The Fishermen’s War

1914

In the days leading to war, apart from British warships signalling merchantmen at sea, official general warning telegrams were said to have been transmitted, although there is reason to doubt their effectiveness. In practical terms, wireless was not much more than a decade old and expensive to operate, was only fitted to a minority of larger and more prestigious merchantmen. Therefore, it was simply not possible to contact the deep-sea fishing fleets – something that senior naval officers only realised a few hours before the conflict began. Coastal patrol flotillas were instructed to inform fishermen of the state of war though, but not to go out of their way to do so.

Notwithstanding a desire by senior naval officers to have fishing craft cleared completely from around the United Kingdom, in order to conduct their operations unhindered, in the weeks following large numbers of fishing boats continued to sail. Consequently, when the well-escorted German cruisers Albatross and Nautilus mined waters off the Tyne and Humber on the night of August 25-26th, fishing craft were the first and majority to fall victim to these engines of war: as mines were sometimes called. Per an Admiralty order that was not particularly effective, two sizeable areas seaward of the Tyne and north of the Humber were blocked off as dangerous: with the initial intention of having them cleared by minesweepers. Incidentally, there had already been an earlier German operation, to the north of the Thames Estuary, but the mines laid affected merchantmen and warships more.

Even although the Albatross and Nautilus operations had been seen and reported, senior officers in the Admiralty ignored these. Instead, they chose to believe that the culprits had actually been German trawlers and stated this publicly on August 31st.

A period of paranoia followed these raids, with everything regarded suspiciously, including usual fishing practices. Even floats were thought to be mines, as was all sorts of other floating junk that was accumulating through sinkings. Another official pronouncement in early September stated that ‘trawlers painted black, with white numbers’ on their funnels were ‘probably German mine-layers’. It is worth pointing out that German naval officers also harboured dark suspicions about fishing craft that they were intelligence gatherers and consequently, their surface forces sank any Britons encountered in the North Sea: making their crews Prisoners of War. (Between August 22nd and 26th German torpedo boats did away with 21 trawlers, with cruisers doing the same to another three.) Even although, overwhelmingly, this was not the case, drifters from Scottish northeastern ports were tasked in seeking out these non-existent German minelayers: without any protection whatsoever. This was not the only scheme, whether taken up, or not that regarded fishermen as expendable.

Within the general coastal restrictions for the maritime industries in the early months per unpublished Admiralty Orders, there were some specifically for the fishing sector. They had already begun in late August and the most extensive area of prohibition was in the North Sea; eastward of a line running between the Hook of Holland, in the Netherlands and Sumburgh Head, in the Shetland Isles; and also south of the Latitude of Lowestoft, Norfolk. These restrictions were increased in early September: due to the recent German mining. By mid-month, apart from the elements of the North Sea already mentioned, a large part of the English Channel and all of the Pentland Firth were out of bounds to all fishing craft. Foreign boats were banned from the entire east coast as of October 1st.

In the prevailing atmosphere fishermen whose boats had not been taken up for naval service were in a quandary. While they wanted to follow their normal calling, without reliable information from the State that was being withheld deliberately, some were reluctant to sail. It was, however, realised that much of the area put off limits as enemy minefields was safe and so, fishermen then returned to work there – occasionally getting blown to smithereens for their trouble. According to the official British figures, of the six trawlers destroyed in September alone, there were deaths on five: totalling 25.

British mining began in late September, off the Belgian coast, with another large area blocked off as dangerous on October 3rd. Initially, the mining was limited, with the claimed aim of hemming in the newly-captured Belgian ports and the announcement was actually to force all traffic through the Downs.

Meanwhile, in late September part of a serious German mining operation against the Grand Fleet was begun, but cancelled. Another effort was made in mid-October, but the Forth and Thames elements failed, with only the North Channel between south-western Scotland and Northern Ireland being carried out by an auxiliary minelayer: Hilfkreuzer C. A trawler picked up the survivors from the first vessel, a merchantman, sunk. Admiralty hubris continued in an announcement on November 2nd. Fishing craft were not blamed for this latest mining operation that had sunk the new battleship Audacious. Instead, it was stated that it must have been ‘some merchant vessel flying a neutral flag’. Nevertheless, all civilian vessels in the North Sea would be affected adversely, as from two days hence it was to be ‘considered a military area’.

Aiming to cut the main east coast shipping lane, the next German mining occurred on November 3rd in the Smith’s Knoll Channel, while nearby Yarmouth was shelled by a heavy covering force. Among the victims of these mines, laid by the light-cruiser Stralsund, were four British fishing boats. Incidentally, two neutral steamers were also lost and at least one of them had absolutely no knowledge of the danger.

Understandably, catches in nearby ports dropped off dramatically in the immediate aftermath of the Yarmouth raid: especially as mines were breaking free from their sinkers in the bad weather and destroying more craft. Also, as might be expected, prices rose significantly for those, such as herring boats from Lowestoft that still ventured to sea.

As an example of local restrictions in this period, on the orders of Admiral Lowry R.N., in November, seemingly due to an enquiry relating to the upcoming herring season, these were increased and fishing was banned in the entire Firth of Forth out to a line between St. Abbs Head and Fifeness. Lowry’s claimed original concerns were about night operations, but actually banned fishing day and night. Predictably, numerous petitions from local authorities, professional bodies and others found their way to Whitehall, including the First Lord of the Admiralty, pointing out that these would put men out of work, causing hardship. Resistance was mounted by the naval authorities, including referring to the dangers from minefields. Nevertheless, petitions continued, including through the Secretary of State for Scotland and Board of Trade. Eventually, limited relaxations were agreed to grudgingly in December: to come into force the month after.

It is also worth pointing out that fishing inshore could bring its own particular dangers. Areas in the vicinity of coastal gun-batteries were off limits and offenders, especially at night, might well find themselves under fire.

However, on December 1st more restrictions were imposed, all around the coasts of Britain and Ireland. Under the Defence of the Realm Act, fishermen were banned secretly from more parts of the North Sea, the English Channel east of Portland, the Irish Sea north of a line from St. Bees Head to Bally Water and most of the west of Scotland. Written permission from fishery boards and countersigned by the local Senior Naval Officers, was required for boats working offshore. Small boats were still allowed to fish on the south and east English coasts – if they were less than 35 feet long and remained within the three-mile limit.

The last major German battlecruiser raid that took place on December 16th on England’s east coast, also had a minelaying element. While Whitby, Scarborough and Hartlepool were shelled by a force of heavies, the light-cruiser Kolberg laid another large minefield straddling the main east coast shipping lane between Scarborough and Filey. Casualties, both mercantile and naval, were heavy, especially on Christmas day, but there appears to have been no appreciable effect on the fishing communities still trying to ply their peacetime trade.

The crews of the fishing boats sunk by the German surface forces were at this time taken back to Germany and interned. Consequently, they were among those that went to the Kriegsgefangenenlager (war prison camp) at Ruhleben that November. In all likelihood down to these fishermen, there was ill will between English east coast mariners and Germans regarded as suspect that were also incarcerated. Due to neither group having a good grasp of the other’s language, exasperated utterances of ‘these bloody Germans’ were mis-translated as die blutiger Deutschen that was a dire insult meaning bloodthirsty! The German suspects were moved to other accommodation away from the stables and into the grandstands.

1915

As might be expected, regulations and prohibitions relating to fishing craft that were produced by State organs, proliferated. So, at least by November 1915, Admiralty Orders classified as secret were being printed in a consolidated form, with amendments, for the convenience of naval officers. (Later they also included elements in italics that stated explicitly that were not to be passed to fishermen!) Separately, there were voluminous printed Notices to Fishermen that were to be communicated to the fishing communities. Issued as per the Defence of the Realm Act, those that chose to disobey these could find themselves court-martialled and potentially, sentenced to ‘penal servitude for life’.

Even with the German declaration of totally unrestricted trade war in February, there was no discernible change for fishing craft in the weeks following. Nevertheless, mines caught in their gear were still the subject of occasional press reports.

On April 1st, U10, a coastal submarine of the Hochseeflotte (High Sea Fleet) operating from Heligoland, was approximately 40 miles seaward of the Tyne. Under the command of Kapitänleutnant Fritz Stuhr, three trawlers, Gloxinia, Jason and Nellie, were stopped and sunk. On this day the boarding parties used explosive charges. However, four days later and slightly further north another trawler, Acantha, was intercepted. Possibly having run out of charges and without a deck gun, the coup de grace was given by torpedo. No casualties are noted in the official British returns.

Two trawlers, Zarina and Vanilla, are also shown in April as having been torpedoed off the Humber and Norfolk on the 7th and 8th. No German submarines have been identified as in these areas on these dates and it is far more likely that they were destroyed by mines. Both crews of nine, including their skippers, were killed.

Contact of a different variety occurred between a German submarine and a British fishing boat on April 2nd. Perhaps wanting to lay claim to a financial reward for intelligence reported to the British authorities, while 25 miles seaward of Start Point, Devon, a trawler named Onward was stated in a press item as having chased an enemy submarine. U24 was an ocean-going boat under the command of Kapitänleutnant Rudolf Schneider (well known for sinking the Arabic some months later) that was on the surface and pursuing the Lochwood. Two torpedoes missed the merchanman, but the third did for her and consequently, the Onward was instructed to take care of the sinking Admiralty collier’s crew.

Later in the month, there were attacks on fishing craft by other Hochseeflotte boats that were also operating from their bases in Northwest Germany. An old coastal-boat, U6, was tasked to patrol between Aberdeen and the Orkneys that in modern parlance was a ‘target rich environment’. Encountering difficulties and feeling under-armed, she stopped the trawler Glencarse on the 18th and took her as a prize. While off the Firth of Forth, U10 stopped and destroyed the trawler Lilydale with an explosive charge. A press report said that a British ‘patrol boat’ fired on the submarine, inflicting ‘considerable damage’, but the German official history stated that the reason she began her transit home was an ‘engine defect’. Also, returning from an unsuccessful patrol in the North Channel and Irish Sea, U22 stopped the trawler Saint Lawrence, south of the Dogger Bank on the 22nd and sank her with an explosive charge.

By mid to late May, there were concerns within the fishing trade nationwide about the continuance of deep-sea trawling around Iceland. As far as the owners in Hull were concerned, the minimum number of large trawlers for a ‘moderate supply of Iceland fish’ was fifteen and these were the port’s last: as the rest had already been taken-up for government service. Presently, there were also another fifteen, but these were smaller boats working to the south and east coasts of Iceland. They did not have the range to venture further to the north and west as the season dictated. With a possible increase of available larger boats to 22 in June, it was thought that fishing in these waters could be maintained from this port all year round. It was stressed by a representative of the Hull owners that it was important ‘to maintain a supply of fish in view of the great shortage of meat’. Grimsby’s owners were not prepared to admit a minimum number and requested the ‘opening of the closed areas on the Scotch (sic.) and Irish Coasts’ – citing patriotism for both the Scots and the navy for that matter, to just give up areas to help these English fishermen. (Certainly, by June 3rd, all of Aberdeen’s large trawlers had been requisitioned.) In regards to Hull, the matter came to a head at the end of May, as this port’s mobilising officer informed the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries in London that unless informed ‘to the contrary he will be compelled to take up the remaining fifteen large Iceland vessels’ the following week. Meanwhile, increasing tonnages of fish landed in Grimsby had been from Danish boats. The minutes written by naval decision-makers at the appropriate level, indicate that they were not particularly sympathetic to any of these fishing ports’ plights.

As the month turned and into summer, the pattern of the attacks by the Hochseeflotte boats generally remained similar, in making these on warships, merchantmen and fishing craft, as circumstances dictated. Operating in the coastal waters was already proving tricky though: especially for the older, coastal submarines. This was due to the presence of Auxiliary Patrol craft that could be mistaken for those still fishing. While most civilian craft attacked did not resist and so, were sunk by charges, or opening their hull-valves after abandonment, some, nevertheless, were shelled: increasingly with the new, heavier 8.8. c.m. guns that were replacing smaller calibre weapons. Two of the latter were the steam-trawlers Saint George and Cruiser that refused to stop when signalled by U41 on May 2nd. The former Granton boat stopped only after, seemingly, trying to ram the U-boat and consequently, her crew were taken as Prisoners of War. The latter ran and only stopped after being hit by a shell: with four deaths and at least one, injured, taken prisoner. According to a press item, the Cruiser’s North Shields crew totalled nine. Interestingly, on more than one occasion on this day, when U41 sank a number of trawlers, she was fired upon by armed trawlers of the Peterhead Auxiliary Patrol.

Unsurprisingly, further out such as on Dogger Bank, where large numbers of craft fished within sight of each other, it was far easier for submarines to weigh in with impunity. A particularly serious instance occurred east of the Shetland Islands on the night of June 23rd to 24th though. In less than five hours, U32 destroyed fifteen steam-trawlers by shellfire. Kapitänleutnant Freiherr von Spiegel und zu Peckelsheim left the remaining trawler to rescue the survivors.

In fact, June 1915 was the worst month of the entire war for fishing-hull losses. Fifty-one trawlers and nine smacks were destroyed: with 26 fishermen killed.

Complicating matters for the fishermen in the North Sea, as of late May, decoy, or ‘Q’ trawlers in conjunction with towed submarines, were deployed from the Firth of Forth. These operations resulted in the sinking of U40 on June 23rd and U23 on July 20th. Once these tactics were realised, the Hochseeflotte’s submarine commanders not only became wary of trawlers that summer, un-armed or not, they may well have taken a much harder line against them.

Meanwhile in the south, the first diminutive UB-boat of the Marinekorps Flandern known to have come into contact with British fishing craft was UB16 that was under the command of Oberleutnant zur See Hans Valentiner. While on transit to the North Hinder (in the southern North Sea between Antwerp and the Thames), the British fishing smacks Boy Horace, E and C and Economy were stopped, boarded and sunk by explosive charges on June 3rd and 4th.

Less than a week later, on the 9th and 10th, while operating between the North Hinder and the Galloper (off East Sussex), six Lowestoft smacks, the Britannia, Edward, Laurestina, Intrepid, Qui Vive and Welfare were all dealt with in the same manner. Although her commander, Oberleutnant zur See Werner Fürbringer, wrote of his experiences post-war, there is nothing on this incident.

It is known from press reporting that four of these latter smacks’ crews were landed, by Dutch craft, in the Netherlands. Two were said to have been torpedoed and another two sunk by a Zeppelin. There is nothing whatsoever mentioned in the appropriate German official history (on North Sea operations) of Zeppelins attacking fishing craft in this period. Of note, in April Zeppelins had reported fishing craft off the Horns Reef (off western Denmark) and they were intercepted by a torpedo-boat flotilla. Escorted into Cuxhaven, seven were sent to Hamburg for possible prize court proceedings. One, proved to be British, from Grimsby. Interestingly, Fürbringer wrote that while UB2 was in company with UB16 that August, approximately thirty miles from Lowestoft, they were attacked by a Zeppelin.

Occasional attacks with only slight variety continued throughout July and into August, destroying a few at a time. However, on July 30th UB10 sank eight smacks off Lowestoft. On August 11th another nine smacks were destroyed by this same submarine. In his patrol reports her commander, Oberleutnant zur See Otto Steinbrinck, wrote in terms of most of the British fishermen being friendly and even helpful, although in judging Steinbrinck’s character, this can be doubted.

Smacks were also armed by the R.N. and used as decoys, as found out by UB6 off Yarmouth on August 11th. Although she survived this assault from H.M. Armed Smack G&E without casualties, UB4 did not. She was attacked and utterly destroyed by H.M. Armed Smack Inverlyon on the 15th.

Following this, certainly by the 23rd, smacks were ‘assumed to be armed’ and so, instructions were issued to the UB-boat commanders to be cautious. Orders to abandon the fishing craft were to be made from distances between 1,000 to 1,500 metres – warning them with machine-gun fire. Demolition parties were not then sent over until the ‘fishermen had come to the submarine in their dinghy.’

Seeking retaliation for attacks on the UB-boats, an operation was intended for UB10 and UB17 in late August, but was defeated through adverse wind and sea conditions even before sailing. Nevertheless, an attempt to capture an armed smack was embarked upon by UB2 and UB16 in early September. Although there was an unsuccessful clash, another six unarmed smacks were destroyed in this short-lived operation.

Returning to eastern Scottish waters, while scouting for the (soon to be sunk) auxiliary minelayer Meteor, in August, a few trawlers were sunk by U17. This was a busy and varied patrol that included U17 attacking a decoy-trawler on the 11th that was in company with a dived submarine in the Firth of Forth. They were H.M. Armed Trawler Ratapiku and H.M. Submarine C23. Neither side was successful on this occasion.

Far more serious, under the command of Kapitänleutnant Max Valentiner, U38 was tasked to the west coast of the U.K. this month. Although a special operations element failed, Valentiner left a trail of sunken vessels from the North Sea, around the Shetland Isles and Hebrides, into the Irish Sea and down to the Southwest Approaches, before returning to his Heligoland base. Among his tally of thirty civilian vessels were five trawlers and fifteen drifters.

With the first unrestricted submarine campaign against ‘trade’ abandoned in mid-September, the sinkings of fishing craft tailed off accordingly. Nevertheless, fatalities from new minefields sown almost nightly (if not swept up daily) remained, as the UC-boats continued their silent and indiscriminate activities along the southern and eastern coasts. And, of course, there were all the other hazards, natural and otherwise, still to contend with.

1916

Even if the Military Service Acts (1 & 2) did not affect merchant mariners overly, this was not necessarily the case for fishermen. It is not at all clear on what legal authority an Admiralty ‘special Recruiting Memorandum’ was issued as of February 16th. Within the first appendix was the claim that fishermen were ‘regarded as a reserve for the Navy’ and so, ‘not liable for service in the Army unless it should be decided at some future time that they are more urgently needed for service in the Army for the Navy or for the fisheries’. It continued, possibly for individuals that had bothered to read the Act that while those in ‘sea fishing’ were ‘included among the certified occupations exempted from the provisions of the Military Service Act’, this was only for ‘service in the Army’.

It looks as if the intention was for all fishermen of military age to be ‘enrolled in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (Y. Section)’ unless unfit physically. These reservists were not to be ‘called up for service ... without further orders’, unless they volunteered! Hypocritically, it was stated that ‘to avoid undue disturbance to the Fishing industries in such an event, the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries’ would ‘be consulted before men’ were taken for naval service.

The recruitment of fishermen that had already been rejected for the R.N.V.R. (Y Section) and holding certificates of exemption was ordered, in late October, by the Admiralty. Of course, this was still to be on a ‘voluntary’ basis. They were not, however, to be medically re-examined until the point of being called up. By then the ‘ordinary standards of height and chest measurement need not be adhered to in their cases’.

There must have been complications, not covered by this scheme. One relates to how fishermen that had survived sinkings and were not taken on in what would appear to have been a dwindling number of other craft subsequently were to be treated.

During the autumn and into the winter of 1915 the UB-boats of the Marinekorps Flandern had concentrated on coastal defence, but had also been sent to the Thames Estuary, in the hope of finding warships, auxiliary patrol craft and transports to attack. Unsuccessful, their commanders took it upon themselves, in January 1916, to begin destroying tiny, sailing fishing craft once again: especially in the Hoofden. Conducted as per the required ‘prize rules’ in daylight, the first casualties were three smacks named Foam Crest, Evelyn and Sunshine, sunk by UB16 on the 18th. This boat, under the command of Oberleutnant zur See Hans Valentiner (that can be positively identified from the personised paintwork of a shark’s head on the forward casing), had attacked another smack, Acacia, the day before. Her skipper having had an earlier boat sunk the autumn before, attempted to ram the submarine, forcing her assailant to dive and the smack to escape on a ‘good breeze’. Anyway, the destruction of British and Belgian craft continued in small numbers until March 6th, with UB16 sinking the British smacks Young Harry and Spring Flower. The gap in sinkings of fishing craft that occurred was probably only because of the changes in rules of engagement that allowed for dived torpedo attacks of ‘armed merchantmen’ and a concentration on these. Also, separately, UB27, a Heligoland-based boat of the Hochseeflotte sank the British smack Blessing on April 28th.

The Admiralty’s orders to British fishermen became ever larger and complicated and relied partly on the fishermen’s interaction with civilian bodies. As stated in those for May 1916, permits for operating in local areas were to be made through the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries for boats registered in England; the Fishery Board for Scotland; the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction for Ireland; and the Government of the Isle of Man as appropriate. But, all had to be countersigned by area Senior Naval Officers and could be ‘withdrawn at any time’. Of course, any other orders from naval officers had to be obeyed without question: as were emergency orders from the Fishery authorities and H.M. Customs. Passage through prohibited areas north to the Icelandic, Faroese and ‘other Northern fishing grounds’ were subject to a particular Notice to Mariners. They had to ‘commence their journeys as soon after daybreak as possible, and proceed with all possible speed, and they must not fish inside such areas’. Unless otherwise ordered, fishing craft were to burn navigation lights at night and all had to show clear identification marks ‘in accordance with the regulations’. Towards the end of these edicts it was stated that the crews of ‘British fishing craft must consist exclusively of British subjects, or subjects of Allied nations to whom special permission’ had ‘been granted’. And, a few sections further on there was a warning that fishing was ‘in all cases only allowed subject to the understanding that no claim’ would ‘be entertained for damage to or loss of nets, trawls, lines, or other gear, done or caused by any of H.M. ships or vessels’.

As an aside, in early June the Admiralty had become willing to allow Dutch steam trawlers working on Dogger Bank to dispose of their salted herring catches in Boston, Lincolnshire. This was not a generous offer though, as the idea was merely to deny Germany this useful foodstuff. (According to one telegram the Dutch exported 95 per cent of this to Germany, while another stated 80 per cent.) Less than ill-thought out, it had to be pointed out by the Foreign Office that the British did not eat salted herring. The policy then formed by naval decision-makers was in blunt intimidation of Dutch fishermen in this ‘prohibited area’ – by forcing them into British ports. Still ill-thought out, these senior naval officers were informed that there was nothing in international law to support their proposed action. Sidestepping this minor inconvenience, they fell back on an earlier wicked wheeze, in maintaining that they could be brought in as suspected minelayers. While not stated in these terms and not entirely clear, it would appear that later in the month the Dutch fishermen were warned that those in this area were liable to detention for investigation: for seven to fourteen days. By early July the emphasis had changed to pressuring the Dutch Government to ensure that the export of fish to Germany ceased. Even so, orders were to be given for the capture of three Dutch fishing boats outside the prohibited area, for putting before a British Prize Court. As admitted in a Foreign Office telegram, these were to be hostages. However, on July 16th the Admiralty ordered all Dutch fishing craft with catches of salted herring to be taken into custody for prize proceedings. Confusion reigned, as it was thought that other Dutchmen with fresh fish from Iceland could be encouraged to land their catches at Aberdeen. Returning full circle, by early August the Admiralty was agreeable to Dutch steam trawlers landing catches at Boston and Grimsby. Once again, in making this suggestion, these naval officers showed off their ignorance. Having also shown extreme prejudice against drifters, no objections were then made for Dutch steam and motor (but not sailing) drifters to land their catches in east coast English ports other than Lowestoft and Yarmouth (that were major auxiliary patrol bases). And so, this underhand game with Dutch and other neutral fishermen for that matter, continued.

Returning to the German naval assault, although two British smacks had been captured and sunk in mid-May, it was not really until early July that there was a resumption of the destruction of these diminutive craft by the UB-boats of the Marinekorps Flandern. While there were some single sinkings, even with the potential danger from decoy vessels, multiple craft were normally destroyed in these attacks on groups. Steam trawlers also began to be sunk again, by the new UB II class submarines that were entering service. Far more capable than the original UB I class boats, their ranges were increased significantly, not only up the English east coast, but also westwards through the Dover Straits and down the English Channel to the Atlantic seaboard. It looks as if when their commanders were used to their new submarines, they did not bother overly with small British fishing craft, as attacks on them lessened greatly in autumn.

Also, the first of the new UC II class boats, UC16, arrived at Zeebrugge in the first half of September. Having laid her mines off Yarmouth, on September 23rd this submarine’s crew stopped and sank eleven British trawlers – by gunfire, or explosive charge.

Under similar orders to concentrate on naval ships, the Hochseeflotte’s submarines also destroyed fishing craft occasionally. The first of another generation of ocean-going submarines and under the command of Kapitänleutnant Carl-Siegfried Georg, U57 was forty miles off Whitby, Yorkshire later in September. After three days without any naval targets found, Georg had four British trawlers destroyed on the 24th: seemingly in the normal manner. Overnight another ten were overwhelmed quietly in an ingenious manner and all but one done away with by opening their sea-cocks. Still not finished, on the 25th five more trawlers were sunk by gunfire. The first captured during the night, Fisher Prince, had the crews of all the rest onboard and they were turned over to a Norwegian steamer - with this last trawler then sunk.

Also, among prizes taken by Hochseeflotte submarines around this time that were mostly neutral steamers, was a British trawler. On September 26th U64 took the Loch Ryan.

It is worth pointing out that overall 32 trawlers, one motor fishing vessel and five smacks had been sunk in September though. This was the highest for this year and three crews were also taken as Prisoners of War: a tactic that had become very unusual.

In October three steam-trawlers and one motor fishing vessel were sunk in the southern North Sea, off Spurn Head by surface actions. There were also single sinkings off the Firth of Forth; Girdleness and Buchanness, both in Aberdeenshire; another well to seaward of the Outer Hebrides; and yet one more southeast of Iceland.

Three trawlers were destroyed in the South West Approaches off Fastnet, on November 2nd - by U49 that was commanded by Kapitänleutnant Richard Hartmann. Having taken a Danish trawler as a prize a few days before and using it as a tender, the coal from these Britons’ bunkers was certainly transferred to her. Since none of these trawler crews are shown as casualties and also because the weather was stormy, it may have been that they were also taken onboard the prize as Prisoners of War. Another trawler was also sunk mid-month, by another ocean-going submarine further into the Atlantic, south of Ireland.

One boat of the Marinekorps Flandern was also highly active in November. Under the new command of Oberleutnant zur See Paul Günther, during a training patrol two smacks were done away with by UB37, off Smith’s Knoll, Norfolk. On Günther’s first operational patrol at the end of the month five more smacks were destroyed on England’s south coast between Portland, Dorset and Start Point, Devon. Also, in the same area that month, two UC submarines sank three more smacks.

Attacks on fishing craft tailed off in December. One UB submarine sank two smacks off Trevose Head, Cornwall, in the outer reaches of the Bristol Channel and another UB boat sank a trawler deep in the North Sea, between Northumberland and Denmark. It is worth pointing out that in all the German submarine surface attacks on British fishing craft, there had been virtually no deaths in 1916.

However, in the last two months mines were once again taking a toll. One fishing boat named Vineyard was destroyed off Aberdeen in November: with eight dead. Not claimed by the Germans, this may have been down to a British mine. One trawler, Margaret, was lost with three dead, late in December, on a minefield laid by an UC submarine off the southern Kent coast. Another trawler, Athole, may also have been sunk by a British mine that same month off Tod Head, Aberdeenshire, without loss of life. Similarly, a smack, Camellia, was obliterated off the Eddystone Lighthouse in the English Channel, roughly south of Plymouth, with three killed.

1917

In January the Fishery Board for Scotland made an appeal to all ‘single fishermen over military age and all married fishermen over 35 years of age’ that were ‘employed on board 2nd or 3rd class sailing boats’, ‘unemployed’, or ‘temporarily engaged on other work, not of national importance’. They were ‘invited’ to register with the board’s local fishery officers, with a view to ‘Owners and Skippers of all first class fishing vessels who may be in need of men to replace younger men called up for Naval Service’.

Meanwhile, Vice-Admiral Charles Dare R.N., as Flag Officer Milford Haven, was lobbying for complete naval ‘control of the fishing trade’. He envisioned all ‘fishing vessels ... to be commissioned as Auxiliary Patrol Vessels’, with their crews ‘enroled in the R.N.R. Trawler Section and paid the usual rates of pay ... Not nominal rates’. The industry was then to be controlled entirely by H.M.G., including most of the profits. Prohibited areas could be opened to these craft, as directed. Also, all craft were to be armed, as guns became available, with some also fitted with wireless telegraphy gear (as had become standard practice in the Auxiliary Patrol). Intriguingly, Dare claimed that this was ‘already partly in force’, but kept secret.

As might be expected from a senior representative of the R.N., constant ‘Naval discipline and training’ was ‘most essential’ to ensure their safety. Also, it was a ‘well known fact’ that those that had ‘not been enrolled’ were ‘making large fortunes in the fishing trade’ and so, his scheme would put these fishermen on an equal basis with those already in naval service – dispelling resentment.

Dare’s scheme was taken seriously within the naval Establishment, for trawlers at that time anyway and conferences were held subsequently in March. The Scottish owners were not as hostile as might have been thought, but it was stated that this was agreeable only as long as they were remunerated for the use of their property at suitable rates. Certain aspects were objected to, such as government appointed port managers to conduct the ‘commercial side of fishing’. Interestingly, on the subject of arming the trawlers, the owners were of the opinion that the guns ‘should not be concealed’ and ‘so placed that they would be visible to the enemy submarines’.

Following further correspondence, on April 17th a hybrid scheme was put before the War Cabinet and approved. All fishermen that were ‘not eligible for Naval Service’ were to be ‘induced to join a Special Reserve, thereby fulfilling any obligations under the National Service Scheme’. While owners were to obey orders from local Senior Naval Officers, they could exercise inputs through port fishery committees.

British fishing craft began taking losses to the Hochseeflotte submarine flotillas towards the end of January and a small number of Prisoners of War were also taken. On the way to points south, U45 sank three trawlers around 40 miles northwest of Inishtrahull, County Donegal on the 21st. Having made a transit through the Dover Straits and on the way westward down the English Channel off the Start, U55, under the command of Kapitänleutnant Wilhelm Werner, sank one smack on the 22nd and in the outer Bristol Channel, off the Cornish coast, destroyed another six on the 30th. Two fishermen from the Trevone drowned while they were trying to get onboard U55, with no apparent efforts made by this submarine’s crew to save them. (A year later Werner would become infamous for torpedoing, without warning, vessels such as the hospital ship Rewa.) After minelaying off Seaham and Sunderland, UC31 sank three trawlers by surface action between the 28th and 29th. Also, three trawlers had been taken as prizes in the North Sea by U44, on the 23rd, while returning to base with a broken propellor-shaft.

Predictably, with the new almost entirely unrestricted campaign of Handelskrieg mit U-booten begun, the toll more than doubled in February. Overwhelmingly, the trawlers were sunk by the Hochseeflotte submarines in Scottish waters, or in the North Sea. Six skippers and one engineer were taken prisoner and all but one by the same boat, UC44, under the command of Kapitänleutnant Kurt Tebbenjohanns. Also, with two exceptions, all the smacks destroyed were by boats belonging to the Marinekorps Flandern. These sinkings were singly, or in small numbers, in areas variously on the English east coast off Lowestoft, through the English Channel to the northern Cornish coast and across the Bristol Channel, near St. George’s Channel. Of these, south of Plymouth, three smacks were sunk by Oberleutnant zur See Herbert Pustkuchen of UC66 that had caused a near diplomatic breach with the United States in March 1916, by sinking the French passenger steamer Sussex. And, two trawlers were also lost to mines that month with nineteen dead, including both skippers.

March was the worst month of this new German campaign, with a total of 44 British fishing-craft captured and sunk and one more trawler, Nuttalia, taken as a prize (again by Tebbenjohanns). Nevertheless, for all these attacks, according to the official British tally, only three lives were lost and no other Prisoners of War taken. All 13 of the steam trawlers and the one motor fishing vessel were taken by six UC-boats of the Hochseeflotte, in east coast Scottish and English waters. Also, of the 29 smacks, all but one of these was destroyed by UC-boats of the Marinekorps Flandern in similar areas as in February. Two ‘actions’ stand out especially though. While off the northern Cornish coast on the 12th, UC47, under the command of Oberleutnant zur See Paul Hundius, captured and sank ten trawlers in only four hours. And, on the 24th UC17, commanded by Oberleutnant zur See Ralph Wenniger, laid into another fishing fleet 15 miles south of the Eddystone Lighthouse, Devon. Nine smacks were destroyed on this calm and sunny afternoon: with their crews picked up by naval vessels. It is worth recording that this officer was said, in British interrogation reports of German submariner Prisoners of War, to have been humane: saving life whenever possible.

The official losses for March mentioned above were in error though, as two trawlers, Industria and Expedient that had been attributed as missing in April were actually stopped and sunk off Aberdeen, by UC75, on March 25th and 28th. It seems that the Industria was out of sight of two others, Median and Rosslyn, or more likely destroyed later in the day, as her crew of nine perished, seemingly, after taking to their lifeboat. A heavy storm was noted in the German official history for March 26th, stating that a helmsman was washed off the submarine’s bridge and drowned. It may, therefore, have been that it had not subsided sufficiently for ensuring the safety of life two days later, when the Expedient was also sunk. This unfortunate trawler’s crew also made it into their lifeboat, but were not rescued. UC75’s commander, Oberleutnant zur See Johannes Lohs, was regarded as a rising star, but these deaths, especially the latter ones, could be seen either as due to poor judgement at best and sheer callousness at worst.

April’s loss of 39 fishing craft was slightly better numerically than in March, with one also damaged - although more fishermen were killed. Overwhelmingly trawlers, they were destroyed by submarines of the Hochseeflotte, along the northeastern English and eastern Scottish coasts, as well as around the Orkney and Shetland Isles. Having already had fishing craft ‘victories’ on his first patrol in command, Oberleutnant zur See Wilhelm Barten, of UC76, managed to sink eight more on April 12th off Aberdeenshire. (However, he never managed to repeat his performance, since on preparing for the next patrol, while loading a mine it detonated. Not only did this cause considerable damage, it killed Barten and over half his crew.) UC44 was responsible for the destruction of another five trawlers and unusually for Kapitänleutnant Tebbenjohanns, nine of the Dalmation’s crew were killed when she was sunk on the Dogger Bank, on the 15th. Five more trawlers were despatched variously by UC41 between Northumbria and Berwickshire from the 16th to 19th. Commanded by Kapitänleutnant Kurt Bernis, he had also attacked another trawler, Breadalmane, off St. Abb’s Head on the 13th. Not only shelled, scuttling was attempted. Although damaged, she was, nevertheless, towed to Granton three days later. Unfortunately, another two fishermen were killed onboard her.

On April 12th an ocean-going minelayer, U78, sank another trawler, Andromache, seemingly out of British waters. The information to hand is vague, but this might either have been south of Iceland, or west of the Shetland Isles. It is known that her skipper was taken prisoner, but the rest of her crew perished. Yet another trawler, Brothertoft, was sunk probably on the Dogger Bank, by UC31, on the 15th – with another nine fishermen dead. And, although luckier inasmuch as there were no fatalities, UC27 that had been in the Baltic Flotilla, was on transit to the Mediterranean, when two trawlers, Narbeth Castle and Nestor, were encountered and destroyed between the Fair Isle and the Orkney Isles, on April 6th. Since this was an area used by warships routinely, it may have been that these boats might have been given permission to fish there. Unusually, a drifter, Heather, was sunk off the Bishop Rock, in the Scilly Isles, on the 24th, by UC47. However, only three smacks were done away with by submarines of the Marinekorps Flandern that month.

The losses almost halved to 19 in May, due to an operational pause, as the U-boats required maintenance and their crews needed rest. Five of the fishing craft lost were steam trawlers, one motor fishing vessel, as well as two drifters. The skipper and engineer of one trawler, Kitty, were taken as Prisoners of War. Two of the trawlers, Sisapon and Olearia, were far to the north of the U.K. on the Faroe Banks, in the midst of a Danish fleet, when set upon by UC33 on the 23rd. Numerous Danes’ boats were also despatched to the bottom. The majority were smacks though and of these, seven were sunk by UC75, east of the Fastnet Rock, during the evening of the 3rd.

June’s submarine sinkings were up again slightly: totalling 21. Two ocean-going boats, U57 and U96, were well to the west of the Orkney Isles early in the month, but only managed to take three trawlers, Teal, Shamrock and St. Bernard between them. It would appear that the fishermen had either disregarded the Admiralty’s declared prohibited areas, or had been given permission to fish there. The majority of the losses were through the actions of one boat, U63, under the command of Oberleutnant Karsten von Heydebreck, working his way down the English coast. The tiny motor-driven Frigate Bird was destroyed by gunfire off Flamborough Head, Yorkshire, on the 26th, with five deaths. Presumably, this was her entire crew, as the circumstances are not shown in the British official losses. Two days later, only ten miles off Spurn Head, in the Humber area, three more motor fishing vessels and three steam trawlers were sunk, with a smack also apparently damaged. Also, of the six sailing smacks sunk, four were accounted for by Oberleutnant zur See Claus Lafrenz, commanding UB18, off Start Point, in Devon. And, this was the last month when any Prisoners of War were taken. On the 3rd the trawler Virgilia that was off Girdleness, Aberdeenshire, was captured and sunk, with her skipper taken to the Fatherland.

Excluding one serious incident, July’s losses comprised of four trawlers with one man killed; three smacks by surface action and another mined, with five more killed that were attributed to UC4. On the 10th a number of trawlers well seaward of the Faeroes (the locations differ significantly in British and German accounts) were set upon by U53, commanded by Kapitänleutnant Hans Rose. As stated in the German official history this occurred west of the Shetland Isles, with the (defensively) armed Pretoria and Stoic putting up resistance. Still, this must have been rather pointless as U53 was a very large cruiser-boat, armed with weapons including two 8.8 c.m. guns. The Pretoria and Stoic dealt with, so too were the rest named Cedric, Mabel, Pacific, Peridot, Romantic and Sea King.

Tailing off dramatically, in August there were only six fishing craft lost. But, the death toll was comparatively higher. The Young Bert, a trawler (described as a smack in the official British losses) was stopped and sunk by U63 on the 2nd. The German official history indicates that there were deaths, but gave no details. All that is known is that all five of her crew were never seen again. Later, on the 17th, a smack (or ketch) named Susie was sunk by gunfire off Scarborough, Yorkshire, by UC16. Unexplained in the German official history, her second-hand was killed. And, off St. Abbs Head, Berwickshire, the Jane S, a diminutive motor fishing vessel, was blown up by a mine attributed to UC42 – killing all five onboard.

Of the seven fishing vessels lost in September, the only deaths were the five crew of the motor fishing vessel Margaret. She hit a mine near Wick, Caithness, on the 5th.

Although only five craft were destroyed in October, nineteen fishermen were killed. On England’s east coast, on the 2nd, a smack named Willing Boys was blown up by a mine ten miles Northwest of Smith’s Knoll: with all five onboard killed. This was attributed by the Germans as having been laid by UC14 on September 7th. Also, the Reliance, a drifter with ten onboard, was presumed by the British to have been mined near Smith’s Knoll, on or about October 7th. Similarly, the Germans were not absolutely sure, but reckoned that this had been down to a mine in Stanford Channel, off Lowestoft, laid by this same UC-boat, whose command had been turned over to Oberleutnant zur See der Reserve Adolf Feddersen recently. (In all likelihood, UC14 had already been lost with all hands, on October 3rd: within a short reach of the safety of Zeebrugge. The charge that destroyed the German submarine may have been laid by British motor-launches in late September and her wreck shows that she had been blown in half.) The other killings occurred in the Bristol Channel, north of Lundy Island, on the 4th. Two smacks, Rupee and Young Clifford, were sunk by gunfire, with the resultant loss of life of four from the Rupee.

November was quiet in this respect, with a total of only three smacks captured and consigned to the deep. Two of these, Courage and Gazelle, were near the Lundy Lighthouse on November 30th and one more smack in the vicinity, Lustre, was also damaged by gunfire.

Two trawlers were lost on December 12th. The John M. Smart, seemingly in company with at least four others ten miles east of the Tyne, was shelled by one, or more, German destroyers of the 4 Torpedoboots-Halbflotille: with four fishermen killed. This was a tiny element of a complex Hochseeflotte operation to intercept convoys along the Scandinavian route. In the dark these fishing vessels were misidentified as convoy escorts. Meanwhile, the Amadavat was mined east of the Shetlands by U71 – with all nine onboard killed. There were also three smacks hit that month, all far apart. Two were captured and sunk by UB-boats, but one, Neptune and her four crew fell victim to a mine off Black Head, Galway Bay, on the 17th. According to the German official history, this was part of a barrage laid by U80 seven months before.

1918

It has not been discovered how often fishermen were disciplined for working in prohibited areas, but there are cases within the surviving records of the office of the Commander-in-Chief Plymouth, Admiral the Honourable Sir Alexander Edward Bethell K.C.B. K.C.M.G. R.N., for the spring to autumn of this year. There was one particularly serious case, relating to 29 Brixham fishermen that were taken to court. The evidence shows considerable resentment from these fishermen and a ‘system’ that was both confusing and utterly shambolic. Convicted, the admiral’s office was not satisfied and applied to the Admiralty for a lawyer to fight an appeal.

At the time of writing, it has not been possible to ascertain why the numbers of commercial trawler sinkings declined markedly towards the end of the war. It may have been that arming them acted as a deterrent, or German submarine commanders were keener on sinking larger targets. Of course, it might have been down merely to most of them being requisitioned for naval service. Further study of German sources might provide some insights into this.

In January ten fishing vessels were lost. Only in the case of the drifter, Premier that was shelled by U91 west of Loch Eynort, Skye, was there a fatality. The rest were smacks destroyed in Devonian waters by UB and UC boats of the Marinekorps Flandern and one of the Hochseeflotte’s ocean-going boats. This last mentioned one, U93, sank the Veda 30 miles seaward of the Eddystone Lighthouse, on the 2nd. (Although U93 also sank a number of merchantmen until mid-month, she did not return from patrol and lies off the French coast at Hardelot.)

Two trawlers were mined off the east coast of England in February: with nine killed on the Stratcom. However, both incidents would seem to have been from drifting mines that could have been British, or, German. A drifter, Reaper, was also mined, by UC49, just north of Tynemouth - killing the eight fishermen onboard. And, a motor fishing vessel, Maggie Smith, disappeared with her three crew near Bell Rock, well east of the Firth of Tay. She was presumed to have detonated a mine: possibly also laid by UC49. Elsewhere, seven smacks were also destroyed, all but one in Devonian waters, by one boat: UB33.

On March 11th another trawler, W.A. Massey, was blown up by a mine, near Handa Island, in the Minch that killed ten. Since no German claims have been made about this sinking, it is likely that the mine had come adrift from a British minefield. Five motor fishing vessels were sunk in surface actions near the end of the month, all but one by UC64 within sight of Whitby, Yorkshire: but there was no loss of life. Four smacks were also hit, three by UC75, in the Irish Sea between the 9th and 11th. The fourth smack, Geraldine, as well as the motor fishing vessel St. Michan, were also destroyed in the Irish Sea, east of Lambay Island, County Dublin, on the 30th. They were shelled by U96, commanded by Kapitänleutnant Heinrich Jeß and with the Geraldine hit, none of her crew of five survived. An editorial in the shipping press, if accurate, shows that U96’s boarding party threatened the crew of the St. Michan with a pistol, stole equipment and money, before leaving hastily on the approach of a British sloop.

Unlike merchantmen that were still taking a heavy punishment, fishing craft losses in April were very light indeed. One smack, Ruth, was sunk near the South Cross Sand Buoy, Norfolk, by UB16, on the 13th. And, two trawlers, Tyne Wave and Peregrine that were twenty miles from the Ramna Stacks, Shetland, were also done away with by U19 ten days later.

More than half of May’s fishing-boat losses were in the Irish Sea, on a single day, over the horizon from the Isle of Man. UB64, commanded by Kapitänleutnant Otto von Schrader, sank two motor fishing vessels and seven smacks on the 30th. On the Atlantic side of Ireland, another smack, Pretty Polly, was for some reason shelled off Roundstone Bay, County Galway on the 31st. U101, commanded by the now ennobled Kapitänleutnant Carl-Siegfried Ritter von Georg, was armed with an 8.8 c.m. gun, so it is hardly surprising that seven fishermen were killed in this assault. In spite of the Royal Navy’s Zeebrugge Raid and follow up operations to put the Marinekorps Flandern’s bases out of action, towards the end of May two motor fishing vessels and four smacks were also destroyed along England’s east coast between Yorkshire and Norfolk: by UB40 and UC70.

June’s toll was down again. Two trawlers are known definitely to have been mined. One, Eros, was off the Firth of Forth, on the 8th when she found a barrage, newly laid by UC40 – resulting in six deaths. The other was the Pochard that was 40 miles seaward of the Humber’s Spurn Point Lightvessel on the 28th, when she too ran into another barrage: just laid by UC58. Three smacks off the Smith’s Knoll were also sunk by surface action, by UB40, on the 6th.

Another trawler, named Egret, was also lost, on June 1st, off the Humber. It is stated in the official British losses that she was torpedoed, with 11 killed and their names are shown on the Tower Hill memorial. At the time of writing, it has not even been possible to confirm the identity of this vessel though, or even if she was in commercial, or naval, service. No claim has been made for any German submarine to have conducted such an attack either. While it was not entirely unknown for torpedo attacks to have been made on trawlers, these were very unusual and bearing in mind where this incident occurred, it is more likely that this unfortunate boat hit a mine.

The only submarine that attacked fishing craft in July was UB40, under the command of Oberleutnant zur See Hans Joachim Emsmann. Off the Humber, on the 7th, he and his crew sank two motor fishing vessels and damaged a trawler, Leeds, killing two. On this boat’s next patrol, off the Norfolk coast, ten smacks were destroyed between the 26th and 28th. Three were killed on the first despatched – the Boy Jack. (Emsmann, with a new command, UB116, entered the Admiralty anchorages in Hoxa Sound, Scapa Flow, on October 28th. Picked up by the hydrophone system, this boat was destroyed, with all hands, by the detonation of a controlled minefield.)

No losses of British fishing craft in British and Irish waters were recorded for August, but there was one off Nova Scotia. A sailing fishing vessel named Nelson A was captured and scuttled by the cruiser U156, commanded by Kapitänleutnant Richard Feldt, on the 4th. This had followed mining in U.S. waters, but Feldt was not finished and among international fleets, sank ten Canadian-registered sailing fishing craft between the 20th and 26th. This included one named the Triumph that had been captured on the 20th and used as a ‘raider’: seemingly for five days. Also, towards the end of a long patrol in American and Canadian seaways, the ocean-going minelayer U117 sank two more Canadian sailing fishing vessels on the 30th. They were almost 300 miles off Newfoundland.

On September 22nd a trawler named Euthamia was mined 65 miles seaward of the Humber Lightvessel. And, the last wartime marine casualty is shown in the official British losses as the smack Conster that was mined off Rye, Kent on November 7th. Neither were claimed as German ‘victories’ and no deaths were recorded.

The final physical toll to the active commercial fishing sector in hulls destroyed and men killed from the Great War is, generally, easier to determine than for the Mercantile Marine: if only because of the smaller scale. Excepting undetected errors and omissions, the loss of vessels through all causes can be counted in the British official published listings and totalled around 670. Broken down, there were 374 steam-trawlers (that included 2 drifters), 39 motor fishing vessels and 257 smacks and other sailing vessels engaged in fishing. (If totalled from German official histories, the figures would be different, especially in their designations of vessel types.) Comparing the fatalities in these same British official losses with the rolls compiled by the Imperial War Graves Commission, 52 skippers and 365 other fishermen were killed. The minute sheet mentioned elsewhere and attached to a copy of the roll for the I.W.G.C.’s Tower Hill memorial gives completely different figures though. This states the dead at 165 skippers and 1,191 other fishermen. Presumably, this also accounted for those in naval service. Similarly to the Mercantile Marine, there are no figures for those injured, maimed and made ill, physically and mentally.

Unfortunately, this was not end of the destruction from mines either, as a list compiled by Lloyd’s of London attests to. Although there were relatively few of these marine casualties that were British, the majority were of fishing craft.

Post War...

It took time for the fishing industry to get back to normal once again. It is not clear when the demobilisation of the many hundreds of surviving fishing craft in naval service began in earnest. However, according to various Admiralty orders that were printed as a body in March 1919, trawlers and drifters were to be released as rapidly as possible, except for some minesweepers that were required to assist the Admiralty wartime-built craft in clearing up the almighty mess left by minefields and other underwater obstructions. It can be seen from one collection of returns this was largely complete by the end of 1920 though. Chief skippers and skippers R.N.R were not, however, to be allowed to return to civilian life immediately.

There were upsides for the fishing industries post war, even if they were short-term. Pre-war fish stocks, especially in the North Sea, had been reducing long term – due to continual over fishing. Largely left alone during the war years, the fish stocks recovered. Unfortunately, following an eighteen-month boom, both fish and prices declined once more. This meant that apart from unemployment for some, the steam trawlers had to venture ever further into northern waters, in competition with Scandinavian fishermen...

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