working overnight to change her appearance, the decoy then made for St. Kilda for a further interception on the 20th. No further contact was made.

Small-scale battles continued. On September 5th a seaplane off Portland, Devon, reported a submarine, while two armed patrol-trawlers, Lord Cecil and Vera Grace also saw a Danish steamer, Jeanne, blowing off steam. Closing, Vera Grace opened fire on the submarine, but this did not stop the merchantman being torpedoed by UB29. In another complicated action on the 26th off the Fair Isle, between the Orkney and Shetland Isles, U20 torpedoed and sank H.M. Armed Patrol Trawler Sarah Alice and H.M. Yacht Conqueror II in short order, along with a merchantman. Although sixteen were lost from the trawler and fifteen from the yacht, there were survivors on rafts. The majority were not rescued until the following morning, even although other vessels involved the day before might have been able to.

It had been quieter in the South West Approaches since May, but there was a burst of activity in October. In one action, two lightly armed patrol-trawlers, Clyde and Ulysses II, had been escorting an oiler, Trinculo, on the 23rd, when a British merchantman, Kandy, altered course sharply, hoisted the flag signal for ‘submarine’ and opened fire on a target. The Trinculo altered away and the two trawlers gave chase, opening fire at ‘extreme range’. This was maintained for almost two hours, until dusk, losing sight of the submarine.

H.M. Yacht Ombra gave sterling service on the night of October 26-27th in the Eastern English Channel during a heavy German destroyer raid that intended hitting the troop transports to the west. Following an attack on Waveney II that was one of the net-drifters of the Dover Barrage, it was realised onboard Ombra that the nearby destroyers were not French and an enemy report was made by wireless. The yacht also ordered all the net-drifters she could find into Dover – thereby saving them from needless destruction. Although there were only four deaths from Waveney II’s company, this was a night of serious losses. Flirt, a destroyer that had gone to the drifter’s aid, was demolished by German gunfire at short range and her boilers exploded: destroying her. Sixty officers and men were killed, including six R.N.R. stokers, one R.N.V.R. signalman and one R.F.R. able seaman. Six more drifters, Ajax II, Datum, Gleaner of the Sea, Launch Out, Roburn and Spotless Prince, were sunk with another 39 reservists dead. Two from H.M. Armed Patrol Trawler H.E. Stroud were killed while trying to help the drifters. Also, the destroyer Nubian had been torpedoed, with yet another thirteen dead – one an able seaman in the R.N.V.R. Realising that the Dover Barrage was not as strong as had been thought, in the days following a few destroyers in reinforcement were received.

Even although a few ocean-going boats of the Hochseeflotte ventured down to the Bay of Biscay for some weeks and so, were mostly out of range for the Auxiliary Patrol, the British still had other problems to deal with. Le Havre was, apparently, mined-in by November 5th, so six trawler-minesweepers, presumably Dewsland, Diamond II, Emerald, Hatano, Kosmos and Ottilie II, were despatched from Falmouth, Cornwall, to clear the port and remain there. There was also a skirmish on November 10th mid-Channel, when H.M. Armed Trawlers Gavina and Isle of Man drove a submarine away from a small merchantman. There were reverses though. Among these, on the 3rd H.M. Minesweeping-Trawler Glenprosen was destroyed off Lowestoft by a mine, with five killed. Even with a shallow draught, H.M. Paddle-Minesweeper Fair Maid was all but cut in two by a mine six days later, again with five killed. Although these had been in different locations, both were down to UC18. Also, in clearing mines sown by UC17 off Dartmouth, Devon, on the 10th, a minesweeping-trawler, Benton Castle was sunk: with yet another ten deaths. And, these were not the only losses of minesweepers to mines that month either.

Later in the month there was another, rather lacklustre, German surface raid in the eastern English Channel: this time on the Downs. In the last seventy-minutes of November 23rd, six destroyers were seen by H.M. Armed-Drifter Acceptable and was fired on by the rearmost vessel. Badly damaged by this assault, there would seem to have been no casualties though and with a warning-rocket fired by a relatively close British destroyer, the raid fizzled out.

Towards the end of November there were also other clashes in the English Channel. These involved both the Auxiliary Patrol and decoy ships. The most successful was on the 30th, when UB19 was destroyed by gunfire from H.M. Special Service Vessel Penhurst, mid-way between the Start and Cape de la Hague. Accounts differ as to the German casualties, but their official history stated that eight were killed and fifteen captured.

Into December small-scale struggles in the English Channel, Bristol Channel and as far west as the waters off Ushant continued. Even although submarines were chased, fired upon and depth-charged not infrequently, they remained resilient – if battered.

Mining, especially, but not exclusively, on England’s east coasts also continued. Within the seemingly never-ending tally of vessels destroyed by these weapons were a small number of trawlers in government service monthly. Also, two paddle-steamer minesweepers that were near the Shipwash Lightvessel, off Suffolk, on December 29th, were mined within minutes of each other. Totnes had her bows blown off, but was towed into Harwich. Ludlow was less lucky though. She had her stern destroyed, but not only did she sink at anchor, five of her company were killed.

The ice in the far north cleared from the Murman coast in February and so, the northern approach to and from the White Sea was patrolled from then onwards. Apart from two each of British armed boarding steamers and armed Russian vessels, a constant British trawler patrol was maintained. Also, wartime improvements in railway communications and construction of considerable port facilities at Bakaritsa, near Archangel, allowed, theoretically, for the more rapid discharge of transports by the summer of 1916. It was, therefore, hardly surprising that this area received further attention from the Germans. As well as operations in the Barents Sea to hit the transports, U75 laid 36 mines off Mount Sozonova on August 4th. These were along a newly-buoyed channel. The circumstances in British naval accounts are at variance, but three days later H.M. Minesweeping Trawler John High was lost on these mines: with 14 of her 15-crew killed. Most, if not all of these mines had been dealt with safely by the end of August though. Another minelayer, U76, returned to this theatre and on October 2nd and 3rd laid another 36 mines, in two new barrages off the White Sea approaches. It would appear that by the end of the navigable year not only were all of these swept up, but also the remainder from the earlier operations. All the same, there were a number of mercantile casualties and the British trawler-minesweepers saved lives and hulls on occasion. Also, although most of the port of Bakaritsa was obliterated, with a massive loss of life, when two transports blew up on October 26th (new style November 9th), it does not look as if there were any casualties at all within the British naval forces in the White Sea sphere.

And, having been evacuated from the Gallipoli Peninsula on January 9th, the R.N.D. was offloaded at Mudros within days. It was then re-deployed as garrison troops at Imbros, Tenedos and the Gulf of Stavros: the latter as part of the Salonica army. After the possibility of its reduction to six battalions, the division was transported to France in May though. Further re-organisation followed that included the addition of an army brigade. However, the R.N.D. was re-designated the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division and deployed on the Western Front. Although a military division, it retained naval idiosyncrasies.

Finally, many of those that had been discharged from the armed forces experienced hostility from civilians that was similar to that of merchant mariners. It was not until autumn 1916 that the state produced a visible recognition of their past service though. This was in the form of the Silver War Badge.

1917

The blockade of the Central Powers, but particularly Germany continued, but slightly differently. As a response to the new German declaration of unrestricted Handelskrieg mit U-booten, an Order-in-Council of February 16th put additional pressure on neutral merchantmen trading with the European mainland. Essentially, any vessels met with at sea that were venturing to neutral ports of nations trading with Germany would have to have already called at British, or Colonial, examination ports. Failure to do so would result in their cargoes being condemned in the British Prize Court, instead of being requisitioned, or returned: as had been the policy up until that point. (This was a major expansion of the Navicert system that had already begun for voyages from the United States of America the spring before.) At sea the 10th Cruiser Squadron maintained their patrols as before, stopping only merchantmen that had not complied with the Order-in-Council: as per lists of vessels signalled routinely.

Four A.M.C.s of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were sunk by submarines between May and October. All were out of their patrol areas that were further to the west and those lost were either in transit to rejoin their patrols, or to refuel. Even although there were efforts to provide escorts for them while in transit, this did not prove all that effective: especially with the lack of darkness in these latitudes from spring to autumn. The first was Hilary at approximately 7.30 a.m. on May 25th that was slowed down severely west of the Shetland Isles with one torpedo and then sunk with two more. The author of this attack was Kapitänleutnant Walther Schwieger, by then in command of U88. Only four of her ship’s company were killed, of which one was in the Royal Naval Auxiliary Sick Berth Reserve and another in the M.M.R. They were in a full boat abandoning ship when the second torpedo exploded almost below them. Resistance from a six-pounder was put up until the third torpedo hit at 8.40 a.m. It was only after Hilary had sunk that U88 surfaced, seeking information on the vessel just destroyed. Avenger was next at 2 a.m. on June 14th, again west of the Shetland Isles. According to British accounts, only one torpedo was used by the submarine. However, the German official history states that U69 fired a torpedo double shot (Torpedodoppelschusze). The only fatal casualty was a greaser in the M.M.R. that was unfortunate to be forward of the boiler-room where the torpedo struck. Otway was the third that was attacked at 10.25 p.m., by UC49, north of the Hebrides, on July 22nd. A torpedo struck aft and ten R.N.R. seamen were killed as a result. She survived for approximately two hours, but on her engine-room flooding she became unnavigable and settled after midnight. The last one was Champagne that had been loaned to the French, but just recommissioned with a British ship’s company. She was hit by three torpedoes fired by U96 and sank at about 6.30 a.m. on October 9th, six miles off the coast of County Down. Although all in the boats that had managed to get away were rescued, this was hazardous due to wreckage and the heavy weather. Unfortunately, 47 were killed. Nine of them had been in the R.N.R. and they included two warrant telegraphists, one engineer sub-lieutenant and one assistant paymaster. Ten had been in the R.N.V.R., one being an ordinary telegraphist and the rest seamen. Of the three that had been in the R.F.R., one was a petty officer stoker and the other two stokers. And, there had also been 23 of the M.M.R. killed, mostly from the engine-room department, but one had been a chief cook, another a chief writer, as well as an assistant cook and lastly, an assistant baker.

Not all attacks on the A.M.C.s of this squadron were successful during this summer though. These included on Ebro on May 26th; Orvieto on June 4th; Arlanza June 24th; and Changuinola on July 20th. At least one attack on a submarine for this period is also known of, when Patuca opened fire, but ‘without effect’.

Due to the second almost completely unrestricted campaign of Handelskrieg mit U-booten as of February and the then naval routing of ocean-going merchantmen to and from the U.K. that was far from competent, losses of Allied tonnage in the subsequent months were horrific. Eventually, early summer brought about a gradual introduction of convoys for these merchantmen on long-haul commercial account. Predictably, this meant additional duties for the naval reserves. As well as officials for the organisation of convoys ashore, often found from the newly-formed Ministry of Shipping, long experienced officers with R.N., or R.N.R. commissions were re-appointed to command at sea, as Convoy Commodores and Vice-Commodores. Some of these R.N.R. captains were retired admirals: with all sorts of possibilities for embarrassing situations to arise. Also, some more junior R.N.R. officers were appointed as watchkeepers on the limited number of cruisers involved in escort duties. (It is worth pointing out that it was not unheard of for men-o-war as small as destroyers to have R.N.R. officers as watchkeepers, or by then, even in command. An example of the latter was Lieutenant Charles Herbert Lightoller, once of the Titanic and Oceanic.) Also, still short of communicators, reservist signalmen and a lesser number of wireless operators were also formed into a pool for use onboard the merchantmen: for command-and-control purposes.

Although convoys proved to be far safer both for merchantmen and for that matter, their escorts, the latter were not immune from attack. H.M. A.M.C. Orama joined the homebound convoy HD 7 off Dakar, Senegal on October 7th. By the 19th they were well out in the Atlantic on the edge of the South West Approaches. During the forenoon there had been a short-range surface gun attack on an American merchantman, the J.L. Luckenbach, by U62. Consequently, one of the convoy escorts, U.S.S. Nicholson was despatched and although the merchantman had been returning fire, damage on one of U62’s forward ballast tanks was probably inflicted by the American destroyer. Remaining in the area and having just relocated the J.L. Luckenbach, the well-defended convoy hove into view. At periscope depth and allowing the destroyer screen to pass overhead, one torpedo was used to hit the lead ship of the main body, just before 6 p.m. According to the German official history she was merely the ‘largest of the steamers, with two funnels’. It is clear that if U62’s commander, Kapitänleutnant Ernst Hashagen, had any more torpedoes, he would have used them to sink her, but he did not. Four hours later Orama sank. While none of her company were killed on the day, four (or possibly five) died of their injuries later. Of those identified, three had been engine-room ratings in the M.M.R. and the other was a signalman in the R.N.V.R. Also, none of the 121 ratings in the M.M.R. late of the Caronia that were passengers, seem to have been killed.

Another A.M.C. was also lost in this year: early on. She was Laurentic, by then transporting specie to Canada, for the payment of munitions manufactured in North America. Having sailed from Birkenhead on January 23rd, bound for Halifax, she anchored within the boomed area in Lough Swilly, as ordered, at 7.45 a.m. two days later. Weighing at dusk at 5 p.m. and proceeding once again, with the intention of navigating the coastal channel westwards out to the Atlantic, she struck two mines shortly before 6 p.m., between Fanad Head and Malin Head. U80 had laid a small field of six mines there the day before. (The published and amended confidential instructions in force maintained that there was no swept channel to and from Lough Swilly. In fact, there was, but this information had not been communicated to Laurentic’s command.) There was considerable damage to her port side and the engine room flooded rapidly, making damage control difficult. Since she was settling slowly she was abandoned in a disciplined manner: the last boat leaving her side around 6.45 p.m. Despite being comparatively close to safety, the loss of life for all in the lifeboats trying to pull to shore that night was terrible. Those in two boats were rescued by H.M. Patrol Trawler Imperial Queen, but no others could be found overnight. (Other trawlers, Alpha, Corientes, Ferriby and Lord Lister were also involved, gaining praise from Laurentic's late captain.) Unfortunately, there were at least 350-odd fatalities, but for various reasons it is difficult to tally the numbers with absolute accuracy. Nevertheless, a great many died of hypothermia, in temperatures that it is said dropped to minus thirteen degrees centigrade. Of those that perished around 86 had been in the R.N.R.; almost 20 in the Newfoundland R.N.R.; around 20 in the R.N.V.R.; about 15 in the R.F.R.; and over 120 in the M.M.R.

The Auxiliary Patrol was to be re-organised, yet again, as an early decision of Admiral Jellicoe taking up the appointment of First Sea Lord, in November 1916. As the responsibility of the newly-formed Anti-Submarine Division, the A.P.’s operations were to be unified. Less than coherently, reports were only called for respecting the English Channel. These resulted in suggestions for a fixed coastal lane from the Scilly Isles all the way to the Thames that was to be defended by a ‘continuous line of trawler patrols three to five miles apart’. Even although considerable weaknesses should have been realised, not least because not dissimilar ideas had already failed miserably in the Mediterranean, other areas lost craft as reinforcements for the south and this scheme was ordered as of 21st January 1917. Interestingly, in post-war naval analysis, it was stated that this lane seemed ‘to have fulfilled its purpose’, but only for ‘a time’.

According to the official returns, five trawlers on government service were lost in January 1917. H.M. Patrol Trawlers Teal and Amplify were wrecked far apart in Scottish waters; Patrol Trawler Jacamar sank following a collision off Folkestone Lightvessel with five dead; and H.M. Minesweeping Trawlers Donside and New Comet were mined off Suffolk: on barrages laid by UC4. Between the last two there were another fifteen fatalities. Also, an armed net-drifter, Cape Colony, was mined off Harwich: apparently, with no deaths. And, a motor launch was also wrecked, in waters off County Waterford.

H.M. Yacht Verona was lost in the North Sea off Portmahomack, Ross and Cromarty, in the early hours of February 24th – sinking in less than a minute. This had been down to a mine laid by UC33, more than a month before and apart from the vessel’s loss, there were also 23 killed: all reservists. 14 had been in the M.M.R., seven in the R.N.R. and the last two had been R.N.V.R. signalmen.

February’s trawler losses doubled, with ten mined. Five were off Britain’s east coasts, but there were three along England’s south coast, one off the north coast of the Bristol Channel and one in Irish waters off County Cork. All suffered fatalities and these totalled 85. Also, all were claimed as sunk by German UC-boats. It is entirely possible that the tenth, Cotsmuir, was also mined, but it only known that she disappeared on the 2nd somewhere between the Tyne and Humber: with twelve onboard. Three drifters also came to grief in this month. Two, G.S.P. and Gracie, were involved in collisions and Aivern foundered in the English Channel, while on passage to the Mediterranean. Three men are recorded as having been killed on G.S.P.

As previously, the majority of the losses in March were down to mines. While off Gravelines, northern France, on the 18th, H.M. Paddle Minesweeper Duchess of Montrose had dealt with five mines, laid by UB12 two days before, when she struck another amidships. Breaking in two, she sank rapidly: with twelve killed. All except one, a petty officer R.N., were reservists – five in the R.N.R., two in the R.N.V.R. and four in the M.M.R. The survivors were pulled out the still-freezing water about ten minutes later.

Three armed trawlers were also lost that month to mines laid by UC-boats. One, Northumbria, was in the Firth of Forth on the 3rd; a second, Christopher, far to the south off Southwold, Suffolk on the 30th; and the third, Evangel, was off Milford Haven, Pembrokeshire on the 25th. In total another 25 reservists were killed from these craft. Also, a trawler-minesweeper, Vivanti, foundered off Fairlight, Hastings, in Kent, on the 7th: in conditions as yet undiscovered, but possibly in foul weather. Another trawler, Caledonia, was on government service apparently, but not commissioned when destroyed on March 17th. It looks as if she was unarmed, as she was one of three small-craft held up by UC50 that day. No casualties have been found for her, but the German official history seems to state that her skipper and engineer ‘died’.

And, of the five drifters destroyed in March, two were said to have been mined. Forward III was off the Shipwash Lightvessel, on the 31st, when she was sunk by a mine laid by UC6 – causing the death of nine more reservists. However, the Germans did not claim the destruction of Protect that was off Dover on the 16th when sunk, along with yet another ten reservists killed. Two drifters, Campania II and Energy, seem to have been lost in a gale on the 5th along the Scottish East Coast. Ten were killed on the former, but no information has been found for the latter that had not been commissioned. Gowan was another tiny drifter on undisclosed government service and she too was stopped and sunk by UC50 on the 17th. Incidentally, there must have been multiple small-craft named Energy and this was definitely the case for those named Gowan.

Although March had been the worst month in 1917 for losses of civilian fishing-craft, it was April for those of the Auxiliary Patrol. Fourteen trawlers were sunk. One, H.M. Armed Patrol Trawler Margate fought UC50 for half-an-hour on the 24th off Spurn Head, in defence of local fishing craft. In doing so thirteen of her company were killed. All the others were mined, overwhelmingly by UC-boats. Eight of the trawlers were patrol-craft in Scottish, English and Irish waters. The other five were trawler-minesweepers, widely dispersed, including one that had been sent over to northern France. The dead from these craft amounted to another 113. Plantin, one of the many armed net-drifters based at Poole, Dorset, was also destroyed by a submarine-laid mine on the 26th – killing her crew of nine. The single largest loss during this month was the paddle-minesweeper Nepaulin though. Working near number three buoy in Dunkirk Roads on the 20th, she struck a mine very newly-laid by UB12. Disintegrating, figures differ as to the fatalities and may have been as high as 22, but 19 only have been identified. Excepting one ordinary seaman in the R.N., they were all reservists. Thirteen had been in the R.N.R., two in the R.N.V.R. and the rest in the M.M.R.

May’s A.P. losses were primarily of seven trawlers, almost all to mines laid by UC-submarines. Four were of trawler-sweepers. The first of these was Lord Ridley, off Whitby, Yorkshire, on the 10th. Two days before a barrage of nine mines had been sown there, by UC40 and one had been sighted on the surface on the 9th. Succumbing to another of these charges, ten were killed, but it was reported that there was one survivor. Next, Bracklyn, was at work off Yarmouth during the afternoon watch of the 11th when she struck a mine, laid by UC1 and sank - with the deaths of ten. Slightly further south again off Lowestoft, on the 23rd, Tettenhall, hit a mine from UC14 around noon, sinking rapidly with the deaths of six more. Over in County Cork, off the Bull Light, near Dursey Head, Ina William, was sunk in the forenoon of the 30th, due to UC50. This mine detonation resulted in in another twelve killed. There were also three patrol-trawlers destroyed. Lucknow was off Portsmouth, Hampshire, on the 18th, firing at mines (probably with small arms) that were on the surface at low water. These had been laid off Nab Head the night before by UC36. Nine were killed. Senator, although a patrol-trawler, was one of many fitted with sweep-gear. Operating in Tory Sound, north of County Donegal on the 21st and heaving in her sweep during the last dog (6 p.m. to 8 p.m.) she was blown up by one of twelve mines laid on the 8th by U80 - killing another eleven. Merse was equally as unlucky. UC65, commanded by Kapitänleutnant Otto Steinbrinck, had laid very dispersed barrages in the Clyde Estuary between April 30th and May 1st. Some had been swept up, but while acting as a fleet-sweeper, Merse was ahead of the battleship Ramillies and off Garrock Head, struck one of the mines with the loss of all seventeen of her hands.

Also, commanding a patrol unit, H.M. Yacht Zarefah was off the approaches to Kirkwall, in the Orkney Isles, on May 8th. At 7 p.m. she had sunk, by gunfire, one of nine mines laid earlier in the day by UC31. Twelve minutes later she was blown up and sunk by another, killing sixteen of her company. And, there were also two collisions. A Cromarty-based patrol trawler, Epworth, sank somewhere on Britain’s east coast on the 22nd. Eleven were killed in this accident. More precisely, Rosevine, one of Lowestoft’s net-drifters, was lost off Great Yarmouth on the 24th. Thankfully, no deaths were reported following this incident though.

June’s deprivations were roughly the same in number as May, but their make-up was different. Five patrol-trawlers and one Admiralty-owned trawler were mined: all but two to UC-submarines. Carew Castle was lost off Hartland Point, Devon on the 12th. The majority of her crew survived, but three were killed. At 4 a.m. on the 17th, Fraser that was sweeping with Ben Gulvain, was sunk off Boulogne. Twelve (or thirteen) were killed, but four, including one that was badly wounded, were saved by Ben Gulvain though. Off Malin Head, County Donegal, Corientes was lost on the 23rd. Thirteen were killed that included the unit’s leader – a lieutenant R.N.R. A day later, Taipo was destroyed near the Royal Sovereign Lightvessel, off Hastings, Sussex, with another five dead. And, Gelsina was lost off Girdleness, Aberdeenshire, on the 25th, with five of her company also killed. The Admiralty-built trawler, Charles Astie, was lost to a mine off Fanad Point, Lough Swilly, on the 26th while, apparently, escorting a transport, Hartland. All seventeen onboard were reservists in the R.N.R. or R.N.V.R. and were killed. One drifter, George V, was also mined, to a controlled-mine off Dover. Nine deaths occurred through this accident.

One patrol-trawler, Towhee, disappeared in the English Channel during the first watch (8 p.m. until midnight) on the 14th. Portsmouth-based, along with three other trawlers, she had been escorting the ‘1st group of FCTs’ (French Coal Trade), comprising of ten steamers and a towed sailing vessel, over to Le Havre. Confused, investigations threw up a number of possibilities, including being sunk by mine, torpedo, or collision with a merchantman named the Jason. Nothing was established conclusively though.

There was less mystery over the patrol-trawler Bega. She had been part of a large escort of one destroyer, one yacht and four trawlers on June 18th, all for six White Sea bound merchantmen: two Russians and four Britons. Proceeding at eight knots, they were to disperse 50 miles north of Muckle Flugga: the northernmost point of the Shetland Isles. Ten miles short, she was on the port side of the port column, slightly forward of the leading vessel during the forenoon when torpedoed, by U58, whilst dived. Seven of her crew were killed, but at least nine were saved by H.M. Yacht Mingary. Taking into consideration information known, it looks as if the convoy’s speed was overestimated slightly by the submarine’s commander and/or navigating warrant officer.

Minesweepers were also lost in June. The first, Borneo, a trawler-minesweeper, went down with all her eleven hands, off Beachy Head, Sussex, on the 18th. Newly laid that day, by UC17, one mine had been seen by H.M. Torpedo Boat No. 22 earlier and this was the same barrage that Taipo also encountered fatally the following week.

Across the English Channel two Ascot-class paddle-minesweepers were sunk off Gravelines on the 24th. Gatwick, Kempton and Redcar had sailed from Dunkirk at dawn, to sweep the entrance to Calais. Anchoring during the dangerous low-water period, they were told by a patrol-drifter of moored mines found. Sweeping three-abreast, Redcar struck a mine forward, killing the gun-crew and other men at the bow. Fortunately, as these Admiralty-built paddlers were of a stronger construction than the pleasure-craft drafted into wartime service, she did not sink instantly. As the survivors were being transferred to Kempton, she also hit a mine midships: destroying her engine-room and all within. Drifting towards the barrage that had been laid by UC1 on the 22nd, Kempton’s captain managed to anchor her safely. She too sank, but the loss of life was limited to eight on Redcar and four on Kempton. Comparatively unusually, in a published account there is a graphic description of one individual that was mortally wounded.

The losses in vessels eased off somewhat in July, even if not for those involved. Another paddle-minesweeper, Queen of the North was blown up on the 20th and of her ship’s company of 32 there were only three survivors. She had been working in daylight, off Harwich, near the Shipwash Lightvessel and east of the War Channel. One of the survivors stated that she sank in thirty seconds! Once again off Harwich, a patrol-trawler, Kelvin, had been mined on the 7th – with four, or possibly five more deaths. These were the results of two separate barrages, laid by UC4, on July 14th and June 29th respectively. Also, another patrol-trawler, George Milburn, was mined off Dunmore Point, County Waterford on the 12th, by UC42, killing another eleven reservists. And, one of Kirkwall’s minesweeping-drifters, Southesk, was mined, by UC33, on the 7th in Auskerry Sound, resulting in yet another four deaths.

Two more trawlers were destroyed through accidents that month. Drake II was wrecked on the 3rd in Garnish Bay, County Cork: seemingly with no deaths. Vale of Leven was sunk due to a collision off Worthing, West Sussex on the 9th. Over two days five of her crew died. Also, near Haisborough Lightvessel, off the Norfolk coast, a drifter, Betsy Sim, sank through collision on the 18th. Apparently, there were no human casualties though.

One patrol trawler, Robert Smith that was attached to the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was shown in official British records as having disappeared on July 20th, or 21st. German records cannot confirm her fate absolutely either. Nevertheless, it is highly likely that she encountered U44 that attacked her on the surface, well into the Atlantic, roughly northwest of the Hebrides on the 21st, or shortly after. U44 was rammed and sunk with all hands, by H.M. Destroyer Oracle on August 12th, but beforehand, she had met up with U84. In passing information, it was stated that U44 had sunk a patrol vessel by gunfire. There had been 25 onboard Robert Smith and so, may have included armed guards for merchantmen to be taken in as prizes.

Even fewer Auxiliary Patrol vessels were destroyed in August. On the 20th H.M. Minesweeping-trawler Kirkland was lost off Fugla Skerry, Papa Stour, in the Shetland Isles, to a mine laid by U80. She may have been on escort duty at the time, but it is known that the detonation caused the death of eleven more reservists. Two days later off the Firth of Tay, Sophron, a patrol-trawler fitted with sweep-gear was working near where UC41 had blown up on the 21st – while laying a barrage. Unfortunately, Sophron struck one that had been laid previously and she sank with the loss of eight of her crew. Another patrol-trawler with sweep-gear, Jay, was torpedoed by UB35 while dived, when off Southwold, Suffolk, on the 11th. Nine of her company were killed. And, an Admiralty-trawler, Benjamin Stevenson, was lost on the 18th. Forty miles east of Fetlar, one of the Shetland Isles, she had been escorting an eastbound convoy, when she and a patrol-trawler, Elise that was also on escort duty, engaged U55 (commanded by Kapitänleutnant Wilhelm Werner). While the submarine dived after 30 minutes of battle and cleared off, Benjamin Stevenson had been hit three times and sank some hours later. Thankfully, none of her crew were reported as being killed.

The rest of this month’s marine casualties were down to accidents. A patrol-trawler, Bovic, sank on the 5th, due to a collision southeast of Souter Point, on the coast of County Durham. There would at least seem to have been no deaths. One of Devonport’s extended defence drifters, Nina, blew up on the 2nd, with four deaths. Dewey, an armed-drifter was lost by collision with a steamer, Glenifer, off the Royal Sovereign Lightvessel at about 11 p.m. on the 12th, with the heavy loss of eleven dead on the drifter. The one survivor was too ill to give evidence at the Court of Enquiry. The steamer was, subsequently, judged to have been largely, but not entirely, at fault. And, another drifter of some sort, Ocean’s Gift II, suffered a fire, possibly caused through an explosion, while off the Wash on the 30th – with her skipper the only apparent fatality.

Five of the six of September’s losses of small-craft were mined, as usual, by UC-submarines. The first of the trawlers was a minesweeper, Eros, which was destroyed off Felixstowe, Suffolk on the 5th. Two were killed and one more seems to have also died of his wounds the following March. At the other end of the county off Lowestoft, another minesweeper-trawler, Loch Ard, was lost on the 10th. Five more reservists are shown to have been killed. In the extreme north, a patrol-trawler, Asia, was lost off the Bressay Islands, within the Shetland Isles, on the 12th: with seven more men dead. The former of two drifters was a Sheerness-based net-drifter, Hastfen that came to grief off Longsand, in the Thames Estuary on the 24th: killing another four. The latter was a Portsmouth extended-defence drifter, Ocean Star that disappeared off the Nab, on the 26th. Yet another ten men were killed.

H.M. Admiralty Trawler James Seckar, was stated in the official British returns of losses as having disappeared on the 25th. German sources provide detail though. In the Atlantic, deep in the Bay of Biscay, U63 attacked one of the French coal trade convoys, torpedoing a French steamer, Dinorah, while dived. James Seckar went alongside the damaged collier and was sunk promptly with another torpedo. U63 then finished off the Dinorah by gunfire. The trawler’s company had numbered sixteen.

October was worse. Four trawlers were mined definitely and one more probably. By then the ocean-going minelayers of the Hochseeflotte and the improved UC-boats of the Marinekorps Flandern were operating all around the United Kingdom and further. Vitality, a minesweeping-trawler, was lost off Orfordness, Suffolk and Thomas Stratten, a patrol-trawler serving as a Special Service Vessel, was also destroyed off the Butt of Lewis: both on the 20th. Three days later, another patrol-trawler, Earl Lennox, sank off the Sound of Islay. Similarly, Strymon, another patrol-trawler was lost far to the south on the 27th, near the Shipway Lightvessel, off Harwich, Essex. Also, on the 10th yet another patrol trawler, Waltham, disappeared off the Isle of Man, in the Irish Sea, on the 10th. It was not until many decades later that a wreck of an armed steam-trawler within an area mined by UC75 was found by divers. And, two drifters were also mined. Active III, was mined, possibly while sweeping, while off Milford Haven, Pembrokeshire on the 15th. Three days later, Comrades was lost off Cape d’Antifer. The total of dead reservists on these craft was 51.

During the forenoon of the 17th one of the giant cruiser submarines, U53, attacked a homebound Gibraltar convoy: HG 20. Off Ushant at the time, a British steamer, Polvena, was torpedoed without warning. This damaged her number three hold and engine room that also resulted in three fatalities. Abandoned, two patrol-trawlers, Conway Castle and Ruby, were ordered to remain with the damaged merchantman until tugs arrived from Brest. Unfortunately, around dusk while still circling their charge, Ruby was struck by another torpedo, fired by UC79 and she sank with all eighteen hands. The trawler had been obliterated inadvertently and the merchantman settled and sank.

There were also three accidents resulting in losses that month. H.M. Yacht Kethalies was sunk through collision off Blackwater Lightship, Rosslare, County Durham on the 11th. Of the fifteen dead, all but one, a R.N. signalman, were reservists. An armed-patrol trawler, Clyde, was also sunk in a collision, off Sidmouth, Devon, on the 14th. Seemingly, there were no fatalities though. Earlier, on the 8th, another patrol-trawler, Ben Heilem, had been wrecked off Berwick. Thankfully, no fatalities were recorded for this incident either.

Unsurprisingly, small-craft continued to be mined in November, although at least there were only two. H.M. Armed Trawler Morococala was sunk off Daunt Rock Lightvessel, County Cork, on the 19th. She had been sweeping a barrage laid by UC31 the day before. Another twelve reservists were killed as a result. Around the coast seaward of Dublin Bay, in the Irish Sea, a net-drifter, Deliverer, disappeared on the 3rd – with her crew of ten. She had been mined by UC75. Also, a Milford-Haven armed-patrol trawler, Thuringia that was escorting an oiler, Alchymist, was blown up in Irish waters on the 11th. Torpedoed by U95, off Youghal, County Cork, it was witnessed that she ‘immediately disappeared’ and all fourteen onboard were killed.

Three others were lost through collisions in November: all in English waters. H.M. Paddle Minesweeper Marsa was hit at anchor by H.M. Destroyer Leader Shakespeare in the fairway in the busy entrance to Harwich Harbour, Essex on the night of the 18-19th. It was dark and misty and although Shakespeare was moving slowly, saliently Marsa had anchored sloppily and without lights or bell signals, it was only a matter of time before a collision occurred. Continuing, an armed-trawler, Newbridge, was destroyed off Prawle Point, Devon, a day later. She had only returned to service around a fortnight before, having been alongside for repairs. And, a Poole-based net-drifter, John Mitchell, went down off St. Alban’s Head, Dorset on the 14th. Seemingly, there were no fatalities in any of these and another accident, when H.M. Motor Launch Number 52 succumbed to fire in Sandown Bay, off the Isle of Wight on the 29th.

As part of a larger operation on December 12th, four German destroyers attacked an eastbound Scandinavian convoy of six merchantmen off the Norwegian coast. They were escorted by two destroyers and four armed-patrol trawlers. The British destroyers tried to draw their opposite numbers away. Three followed. Partridge torpedoed V100, but the weapon did not detonate and already disabled, the Briton was sunk by gunfire. Pellow, survived with the aid of a squall, ‘damaged to the extent rendering her incapable of continuing the action’. Meanwhile, the fourth German destroyer despatched the entire convoy and the very outgunned trawlers: taking prisoners, civilian and naval. The trawlers were Commander Fullerton, Livingstone, Lord Alverstone and Tokio. As for the dead, of the 74 from Partridge, one was a midshipman R.N.R., three were ratings R.N.V.R. and one more was an able seaman R.F.R. Four were killed on Pellew, but none were reservists. Two from Commander Fullerton were also killed – her skipper and one trimmer: both R.N.R.

Four more trawlers were lost that month. One, H.M. Armed Patrol Trawler Apley, was lost near Owers Lightship, off Selsey Bill, Sussex, shortly after midnight on the 6th. Stated as mined in British records, she was claimed by UC71 in a surface torpedo attack. Eleven were killed, ten in the R.N.R. and an ordinary seaman in the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve. Another of Portsmouth’s armed patrol-trawlers, Sapper, was said to have been wrecked in the same area on the 29th. Seemingly, once again due to UC71 though, the trawler may well have struck a mine laid five days earlier. All 19 onboard were killed. The other two, both armed patrol-trawlers, were lost accidentally. Duster was wrecked off Scratten Cove, near Portreath, on Cornwall’s northern coast, on the 17th. And, Ocean Scout I was in a collision off Inisheer Light, County Galway four days later. Fortunately, no fatalities were reported in either incident.

One of Newhaven’s minesweeping drifters, Piscatorial II, may also have been mined by UC71, on the 28th. She is stated in British records to have disappeared a day later and ten more reservists lost their lives onboard her. There was no mystery over H.M. Motor Drifter Bounteous. She was wrecked on the north shore of the island of Rhum on the 4th. Also, a day later another of Oban’s motor-drifters, Helen Wilson, was lost to fire, in port. No fatal casualties were reported for either.

By this time there were many decoy vessels in service, especially based at Queenstown, since Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly R.N., ‘Commanding on the Coast of Ireland, &c.’ was such a strong advocate of this type of warfare. This remained as vicious as ever, with both sides giving as good as they got and the British lost well over a dozen vessels in this year. Included were some whose crews had considerable skill and experience, but then there were also U-boat commanders with their own expertise.

The Lady Olive was a small coastal steamer that had been taken up in November 1916 and began active service as Q18 at the beginning of 1917. According to British accounts, while slightly west of Jersey during the morning watch of February 19th, she was shelled by UC18, initially, from a range of three miles. After the decoy’s ‘panic party’ abandoned ship, the submarine closed to around 100 yards on her quarry’s port quarter while putting shots into her, when the decoy vessel opened fire and destroyed UC18 in short order. Unfortunately, Lady Olive also sank, but at least part of her ship’s company was picked up by the French destroyer Dunois the following evening: after a trying time in boats and rafts.

A modern television documentary, The Hunt for the Lady Olive and the German Submarine, has in all probability provided additional information on this action. Two hulls lie relatively-close together, but further west than was thought. The steamer is upside down, making positive identification unlikely, but she is of a similar size and build. The submarine is of the correct type, even if absolutely positive identification cannot be made. Although not mentioned in the documentary, comparing the film footage of the submarine hull with the little that can be extracted from the German official history, sense can be made of it. UC18 had sailed from Zeebrugge after noon on February 16th, tasked with laying mine-barrages off Boulogne, Le Havre and the Ile Vierge, on the northwest coast of Brittany, as well as conducting Handelskrieg in the English Channel and Biscay. Much of this boat’s forward casing is missing, showing that four of her six mine-chutes are empty. So, it can be assumed that she was on her way to lay the third barrage off Ile Vierge, as speculated upon in the German official account. Also, apart from spent shell cases and live shells littered around, the gun’s tampon is not in place, indicating having been in action immediately prior to sinking: backing British versions.

Following on from sinking two merchantmen and a gunboat off the south west coast of Ireland on March 13th and nearing the end of a patrol, U61 came upon a steamer: Warner (Q27). The submarine’s commander, Kapitänleutnant Victor Dieckmann, realised that she was a decoy and sank her with his last torpedo. British and German records do not tally entirely as to the casualties and Prisoners of War taken. There were at least ten killed, with one that had died of his wounds; along with her navigating officer, one wireless operator and four other ratings that were captured and taken onboard the submarine. Of the dead two were reservists – one lieutenant R.N.R and a greaser in the M.M.R. The survivors, in two boats, were rescued the next afternoon by H.M. Submarine D3.

Fifty miles west of the Fastnet, during the forenoon of May 20th, Lady Patricia (Q25) that was operating as the Paxton and U48 opened fire at 4,000 yards. Smoke was made by the decoy and fire returned after being hit: seemingly forcing the submarine deep. The afternoon watch was spent changing her disguise, into a Swede, Tosca, but during the last dog, she was torpedoed by U46 without warning. This dislodged a gun-cover and so, remaining afloat, a second torpedo was used to sink her. Those that survived spent up to seven days adrift. At least thirty of her company were killed, or died before rescue. Of these, three had been in the R.N.R., two in the R.N.V.R. and eight in the M.M.R. Also, at least one prisoner was taken – her captain.

Three decoy vessels were lost and one damaged significantly in June. The first was torpedoed by U82 while dived, northwest of the Fastnet on the 11th: taking her for a normal steamer. She was in fact Zylpha (Q6), whose engine-room flooded, but remained afloat long enough for her to be towed a considerable distance by a sloop, Daffodil. Unfortunately, Zylpha sank on the 15th, near the Great Skilligs. One life was lost. He was an engine-room artificer in the R.N.R.

The next sunk, on the 20th, was Salvia (Q15) that was one of a number of sloops used as decoys. Operating well into the Atlantic, U94 hit this ‘unknown steamer’ with a torpedo that detonated the depth-charges and wrecked much of her after end. Keeping astern, U94 then opened a heavy fire from approximately 1,700 yards, forcing the decoy’s abandonment for real. Apart from Salvia’s captain that was taken prisoner, five were killed in the explosion and shelling. Unusually, all were junior ratings in the Royal Navy. The survivors were rescued by another decoy, Aubretia (Q13), later that day in weather that was said to have been ‘boisterous’.

The last totally destroyed in June was Bayard (Q20), a 220-ton sailing lugger. She was involved in a collision somewhere in the English Channel on the 29th. Seemingly, there were no fatal casualties. Also, earlier in the month, on the 3rd, Mavis (Q26) was torpedoed by UC29 seaward of the Wolf Rock, near Land’s End, Cornwall. Struck on her starboard beam, this caused her engine and boiler-rooms to be flooded. Attended to by destroyers, a trawler and tugs, she was towed as far as Plymouth Sound, but had to be beached in Cawsand Bay. Four were killed – three stokehold ratings in the M.M.R. and an engineer sub-lieutenant R.N.R. Incidentally, UC29 was in the Irish Sea four days later, when she was destroyed in a bitter, close-range action, by another decoy: Pargust (pendant number unknown). There were only two German survivors, one of whom had been washed over the side in the heavy sea running.

There was a respite for the decoy-vessels in July: with only one loss. A trawler commissioned under the scheme introduced in April 1917 taking over those left in civilian hands, Asama, was engaged in the protection of craft still allowed to fish, even although only armed with one three-pounder gun. Well into the Atlantic, in the South West Approaches, on the 16th, while accompanying a Belgian trawler, Raymond, she was shelled by U48. Holding off the much heavier-armed German boat at 3,000 yards at first and using smoke, although taking hits, it took almost two hours for the trawler to be sunk. Her second engineer that was in the M.M.R. was killed and three others, her skipper, a seaman and a fireman, were also wounded. The survivors were rescued by H.M. Destroyer Hardy a few hours later. The Belgian trawler managed to escape unscathed. Skipper Albert Lawrence Petherbridge R.N.R. received the D.S.C.; three others the D.S.M. (including the two R.N.V.R. gunners); and four more were mentioned in despatches. Also, there was subsequent discussion about re-arming these fishing craft with heavier weapons: such as twelve-pounders.

August’s losses were high, especially in fatalities. Bracondale, late collier on Admiralty service, was commissioned for decoy duties in the spring of 1917 as Chagford. Operating out of Buncrana, County Donegal, in the morning darkness of August 5th, approximately 120 miles northwest of Tory Island, she was torpedoed by U44. Although her engine-room was flooded, fire was opened on the submarine on surfacing. Forced back down to periscope depth again, a second torpedo was used half-an-hour later and a third after another hour. It was not until the early afternoon of the next day that she was abandoned completely though. Even then with all but one of her crew safe, an attempt was made to tow her, but she sank in a ‘rough sea’ during the morning watch of the 7th. One able seaman R.N. had been killed.

An ex-collier in Admiralty service, Dunraven, was lost on August 10th. This was only after a long, complicated and absolutely hair-raising combat with UC71 two days before 120-130 miles west of Ushant. On wirelessing finally for assistance, an American yacht and two British destroyers arrived on the scene. Badly damaged, her stern had been wrecked through fire and the detonation of depth-charges, cordite and four-inch shells that also caused her after four-inch gun to land on the well deck; and she had also been holed by a torpedo abaft her engine-room. British sources give the impression that UC71 was driven off. However, having used his last torpedo that afternoon, the submarine’s commander, Oberleutnant zur See Reinhold Saltzwedel, merely observed the newcomers for some hours: before beginning the return to base. Strenuous efforts were made to tow Dunraven to Plymouth, but these failed and she capsized in a heavy sea, during the early hours of the 10th. Even then, derelict and a danger to navigation, she had to be shelled and depth-charged by a destroyer to get her to sink. Numerous sources state that there was one fatality from this extraordinary action, but it has not been possible to confirm this. It may have been assumed that the man that was blown overboard when the cooking ordnance on her stern exploded was killed. But, it is known definitely that there were wounded – although nothing more.

H.M. Sloop Bergamot is shown on the official losses as a special service vessel. She was on her way to rendezvous with a steamer, Kroonland, when torpedoed without warning, during the first watch of the 13th. This attack was put in by U84 on what was thought to be a ‘seemingly unarmed steamer’, about ‘70 nautical miles west of the northern tip of Ireland’. Struck in the ‘auxiliary engine room just abaft the main engine-room’, she broke in two and sank in three minutes. The majority of her company managed to survive in the two ship’s boats though. One, with 47 onboard, spent almost two days under sail, passing Bloody Foreland and making for Lough Swilly before being picked up by H.M. Armed Trawler Lord Lister. It took a few hours more for the other boat, with 31, to be rescued by coastguards at Malinmore, County Donegal. Of the fourteen killed, four were in the R.N.R. – the rest being regulars. It is highly probable that some of these casualties had been in the water when the sloop’s ready-use depth-charge detonated. Apparently, on surfacing, the submarine also took two prisoners. Subsequently, Probationary Surgeon Robert Sydney Steele Smith R.N.V.R. was awarded the Albert Medal for saving the First Lieutenant’s life.

Vala (Q8) had been one of the early decoy-vessels. A small and slow steamer with a maximum speed of eight knots, initially, she had operated out of the fleet anchorages at Scapa Flow, but spent most of her naval career based down in Pembrokeshire. She had sailed on August 19th for a patrol in the South West Approaches and disappeared. It became known subsequently that she was sunk with all hands, by UB54, on the 21st. Observed by the submarine’s commander, Oberleutnant zur See Egon von Werner, during the afternoon of the 20th, around 120 nautical miles southwest of the Scilly Isles, her movements were suspicious: as not only was she slow, she also stopped occasionally. At 5.40 a.m. the following day a torpedo was put into her and while two boats with part of her crew abandoned, they remained at her stern. Therefore, von Werner sank Vala with a second torpedo an hour later. Survivors in lifeboats were questioned as to her identity. Eventually, all of her company of 43 perished. Twelve of them had been in the R.N.R., one was in the R.N.V.R. and another three had been in the R.F.R.

Three sailing decoys were also lost in August. Prize (Q21) had originally been the Else, a German-built and registered topsail-schooner. She was said to have been the first prize taken in the war and some wag renamed her the First Prize. On being taken into naval service in November 1916, this name was shortened. Another vessel operating out of Milford Haven, Pembrokeshire, she had encountered U93 on the surface on April 30th and both had damaged each other seriously in the ensuing gun-action. Three Germans that had been blown over the side were rescued and in turn, in a spirit of cooperation they helped keep Prize afloat. Lieutenant William Edward Sanders R.N.R., her captain, received the Victoria Cross and promotion to Lieutenant-Commander for this action, with a D.S.O. to a commissioned officer and D.S.M.s for the rest of her ship’s company. Additionally, D.S.C.s went to two skippers of craft that had aided Prize when in a bad way. Patched up, instead of taking her out of service, the decoy’s base was changed to Killybegs, County Donegal and at least one scrape followed. Unfortunately, she was sunk in August by UB48 that was on her way out to the Mediterranean. In the Atlantic off the North Channel, Prize that was disguised as a Swede, had been working with H.M. Submarine D6 when UB48 opened fire on the sailing vessel early in the morning watch of the 13th. The German submarine having then closed cautiously, Prize ran up the white ensign and opened fire, but D6 could not see the German submarine for most of the action. This was broken off when UB48 dived, but her commander, Oberleutnant zur See Wolfgang Steinbauer, was determined to sink this auxiliary warship. Shadowing his target all day and due to a dark night, a surface torpedo attack was put in at about 3 a.m. on the 14th. This missed, but the second about thirty minutes later did not and Prize exploded. Remaining until dawn, the Germans made a search, but apart from one corpse, all that was found was wood splinters and miscellaneous other debris. Records relating to D6 that had also remained near Prize was partly at variance, inasmuch as the time of her destruction was said to have been around 1.30 a.m. and cannot be explained even with the two boats’ logs on different time zones. Anyway, according to the deaths recorded, Prize’s experienced company comprised of 27 officers, petty officers and men. Seventeen had been in the R.N.R., three in the R.N.V.R. and the others were in the navy proper.

UC63, under the command of Oberleutnant zur See Karsten von Heydebreck, was on her way back to Flanders on the 15th she came across two smacks and tried to have them stop with gunfire, off Jim Howe Bank, Norfolk. This was returned by the decoys Nelson (under the name I’ll Try) and Ethel & Millie (as Boy Alfred) and according to the German official history they were only subdued after ‘stubborn resistance’. The British Court of Enquiry concluded that Nelson had been ‘handled in a seamanlike and brave manner, and continued fighting till she was sunk by gun-fire, being apparently out-gunned’. As she sank, her company abandoned ship. Skipper Thomas Crisp D.S.C., R.N.R. ‘died in action, giving orders up to the last minute’. He had been wounded horribly and subsequently, received the V.C. posthumously. The second-hand that was the skipper’s son received the D.S.M. and a leading seaman got a bar to his D.S.M. Less was known of Ethel & Millie’s fate, but seemingly on receiving a direct hit the survivors also abandoned ship and were last seen on the UC63’s casing. Unknown to the British authorities, before being consigned to the deep, among booty was her three-pounder gun and a hydrophone. Regarded as missing, in time it became known that all seven of her company had not survived. Whatever befell these British mariners, it might be said that their deaths were avenged on November 1st. H.M. Submarine E52 sank U63 off the Goodwin Sands, killing von Heydebreck and all but one of his crew.

Even if September only brought one more decoy destroyed, the death toll was high. Although the Glenfoyle had previously been on government service as a transport, she was commissioned as another decoy-vessel in the spring of 1917. Only on her second patrol as Stonecrop off southwest Ireland, she came to the attention of a cruiser-submarine, U151, on the 17th. Very heavily-armed, the submarine opened up with her guns from a range of ‘several miles’. Theoretically, the Briton’s top speed was 8¼ knots, but could only make seven and although difficult to handle, she made an appearance of trying to flee. In danger of being overhauled and damaged severely by the submarine’s gunfire, smoke was made, before ‘abandonment’. At a range of 600 yards, Glenfoyle then fired on U151 with her four-inch gun and howitzers. Hit three times, the submarine dived and although damaged, continued on her patrol to the Azores and west coast of the African continent unhindered. The decoy having also survived this combat, was torpedoed and sunk the next day, by U43, approximately 150 miles southwest of Fastnet. Five men had been killed and one lifeboat destroyed by the explosion. The survivors in the other two lifeboats and especially those on ‘some floating timbers’ that had been turned into a raft, had an absolutely terrible time. It was not until the 23rd that those still alive on the raft were rescued by H.M. Sloop Zinnia. By the end of their ordeal, 35 officers and men had died. The majority were in the Royal Navy, but four were in the R.N.R., two in the R.N.V.R. and five in the M.M.R. The action with U151 was recognised in a D.S.O. for Commander Maurice B.R. Blackwood R.N., her captain, plus D.S.C.s for three other commissioned officers and a warrant officer.

While the patrolling continued, it was not until December that there were any more losses of decoy vessels – two of them. The first, H.M. Sloop Arbutus was torpedoed by UB65 fifteen miles from the Smalls, in Saint George’s Channel, at 4 p.m. on December 15th. Although she, nor U.S.S. O’Brien nearby, had been zig-zagging, this seems to have been because they were trying to intercept UB65 that had been seen by lookouts and others thirty minutes before. The torpedo struck the boiler-room and exploded, flooding most of the machinery spaces and bunkers, as well as opening up the port side and causing other damage. The American destroyer has been said to have dropped a depth-charge over the submarine, but the sloop is known to have released one of hers and this could well have been the same explosion. Most of Arbutus’ company abandoned ship and were picked up by O’Brien. Six engine-room ratings were killed and a painter died of his wounds two days later. One of these casualties was a stoker R.N.R. Also, her captain, Commander Charles Herbert Oxlade R.D. R.N.R. and navigator, Lieutenant Charles Stewart R.N.R., stayed with their stricken vessel. Unfortunately, they too were lost overnight in a severe gale after an explosion onboard when the hawsers of two rescue tugs, Francis Batey and Margaret Ham, parted and she drifted away and disappeared. In the aftermath, questions were asked, finally, as to the construction of these sloops that were not built to warship standards.

As her pendant number (Q7) showed, Penshurst was one of the comparatively early decoys. Having had a number of scrapes, she was sunk finally on December 24th, off the Smalls, by U110. Dived, a torpedo fired from 300 yards hit her ‘between the boilers and engine-room’ at around 1.30 p.m. This also destroyed part of her disguise, ‘exposing the midships 4-inch gun’. Although the submarine’s commander was cautious, with the decoy settling slowly, she surfaced and a gunnery dual occurred. A P-boat made her presence known and the submarine exited, but Penshurst sank that evening at 8.5 p.m. Two R.N. ratings were killed – a cook’s mate and a stoker.

Up in the far north, the partial spring thaw brought reinforcement to Britain’s small-craft based on the edge of the White Sea. On April 6th twelve trawlers arrived, with another five trawlers, four drifters and two yachts in May. However, in an one-off mining operation this year, U75 arrived off the Murman Coast on April 9th, laying four small barrages over two days. Two of these were across the entrance of the Kola Inlet, with the others off the Ribachi Peninsula. The German official history commented that there was little patrolling, no mercantile traffic and that it was a ‘lonely area’.

A Russian transport, Hansley, said to have been an ammunition-ship in German sources, but that may have been a collier by then, was also torpedoed by U75 on the 9th. (She had been a German prize, Hans Leonhardt, requisitioned by the British Government and then sold to the Russians.) There were two British fatalities - a leading seaman R.N.R. and an able seaman R.N.V.R. and it can be seen from their service records that they were from her gun’s crew. Apparently, there were also other losses to these barrages and H.M. Minesweeping Trawler Arctic Prince was damaged, while clearing the Kola Inlet on April 15th. She was towed back to the U.K., arriving in August. Unfortunately, five junior ratings R.N.R. and one signalman R.N.V.R. had been killed.

Conditions allowing, the approach to the Kola Inlet was patrolled constantly by trawlers during this year. Also, a further two trawlers and two armed-boarding steamers were kept off Cape Cherni, in the protection of inbound traffic.

As navigation into Archangel became possible again from June, merchantmen bound there from the U.K. were instructed to ‘proceed independently by the outer sea route to Yukanski (on the Murman coast). Once there, they would be convoyed into the White Sea to the Archangel Bar by trawler-sweepers. As merchant losses mounted off the North Cape, as of September the Auxiliary Patrol protection began at Vardo, or Kirkenes, in Norway. The return trips worked in reverse. Losses while under escort in these waters that year were, according to one British official source, ‘very small, amounting it is believed only to five’. The Auxiliary Patrol vessels were also called upon to aid merchantmen variously.

Russian trawlers began to be put under British command in April, but they were unreliable and by November they had given up on all work. Apart from four Russian torpedo boats that operated well in the short period they were there before the ice closed in, little cooperation was received from other Russian men-o-war: even before the Bolshevik Revolution in November.

During the later stages, as had happened previously, most of the British squadron had been recalled for the winter. Notwithstanding that sources do not tally completely, the only small-craft left at the end of the year seem to have been the yacht Salvator, armed-minesweeping trawlers Avon II, Exyahne, Ganton, Holyrood, Miletus, Neath Castle, Saint Cyr and Sarpendon II; boom-defence trawlers Devanha and Strathisla; and drifters Anchor Star, Briton, London County and Oswy.

It can be seen from the surviving daily situation reports that by 1917 there were not inconsiderable numbers of small craft in the Mediterranean and adjoining seas. Of interest, they suffered comparatively few losses.

The first of these was on February 17th when H.M. Armed Trawler Hawk was sunk approximately 140 miles southeast-by-south of Malta, by U64. The trawler had been escorting a small convoy and was hit, along with the collier transport Okement, in what was said in the German official history to have been a ‘double torpedo shot’ (Doppeltorpedoschuss). British sources give an inherently different account. Hit aft at 4.50 p.m. the Okement was abandoned in good order fifteen minutes later and her entire crew was picked up by Hawk. At was not until 6.30 p.m. that Hawk was then torpedoed, with eleven of the merchantman’s crew and seven of the trawler’s company slain.

The next marine casualty was H.M. Motor Launch Number 543 that was lost to an explosion and fire while refuelling at Taranto, on April 13th. She had been loaned to the French earlier in the year, but the only death was Lieutenant Samuel Hill R.N.V.R. As already mentioned earlier, this was not the only M.L. lost to fire by any means: even if their petrol fuel might have been mixed with kerosene.

As part of a larger operation carried out by the Kaiserlich und Königliche Kriegsmarine, the Otranto Barrage was attacked on the night of May 14-15th. Three light-cruisers, Novara, Saida and Helgoland, dealt with the drifters: of which there were then 47 in line. Taking a third of the groups each, the cruisers steamed along the lines calling on their surrender. Some gave into these threats, surrendering and having their craft sunk by gunfire after their abandonment. Others slipped their nets and exited rapidly. Yet more fought as best they could, or if out of range, remained on station under fire. Although there may have been more, they were named in various reports as Admirable, Bon Espoir, Boy George III, British Crown, Christmas Daisy, Coral Haven, Floandi, Forerunner, Garrigill, Girl Rose, Gowan Lea, Morning Star, Quarry Knowe, Selby and Taits. Others that were in the centre, were lucky, in receiving little attention from the cruisers’ guns. At the end of the action fourteen drifters had been sunk though. They were Admirable, Avondale, Coral Haven, Craignoon, Felicitas, Girl Gracie, Girl Rose, Helenora, Quarry Knowe, Selby, Serene, Taits, Transit and Young Linnett. Fourteen reservists had also been killed – all but one in the R.N.R. and the exception was an able seaman in the R.N.V.R.

Rear-Admiral Mark Kerr R.N. that was in command of the Adriatic Squadron forwarded a long list of recommendations for decorations and awards. But, gentlemen in the Admiralty were hypocritical in seeking to add senior R.N. officers and highly disparaging about the reservists. Consequently, Kerr was forced into making a much-reduced new list of recommendations. Apart from two captains and one engineer-commander R.N. on cruisers that received superior gongs; one V.C. was awarded to Skipper Joseph Watt R.N.R. of Gowan Lea; five D.S.C.s went to other skippers; a bar to the D.S.C. was awarded to a lieutenant R.N.R. that was in charge of the patrol line; and four C.G.M.s were received by R.N.R. drifter ratings. Seventeen D.S.M.s were also awarded to ratings, but it is clear not all were on the drifters; with one bar to a D.S.M.; and 33 others were also mentioned in despatches.

On July 4th Zeus that was a small motor-sailing vessel decoy was, according to the official British listing of vessels lost, having been destroyed to ‘avoid capture ... off Cape Passaro’. This entry was under the name of Mona. Of fascinating note, there was no mention of her in the post-war books on Q-ships. Originally, she had been the Mona that had been bought locally by early September 1916 and refitted over many months at Mudros. She may have been commissioned as Zeus in April 1917, but did not sail for her first patrol from Malta until July 2nd. In company with H.M. Submarine E2, while off the east of Sicily two days later, she was approached by a ‘large enemy submarine’. (This could have either been U63, or U65 – the latter seemingly the better candidate.) Unfortunately, due to a heavy swell E2 broke the surface and was seen by the German boat that then dived. E2 remained at periscope depth, hoping for the other to surface once again. Meanwhile, Zeus had turned back for Malta and on E2 surfacing six miles astern, was mistaken for the U-boat. The very inexperienced R.N.V.R. lieutenant then abandoned and blew up the decoy – with her crew picked-up by a Japanese destroyer.

In British records stated as having disappeared on the 16th, H.M. Auxiliary Minesweeper Newmarket that was twin-screwed, rather than paddle-driven, was torpedoed by UC38 in the next morning’s darkness, south of Cape Nicaria (of the island of the same name) in the Aegean. Having returned to Port Laki, Leros, she had responded to a report of an attack on a steamer, Firfield, out of turn that evening. It was said in the German official history that the minesweeper had sunk ‘quickly’. According to more than one account 70 of her ship’s company perished, although research has not identified all. Those found number 62 that included 23 in the R.N.R.; 22 in the R.N.V.R.; four in the R.F.R.; and 23 in the M.M.R. Three others, an engineer and two seamen, were also said, in a German account, to have been taken prisoner. And, her navigator and surgeon had, fortunately, been ashore at the time of her last sailing: at dinner with the island’s governor.

The next loss was of a Malta-based armed trawler, Orphesia that left Alexandria, Egypt on the 22nd, as part of a convoy escort. She struck a submerged wreck in the Great Pass and sank hours later: apparently with no human casualties.

Under orders from the S.N.O. Chios to intercept a small vessel thought to be working for the Ottomans, H.M. Motor Launch Number 474, under the command of Lieutenant John Alexander Miller R.N.V.R., sailed from that same port at 1 a.m. on July 22nd. Unfortunately, having gone aground later that night within the Kumuthi shoals, she was shelled by Ottoman artillery after dawn and abandoned. Interestingly, for once the condescending attitude by R.N. officers towards reservists, worked in the favour of Lieutenant Miller during the subsequent Court of Enquiry. Essentially, this officer’s attempt to gain contact with the suspect vessel had gone awry, but he managed to save his entire crew, in exceedingly trying circumstances. Reprimanded, he had further commands before demobilisation in 1919.

Two armed trawlers, Helgian and By George, were near a danbuoy indicating the entrance to Stavros Anchorage, in the Aegean’s Gulf of Ruphani, during the morning watch of September 6th, when Helgian was blown up. They had been about to conduct daily sweeping, but Helgian was not actually in the swept channel. Two of her crew, both wounded, one badly, were picked up by the other trawler. Unfortunately, the other ten were killed. One of the survivors, Deckhand Alexander Donaldson Stewart, had been in the fish-hold asleep when wakened just before the explosion by the boat’s coxswain, Frank Herridge, telling all there to ‘Get up’. He, Herridge (described as a petty officer, but shown in his service record, probably erroneously, as a leading seaman) and another deckhand, Thomas Hart, all went into the water – but the other two could not swim and drowned. Clearing the two barrages, laid by UC23 on July 11th, also destroyed By George on September 7th though. Another armed trawler, Kalmia, rescued the crew of fourteen excepting two. The unlucky had been forward, on look out and at the gun, while most that survived had been aft for tea and managed to get away in the ship’s boat that had been towed astern. It was pointed out afterwards that using danbuoys in this way was not sensible and there was much ink spilt on the use, or otherwise, of life-rafts and belts.

On September 30th, following a short gunnery-dual, H.M. Admiralty Trawler Charlsin was sunk by a charge, eight miles north of Marsa Matruh, Libya, by a boarding party from UC74. She had been ordered to escort a transport, Borulos, from Sollum to Marsa Matruh, even although she had severe mechanical defects and broke down completely: requiring the jury-rigging of sails. On abandoning, since she was ‘done for’ and at least one crewmember was wounded, UC74 came alongside Charlsin’s lifeboat. Skipper Robert Extoby Parker R.N.R. and four others were taken onboard the submarine and interrogated by Kapitänleutnant Wilhelm Marschall, in good English. (Aspirant officers of the Kaiserliche Marine were required foreign language skills.) On completion, they were allowed back onto their lifeboat, where they pulled to the shore and walked to Marsa Matruh. Of potential further interest, Charlsin had originally been the Hamburg-registered Esteburg that was captured by H.M. Submarine E4 off the Danish coast in September 1915.

H.M. Drifter Jean had already been damaged during the Austro-Hungarian assault on the Otranto Barrage on the night of May 14-15th, was lost off Cape Santa Maria di Leuca at 8 p.m. on October 17th. She was within a group returning to base when two explosions in short succession were heard. The first was judged later as from a mine and the second that was generally said to have been much louder, either from Jean’s boiler, or her depth-charge. A dark night, Orient II rescued Jean’s skipper and mate from the water. Hope IV, Ivy, Mayflower and Silver Herring also searched the area, but found no more survivors. The other eight that had been in the R.N.R. perished. Included was a lieutenant – a unit commander.

The last known of these marine casualties for this year was another drifter, Annie, on December 19th. She grounded off Enos, Cephalonia and this must have been serious, as she was removed from Admiralty ‘charter’ immediately.

1918

Five armed-merchant cruisers were lost in this last year: four to German submarines. Three had been in transit and under escort by destroyers, or patrol craft. Even the fourth that was part of an ocean escort, was far in front of the convoy: as per standard tactics of the day.

H.M. A.M.C. Calgarian had been ordered back to Liverpool for a short period and sailed from Halifax, on February 15th, in charge of a slow convoy: HS 29. It was supposed to arrive at the offshore rendezvous at 8 a.m. on February 28th, in order to meet the destroyer escort. Heavy weather had upset this intention though and it was decided subsequently for the new escort to meet HS 29 when weather permitted. This occurred at 11.30 a.m. on March 1st March: all the merchantmen being present and correct. As per orders, Calgarian, with two destroyers from the ocean escort, Moresby and Beagle, parted company for Liverpool at 1.0. p.m.: making around 19 knots and steering as per zig-zag number two (in the War Instructions for British Merchant Ships). Unfortunately, while six miles north of Rathlin Island, County Antrim, in fine weather and a calm sea, she was torpedoed by U19 at approximately 4.40 p.m. (times in reports varied). Struck near her forward stokehold, she lost steam and it was thought onboard Calgarian that it was down to a mine. Beagle and a couple of local patrol trawlers, Lord Lister and Thomas Collard, attempted a tow, but early on mistakes were made. These were, seemingly, by those onboard Lord Lister that fouled Beagle’s hawser, forcing the destroyer to slip. Moresby circled the stricken vessel, putting a smokescreen down: rather ineffectively. An outbound convoy, OB 51, was passing and H.M. Sloop Rosemary was detached to help. She had managed to get two hawsers (one heavy manilla and one wire) over and was beginning to tow Calgarian (with revolutions for ten knots) when at 5.35 p.m. U19’s commander, Kapitänleutnant Johannes Spieß, put another three torpedoes into Calgarian in short time. Damaged severely along her port side, she was settling, so her surviving company abandoned, mostly using her ship’s boats and she sank around 6 p.m. Thomas Collard that was alongside Calgarian towing at the time of the first attack took many off the ex-liner, even although all of her own crew were injured. Unfortunately, after the second attack she was so badly damaged herself that she sank soon after. Lord Lister was also in the vicinity and badly damaged, being beached in Church Bay, Rathlin Island. Fellow patrol trawlers Lewis Roatley and Walpole II, as well as a drifter Boy Alan, were all involved in towing her variously and Lewis Roatley also picked up her survivors. H.M. Yacht Zara was also mentioned in rescue work, as were patrol trawlers Corrie Roy, Rushcoe, Samuel Barkas and War Duke. It would appear that the deaths from Calgarian were almost entirely restricted to her engineering branch – two engineer sub-lieutenants R.N.R.; 31 firemen or trimmers in the M.M.R. and also one steward in the M.M.R. None of her passengers appear to have been killed. As for the Auxiliary Patrol craft, amazingly, there were only two deaths. One was an ordinary seaman R.N. and the other a deckhand R.N.R. that were both on Lord Lister.

Before leaving this incident, the captains of the two escorting destroyers, Beagle and Moresby, were criticised within the Admiralty for not putting in any depth-charge attacks on U19. Although understandable, since there was a mantra of taking the offensive within the R.N., it was not known until after the war that depth-charges, as then deployed, needed to detonate within twelve to fourteen feet of a submarine’s pressure hull to do any real damage. Also, Kapitänleutnant Spieß had put his boat in the perfect position for such a target set-up and although Calgarian was moving rapidly, the zig-zag pattern used was not suitable for coastal waters. This was something the Admiralty had already realised, but not made widely known. And, the submarine had a lot of water to operate in, so could evade depth-charge attacks. Nevertheless, two attacks may have been attempted. Shortly before Rosemary secured her hawsers, H.M. Sloop Anchusa that was screening OB 51, fired a depth-charge after sighting a periscope. She then remained seeking out this target until rejoining the convoy after dark. A periscope had, apparently, also been seen onboard H.M. Drifter Boy Alan and may have used her depth-charge and/or fired one round from her six-pounder gun. Of interest, the German official history claimed that the depth-charging was ‘heavy’, but ‘did not cause any serious damage’.

Another, Moldavia, was in charge of the ocean escort of a small troop convoy HC 1 that sailed from Halifax on May 11th. This was comprised of the Teiresias, Rhesus, City of Brisbane, Runic and Persic. However, as the lead-ship well ahead of the centre, she was torpedoed by UB57, mid English Channel south of Sussex, at 2.35 a.m. on the 23rd. HC 1 had been zig-zagging using pattern number two at eleven knots and so far forward, Moldavia was, apparently, zig-zagging independently. Struck relatively-far forward port with one torpedo from a range of approximately 2,000 metres, numbers three and four holds were flooded immediately and the stokehold bulkhead was also started. Unsurprisingly, she proved difficult to handle, with her steering, compasses and wireless telegraphy gear also knocked out. Consequently, losing weigh she nearly collided with the Persic that was then to her starboard. Efforts had been made to keep her upright using her trim-tanks and salvage tugs were requested, through signalling a destroyer. But, the stokehold bulkhead having failed, the stokehold flooded and so, she stopped around 3 a.m.: settling slowly. During her disciplined abandonment, two of the destroyer escort assisted. Initially, Scourge went alongside, while Grasshopper circled dropping depth-charges. The German official history stated that there were six detonations. Scourge then circled, while Grasshopper transferred Moldavia’s crew and passengers from the boats and rafts. Unfortunately, American troops of the 58th Regiment had been billeted in number three upper hold and it would appear that 56 other ranks were killed.

HS 42 was a large convoy of 35 merchantmen in nine columns that sailed from Halifax on May 30th, with Patia as the ocean escort. An uneventful trip, six U.S. destroyers from the Queenstown station made contact in the closing hours of June 11th: beginning their escorting duties. Over the night of the 12th and 13th, nine British destroyers also joined. Seemingly, at 7.43 a.m. on the 13th, while in the inner Southwest Approaches, the convoy dispersed variously, with Patia escorted by U.S.S. Wilkes and Trippe, bound for Avonmouth, Somerset. Unfortunately, at approximately 2.30 p.m., while south of the Smalls, Pembrokeshire, Patria was sunk by one torpedo from UC49. An attack was put in on the submarine, dropping twenty depth-charges that resulted in UC49 sustaining an oil bunker leak. In all likelihood it was not until after this that the majority of Patia’s company were taken onboard the two U.S. destroyers and landed at Falmouth, Cornwall. There were twelve fatalities though: all reservists. The seven in the M.M.R. had been in the ‘hotel’ branch; her engineer-commander had held a commission in the R.N.R; the one R.N.V.R. casualty had been a signalman; and last three were R.F.R. able seamen. Strangely, although it was established at the Court Martial that Patia had not been zig-zagging and so an ‘error of judgment’ on the part of her captain, no one was held responsible.

H.M. A.M.C. Marmora had been ordered to sail from Cardiff on July 22nd, for ocean escort duty from the west coast of Africa. On the way out, she was also to escort a large transport, Boonah (ex-Melbourne, a German prize), leaving Avonmouth, Somerset that same day: with a rendezvous in Barry Roads, Glamorgan. The ‘destroyer’ escort that was provided by Milford Haven, comprised only of two patrol craft, numbered 66 and 67. Once formed up the Boonah was to keep four-cables on Marmora’s starboard beam, with the two patrol craft four to five cables forward of the A.M.C. on her port and starboard bow. Well into the Southwest Approaches, with Fastnet about 50 miles distant and probably at 11 knots (the transport’s then maximum speed), Marmora was torpedoed by UB64 at 3.45 p.m. on the 23rd. Although aided by the long-legs of zig-zag pattern number two of mostly 15 and 20 minutes (but occasionally 10) that at 11 knots gave a mean 9.9 knot speed of advance, at the range fired that was seemingly between 8,000 and 10,000 yards, this was a skilled attack carried out by Kapitänleutnant Otto von Schrader. The first torpedo struck forward in number one hold and the second, about five seconds later, further aft between the two stokeholds that flooded immediately. Stopped and beginning to settle more rapidly, the boats were swung out in preparation for abandoning at 4.15 p.m. Meanwhile, P.C.66 put in attacks on the submarine. The first, with a single depth-charge, was on Marmora’s port side at approximately 1,200 yards. However, UB64 was seen far further out, another 6,000 to 7,000 yards distant. The patrol craft opened fire at 5,000 yards, without apparent success, but the submarine dived. P.C.66 then dropped six more depth-charges on UB64’s last observed position. P.C.67 had remained with Marmora, circling, until the settling vessel was abandoned in a disciplined manner as of 4.15 p.m. Initially, she rescued those on rafts, but on Marmora sinking half-an-hour later, she picked up the rest of the survivors and took them into Milford Haven, while P.C.66 escorted the Boonah from the scene. Ten had been killed and 32 R.N. and M.M.R. were also injured. The three dead seamen ratings had been in the vicinity of number one gun forward: one of which was in the R.F.R. The rest were trimmers or firemen in the M.M.R. All but one had been in the stokeholds: the other trimmer was last seen by himself on a life-raft exhausted. It may of interest that according to the German official history, the ‘convoy’ was described as ‘about 6 steamers’ with a ‘strong destroyer protection’. P.C.66’s depth-charging was also said to have been ‘strong’ though.

The wrecking of H.M. A.M.C. Otranto off Islay on October 6th was shocking. She had been part of the ocean escort for HX 50, comprising twelve troopships that had sailed from Halifax on September 25th for rendezvous off the west coast of Scotland, then the North Channel and overwhelmingly, Liverpool. (The U.S. escorts left in predetermined positions during the transit.) This trip had been beset with problems with a collision off Newfoundland between Otranto and the Croisine, a small French sailing-vessel, as well as influenza cases mounting (to approximately 1,300) within the U.S. troops. And, by the time the convoy reached the eastern Atlantic the weather was very heavy indeed. Unsurprisingly, good station-keeping could not be maintained and unable to take sights (stated by one vessel since noon on the 3rd), navigation was by dead-reckoning. Also, the rendezvous was not made. Apart from HX 50 passing through this area three hours early, the destroyers (with Minos as Senior Officer) had to shelter over part of the night of October 5-6th between Inishtrahull and Tory Island: but sailed before daylight. (Times and details in the various reports, especially latterly, vary considerably. So, those following are best guesses.) Consequently, during the morning watch of October 6th the convoy was scattered widely, but with Otranto seemingly ahead of what might have become the left-wing, approximately eighteen miles north of where she should have been. (The destroyers located the starboard-wing of the convoy, to the south and aided all vessels found subsequently as far as they could.) As visibility increased around 8 a.m., onboard Otranto, cliffs were sighted ahead, three or four miles distant. Apparently, before her senior officers got to the bridge, her officer-of-the-watch then misidentified the land and ordered her (and the others in sight) to port, but they went to starboard. In close proximity with the Kashmir, both vessels then made frantic and ultimately mistaken course alterations in emergency. Unfortunately, the Kashmir hit Otranto port-side midships: damaging her severely. Drifting apart, the Kashmir was found to be still seaworthy and having lost sight of Otranto proceeded. Mounsey, one of the planned destroyer escorts that had been delayed due to machinery faults, located Otranto at 9.30 a.m. and made absolutely heroic efforts to save as many lives as possible. Eventually Mounsey that had become damaged herself was ordered away, while Otranto was still drifting shoreward. Without power by then and so, dead in the water, Otranto was pushed onto a reef off Goul Point, Islay later that forenoon. Throughout the day and overnight she was battered to pieces.

Under the command of Lieutenant Francis Worthington Craven R.N. that deservedly, received a D.S.C., Mounsey’s company saved 597 souls. This broke down as 300 American military personnel; one American civilian; 27 officers and 239 men of Otranto’s company; and 30 French fishermen. Another 21 have been recorded as managing to swim ashore: all but four were Americans. But, the loss in human terms was grievous. In one account 316 American soldiers were washed up on local beaches and buried. And, of Otranto’s company, 94 were killed. As usual by this time, many in the crews of A.M.C.s were in the M.M.R., especially of engine-room ratings and hotel staff. 49 were in this reserve. Of the nine in the R.N.R, all but one were commissioned officers, mostly engineers and even then, the exception was a midshipman. The six in the R.N.V.R. had all been junior ratings: seamen or signallers. There were also two attendants from the Royal Naval Sick Berth Reserve. Another ten had been N.C.O.s and privates in the Royal Marine Light Infantry. The remaining 18 had been in the R.N. proper. Captain Ernest George William Davidson R.N. remained with his command. Apart from the Surgeon, the rest were, overwhelmingly, seamen: both senior and junior rates. Two of the latter had been in the R.F.R.

Although not the first of Britain’s small-ships to be lost in this year, John E. Lewis, an armed trawler fitted with sweep-gear, was the first mined. Due to unsuitable weather for sweeping, she with her division were, during the forenoon, returning to harbour on January 16th when she struck a mine, identified as German, near the Cork Lightvessel, off Harwich, Essex. Comparatively lucky in that only her fore foot was destroyed, she sank in eight minutes and all but two of her crew managed to abandon her: picked up by H.M. Drifter Enterprise. This and another mine destroyed by another trawler, Drummer Boy, may have been laid by UC11.

Two days later in the evening darkness, another of the armed-minesweeping trawlers was blown up, around the coast in Sussex off the Royal Sovereign light-vessel, near Hastings. She was Gambri, with a particularly large ship’s company of 21 – all of whom perished. In command was Chief Skipper George Bee R.N.R. that had commanded one of the minesweepers in the failed assault on the Dardanelles on 18th March 1915: when they did their best and were then vilified unfairly in theatre and back in London. Six mines had been laid in this area by UC71.

The last armed-minesweeping trawler lost this month was Drumtochty, off Dover, on the 29th. This was again in evening darkness and there were no survivors from her eleven crew. It could not be determined whether her destruction was by mine, or torpedo and no German submarine has been attributed either. So, it may well have been a British mine adrift.

There were two more marine casualties in January. One was an armed trawler, Miranda III that went aground in Burra Sound, mainland Orkney, while on the Hoy Sound patrol, on the 13th and would appear to have been wrecked the next day. The other was a net-drifter, Ethnee. She was stranded on the Goodwin Fork, within the famously tricky Goodwin Sands, Kent, at 7 a.m. on the 15th and became a total wreck. No deaths are recorded for the former and a report stated that the crew was saved for the latter.

On the dark and calm night of February 14-15th, the Hochseeflotte’s (Destroyer) Flottille II attacked the Dover Barrage. By this time deep mines had been laid between Folkstone and Cape Griz Nez, not only with net-drifters barring surface transit, but also other vessels illuminating the area brightly nightly – all with the aim of forcing submarines to dive into the underwater hazards. Yet more light forces were also on hand patrolling. Post war, Admiral Reinhard Scheer maintained that the German performance had been ‘brilliant’ and also made exaggerated claims about the British losses. In reality, this was a confused action, with mistakes most definitely made by the British, but the German destroyers could also have created so much more death and destruction. Even so, the losses were serious locally. Split into two attacks, the northern one by one of the two half-flotillas opened fire on one of the illuminating vessels, H.M. Paddle Minesweeper Newbury, at 0.40 a.m. on the 15th. Surprised, she took numerous hits and the deck depth-charge exploded: wrecking her. As well as eleven deaths, all R.N.R. except one in the M.M.R. and a R.F.R. leading seaman loaned from Attentive II, virtually all onboard were wounded. As in the Otranto barrage attacks, the German destroyers then went along the drifter line. Although most of them escaped, both drifters and another paddle-minesweeper, Lingfield, came under heavy fire. Also, W. Elliot and Veracity were sunk by gunfire. This part of the action was broken off at 1.10 a.m. The southern attack with the other half-flotilla began at 0.45 a.m. The first attacked was an Admiralty trawler, James Pond and her pyrotechnics were set alight. Although beaching was attempted, the flaming wreck had to be abandoned. Assaulting the drifter line variously, Cloverbank, Cosmos and Jennie Murray of two divisions were sunk, along with Golden Gain, Golden Rule and Treasure and Violet May damaged. Chrysanthemum II of another division came under fire, with Christina Craig sunk. Having turned, the German destroyers then found and sank Silver Queen that had rescued survivors from Cosmos: while the latter was still on fire. Two other drifters, Vera Creina and Ocean Roaner had also gone to Cosmos’ aid and were fired upon. According to Scheer, this half-flotilla began their return to Flanders at 2.40 a.m. Of the 77 killed on the trawler and drifters that night the majority had been in the R.N.R., but there were also ten in the R.N.V.R. and four in the R.N. proper.

One armed-trawler was lost to mines in February. Cleon had been on duty between the South East Folkstone Gate Buoy and Varne Buoy, in the eastern English Channel, during the night of the 1st-2nd and although a heavy explosion had been heard around 9 p.m., it was not until the next morning that she became overdue and a damaged boat found confirmed her destruction. All twelve of her company were killed.

There is something of a mystery relating to the hydrophone-fitted trawler Remindo that in British operational records show that she blew up slightly north of the Bay of the Seine on the 2nd. This was reported by Olympia that was another hydrophone-fitted trawler operating out of Portland. The German official history, however, stated that UC79 surfaced in this area at dusk, attacked a small convoy and torpedoed the trawler. Since there were no casualties connected to the French Coal Trade convoys that week it may have been a French coastal convoy that UC79 hit. Anyway, all twenty of Remindo’s company were killed that included two R.N. junior rates.

Also, H.M. Admiralty Trawler Nathaniel Cole and armed-trawlers J. & S. Miles and Ferriby had been on hydrophone watch in the general vicinity of Inishtrahull, Isle of Mull, on the 4th. Having heard detonations, they made for the Cunarder Aurania that had been torpedoed by UB67 and rescued the survivors from their boats. (Eight had been killed.) Since the steamer remained afloat, the trawlers stayed with her overnight, joined by Vale of Lennox. In deteriorating weather, Nathaniel Cole was ordered to try and get onboard the Aurania and in doing so, was damaged. She with Ferriby as escort, were then instructed at 10 a.m. on the 5th, to return to Buncrana. During the afternoon, with water ingress increasing rapidly, the mercantile survivors were transferred to Ferriby and efforts began to tow Nathaniel Cole. Unfortunately, after continual struggles in a heavy swell and lousy weather, she foundered during the morning watch of February 6th.

Winding up this month, another armed-minesweeping trawler, Sardius II, was wrecked on the 13th. One file refers to Runnelstone Rock, but more often this marine casualty was stated as having occurred in Pendower Cove, near Tolpenden Penwith, Cornwall.

There were two losses attributed to warlike operations in March. Columba, a spare-gate boom-defence trawler, along with another trawler, had been under tow by a tug south of May Island, in the Firth of Forth, in the afternoon of March 10th. The northern part of the channel had been swept that morning and the southern part was due that same afternoon. Unknowingly in the still dangerous area, Columba struck a mine that had been laid by UC40 four days before. Four more reservists and a regular chief petty officer lost their lives.

Agate, an armed patrol-trawler with ‘Actæon’ gear deployed and leading a routine daylight sweep in the highly hazardous waters off the Royal Sovereign light-vessel, was mined on the 14th. With her forefoot blown off and thought to be in danger of foundering, her crew were rescued by her partner trawler, Delphine. There were seven survivors, all physically wounded, or suffering from shock. Four more had been killed though. The area had been swept by paddlers on the three days beforehand and was thought to be clear. But, there was so much junk around, it was regarded as likely that the odd mine might have been missed. Twelve had been laid by UC71 during the evening of the 8th.

Four trawlers were also lost to accidents in March. On the 10th, Endeavour, a Scapa-based boom-defence trawler, was in a collision at Kirkwall Boom. Six days later, Vulture II, an armed patrol-trawler (with a single towed charge) was also wrecked by collision, at Eriboll, on the northern coast of Sutherland. Seemingly, she became a danger to navigation. To the south, Adrian, a multi-armed patrol-trawler, was lost to collision off her base port, Harwich, on the 13th. And, another armed-trawler, Swallow, was in a collision off Whitby, Yorkshire, on the 29th. No fatalities were reported.

Five drifters were also destroyed in March – two mined. The former was Nexus that was one of five with experienced crews that had been detailed to work on a net-line in the Thames Estuary, in the forenoon of the 13th. It was thought that the offending charge that detonated about 10.50 a.m. was German, due to the ‘dense black smoke and the volume of the explosion’ that was considerably larger than British electrically-controlled mines. Whether it was German, or not, Nexus’ bow was blown off, killing one deckhand. Ten days later, New Dawn fell victim to a mine laid by UC17 while sweeping at the entrance of the Needles Channel, off the Isle of Wight. Three were killed on the day. However, another that had been reported initially as seriously wounded, died in Haslar Hospital, on the 31st. He was an ordinary seaman in the Royal Naval Canadian Volunteer Reserve, but may have been American.

Unusually, an armed net-drifter, Border Lads, was torpedoed and sunk without warning: by UB78. This was two miles east of the Tyne, at 11.25 a.m. on March 25th. Four were killed and the survivors were rescued, probably by another drifter, Forward IV.

Two more drifters were destroyed through accident that month. Within the Humber’s Auxiliary Patrol area, William Tennant was in a collision that proved terminal with Principal, in deep water, at about 4 a.m. on the 5th. Both were armed patrol-craft. Further south, J.C.P. was a lightly-armed drifter in the Dover and Downs area that was also lost by collision, on the 22nd: said to have been off Green Flash Buoy.

Into April two turbine-driven minesweepers, St. Seiriol and Atalanta II, accompanied by a motor launch, were working off Harwich, Essex, between the Shipwash Shoal and the old war channel on the 25th, when St. Seiriol was blown up. The area had already been swept by M.L.s and from this it was known that the mines that had been laid by UC4, probably on April 20th, were on the surface at low water during neap tides. However, a ‘strong’ flood tide had been running when St. Seiriol was struck at 8 a.m. She was taken in tow by Atalanta II, but ultimately sank in shallow water on the Shipwash Shoal at 11.30 a.m. The survivors were rescued by Atalanta II and the motor launch numbered 13. There were, however, twelve fatalities. All but one were reservists: seven in the R.N.R. and four in the R.N.V.R.

Three trawlers were also lost to mines in this month. An armed-trawler, Numitor that seems to have been minesweeping in company off Orfordness, Suffolk, struck an underwater charge at 9.20 a.m. on April 20th. Reported by wireless by Drummer Boy, the seven survivors were landed by Craigmillar. Unfortunately, five had died. The mine had been laid by UC4, seemingly earlier that day and was in the same barrage that took St. Seiriol as well. Way up north, off Montrose, a multi-armed trawler, Plethos, was mined at 10 a.m. on the 23rd. She was, apparently, part of an unit sweeping and destroying a field laid by U80 three days before. Another four were killed in this detonation. The third, Embley, was definitely a minesweeping-trawler. Unfortunately, she was blown up by a mine that fouled her kite, while about a mile south-south-west of May Island, in the Forth, at noon on the 28th. The survivors were picked up immediately by the yacht Shemara and the other trawlers involved in this operation – John Brennan, Kimberley, Lysander II, Strathcarron and possibly Aberdeen. (The last had struck a submerged object that might also have been a mine and had been ordered back to Granton.) Yet another eight were killed on Embley. Unknown to this unit, this barrage had been laid by UC40 the day before.

Another trawler, Lord Hardinge, was also lost in this month. Well-armed, this included a 7.5-inch howitzer, but she was involved in a collision off the Daunt lightvessel, County Cork, on the 20th.

Another five drifters were also destroyed through accidents in April. Off Scarborough, Yorkshire, on the 4th, a Hull-based net-drifter, J. and A., was in collision with a steamer, Avocet that was part of convoy TU 76. In not dissimilar circumstances, Annie Smith, both armed and fitted with minesweeping-gear, was hit and sunk by a steamer, Ballycotton, off Lundy Island, in the Bristol Channel, at about 5 p.m. on the 9th. The drifter had been sending maritime traffic into port, due to reports of a submarine in the area. The steamer did not stop to help, but, thankfully, none of the drifter’s crew had been killed. In the same general area, but off St. Govan’s Light Buoy, Pembrokeshire, a similarly-armed drifter, Select, was also struck and sunk by a steamer named the Claddagh, at 11.10 p.m. on the 16th. Sinking in a few minutes, with one deckhand R.N.R. killed, at least the merchantman rescued the survivors and landed them in Barry. There, these hapless mariners then found that local shopkeepers would not supply them with food, as they could not produce ration cards. Unusually, a non-commissioned drifter, Sunbeam I that was on examination service was also in a collision of some sort on the 16th at Inchkeith, an island in the Firth of Forth. Finally, Pursuit, a boom-defence drifter was hit by H.M. Yacht Rovenska at 4.05 a.m. on the 22nd. The weather was relatively heavy and she sank 25 minutes later, almost a mile from the Boom Gateway, Penzance, Cornwall. At least the yacht saved the drifter’s crew.

On May 1st two Hunt-class minesweepers, Blackmorevale and Pytchley were working off Montrose, Forfarshire, in good weather, when at 2 p.m. a mine detonated under the captain’s cabin on Blackmorevale. Not only did this wreck the fore-bridge, killing all there, the boiler-room was also destroyed and the fore stokehold flooded. At least one other ‘Hunt’, Holderness, was in company and also possibly Oakley. Apart from rescuing the survivors, many of whom were wounded, efforts were made to salvage Blackmorevale, but she sank at 3.45 p.m. 26 officers and men were killed. Only her captain and one signalman were in the R.N. proper. Two other officers also perished - her Navigator that had been in the R.N.R. and the Officer-of-the-Watch in the R.N.V.R. Fifteen had been stokehold ratings in the M.M.R.; five were R.N.R. deckhands; and there were also two more signalmen that had been in the R.N.V.R. One fireman had been very lucky though. Posted missing, he had been given leave that morning and so, was not onboard. The mine that caused so much death and destruction had probably been laid by U80 on April 27th.

H.M. Auxiliary Patrol Vessel Dirk that was leading Convoy TU 26 was torpedoed off Flamborough Head, Yorkshire, at 1.30 a.m. on May 28th. In all likelihood she had deployed her single-sweep in convoy protection. There were only two survivors, the other twenty having perished. It must have been UC75 that had carried out this attack, although in the German official history, the vessel torpedoed was not identified and was dated as the 29th. However, UC75 was sunk by H.M. Destroyer Fairy during another attack on a convoy off Flamborough Head, on the 31st. Having rammed the submarine twice, Fairy too, foundered.

Two armed-minesweeping trawlers were sunk on May 24th, in different places off Lowestoft, at least one by mines laid by UC17 the day before. The former was Gabir that had been one of a number sweeping and destroying mines since daylight. At noon she struck another and sank in ten seconds. Two of her crew were killed. The latter, Yucca, was sweeping with Craik. They had encountered an obstruction and were dealing with it when Yucca exploded at 2.50 p.m. She too sank rapidly and seven of her company were killed. The survivors were picked up by Craik, Leam and Coadjutor within fifteen minutes. Of these, three were seriously injured.

One armed-minesweeping trawler was also lost by collision in May. At 8.30 p.m. on the 13th, Skipper Arnold Herbert Howe R.N.R., in command of Balfour, in Newhaven, East Sussex, received orders to escort a transport, Nidd, to Dieppe that evening. Having duly cleared harbour the escort was, supposedly, zig-zagging ahead of the transport southwards at around a distance around two cables (approximately 400 yards). At 9.45 p.m., while five miles west-south-west of the Royal Sovereign Light Vessel, the Nidd’s hull was struck heavily and her starboard otter also became damaged. So, she stopped to retrieve this otter. While doing so, at 10 p.m., a submarine was seen on the surface, stationary, about one point (11¼°) on her starboard quarter: seemingly around 300 yards away. Following the Admiralty’s instructions to masters, the Nidd proceeded once again, at full-speed and altered course one point to port: to put the submarine astern. The gun-crew also closed up and loosed off one round of common shell that appeared to hit. The submarine disappeared subsequently. Since the Nidd was overhauling Balfour to port of the trawler, at 10.10 p.m. she was signalled, reporting a submarine. Inextricably, Balfour then starboarded her helm (altering course to port) and thereby, put her across the Nidd’s bows. Realising this, the transport’s master, John Waterhouse Kitwood, rang down to stop her engine, but there was not enough time and room. Consequently, the Nidd struck the trawler, cleaving a chunk out of her port side. Once again taking charge, Captain Kitwood restored his engine to ahead. Effective, this kept Balfour securely in place long enough for her company to scramble onboard the transport, before it drifted away low in the water. Unlike that of the witnesses from the Nidd at the Court of Enquiry, the evidence as given by those onboard Balfour was confused and inconsistent. Skipper Howe’s intention was, nevertheless, to ram or depth-charge a submarine – not necessarily the same one. There were few German submarines on patrol in the eastern English Channel at this time. As far as can be determined, there were only two possibilities. UC71 had sailed from Ostend on the 8th, had been off Dungeness, Kent two days later and was off Beachy Head on the 15th: returning to Zeebrugge nine days later. However, UC78, under the command of Kapitänleutnant Hans Kukat, sailed from Ostend on the 2nd, tasked with minelaying off Boulogne and Newhaven and using her other weapons in the eastern and central English Channel. It is thought that the minelaying was completed, but she never returned from patrol. Everything points to the submarine on the surface seen on May 13th being in a bad way. In fact, Captain Kitwood said that he heard air escaping. This, therefore, indicates that she had surfaced out of necessity and not just to recharge her batteries. Even so, if the damage had only been to her compressed-air bottle-groups and lines, unable to dive, there could have been opportunities for surrender – in daylight. But, this boat’s disappearance probably means that she was mortally damaged and sank.

As for drifters, two were also lost by accident during this month. Holly III was in collision with an armed-trawler, Ben Breac, at 11.40 p.m. on May 11th off Land’s End, Cornwall. There were no fatalities on this occasion. And, at 1.30 a.m. on the 16th Silvery Harvest was hit and sunk by an unnamed French steamer. She had been protecting number one fishing fleet off Berry Head at the time. Seven of her crew died as a result of this accident. In his report, the Senior Naval Officer, Torquay, praised the drifter as the ‘best’ under his command.

June’s losses were light and all three were directly down to German actions. One of the armed-minesweeping trawlers based in Le Havre, Princess Olga, was destroyed off this port through an underwater explosion on the 14th. It was assessed that this had been due to her plunger kite in contact either with a mine lying on the bottom, or one that had become fouled by its own sinker. This started plates in the tunnel-way under her quarter and the engine-room staff could not pump the ingress out, since carbide stowed in the tunnel had been set off, causing dense flame and smoke. Abandoned in a disciplined manner, the commander that was in charge of these craft took the opportunity to request life-rafts for the second time. He had, originally, made the same request eleven months before. Incidentally, this marine casualty was attributed to UC77 in the German official history.

The second was a multi-armed trawler, also mined, but off the Shipwash, near Harwich, on the 26th. Achilles II had been part of a section that had begun to sweep a barrage, laid by UC4, at 4.30 a.m. Unfortunately, she struck a mine aft at 9.20 a.m. and sank immediately. A fellow boat, Pomona, brought in the three survivors. Thirteen had died though. One, Richard Holdsworth, had been a telegraphist in the R.N.V.R. that had insisted in trying to save the life of Lieutenant Herbert Law R.N.R.

The third was entirely different and especially by this time, most unusual. St. John’s was a Lough Swilly based armed trawler that had been screening a convoy, but could not keep up, due to poor coal and so, had fallen astern at 2.30 a.m. on the 3rd. She was then attacked 45 miles north of Tory Island, by U101, a powerfully-armed ocean-going boat, on the surface at about 5.15 a.m. Returning fire with her six-pounder, after thirty minutes it was put out of action and the four men of its gun crew killed. The submarine then ceased firing, sent a boat to St. John’s and then U101 also secured alongside her. Three prisoners were taken, two of whom were wounded – one severely. However, not only were the other survivors ‘treated with great humanity’ in that they were given the submarine’s own boat so that they could be rescued, an en clair wireless message was transmitted by the submarine, giving their position. The last put U101 at significant risk. It is not known why Kapitänleutnant Carl-Siegfried Georg, in command, ordered this noble act, but it impressed the Rear-Admiral commanding at Buncrana.

In July there were two A.P. craft lost. An armed-minesweeping patrol-drifter, City of Liverpool disappeared off South Foreland, near Dover, Kent, during the night of July 30-31st. Earlier, a M.L. had seen a German moored mine and at 2 a.m. on the 31st an explosion was heard in the vicinity. It was presumed that this had been City of Liverpool’s destruction, as some wreckage, identified as from her, was found. She had had ten all told in her company. The other five mines of this barrage, laid by UC71, were swept up without further casualties.

The second incident occurred at 2.15 a.m. on the 18th, when a vessel was seen right ahead of H.M. Yacht Vagrant, three miles southwest of Newhaven. Action was taken to avoid collision, but this failed and an Admiralty multi-armed trawler, Lancer II, was struck on her port side. Taking in water, in spite of her pumps working, most of the trawler’s crew was taken onboard the also damaged yacht fifteen minutes later. At 3.45 a.m. a hawser was gotten onboard the trawler and towing began. Around an hour later, another Newhaven-based armed trawler, Inchgarth and a tug named Alert arrived and took over. Lancer II could not be saved and sank soon after: with Inchgarth receiving her crew from Vagrant.

During an extensive operation by Portland-based hydrophone craft in early August, Admiralty Trawler Michael Clements was in collision and sank off St. Catherine’s Head, Isle of Wight, on August 8th. All of her crew were saved by the other two divisional trawlers and landed back at Portland, Dorset.

Four drifters were also lost to accidents in this month. In the last minute of August 1st and seemingly while patrolling moored mine nets somewhere within the Dover Straits, Scania was struck and sunk by H.M. Patrol Boat P.57. Two of Scania’s crew were killed. A second collision occurred when Tulip II, an armed-drifter, was sunk by a steamer, Thames, three miles off St. Anthony, Falmouth at 9.15 p.m. on the 22nd. She may have remained on the surface for some hours, since the official day of loss is stated as the 23rd. The third was also due to a merchantman, Glengarrif that sank Guide Me II one-mile E.S.E. of the Muglins, County Dublin, at 11.50 p.m. on the 29th. One R.N.R. deckhand was killed. And, a motor drifter, Strathmore, was lost to fire off Buncrana, County Donegal, in circumstances unidentified, on the 20th.

There were only two marine casualties in September. In busy waters, a multi-armed patrol trawler, Elise that was on escort duties, was torpedoed by UB34 two miles northeast of St. Mary’s Lighthouse, Blyth, Northumberland at around 5.20 p.m. on the 22nd. According to the German official history, there were fourteen steamers in a convoy, with an escort of destroyers, trawlers and six aircraft. A steamer estimated at 3,500 tons was thought to have been hit by one torpedo, but not seen to have sunk. A heavy depth-charge attack, counted at 27, followed. After thirty minutes the submarine then ventured back to the surface: probably at periscope depth. Only destroyers and small craft were observed on the scene. Elise was mentioned as the vessel sunk. There are few details of this action in British records. Nothing has been found about a convoy, never mind such a heavily-defended one and the only precise report of a depth-charge attack was by H.M. Torpedo-Boat 34 that dropped five. Anyway, it is known that all fourteen onboard Elise had been killed.

A little context might not go amiss. UB34 had been commanded by Leutnant zur See der Reserve Hans Illing. He had been a watch officer since January 1916, on UB21 then U62. So, he was not inexperienced as a submariner, but UB34 was his first command, as of 9th September 1918. This was his first attack and his only ‘victory’.

The other A.P. loss this month was also in circumstances unexplained. A multi-armed trawler, Sealark II, was sunk through collision off St. John’s Head, in the Orkney Isles on the 30th. Strangely, she is shown as having been Kingstown-based – at least in July and did not show up in the Orkney and Shetland order of battle in September.

There were only two trawlers destroyed in October, both through accidents. Once again in the choke point of the North Channel, there was a collision five miles from Altacarry Lighthouse, Rathlin, on the 27th. The armed patrol-trawler Lord Lister had been escorting Convoy HS 59 and on leaving this, hit multi-armed patrol trawler Neptunian that was returning to her unit, having been escorting a cable-ship, Monarch, to Campbeltown, Argyll. Neptunian sank in ninety seconds, killing seven of her crew: unusually, including one stoker R.N. And, a hydrophone-fitted Admiralty trawler, Thomas Cornwall, was in transit from Falmouth to Granton when she was hit by a French steamer, Ranee Hyafil, off Flamborough Head, Yorkshire, at 8.45 p.m. on the 29th. The Frenchman had been part of convoy TU 24. Although there were two survivors, the other twenty reservists onboard were killed.

Two drifters were mined this month. Coleus, lightly-armed and sweep-fitted, was lost to a charge thought to have been adrift: seemingly at 6.45 or 8.45 a.m. on the 4th. Six survivors were rescued by another drifter, Katreen, two of whom were wounded. The other four were killed though. Along the coast, within the main eastern approach to Portsmouth, Hampshire, another drifter, Calceolaria, was lost on the 27th. She had been working on nets, when, at 12.30 p.m., she hauled up a mine that exploded. Five were killed, with another four injured. This one has been attributed to UB12.

Another three drifters were also destroyed accidentally in October. Lustring, a hydrophone-fitted patrol-drifter, had been in The String, off Helliar Holm, in the Orkney Isles, when involved in a collision with a lightly-armed minesweeping trawler, Elvina, on the 3rd. No deaths are recorded for either boat. Three days later in the late evening darkness, an armed-drifter, Ocean Foam, was in collision with an armed-trawler, Castor II, in Mount’s Bay, Cornwall. She sank, seemingly, the next day. All were saved. Also, in circumstances that are not at all clear, it would appear that on the 29th a motor-driven drifter, Falkirk, had broken down in waters off Aberdeenshire and was taken in tow by an armed patrol trawler, Robert Barton. But, Falkirk was then sunk in a collision with an unknown steamer off Kinnaird Head in the late evening.

As the war neared its end, H.M. Paddle-Minesweeper Ascot sailed from Portsmouth on November 7th, for the base at Granton, on the south side of the Firth of Forth. She was last identified positively off Gorleston, Suffolk the next day. Unfortunately, off Longstone, Farne Isles, she was torpedoed by UB67, during the afternoon of November 10th. None of her ship’s company survived. The majority, 30, had been in the R.N.R.; two lieutenants, two signalmen and one telegraphist were of the R.N.V.R.; two engineers, one cook and two stewards were from the M.M.R.; and of the eleven in the R.N., three were, by then, in the R.F.R.

An Admiralty trawler, Charles Hammond, was also lost in the last fortnight. She had been in the vicinity of H.M. Destroyer Leader Marksman and a division of sloops including Poppy, in the Firth of Forth, on the evening of the 1st. At 8.5 p.m. Marksman collided with the trawler. Standing by her, a party was sent onboard the stricken vessel at 10.40 p.m. Presumably, all onboard were evacuated before she, seemingly, disappeared at 3.37 a.m. on the 2nd though.

The first decoy destroyed this year was a small auxiliary-powered ketch: Wellholme. She had been operating off Portland Bill, Dorset, on January 30th. In the dusk around 5.40 p.m. a submarine’s conning tower was seen to starboard about 400 yards away. UB55’s commander, Kapitänleutnant Ralph Wenninger, seems to have already regarded this vessel as suspicious, especially as she did not make off in the ‘clear weather’. She was also said to have had a ‘large black box’ at the foot of her mainmast. On opening fire on Wellholme, she turned immediately towards UB55. Accounts differ as to whether the decoy returned fire, or not, though. The German official history stated that she did, but the R.N.R. lieutenant commanding said that she did not. Anyway, the submarine’s third shot hit her midships on the waterline, resulting in the decoy capsizing and sinking rapidly, with the loss of three lives. Two were seamen, one R.N. and the other R.N.R.; with a motor mechanic in the R.N.V.R. The rest were not found and rescued by H.M. Yacht Lorna, until 1.15 a.m.

Another decoy that had previously been a fair-sized transport named the Westphalia, but commissioned as Cullist, was sunk by U97 on February 11th at about 1.20 p.m.: in the Irish Sea approximately 25 miles east of Drogheda, County Meath. Torpedoed without warning from long-range, it made its mark midships, between the engine-room and number three hold. Less than two minutes later she had sunk, with some men still at their stations. U97 surfaced, taking two prisoners from those in the water and Kapitänleutnant Hans von Mohl, an inexperienced submariner in command, was, apparently, abusive. The 34 cold and wet survivors, on a wooden raft and a Carley float, were rescued by a patrol trawler, James Green, after 6 p.m. and they arrived in Kingstown about four hours later. 43 of her ship’s company had perished though. Of these, eight were firemen or trimmers, plus the donkeyman that were all in the M.M.R.; four commissioned officers were in the R.N.R.; and a probationary surgeon and an ordinary telegraphist had been in the R.N.V.R.

H.M. Decoy Drifter Brown Mouse was destroyed accidentally in the early hours of February 28th. She had been on her way to work with the local fishing fleet that was off the Devon Coast roughly east of Dartmouth. A fire around the boiler (that in mercantile service would have been called the donkey) was discovered not long after midnight and in spite of vigorous efforts, could not be extinguished. The forward half was engulfed in flame by 1 a.m. and with the ammunition room aflame, her company abandoned in the ship’s boat: rescued by a Brixham smack, Ebenezer, two hours later. Since it had proven too dangerous to lower her sails, she continued on a port tack. A patrol-boat dropped three depth-charges around the flaming wreck at 4 a.m., but these did not sink her. The Ebenezer remained on the scene until 5 a.m., when Brown Mouse was seen to have burnt down to the waterline. H.M. Drifter Silvery Harvest that had seen the fire and also arrived on the scene, warned other craft to stay away, due to detonating ammunition. It was later established that the fire had taken hold of the wooden lagging around the boiler, possibly from a spark from the boiler chimney, but all involved were rather vague as to their responsibilities regarding it.

On June 16th, one of Lowestoft’s three ‘special service’ drifters, Ocean Fisher, struck a mine off Haddock Bank (well out into the North Sea E.N.E. of the Wash) and sank. Armed with a three-pounder gun, it can be presumed that she had been with still commercially active fishing craft at the time of her demise: in all likelihood due to a drifting mine. Eight of her small company, all in the R.N.R., were killed. Incidentally, there is an entry in the German official history attributing this to barrage number 46 that was laid by UC40 two days before. However, this boat was operating in and around the Firth of Forth.

The next known loss of a decoy vessel was a trawler, Speedwell II (Q 23). Apparently, she went ashore in Mount’s Bay, Cornwall, on July 15th and broke up. Intriguingly, she was still shown as Granton-based in an order-of-battle for the beginning of the month.

Lochiel was a Humber-based armed-patrol vessel. She was leading an escort for an UT convoy when destroyed by a mine, or torpedo, at 4.15 p.m. on July 24th, off Whitby, Yorkshire. Twelve of her company were killed.

The Charyce when taken up for government service in mid-December 1917 was a virtually new coasting tanker. Commissioned as H.M. Decoy Ship Stockforce in January 1918, she had been in scrapes before being sunk on July 30th. Southwest of the Start, Devon, she was making 7½ knots when struck on her starboard side at number one hold, at 4.55 p.m., by a torpedo from UB80. This wrecked the forward part of the ship, but even her bridge that was aft was damaged by the contents of her fore-hold, including 12-pounder shells, dropping all around. Settling by the bow, as usual her ‘panic party’ abandoned, but although her forward gun was out of action, the two four-inch guns were not. On UB80 surfacing after observation and closing to 300 yards of Stockforce’s quarter, at 5.40 p.m., the decoy’s guns opened fire: at least causing damage to her bridge casing. Diving in emergency after having taken two hits, Kapitänleutnant Max Viebeg had intended putting another torpedo into the Q-ship, but found that both periscopes were inoperable and after assessing the damage the following day, had to return to base. Although still having power (as was usual in tankers, her engine was aft) and trying to make for land, Stockforce sank at 9.20 p.m. on the 30th. Trawlers and torpedo boats rescued the wounded and able-bodied respectively. Amazingly, none of her company had been killed. The British were convinced that the submarine had been destroyed (claiming twenty direct hits) and among awards bestowed subsequently, Lieutenant Harold Auten, D.S.C., R.N.R., her captain, received the V.C.

The last special service vessel lost in British waters, was M.J. Hedley, on October 4th. Although the relevant Admiralty file has not been retained, there is some information. In Barry Dock, Glamorganshire, according to a press piece, laden with coal she was ‘at her moorings ready for sea’, when at around 2.15 a.m., she ‘showed signs of lurching over’. Abandoned by boat by her crew of 22 immediately, she capsized ‘within five minutes’: but was later salvaged.

Shifting to the deep Atlantic, even although Great Britain was desperately short of long-haul commercial tonnage by then, steamers were still being deployed as decoy-vessels: even if they were of the cargo-handling variety. One of these was the Willow Branch, an ex-transport of just over 3,300 gross-registered tons commissioned as Bombala. On her last voyage, she had sailed from Gibraltar with coal and ammunition on April 18th, bound for Sierra Leone. Had she engaged one of Germany’s large cruiser submarines, she might have prevailed, but in good weather and in a calm sea seven days later she was unfortunate to have encountered two. Employing tactics as advocated by Kapitänleutnant Hans Rose, they were in the same area and in wireless contact, when U154 and then U153 spied the steamer travelling southward. Using the times in the one British report, U154 was first seen at 10.15 a.m. off Bombala’s port quarter and then U153 fifteen minutes later off her starboard bow. Both submarines opened fire on their then zig-zagging target and it was not until about thirty rounds later that they began getting hits. This less than equal dual lasted for about two-and-a-half hours, before Bombala’s crew abandoned ship finally, in the two undamaged ship’s boats. (The official German account stated four, but this would not seem to have been accurate.) Bombala sank by the bow, said in the official German account as torpedoed by U153. The other, U154, drew near to the boats and her commander, Kapitänleutnant Hermann Gerke, interrogated the survivors courteously in ‘broken’ English. Sub-Lieutenant Eric Hugh Allan R.N.R. was taken prisoner. The two lifeboats then began the long sail to West Africa. After a day they lost contact and the one with 25 hands, in the charge of Leading Seaman John William Leadley, reached the coast of Mauritania on May 3rd. The journey had been absolutely horrific and by then there were only fourteen left alive. Even then, twelve succumbed to thirst and hunger on the beach. Eventually, Leading Seaman Leadley and a black mariner from Sierra Leone named David Madera, managed to get to Dakar. In total there were 58 fatalities. There were eight of the R.N.R., comprising of her executive officers, paymaster, two engine-room artificers and a seaman. Thirty-two were black mariners from Sierra Leone in the M.M.R. that formed the majority of the stokehold branch, along with the boatswain, six seamen, the chief and assistant cooks, a few stewards and a boy. The rest were in the R.N. and even then, one was in the R.F.R. – the telegraphist. Included was Sub-Lieutenant Allan, as he did not survive either. U154 was sunk with all hands west of Portugal, on May 18th, by H.M. Submarine E35.

Up in the Barents and White Sea region 1918 began with political complexity. In the negotiations that led ultimately to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the Germans had put pressure on the Bolsheviks to have the British evicted, but this did not come to pass. Instead, the Soviet General Staff decided that a war footing in the Arctic seas should be maintained, in order to keep the northern ports open: especially for the import of food and agricultural machinery. Therefore, the British remained and this was the practical reality anyway, since the northern ports were still iced in. Light reinforcement for the then slender forces at Murmansk began to be despatched from the U.K. in early March though. This month brought even more complexities ashore, since the Bolshevik-German negotiations had broken down. Not only was there a danger from advancing German troops, according to the Bolsheviks, Finnish White Guards (that were in alliance with the Germans) also planned to attack the Murman railway. An appeal from the S.N.O., Rear-Admiral Thomas Webster Kemp C.B. R.N., to his superiors in London for significant reinforcement, was turned down. So, in cooperation with the Bolsheviks, in the defence of Murmansk and the adjacent coastline, by the end of the month he could draw on one British battleship - Glory; one British cruiser - Cochrane; one French cruiser - Amiral Aube; 30 additional Royal Marines and 20 Royal Engineers; and also 200 French artillerymen that had been on the Russian Front and had become refugees. As for small-craft, as recorded at the beginning of March there was one yacht - Salvator; eight armed-minesweeping trawlers – Avon II, Exyahne, Ganton, Holyrood, Miletus, Neath Castle, St. Cyr and Sarpedon II; possibly one drifter - Oswy; and one boom-defence trawler - Devanha that was due to return to the U.K. for a refit.

There had also been one more trawler, Idena that was lost on February 5th. She had been one of eight trawlers that began a passage from Murmansk to Lerwick three days before – the others being Charles Chappell, Daniel Henley, James Hunniford, Oliver Pickin, Resmilo, Sir James Reckitt (in command) and Urka. Having previously passed the North Cape, following a gale on the 4th, Idena was found to be leaking forward during the afternoon. In the evening, at 10.30 p.m., they all had to slow down and Idena’s state was worsening. At 2 a.m. on the 5th she had disappeared astern and a search was made by Sir James Reckitt, but she could not be found in the snow squalls. At daylight, four of the trawlers were ordered to continue to Lerwick, with, Sir James Reckitt and Oliver Pickin continuing the search for Idena and by then, also Charles Chappell. Located at 8 a.m., an hour later Idena was in a bad way, settling fast. Since her crew and also passengers had already been taken onboard Charles Chappell, the marine casualty was sunk by gunfire by Sir James Reckitt. Incidentally, the passengers on the voyage comprised of 30 Roumanian officers and another 30 Chief Petty Officers R.N.V.R. that had been on armoured cars ashore.

Politically and militarily, the situation became even more confused in April. The Finnish Government that had only come into existence months before through the Bolshevik Revolution and the breakup of the old Imperial Russia, was said to be about to annex large swathes of land that included the Murman coast and the Kola Peninsula. This newly independent Finland was also thought, correctly, to be receiving military support from Germany. Fortunately, the annexation did not happen, but during the spring there were skirmishes between Finnish White troops and landing parties: particularly from Cochrane. Complicating matters, it was seen to be important to maintain the goodwill of the local population that was cut-off from the rest of civil-war torn Russia and suffering shortages. This was because the British wanted to retrieve the mountains of munitions and other stores at Archangel that were out of their control. So, in March 1918 foodstuffs and clothing began to be exported to Murmansk, with the aim of bartering these for the munitions. This hoped for trade did not come off. Also, at Russian request, two trawlers (Ralco and Ariadne II), gear and instructors were supplied for commercial fishing, but for various reasons, including influenza on the trawlers, this project also failed.

At the request of Germany’s Supreme Army Command that wanted the British supply lines to Murmansk and Archangel disrupted, U22 sailed for the Arctic on April 27th. Arriving in Kola Bay on May 6th, a gale held her up for three days, when she then proceeded eastwards to recce the approaches to Archangel (or more likely just the White Sea). In eight days subsequently, U22 engaged in Handelskrieg by gunfire and charges, while ranging along the Murman Coast. Norwegian fishing vessels came off worst, with six destroyed. The Russians lost one steamer, one sailing vessel and one fishing vessel. Also, the wireless station in Vaida Bay was shelled.

Intriguingly, in this same month two undersea cables ending in Murmansk-Archangel and Murmansk-Alexandrovsk, were discovered to have been broken in the Kola Inlet. A cable-ship, Monarch, was despatched to make repairs in June.

The responsibility for the defence of the land along the Murman Coast was transferred to the Army that June. In explanation, an ‘effective’ British intervention in Northern Russia, to tie down German divisions did not occur that spring, due to the dire situation on the Western Front. All that could then be spared were about 1,300 British soldiers that were despatched to Archangel and Murmansk in May and June. Nevertheless, reinforcement by other combatant nations’ assets produced the beginning of the Allied Intervention that summer.

In tandem, Bolshevik attitudes towards the British had altered for the worse. The governments of Russia and Finland had both come under increasing pressure from Germany to eject the Allies from Northern Russia. In practical terms, the government of the local Soviet had received no help for their people and so, were somewhat estranged from Moscow.

By early July, the Auxiliary Patrol on the White Sea station had been reinforced. The yacht Salvator remained and there were 18 armed-trawlers that tended to either have minesweeping gear, or wireless telegraph sets fitted: although some also sported single-towed charges. Added to those already there were Ariadne II, Aspasia, Benjamin Coleman, John Cormack, Junco, Mitres, Ralco, Thomas Thresher and William Butler. Three more drifters, Anchor Star, Briton and London County had also joined Oswy.

In early July Rear-Admiral Kemp and officials were taken to Archangel on H.M. Yacht Salvator, for negotiations and the discharge of food for the local population on short-rations from a transport named the Egba. (Another food transport, Nascopie, also ventured to Archangel.) These exercises were rather pointless, as the local Soviet and people had become hostile and the central Bolshevik government in Moscow had engineered the removal of the munitions and other stores from Archangel. The Bolshevik ‘special commission’ in charge of this removal even ordered the detonation of the vast amounts of ammunition still there and so, obliterate Archangel. Apparently, no one was able, or willing to obey this. Even so, the situation for the British there, onboard Alexander (a captured Russian icebreaker temporarily commissioned as a British man-o-war), became distinctly worrying.

The situation deteriorated further and plans for an Allied occupation of Archangel were put into effect sooner than intended: with the sailing of the force from Murmansk in the evening of July 30th. Among these were five trawlers that escorted a decoy-vessel, Tay and Tyne and the yacht Salvator, with Major-General Frederick Poole, G.-o.-C. North Russia Expeditionary Force, onboard. Although the operation went awry, slight resistance meant the occupation was carried out between August 1st and 3rd.

On September 1st north-west of the Ribachi Peninsula one of the mines laid by U75 the year before was struck by a vessel. This area, therefore, was swept in October and nine more mines were found and dealt with.

Continuing military operations required further reinforcement, both military and naval. So, the Auxiliary Patrol vessels would have been involved in their protection while in these waters. At least the German threat through Finland diminished greatly in early October: with the removal of 15,000 troops. Nevertheless, Bolshevik forces were still active inland from Archangel and so this area was reinforced accordingly, by sea from Murmansk. Nothing much changed with the Armistice with Germany, as of November 11th.

As recorded in a list for this week, there were then two yachts, Salvator and Josephine, on station. The bulk were of armed-trawlers though: mostly hired, but five were Admiralty-built. They were Ariadne II, Aspasia, Avon II, Battleaxe, Benjamin Coleman, Boneaxe, Bronzeaxe, Coalaxe, Dreadaxe, Exyahne, Firmaxe, Frostaxe, Ganton, Goldaxe, Greataxe, Holyrood, Iceaxe, Ironaxe, John Cormack, Junco, Miletus, Mitres, Neath Castle, Poleaxe, Ralco, St. Cyr, Sarpendon II, Silveraxe, Steamaxe, Stoneaxe, Sureaxe, Thomas Thresher, William Butler, William Spencer and Woodaxe. And, there were also four drifters, Anchor Star, Briton, London County and Oswy.

Nonetheless, within a short timeframe after the Armistice, the majority of the A.P. vessels returned to the U.K. before the winter set in proper. It would appear that having been relieved by Josephine that incidentally had been Russian, the yacht Salvator was one of these. So too were twenty armed-trawlers and also the semi-commercial trawlers Ariadne II and Ralco.

Although there was still a lot of fighting in the Mediterranean area in 1918, cynics might reflect that this was mostly between senior Allied naval officers. Of actual practical use, supporting the war-fighting efforts were more Auxiliary Patrol vessels than before.

The number of yachts and patrol-trawlers based at Gibraltar remained the same as a year before, but there were also 19 M.L.s. The Malta station had been reinforced significantly though. Apart from one yacht, there were 53 armed-trawlers (15 with minesweeping gear and two with hydrophones), five (or six) patrol paddle-steamers and 18 M.L.s. At Alexandria, Egypt, there was also a yacht, along with 48 armed trawlers (10 fitted with minesweeping gear), six drifters, six patrol paddle-steamers and 17 M.L.s. Covering the Aegean were two yachts, 62 armed-trawlers (all but four fitted with minesweeping gear), 26 drifters and 22 M.L.s. And, based at Taranto was also one yacht, along with twelve armed-trawlers (six with minesweeping gear), 116 drifters and 42 M.L.s.

Generally, the A.P. strengths in these commands remained stable. However, this was not the case for the Taranto-based craft. In line with R.N. attitudes that offensive measures were preferable to defensive ones, in January Vice-Admiral The Honourable Sir Somerset Arthur Gough-Calthorpe K.C.B., C.V.O., R.N. began lobbying for a British-commanded defence-in-depth of the Adriatic. Not only did this require destroyers be withdrawn from convoy escort duties, but the ‘fixed’ drifter barrage would also be replaced with ‘mobile’ ones. Reorganisation at high level occurred in April with trawler reinforcement in theatre. On this station in early July were one yacht; 52 armed-trawlers (of which only 18 were fitted with minesweeping gear); 107 drifters; and 40 M.L.s.

Losses in 1918 were, once again, far lighter than around Great Britain and overwhelmingly in accidents. The first was a mining though. At noon on February 23rd, off Malta, an armed-minesweeping trawler, Marion, detonated a mine while sweeping and sank immediately. This charge had been laid by UC25 on January 30th. Six were killed. The next was also in February. Nerissa II had also been an armed-minesweeping trawler that was wrecked off the end of Valanidhi Shoal, Lemnos, on the 28th.

In March there were two marine casualties of small-craft through accident. The former was Princess Alice, an armed-minesweeping trawler based at Alexandria, Egypt. She was lost by collision off that port, on the 6th, under circumstances as yet not discovered. The latter was of a Taranto-based net-drifter, Frigate Bird that for reasons unknown was in Malta. She was hit and sunk by a transport, Theseus, as she left Marsa Scirocco during the night of the 11th. Two survivors seem to have been rescued by the steamer, but nine of the drifter’s crew were killed.

It was not until May that there were any more casualties in small-craft in the Mediterranean theatre. H.M. Admiralty Trawler Antares II had been part of the escort for a convoy GaG 20 that had sailed from Genoa on April 30th, bound for Gibraltar. Only able to make about eight knots, it was an even easier target for UB48 as only the yacht Sapphire II (with a captain R.N.R. as the escort’s S.N.O. onboard) was zig-zagging on the starboard wing forward. Shortly before midnight G.M.T. of May 1st, roughly 65 miles E.N.E. of Port Mahon, Menorca, one of the merchantmen warned of a submarine sighted by using her syren. It was not until about 2.20 a.m. on the 2nd in moonlight that Oberleutnant zur See Wolfgang Steinbauer torpedoed the British steamer Franklyn and five minutes later, the American steamer Tyler though. Both were almost on the extreme right of the convoy. Antares II was on the starboard quarter. The reports from the commanding officers of the two escorts on this side of the convoy differed significantly in regards to a collision that resulted, but Skipper Peter Seary’s of Antares II was far more believable. On one of the merchantmen being torpedoed Antares II got her depth-charge ready for action and began to proceed to the estimated position of the submarine. Unfortunately, Sapphire II was also making for the same spot and so, Skipper Seary turned his boat around and went to the boats with the survivors instead. Antares II having been stopped for two or three minutes, Sapphire II then ploughed into her – causing serious damage. All the survivors were then picked up by the yacht that also remained with the trawler overnight. (The Franklyn survived for an hour, but the Tyler sank in three minutes, with eleven fatalities.) Antares II’s crew was put back onboard at 7.30 a.m., but she was found to be in such a state that towing was not a realistic proposition. So, after getting permission from shore the yacht sank the trawler by gunfire. As for the convoy, it proceeded under the command of its Italian commodore, initially along with an Italian auxiliary cruiser, Porto Torres, only. And, on hearing the explosions, the last escort, the British sloop Sweetbriar that had been on the port wing forward, doubled back astern of the convoy. There she put in a depth-charge attack on the estimated position of the attacker, before being ordered, by Sapphire II, to return to her escort duties. Interestingly, Sweetbriar’s report stated that she only dropped one Type D charge, while the German official history claimed that there had been ‘several heavy depth charges’.

The second loss in May was of a Port Konia-based armed-minesweeping trawler, Loch Naver. She sailed from the Greek island of Syra for Cape Spathi on the 13th, but she and her crew of thirteen disappeared. A search was conducted by fellow trawlers and aircraft, but nothing was found. It was presumed that she had been mined near Mandili Point at about 2 p.m. that day.

On the other hand, it is known how a Taranto-based armed-drifter, Clara and Alice, was lost. Wooden-hulled she had been engaged in operations off the Albanian Coast when she sprang a leak and sank the following afternoon of May 26th. She had been declared as ‘badly worm-eaten’ previously in December 1917 and repairs had been carried out. In the aftermath, responsibility was, essentially, shuffled off downwards to the crew though.

It was not until July 14th that there was another loss of an Auxiliary Patrol vessel. She was an Alexandria-based armed trawler, Loch Tummel that foundered off the coast of Cyrenaica in circumstances unknown, although there was a Court of Enquiry.

Considerably more is known of an incident along the North African coast to the east off Egypt on the 22nd. This involved a commissioned armed-tug, Julia Moran, towing a lighter, L.1, that was an old sailing vessel loaded with 18,000 cases of benzine and an armed-patrol trawler, Ijuin that was their escort. They were on their way from Alexandria, Egypt, to Milo, in the Cyclades, ultimately for the supply of Salonica. (During the night of the 21-22nd, UB51 may have tried to torpedo Ijuin and slightly later the trawler carried out a depth-charge attack.) A surface action began at about 4.45 p.m. on the 22nd when UB51 opened fire on the lighter from a range of five, or six miles. The tow was slipped by Julia Moran and she followed Ijuin that had turned towards the submarine. Ijuin maintained fire for as long as possible, firing approximately 32 rounds and also utilising smoke boxes that gave a short respite. Julia Moran’s gunner only fired three rounds, due to a defect and so, further pursuit of the submarine was pointless. Anyway, they only had one 6-pounder Hotchkiss gun each and so were totally outranged by UB51’s 8.8 c.m. and 10.4 c.m. guns. The first hit suffered by Ijuin was to her stern, seemingly around 6 p.m., with the next to her port bunker. Shrapnel was also bursting overhead, but amazingly, the only casualty was her commanding officer, Lieutenant Robert Henry Wetherell R.N.R., being wounded. Significantly damaged, abandonment was made at 6.30 p.m. Ijuin’s crew made it back to Alexandria in their lifeboat: arriving two days later. On the trawler’s abandonment UB51 then fired on the lighter again, hitting her for a third time and then sank both vessels with charges. Sensibly, L.1’s non-British crew had abandoned her and all were picked up subsequently, by H.M. Gunboat Aphis, at daybreak of the 24th. Julia Moran returned to harbour the next forenoon. Sub-Lieutenant Thomas Cameron Bramble R.N.V.R., in command was criticised for not having made enough effort to search for the lighter’s crew, but he had problems with the Greeks and Egyptians that formed part of his crew, so it is not known what actually occurred on the tug. But, it is worth pointing out that the German official history stated that she had escaped from UB51.

It was not until October that there were any more mishaps with small-craft. A Mudros-based armed trawler, Kalmia, was at Stavros on the eastern Greek coast on the 7th. While taking on stores there was a petrol explosion and she was damaged so badly that it was reckoned that salvage was not practicable.

Another incident occurred on November 2nd, in circumstances undiscovered, mid-way between Malta and Crete. In this, Riparvo, a Malta-based lightly-armed trawler and Dragoon, an Alexandria-based heavily-armed trawler, were in collision, sinking Riparvo. Finally, a Mudros-based armed-minesweeping trawler, Renarro, was lost in the Dardanelles in the early afternoon of the 10th. She had been sweeping between Chanak and Cape Helles in a channel already swept by light-draught Hunt-class vessels and at the time that she was blown up, had several mines in her sweep. Sinking rapidly, twelve were killed: all in the R.N.R., except one in the Newfoundland R.N.R., two in the R.N.V.R. and one in the R.N. The ship’s company had been in the process of changing watch and going to dinner and the lucky handful of survivors had been on the upper deck, or bridge. Also, ironically Renarro had been in one of the early batches of trawlers sent out there in early 1915.

Trying to assess the losses of the reserves is even more complex, to a bewildering degree. Even in the case of the Royal Naval Reserve, should those in the Commonwealth sections, such as the Newfoundland R.N.R., that died on British vessels be included? Royal Fleet Reservists might be excluded from this tally, as they had been recalled to the R.N. and probably should be. Of course, there was also the Royal Naval Division that is problematical. Even after its transfer to army operational control and fought on the Western Front, it remained under Admiralty administrative control and also continued to have some members in the R.N.R., R.N.V.R., R.F.R. and R.M.R. So, providing true and accurate numbers might be regarded as anyone’s guess...

Post War...

As already shown in the outline on the Mercantile Marine at war, it took time for the wartime tonnage and manpower to be released and unsurprisingly, it was the same for the reserves. By the end of 1919 it can be seen from some listings that most of the liners and other larger merchantmen that had been commissioned as auxiliaries during the war had gone, along with their R.N.R. officers. At the other end of the scale and from these same listings, many, although not all, of the motor launches, with their R.N.V.R. officers, had also been decommissioned. Within a further year, the level of reservists can be seen as having been reduced drastically though: in line with the general demobilisation. As economic recession set in as of 1920, some mariners might have wished to remain on government service indefinitely.

Courtesy of one particular document, much more can be determined on elements of the Auxiliary Patrol though. Dated in March 1919, this gave detailed instructions on the demobilisation of hired fishing vessels. Apart from those still required, they were to be released in groups as soon as they had been re-conditioned. If possible, all naval stores, light-fittings, armament, depth-charges and gun ammunition, wireless-gear and hydrophones (if fitted) etc., was to be removed at their operational bases, or sub-bases. Again, if possible, the reconditioning was, however, to be carried out at the ports that they had been taken up for Admiralty service. It is not unlikely that many disputes arose as to the state that they were returned to their owners though, as a clause in their charter parties stated that they were to be returned in the ‘same condition in which they were when taken by the Admiralty, ordinary wear and tear alone excepted’.

Certainly, by the spring of 1918, planning for the post-war clearance of minefields had begun in London and following negotiation with the western Allies, the subsequent British efforts came under the overall coordination of the International Mine Clearance Committee. A presumption of the swept channels being safe was advocated and accordingly, a policy related to potential risk formulated. (It is worth pointing out that until the surrender of the German Fleet was completed, the wartime sweeping around the British coast was to continue though. Essentially, this ensured that these seaways were safe.) In stretches where a potential risk still existed, two further complete sweeps were to be carried out, but elsewhere in these channels, there was only to be one full sweep. Traffic, both naval and civilian, was to continue to use the swept channels until otherwise advised. Early wishes for the wholesale retention of the R.N.R.(T), for a post-war period reckoned to be about six months, proved to be a tricky proposition and was abandoned. So, the expanding R.N. minesweeping force was to be the mainstay, utilising the new classes of Admiralty minesweepers and drifters: along with their largely active-service crews. However, the task was far greater and so the Mine Clearance Service came into existence in February 1919. The vessels used were hired trawlers that had been retained on government service, overwhelmingly, under R.N. command. In spite of it being stated clearly in internal documents that minesweeping was a skilled speciality, the personnel of the M.C.S. were a strange hotchpotch of volunteers. As promulgated, they could be drawn from time-expired and hostilities only R.N. ratings, along with those of the R.F.R., R.N.R., R.N.R.(T), R.N.V.R. and strangely, ‘new entries from civil life who possess the necessary qualifications’. Apparently, those recruited spanned the ages, both young and old – possibly attracted by the relatively generous rates of pay and bonuses for mines destroyed. Also, in mid-March 1919 it was announced that those involved, in the R.N. and M.C.S., would be awarded The King’s Badge.

The M.C.S. was administered, for reasons as yet undiscovered, through the R.N.V.R. It has been said that in June 1919 it had ‘around 700 officers and 14,500 men’. As the minefields were cleared, they were paid off and this still highly-dangerous and monotonous task was completed around the U.K. at the end of November 1919. The numbers of defensive mines sown around Britain’s coasts were considerable. As an example, during the course of the war the East Coast Minefield, between the Tyne and Flamborough Head, was formed by almost 12,000 mines. However, the most extensively-mined area, in a British context, was in the Eastern English Channel – with over 40,000 sown! Tragically, dealing with these showed up mine-laying errors that sometimes resulted in losses and fatalities. Apart from those laid out of position, there was also accidental counter-mining. This was when one mine detonated, setting off the next and so on and was more prevalent with lines of E.C. mines. Others, in shallow waters, could be particularly tricky to sweep.

The first post-war minesweeping accident in home waters was serious. Having sailed from Grimsby the day before and proceeded northwards, two trawlers, Lordship and Ronso, had been laying dan-buoys marking the eastern boundary of the large Yorkshire minefield on 4th February 1919, with Penarth, a Hunt-class vessel, in charge. At about 2 p.m. Penarth ran onto the line they were marking (W.P. 19) that may, or may not, have been laid inaccurately. She struck one mine and then a second five minutes later: sinking shortly after. (Slack water locally was at 2.20 p.m.) The trawlers with heavier draughts, remained sensibly between two to three miles away, but sent their boats to rescue the survivors immediately. There were 36 fatalities, of which the majority were R.N. Even so, three each were in the R.N.R. and R.N.V.R., all seamen or signallers. And, there were two in the R.F.R. as well – one able seaman and the other a stoker.

The next followed three days later. At anchor off the Edinburgh Lightvessel, in the Thames Estuary, a paddle-minesweeper, Erin’s Isle, was struck on her starboard sponson by one of many mines adrift through an offshore wind. Not only was she destroyed, 23 junior rates also lost their lives. Of these, one seaman had been in the Newfoundland R.N.R, one signal boy in the R.N.R. and one signalman in the R.N.V.R.

The last known loss of minesweepers in home waters, occurred on May 5th and was also down to line number W.P. 19 of the Yorkshire field. She was Cupar, a later Hunt-class vessel. Involved in a complex sweep (in a ‘D’ formation), after Sherborne’s sweep had parted ahead, she and Sligo had been ordered to make a 16-point turn (180°) and on completion, another to return them to their original heading. Having almost completed this second evolution, at about 8.45 a.m., a mine detonated under Cupar’s hull aft, crippling her engine. Settling slowly, Sherborne made efforts to tow her, but she sank at 11.20 a.m. Although not abandoning completely until five minutes beforehand, the eleven injured had already been evacuated in two of her boats. M.L. 318 had also taken off most of her company. A list shows that the injuries were, almost entirely, to their backs or limbs.

Meanwhile, in the Mediterranean theatre the areas that the British were responsible for clearing were around Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt and of course, some but not all in the Aegean Sea. Since, the Germans had not mined in the vicinity of Gibraltar, possibly due to multiple natural difficulties, these waters were dealt with rapidly. Both Malta and Egypt proved larger propositions and these areas were not made safe until March 1919. Due to large-scale British mining, as well as Ottoman and presumably also Bulgarian mining, the Aegean required far greater efforts.

At long last, on 12th November 1918, the Allied Fleet and auxiliaries passed through the Dardanelles. Since the Armistice of Mudros of October 30th, without Ottoman resistance, channels had been swept through the straits and off the Bosphorus. Unfortunately, H.M. Yacht Goissa that was on passage from Mudros to Constantinople, was lost to a mine as she entered the inner Straits on November 15th. In the aftermath, there was considerable disagreement as to the precise limits of the swept channel and her position, but it was determined that she had been within it when blown up. Five were killed - all reservists. The 4th Engineer, one greaser and one fireman were in the M.M.R.; one trimmer had been in the R.N.R.; and one telegraphist had been of the R.N.V.R.

There had been progress through to the end of January 1919, with the Gulf of Salonica and various other areas cleared. Work in the Gulf of Smyrna was completed in early April. It was not until the end of that same month that the major task of clearing all those centred on the Dardanelles was begun though. Through spring, summer and into autumn, it was not until early September that these waters were made safe. The rest of the areas in the Aegean that the British were responsible for were finished with, eventually, in October 1919.

Two minesweepers were lost in June, in tackling the large fields west of the Dardanelles and south of Imbros. The former was a later Hunt-class vessel, Kinross that struck a mine on June 16th and sank in 49 minutes. Nine ratings in the R.N. were killed, with three unidentified others injured. The latter was a paddle-minesweeper, Duchess of Richmond that was lost on June 28th. In conjunction with a balloon operated by the Royal Air Force, she had been dropping markers (‘pellets on light moorings’) in defining an area for sweeping. Although she was manoeuvring around mines that were visibly shallow, she ran over one at a deeper depth. Detonating, the boiler-room flooded and although a drifter, Primevere, took her in tow, she could not be saved. A Hunt-class minesweeper, Craigie, as well as Primevere rescued her crew and R.A.F. personnel: with two exceptions. They were a stoker R.N. and a telegraphist R.N.V.R. that were killed.

Also, a later Hunt-class sloop, Pontypool, had also been damaged while west of Cape Suvla on May 23rd. Having heaved up the kite, two mines had been foul and there was an explosion near the surface. This damaged her steering-gear badly and stove in stern plating. Unfortunately, her First Lieutenant, Lieutenant George Henry McAllister R.N.R., was killed and three ratings were injured slightly.

Finally, Allied martial operations continued in Russia, variously. Pertinent to this study, it was decided in London on 14th November 1918 to maintain the occupation of Murmansk and Archangel. To this end supplies, including food, as well as reinforcements arrived there before the winter ice set in. Further essentials were also forced through to Archangel, using icebreakers and transports.

Sometime later in November the A.P. order-of-battle at Murmansk comprised of two yachts, Josephine and Alvina (another Russian-prize); as well as ten armed-trawlers; and the four drifters. In early January 1919 there was only one yacht, Josephine; ten armed-trawlers (with some changes) and the four drifters. It is not known what the make-up of these ships’ companies were, but most of them were still commanded by R.N.R. officers.

The S.N.O. White Sea, Rear-Admiral John Frederick Ernest Green C.B. R.N., was informed by telegram on, or shortly after, 11th March 1919 that the War Cabinet, in London, had decided on the British withdrawal from Northern Russia as soon as possible. By early April the thaw in and around Archangel had begun. A month later the military and naval forces ashore that were being reinforced from Murmansk were, increasingly, in action against the Bolsheviks along the River Dvina. Further reinforcements, both military and naval, were required as covering forces for the evacuation and despatched in stages. Nevertheless, due to political considerations in support of White forces, offensive action towards Kotlas, had been carried out from May and June. Shallow-draught vessels were required for these and there was a minesweeping aspect. A minesweeping-tug, Sword Dance, was working with a monitor, Humber and river gunboat, Cicala, on June 24th, when she was sunk by a Russian mine. One leading seaman R.N. was killed, with others slightly injured. Revolts by White troops in July altered the situation inherently and yet more reinforcement of Archangel from the U.K. was required: arriving at the end of the month. On the same day, July 30th, there were more discussions in London on the immediate evacuation of Archangel – again. Murmansk, however, was to continue to be occupied for the meantime: for preparing the small-craft for their return home to the U.K. Down the Dvina, another tug-minesweeper, Fandango, struck a mine while sweeping on the evening of July 3rd. Eight that were in the R.N. were killed and another four wounded. With the river levels increasing in August though, the retrieval of most of the naval craft in the Dvina was conducted, with the covering troops also falling back. But, this was a fighting retreat throughout September, both on the river and on land. The evacuation of Archangel had also begun in June and was completed on September 27th.

The evacuated small-craft from Archangel were concentrated in the Kola Inlet. Of course, over the spring and summer, with naval support, the military forces ashore in the Murmansk area and along the coast westwards had also to secure their territory temporarily. One operation on Lake Onega was commanded by Lieutenant Joseph Russell Stenhouse D.S.C., R.N.R., under military direction. (He had been in the Ross Sea party in Ernest Shackleton’s disastrous 1914 attempt on the South Pole.) Apart from those on the yacht Josephine that was also a part of this flotilla, Stenhouse was not alone, as all those in command of the motor-boats also held R.N.R. lieutenancies. The rest of these motor-boats’ companies may also have been reservists. The mutiny of the White troops in July resulted in the Bolsheviks taking over the entire Onega Front and creating a potentially dire situation for the Allies. Yet again, there was further naval and military reinforcement that arrived later in August. This British evacuation began at Kem and was completed on September 29th. As might have been expected, Murmansk was the last place to be given up and this was completed on October 12th. Among all the small-craft on transit to the U.K. were many shallow-draught vessels, such as tugs. The Norwegians aided them in allowing passage through their sheltered waterways and certainly for crossing the North Sea, most were towed.

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