The Merchant Mariners’ War

 

 

1914

 

     The high drama of the murder of the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand and his wife Sophie on 28th June 1914 in Sarajevo had faded over the weeks that followed in that hot summer. However, machinations behind the scenes led to political and martial meltdowns and war between the Central Powers and Russia in late July. This had repercussions, leading to France supporting Russia. Fulfilling 19th-century treaty obligations, Great Britain’s government issued an ultimatum to Germany to withdraw its troops from neutral Belgium on August 4th and receiving no response in the required time-frame, entered the war with Germany that midnight.

     British merchant vessels in German waters began to be detained in the last few days leading to war, but their crews were allowed, at first, to remain onboard. This situation continued for a few months, except primarily for those in Hamburg that having insulted passing German patrols, were dumped onto hulks – as punishment. In early November 1914 the majority of the interned mariners in Germany, including those that had been captured at sea subsequently, were sent to Ruhleben, on the edge of Berlin. In peacetime it was a racing-course, but had been converted into an internment camp, or Kriegsgefangenenlager, containing a wide variety of civilian unfortunates. Around half of the interned population were merchant mariners and fishermen. Far from comfortable, the majority had to sleep in stables and haylofts that had little light. At first the food had been foul, but after a mutiny, the contractor that was regarded as corrupt, was replaced and the diet improved somewhat. Even so, it still included the infamous ersatz Kriegsbrot (war bread) and it was only canteen-bought items that made the diet at all palatable. And, in the cold, the original stoves were ‘primitive’, causing complaints. Identically to many others interned (in both world wars), they had to create new societies, while they waited. Some men adapted better than others and for those struggling, over time they received limited funds from the profits made by the camp-run enterprises. But, by the end of the year as well as numerous other business opportunities that had arisen for those with particular skills (and outside contacts), cultural, sporting and educational activities had also begun.

     In the early months German cruisers and armed merchant cruisers in the Indian, Pacific and Atlantic Oceans had captured and sunk a considerable number of Allied merchantmen. Operating under Prize Law that while differing from one country to another, meant that warships had the right of visitation – in other words, stopping merchantmen for investigation. In the event that enemy civilian vessels (or neutrals with majority enemy cargoes) could not be sent to a friendly port for prize court proceedings, they could be (and often were) sunk: while retaining the destroyed vessels’ papers for later presentation to a prize court. Unless armed resistance was encountered (per new German Prize Regulations issued on 3rd August 1914), captured enemy civilians (including passengers) were to be paroled and released. So, far from the Central Powers’ own territories, the captives were put onboard prizes (that is captured vessels) that had been kept in attendance: for holding temporarily. Also, sometimes, on encountering passenger liners, or where cargoes were owned largely by neutrals, they were released purely for practical considerations. Overwhelmingly, while in enemy hands for relatively short periods onboard prizes, these civilians were, indeed, released: even if many experienced privations. (Of course, military and naval reservists would be treated as Prisoners of War, as could those on vessels that had offered armed resistance.) Without secure bases to operate from it was only a matter of time before these German surface forces were dealt with by the Allied navies and consequently, the majority including the armoured-cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau that were under the command of Vizeadmiral Graf von Spee, were sunk during the Battle of the Falklands Isles in December 1914. Nevertheless, there were still a few remnants to be hunted down and dealt with.

     It was not just the Germans that had captured merchantmen – the British had arrested many dozens of German and Austro-Hungarian vessels alongside in British-controlled ports, in home waters and in the world’s seas and oceans. Having gone through prize courts, these vessels were then pressed into British service, requiring new crews. Some retained their old names, but others received new ones. Ex-German hulls could often be identified since their new names were prefixed ‘Hun’, while those that had been Austro-Hungarian often received the prefix ‘Pol’.

     In home waters there were also other threats to contend with though. Proactively, contact mines were laid periodically by German surface forces along England’s southeast coast from the first day of the war onwards. Reactively, to keep trade moving, the first elements of the War Channel that were ‘swept’ regularly by British naval craft were created. As of the autumn the British also began mining across the eastern end of the English Channel to the continental coast and generally, also on the East Coast, seaward of the War Channel. The former was to force merchant traffic into the Downs, in maintaining the (non-declared) blockade. The latter was to fill in the stretches between German minefields, to create a continuous barrier, so as to protect the War Channel from further German raids: such as at Yarmouth in November and along the Yorkshire Coast raid of December.

     In order to impede German naval forces, as early as September, all navigational aids along the East Coast of Scotland and England could be and often were, removed. Of course, this also made navigation for Allied and Neutral traffic equally hazardous. (Throughout the conflict, ships’ steaming lights were also ordered to be dimmed, or extinguished variously.)

     Even with precise navigation within the East Coast War Channel, vessels were not necessarily safe. Bad weather caused large numbers of mines to part from their cables or sinkers and float free. In spite of these engines-of-war, supposedly, disarming themselves in this condition, as experienced by numerous unfortunate merchantmen in the autumn and into winter, they remained lethal.

     Although even in peacetime a small minority of deep-ocean merchantmen could be on government contract for naval and military work as Mercantile Fleet Auxiliaries, hundreds were required in wartime. This had the effect of removing a significant proportion of Great Britain’s freight-shifting tonnage, large and small.

     Mercantile Fleet Auxiliaries were classed in two ways. There were those that were non-commissioned, known as transports that were on time-charter on government accounts. In support of naval operations primarily were colliers, tankers (termed oilers) and storeships. Overwhelmingly, military campaigns required troopships (troopers) for short, medium and long-haul voyages, ammunition ships, horse and mule transports, storeships, etc., etc. At this stage, the majority were required for the redistribution of troops worldwide and most importantly, the landing and constant re-supply of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium. In spite of not infrequent frustration from some naval and military officers that wished power over them, all these vessels’ crews remained subject to the usual civilian legislation of the Board of Trade – the Merchant Shipping Acts. It is worth pointing out that from the beginning pressure was put on masters to rid transports of foreigners: as potential security risks.

     Incidentally, as of 1915 transports also began to be used for the importation of foodstuffs deemed important enough. The first commodity was sugar, through the Royal Commission for Sugar Supplies, but in time, grain and meat would also come under government control. Of course, this was just one example of increasing tonnage removed from commercial work.

     M.F.A.s that were commissioned operated in a different manner, their owners having little to do with them while on government account and were, in fact, classed as naval auxiliaries – flying the white ensign. They took on roles such as armed merchant cruisers, hospital ships (for both the navy and army), fleet store ships and ammunition ships. Instead of commercial articles, the civilian officers and men of these ships signed ‘T’ forms (most commonly T.124), binding them to the Naval Discipline Act. Incidentally, these vessels should not be confused with Royal Fleet Auxiliaries that were once described as ‘a somewhat heterogenous collection acquired by the Admiralty for the attendance of the fleet in various capacities’.

     In early October, under a heavy escort, the first, gigantic troop-convoy of the Canadian Expeditionary Force sailed for southern England. Two U-boats were ordered to intercept it in the English Channel and one missed one of the dispersed elements narrowly. The following month one boat conducted a limited operation against warships and transports of the B.E.F. off La Havre. Two merchantmen were stopped on the surface and despatched – neither were transports though.

     Unlike in their normal operation, the majority of the transport-crews spent long periods stationary in anchorages, or alongside: without leave, as they were on immediate standby. Understandably, they became restless, but at least within a few months they began to receive £1 0s. 0d. per month additionally, as war risk pay. Understandably, other merchant mariners also realised there was risk to their lives and demanded war risk pay. Some employers gave in quietly, others did not and there were, certainly, strikes in Liverpool and Manchester.  By the end of the year government mediation had, essentially, resolved matters: even if not entirely and some mariners were short-changed of their extra £1 per month.

 

1915

 

     Even when merchant mariners got ashore, since most did not wear uniform, they could find themselves insulted for not being in one of the armed services. It was, naturally, not unknown for mariners to re-act with aggression. Not novel to the mercantile marine, as other groups, such as munition workers also experienced the same, requests for a physical sign of recognition of being on government service seem to have first been received at the Admiralty as of November 1914. Consequently, a war service badge was designed, manufactured and began to be issued during the spring of 1915 for at least some merchant mariners on government service.

     Although there had been general pay rates for merchant mariners in peacetime, especially through trade union pressure, these had not been standard. This was often down to different rates paid locally. War, of course, brought great instability and by 1915 there were already growing differences. These developed through commercial employers paying higher rates for hands, even if only through union pressure sometimes and the state refusing to raise their rates of pay for those on M.F.A.s. In January the unions called for increased rates of war-risk pay, with Admiralty agreement as long as the mariners were bound under naval discipline. Understandably, this was rejected. Over time, schemes from middle-ranking naval officers and civil servants were submitted, resulting in meetings with ship-managers and union officials. The general state line was to bring non-commissioned M.F.A.s under naval discipline for any monetary increases however convoluted and also to have mariners sign on for extended periods of time for anything up to the end of hostilities. Unsurprisingly, at first these were resisted by the unions. In June, threats were then made to bring transports within the Munitions Bill (enacted in early July) – but were seen off by both unions and ship-managers. Even although some non-commissioned M.F.A.s were made subject to the Naval Discipline Act, a revised scheme was, eventually, agreed by the unions in October: to begin in Rosyth, before expansion. Under T.358 forms, mariners would agree to sign onto non-commissioned M.F.A.s for the duration of the war, but would not be subjected to the Naval Discipline Act. Administratively, it all remained a mess, as this complicated the pay rate situation even more.

 

     Being insulted in the street and differences in pay were the least of merchant mariners’ problems though, as the war expanded greatly during this year. Prior to August 1914, the Kaiserliche Marine’s submarines had only ever operated in coastal waters. However, the war meant that those of the Hochseeflotte (High Sea Fleet) could proceed into the North Sea from their scattered bases in Germany’s northwest and for the larger, more-capable, ocean-going boats, further around the British Isles. Despite a handful of successes, especially in the spectacular sinking of H.M. armoured-cruisers Aboukir, Hogue and Cressy, by U9, on the ‘Broad Fourteens’ in September, frustration set in because the German submariners were unable to bring the Grand Fleet to battle. (Unknown in Berlin, U15 found the cruiser screen ahead of the Grand Fleet, on August 9th and was rammed fatally by the 2nd-class cruiser Birmingham.) Two incidents occurred, where individual submarine commanders acted against British commercial merchantmen on their own initiative though. In October, a small steamer named the Glitra was held up off the Norwegian coast by U17 on the surface. After her papers had been examined, her crew was ordered to abandon ship and she was scuttled. Less serious, in the southern North Sea in December a German submarine chased the Colchester that was one of the Great Eastern Railway Company’s continental ferries. Otherwise, British shipping remained unmolested. This situation led to successful lobbying by some officers for guerre de course (trade war) using submarines, or in German as Handelskrieg mit U-booten. 

     It was thought by the German naval planners that Great Britain would be forced into surrender rapidly: without a traditional long, drawn-out blockade. Per the advocates’ inherently-flawed thinking, not only would neutrals choose to cease trading with the British if threatened, after a handful of British merchantmen had been sunk, Britons would also refuse to go to sea.

     On 4th February 1915 the German Imperial Government announced that a ‘War Zone’ was to be imposed all around the British Isles and Ireland a mere fourteen-days later. All Allied vessels were to be destroyed within this zone, with no guarantee of the safety for crews and passengers. Due to a recent incident when the Cunard passenger liner Lusitania had been seen to have flown the ‘stars and stripes’ rather than the red ensign, the Germans warned that neutral shipping exposed itself to potential attack. Highly belligerent, or not, the Kaiserliche Marine simply did not have enough boats to carry out this threatened maritime mass destruction.

     Of importance, the submarine commanders’ operational orders left them initiative, so as individuals, they developed their own personal tactics. A fair percentage of commanders spared life as far as possible. If conditions allowed, they approached on the surface (out of sight of naval craft that could not be everywhere, even in coastal waters), with the civilian vessels’ crews and passengers given enough time to abandon ship using their own boats. Additional aid, was also sometimes given, such as in towing the boats nearer to the coast. Other commanders were not necessarily so humane. (In time, a small percentage could most definitely be identified with sociopathic tendencies though.) It was during this first campaign that the momentous torpedoing, without warning, of Cunard’s liner Lusitania occurred on May 7th. It was carried out by Kapitänleutnant Walter Schwieger in command of U20. This resulted in the death of 1,198 souls and caused a diplomatic incident with the United States of America’s Government. International condemnation did not lessen attacks on all sorts of vessels, from tiny fishing-craft up to tankers and large passenger-liners though.  Ultimately, however, it was not until after the torpedoing of the White Star Line’s Arabic in August, by Kapitänleutnant Rudolf Schneider commanding U24 that this intentionally terroristic campaign came to an end: in mid-September. Even then, this was not directly down to U.S. diplomatic pressure that was less than effective. Instead, it was only because the senior leadership of the Kaiserliche Marine, particularly Großadmiral von Tirpitz and Vizeadmiral Bachmann, refused to adopt restrictions in destroying large liners that might, or might not, have had American passengers onboard. But, lobbying for a recommencement of unrestricted trade war began in the corridors of power in Berlin soon after.    

     While a small percentage of U-boat commanders might be regarded as having been sociopaths, there were potential reasons for the torpedoing merchantmen without warning. Apart from irresponsible editorials in the British press, the British Admiralty had also issued confidential ‘Instructions for guidance of Masters’ in mid-February 1915 that if ‘a submarine comes up close ahead of a steamer, the latter is advised to steer straight for the submarine “so as to oblige her to dive”, and then make off at full speed keeping the submarine astern...’. (The latter statement was important, as the general tenor of the instructions was for merchantmen to run, thereby evading capture.) Also, although disingenuous, as it had been public knowledge, a small percentage of liners had recently been capable of being armed against A.M.C.s, (almost 30 in January 1914) but the Germans made much of this, overstating a potential threat to their submarines at that time. In reality, there were comparatively few defensively-armed merchantmen in home waters at any one time during this 1915 campaign: even if the total numbers were increasing month by month. Certainly, by the aftermath of the Lusitania sinking the Kaiserliche Marine’s leadership referred to British merchantmen as dangerous from ramming and also regarded defensively-armed merchantmen as warships – making the latter legitimate targets for sinking without warning. Incidentally, officially designated as special service vessels, a few decoy, or ‘Q’ ships, had been commissioned in late 1914 for service in the English Channel: but paid off within weeks. Nevertheless, various local area commanders commissioned more as of February 1915. These were armed vessels of various types, disguised as ‘innocent’ merchantmen and fishing craft. Some were heavily armed, but others, especially the fishing craft, were less so. But, after the initial shock of encountering these, many, if not all, U-boat commanders learned how to identify the decoy vessels and avoid them.

     There were also occasional attacks on merchantmen by aircraft. During March there were a number of these reported, but there had already been limited attacks on February 26th. All these were in the southern North Sea, by fixed-wing machines described as ‘Taubes’ in pieces in the shipping press. (German sources indicate that these aircraft were probably mostly Friedrichshafen FF.29 floatplanes, based in Flanders.) Almost entirely ineffective, light air attacks continued off and on for the rest of the year and occasionally later.

     In bids to make themselves less recognisable, apart from darkening ship at night, British vessels were known to have painted out their names, funnels, or even hulls and upperworks in dark colours. On the other hand, neutrals tended to make sure that their nationalities were very noticeable, by painting their hulls with their national flags, or colours. Some British vessels also used the latter, as a ruse de guerre, but were discouraged by the Admiralty. (Defensively-armed merchantmen were forbidden expressly to take on the appearance of neutrals.) However, this was only to contain resentment from neutrals.

     As an aside, in 1914 two countries had declared that defensively-armed merchantmen were to be treated as warships. These were the United States of America and the Netherlands. This created all sorts of problems, especially as of February 1915.

     Calling off this unrestricted submarine campaign did not mean the end of sinkings of civilian vessels in British home waters by any means. Two types of tiny coastal-submarines had also been developed by the Germans and in late March 1915 the first flotilla of the Marinekorps Flandern, based at Zeebrugge and Ostend on the Belgian coast, came into existence and became operational soon after. UB-boats were armed with torpedoes, becoming operational within weeks and UC-boats were minelayers that began to arrive as of early summer. At first, they worked in and around the Downs, off Kent and on gaining experience, as far as their limited range would allow northwards up the English east coast in the approaches to the River Thames and as far as Great Yarmouth, as well as along the French coast towards the B.E.F. supply lines. The UC-boats’ mines were laid at night, a highly hazardous activity that continued after the end of the first period of Handelskrieg mit U-booten. The UB-boats, when not acting as coastal defence, were tasked with attacking warships and transports. Also, separately, for a less than convincing reason, there was one submarine operation specifically against merchantmen in British waters that was carried out by the Hochseeflotte boats in early December 1915. And, incidentally, there had also been an operation earlier, in August, off Norway, in an attempt to interdict transports on their way to Archangel with war materials.

     Another major German submarine campaign had also begun in the Mediterranean and adjacent seas as well. In all likelihood, this would have occurred anyway, as a shift of Handelskrieg there was argued for (on a temporary basis) when the Kaiserliche Marine’s admirals were being criticised for their junior commanders’ behaviour at sea around the British Isles in the summer. 

    However, the original German submarine operations in the Med were aimed at the Allied forces that were, obviously, forming up for the April 25th landings on the Ottoman Gallipoli Peninsula.  One ocean-going boat, U21, was sent, arriving initially at the Austro-Hungarian base at Cattaro in mid-May and then Constantinople in early June. Also, four UB and four UC-boats that were constructed in sections, were despatched to the main Austro-Hungarian base at Pola, by rail. Assembled, they were then towed to the Straits of Otranto by an Austrian cruiser and they then made the 800-mile voyage to Ottoman bases at Budrum, Orak and Smyrna, on their own. One UB-boat failed to arrive in theatre.

      It is worth pointing out that many of the transports that were involved in the April Gallipoli landings were shelled heavily, as they lay offshore in formation. In the days following, conferences were held and plans changed, so that the transports were withdrawn to what had become a major British anchorage at Mudros, on the Greek island of Lemnos sixty-miles to the west. However, if absolutely necessary, supply ships would proceed further and anchor off Cape Helles, or within Kephalo, constructed as a defended port.

     Throughout the summer and into autumn the Germans reinforced their submarine forces in the Mediterranean theatre: based on Cattaro. While on passage they destroyed and sank vessels they came upon. U21 having returned to Cattaro for a refit, damaged, the next four ocean-going boats of the latest operational generation, were tasked with attacking warships and transports on the Allied line of communications through the Med to the Aegean and Gallipoli. This assault intensified from October onwards: although they were not always successful by any means, as merchantmen defended themselves as per Admiralty advice. The UB-boats that were based in Constantinople, operated in both the North Aegean and Black Seas: sinking their targets by torpedo while dived. At this stage the UC-boats were used mostly on logistical tasks.

     Not all of the vessels described as transports in the relevant German official history (Der Krieg zur See 1914-1918: Der Handelskrieg mit U-booten) were actually on government service, whether they were on, or near, the routes that transports were using – or not. In fact, it would have been difficult differentiating them anyway, due to another practice ordered by the Admiralty in London. Early on, instructions had been issued for all types of transports to cease flying the blue ensign and instead, use the red ensign of the commercial fleet. Of course, this assumed that vessels flew their ensigns at sea out of sight of land: as, often, they did not.

    There were, however, two ways that German submarine commanders might have been able to identify transports in the British areas of responsibility (by June 1915) around Gibraltar, Malta, Suez and the northern half of the Aegean. Although the convoying of commercial tonnage had been ruled out by the Admiralty pre-war, when possible, vessels on government service were to be escorted by warships. Unfortunately, due to severe shortages, escorts were only then employed at ‘dangerous points’: even if a majority of transports in the Med had, apparently, been defensively-armed by November. As noted in German sources, there was also a third way of identifying British transports - they had tell-tale pendant-numbers painted on their hulls. Also, the French that had the responsibility for security in most of the Mediterranean theatre had been escorting their own transports: causing significant strains elsewhere, such as in leaving some transport routes entirely unpatrolled. A conference was held in November and December by the three Allied navies (British, French and Italian), with slightly different new patrol areas decided upon. Without substantial reinforcements of warships and crews for patrolling, as well as all sorts of other weaknesses remaining, it was all rather academic – except for the merchant mariners that bore the brunt of the German and Austro-Hungarian submarines’ attacks.

     None of this saved the P&O liner Persia that was sunk on December 30th south of Crete, by Kapitänleutnant Max Valentiner commanding U38. The German official history stated that she was one of two ‘armed British transports’ that were torpedoed without warning by this boat on this day. Over three-hundred and thirty passengers and crew were killed. The other ‘armed transport’ was the Clan MacFarlane, with over fifty mariners killed.

     It should be noted that the Austro-Hungarian Navy had few submarines, even if there was an appearance of more. While Italy had declared war on Austria-Hungary in May 1915, it was not until that August that war was also made on Germany. However, when it suited them German boats operating in the Med had been flying Austro-Hungarian ensigns during that summer.

     Courtesy of pre-war planning, from early on in the war merchant masters sailing on foreign voyages from the U.K. were to gain the latest Admiralty intelligence from the Board of Trade’s port authorities. Those returning to the U.K. were also to call on reporting officers in consular and diplomatic posts abroad for information including the latest on minefields. Possibly based on a model already in force in England’s Dover command, it was agreed during this conference that twice daily, Allied wireless stations around the Med would transmit the latest intelligence on the submarine threat. At least some of this would have come from enemy-reporting by Allied merchantmen themselves encountering U-boats.

     Little practical effort had been put in by the Allied navies in the defence of merchantmen engaged in commercial trade in the Med. So, it was hardly surprising that by end of this year, with losses, the relevant British ministries had received communications from shipping interests wishing to divert their tonnage via the Cape of Good Hope and South Atlantic. This was frowned upon by the Admiralty, on logistical and other grounds, but in early 1916 some diversions were agreed on.

     Returning to German naval perspectives, ‘special orders’ had been issued by Admiral von Holtzendorff soon after becoming the chief of the German Naval War Staff in September 1915 – due to Bachmann’s refusal to back down over the sinking of passenger liners unconditionally. Notwithstanding that no ‘war zone’ had been declared for the Med, permission had been given to submarine commanders that targets that appeared to be transports ‘might be attacked without warning as if they were fighting ships’. A further order was issued by this staff in early December that all Allied merchantmen in the Med that were armed, except passenger liners, could be sunk without warning. Caution was urged, in order not to destroy neutral shipping though – as compensation would have to be paid. As in the northern European waters, submarine commanders developed their tactics as their characters dictated.

     Even although the highest British priority in arming merchant vessels was in some, but not all transports, a scheme for the commercial liner services transiting the Mediterranean seems to have been devised in March 1915. Since suitable guns (primarily 4.7-inch for these vessels) were in short supply, if possible, mounts were to be fitted at ports at either end of these runs: in the U.K. and Far East. On entering the Med at Gibraltar or Port Said, the guns themselves would be fitted and then removed on exit.

     Complicating matters further, even before the humiliating retreat from Gallipoli had been agreed, a new Allied campaign in the Eastern Balkans, in belated support of Serbia, had already begun. Troops were landed in Salonica in October, requiring yet more tonnage not only in the original operation of dubious worth, but also in ongoing re-supply, along an even longer line of communication.

     Even if not known of at the time by the public in the United Kingdom, as it was kept quiet deliberately, among various anti-neutral activities in the United States, there had been an attempted German sabotage campaign to destroy Allied merchantmen with planted incendiary devices. Begun in the spring, they were supposed to detonate after the vessels had sailed from U.S. ports. Thankfully, the designs were poor and only one generation worked at all well. Instead of ‘munition’ ships disappearing at sea, most of the incendiaries were found and dealt with safely. But, a number of vessels that were, generally, loading sugar, suffered cargo fires while still alongside in New York: as the incendiaries detonated prematurely. (This subject has been researched deeply as part of an as-yet unpublished biography of Franz Rintelen. Contrary to later claims Rintelen had only been on the periphery of this campaign.)

     Meanwhile, the civilian Prisoners of War in Ruhleben had been joined by more mariners. Some were those that had been incarcerated at the beginning of hostilities elsewhere, especially in East Prussia. Others had been captured during U-boat attacks and despatched to Germany: but not necessarily this camp near Berlin. After negotiation, repatriation for those that were unfit for military service began to be carried out as of that autumn. There had also been some improvements in living conditions, largely down to the internees themselves. On the Germans’ part steam-pipes had replaced the stoves and so, at least the heating was better that winter. As the year wore on the prices in the canteen rose, as, indeed, they were outside the camp – due to a contraction in agriculture largely through state incompetence. By then the camp authorities had banned private business and so, it was the prisoners’ Finance Committee that controlled the canteen profits – trying to keep the prices for the foodstuffs down.

 

1916

    

    The enactment of the Military Service Acts (1 and 2) in January and May might have had serious consequences for merchant mariners of military age. They (stated as ‘Officers and seamen’ including wireless operators in a published list in July) were exempt though, with the exception of stewards on passenger liners. Of course, there were also those that had already succumbed to pressure in 1915 and had already signed onto the Derby Scheme: making them subject to being called to the Colours as and when the military authorities wished. A later list, in November, cleared up the earlier vague reference to stewards, but also added clerks, writers and typists assisting pursers that also became liable to conscription. (Yet more ratings were added in February 1917, but it is arguable that liners had few bandsmen and such like left by then.) So, it would seem that the rest were relatively safe from prosecution and conscription into the army, as long as they continued signing ships’ articles. Certificates of exemption, described as ‘absolute, conditional, or temporary’, issued by a ‘Government Department’ were required.

     One piece in the Syren and Shipping Illustrated of mid-February had opined anonymously on the then availability of hands for merchantmen. In contradiction to the general tone in the press, it began bemoaning the lack of ‘Teutonic supply’ and mentioned the gap caused by those serving in the naval reserves. Continuing, it claimed that ‘a large proportion of British seamen serving in the Mercantile Marine’ were ill-disciplined troublemakers, before launching into a tirade against Distressed British Seamen returning from abroad. Nevertheless, shortages had been made up, as far as possible, with ‘alien seamen of non-enemy nationality’ – particularly Russians. While reactionary (but similar to the stated opinions of numerous senior naval officers), this can be seen in the context of the long-term and increasing use of non-British mariners: particularly those African, Afro-Caribbean and Asian.

     Through the efforts of naval officers in Portsmouth, an Admiralty Weekly Order issued in August 1916 announced that it had been ‘decided to standardise the rates of pay of Mercantile Marine Ratings employed in Commissioned Fleet Auxiliaries’. Separately, it was stated that merchant officers on these vessels were also to be treated similarly.

     However, this order went much further. It was also stated that arrangements had ‘been made for the maintenance of a Reserve at the R.N. Barracks, Portsmouth, of the principal Ratings required to fill vacancies in Commissioned Fleet Auxiliaries’. According to this, such men would ‘be engaged from time to time as necessary by the Superintendents of Mercantile Marine and will be signed on the Agreement Form T.124X for the S.S. “Sunhill,” which will be regarded as the parent ship for Mercantile Ratings at Portsmouth...’. Although officers were not specifically mentioned in this edict, it would appear that some were appointed at least nominally to Sunhill  later in the war. This was the Mercantile Marine Reserve.

     There were, seemingly, also discussions within naval administrative circles on the possible conscription of British mercantile ratings held later in the year: with a suggestion of extending compulsion to seamen officers and engineers as well. This was to ensure the manning of commissioned M.F.A.s firstly and non-commissioned M.F.A.s secondly – with the less able remainder returned to the commercial sector. In order to keep costs down, it was hoped that pay rates for those conscripted could be reduced. It was admitted later that sufficient recruitment to the M.M.R. was failing, probably due to these same low pay rates, whereas this was not the case with the Rosyth scheme that paid better. In December, an Admiralty Manning Committee was set up.

 

     Anyway, elements of the German naval leadership from those at the ‘Front’ upwards to the Naval Staff, continued to advocate totally unrestricted Handelskrieg mit U-booten all throughout this year. Generally, the politicians and diplomats were against this action in case it would draw the United States into the war as an enemy, or at least, they urged caution, while the generals’ views altered depending on the military situation at any one time. So, the naval leadership (at all levels) used the then rules of engagement still allowed to carry on their war against merchant tonnage variously, while almost continually pushing at the extremities as much they thought that they could get away with. The result was a mass of changing orders to submarine commanders that had to implement them according to their judgement.

     One aspect in maximising their rules of engagement lay in the capture of classified British Admiralty instructions from two merchantmen in the autumn of 1915. These were printed accurately and promulgated to neutral governments (and domestic press) by the German government in early February 1916: causing acute embarrassment for the British government internationally. Saliently, these showed not only that merchant masters were instructed to handle their vessels, essentially, as warships, but also that naval personnel were to be drafted onto merchantmen to operate their guns. An Imperial order was issued to the Kaiserliche Marine’s submarine commands, effective on February 29th that armed merchantmen were to be treated as warships and ‘destroyed by every means’. Shortly after, Admiral von Holtzendorff issued a further order stating that passenger steamers were not to be sunk, ‘even when armed’.

    The result of these and similar orders were campaigns begun by the Hochseeflotte boats as of late February and the Marinekorps Flandern boats in mid-March. Even although they were encouraged to make torpedo attacks while dived, many commanders of the ocean-going boats chose to use their guns while surfaced and consequently, there were far more sinkings than there would have been if they had been limited to using torpedoes only. More susceptible to damage on the surface, the UB-boats tended to make torpedo attack at night. Predictably, among those sunk without warning were neutrals and the only vessels stopped on the surface and destroyed with explosives were small sailing craft.

     It was the torpedoing of a French passenger steamer named the Sussex, by UB29 commanded by Oberleutnant zur See Herbert Pustkuchen, on March 24th that proved highly detrimental to the German cause. Of the eighty people onboard that had been killed, or injured, there were Americans: causing a real warning to be issued by Washington on April 18th. This diplomatic note demanded the end of these tactics or the U.S. Government would ‘sever diplomatic relations with the Government of the German Empire’. So, on April 24th an order was issued by Holtzendorff that until further notice all submarines of the Hochseeflotte and Marinekorps Flandern were to ‘only to act against commerce in accordance with Prize Regulations’.

     Minelaying, however, was still to continue in northern waters unimpeded, aided by new generations of more powerful minelayers that began to be received from spring onwards. Through summer to autumn minefields were laid along Scotland’s east, north and west coast, as well as south of Ireland and further along England’s south and east coasts.

     Following the Sussex imbroglio, submarine commanders were ordered to concentrate on attacking warships, with virtually no success – for various reasons. Nevertheless, in accordance with their Prize Rules, there were abundant sinkings of merchantmen and fishing craft through to the autumn. As before, neutrals were also destroyed and a few torpedo attacks without warning were carried out.

     There were also tactical experiments by Hochseeflotte submarines in July that might have had implications for civilian shipping. One was of a two-tier barrier operation off the Norwegian coast, with five boats ten nautical miles apart in front, with three, faster boats twenty miles behind. Only one merchantman was located – by two boats.  U20 got a torpedo attack in before U69.  The Briton Aaro was sunk with three dead and the rest of her crew made Prisoners-of-War. In another operation, boats in a circle were deployed in the North Sea off the Firth of Forth initially, working slowly eastwards and westwards again. The idea was that there would be a higher chance of intercepting targets as they had to enter and leave the circle. And, if the boats could communicate with each other by wireless, more could join in attacks. Sinkings were, apparently, meagre and disappointing for the Germans. Instead of developing these tactics, thankfully for Allied and neutral mariners, they were discarded though.

     Also, due to the massive British offensive on the Somme, in late July a ‘demand’ was received by the Marinekorps Flandern to dislocate the seaborne line of communication across the English Channel. An experiment by one boat was made to see if this could be done under the present rules of engagement, but it proved tricky. Anyway, the Kaiser decided in mid-August that such operations were not worth the risk politically. So, these transports that were either fast and escorted by warships at night, or defensively-armed on this busy route, continued to be spared.

     The geographical scope for U-boat operations was further enlarged significantly that autumn – increasing worries for merchant mariners. Three ocean-going boats were despatched to the Barents Sea (although the Germans stated Arctic Ocean) to hit unescorted transports supporting the Russian war effort. Also, following the commercial submarine Deutschland’s famous voyage to the United States, U53 was specially fitted for the extreme range, with the partial intention of conducting attacks on merchantmen off Nantucket Island. The results of the latter could be regarded as mixed – especially politically.

     Re-drafted British Admiralty instructions to masters that were issued in autumn 1916 bore relatively little resemblance to those of February 1915, although the ‘advice’ to try and force U-boats deep temporarily if close to, or ahead, remained. While masters no doubt regarded some of these as unduly bureaucratic, or even downright patronising, there was genuinely useful information within them, covering numerous subjects. 

     An approach to the Kaiser by the leadership of Germany’s armed forces for the resumption of entirely unrestricted action against commerce, in early October, met with failure. Nevertheless, an interim campaign supposedly under Prize Rules, but more extreme than previously, began instead. Arctic operations were also to be continued, along with reinforcement for the Med.

   As well as there being an emphasis on Britain’s west coasts, the new ocean-going boats increased their operating areas once again – into the Bay of Biscay. There, after experimentation they used ‘captured steamers, cruiser fashion, as tenders for picking up the crews of merchant ships sunk’.

     In the meantime, the campaigns against Allied merchantmen in the Med continued. In early May an order was received from Berlin to limit underwater attacks to warships only and not to molest passenger ships at all. At this stage the ocean-going boats were concentrating on the Western Med. However, in mid-June armed-merchantmen could, once again, be attacked while dived, but only when guns had been ‘observed with absolute certainty’. Passenger steamers were still to be ‘spared in all circumstances’ except in the Aegean north of Crete, where ‘large enemy passenger steamers’ could be ‘attacked submerged, irrespective of armament because it may be assumed with certainty’ that they were transports. A month later, all transports in Aegean and on the routes to and from Malta could be sunk while dived.

     By this time the direct observation of merchantmen’s defensive armament had become problematical for U-boat officers. This was because by the spring of 1916 the British Admiralty had reversed its earlier policy completely. Although still fitted aft, instead of showing explicitly that merchantmen were armed, their guns were to be hidden as far as possible.

     In October, armed-merchantmen within the entire Med region and west of Gibraltar could be torpedoed without warning, but otherwise attacks were to be made in accordance with Prize Rules. Once again, passenger steamers were not to be attacked ‘in any circumstances anywhere’ even if they were armed. Also, in the east on the transport route, all Allied vessels ‘except hospital ships’ could be ‘attacked submerged’. And, although the likelihood was slim, care was to be taken with American vessels.

     Two ocean-going boats that were tasked for the Med as reinforcements, in November, were instructed to conduct an operation off the Canary Isles, on their way there. Thankfully, as merchant traffic that in normal times would have passed through these waters, did not any more.

    Incidentally, two of these boats, U32 and U63, tried to operate in cooperation in the western Med between late November and mid-December. This proved more bother than it was worth though. 

     Also, the small UB-boats that had gone to Pola in the spring and summer of 1916 were transferred to the Black Sea. There, they harried the Russians.

     Minelaying using the small UC-boats and new long-range U-minelayers had begun earlier in the year, in the western Med, off Italy, Sicily, Greece, in the eastern Med and also in the Aegean. It was one of the U-minelayers, U73 that sank H.M. Hospital Ship Britannic that November. Towards the end of the year and into the next, more minelayers were sent to the Med theatre

     Meanwhile, apart from those taken latterly by the raider Möwe that arrived back in Germany in early March, captured mariners, especially masters and fishermen, continued to trickle into Ruhleben and other camps throughout the year. The food situation in Germany had begun to deteriorate markedly and the failure of the autumn potato crop did not auger well. There was some welcome news though and even if never honoured completely, in late 1916 an agreement was formulated between the governments of Britain and Germany to have internees over forty-five released.  

 

1917

 

     The addendum to the Admiralty’s ‘War Instructions for British Merchant Ships’ for January of this year showed an intention of providing additional equipment for their own defence – portable smoke-producing apparatus. As of that February merchant mariners would need all the help that they could get.

     This had also coincided with the first successful shore training of the Mercantile Marine in gunnery, tactics and such like. Utilising Royal Naval Reserve officers already au fait with gunnery, they attended short-courses on Whale Island, the R.N.’s gunnery school at Portsmouth and qualified as instructors, were despatched to merchantmen. This particular scheme was discarded within months. However, it was the beginning of many courses for both mercantile officers and ratings: some of them at the wartime naval establishment in and around the impressive Crystal Palace, in south London.

     Also, in safe and presumably comfortable Whitehall offices, deliberations on merchant mariners continued unabated.  Increasingly, the character of those outwith direct government control was perceived as unacceptable. Regarded as ill-disciplined and drunken in port (as if everyone in uniform were paragons of virtue), compulsion was seen as the answer as far as those on the Admiralty committee were concerned. Elements of the interim Admiralty report in early April 1917 were utterly ludicrous. It began on the evils of drink, wishing complete prohibition. More importantly though, on one hand the War Office should be requested to release merchant mariners that were presently serving in the army, while on the other hand, those still in mercantile service should lose their exemption from conscription into the same army - unless they put themselves under the ‘Admiralty agreement’! It is worth pointing out that although acknowledged as too difficult to carry out at that time, conscription was the preferred model. Nevertheless, since the situation was so serious, white neutral mariners ‘mainly of Scandinavians and Greeks’ that had never actually been completely gotten rid of and ‘coloured’ mariners (‘consisting largely of Chinese’ with Lascars also mentioned elsewhere in this report) could be employed on non-commissioned M.F.A.s.  Bowing slightly to reality in regards to the personal freedoms that merchant mariners held dear, a milder form of the Naval Discipline Act was also required: particularly for the apprehension of deserters. Apparently, no action was taken on this and merchant mariners, aggrieved although they were by then, continued to sign articles and take the risks of serving at sea. And, it is just as well that they did...

 

     Due to substantially increased production and deployment of U-boats, mercantile losses, both of hulls and crews, had already been rising in 1916, but as stated in the appropriate German official history, as of February 1st ‘the final phase of the submarine war began, in which the submarines were given complete freedom of action to attack the merchant shipping serving the enemy’. This was not entirely true, as there were still some restrictions, but not so much that most merchant mariners and fishermen would have noticed. It can be seen in the submarine commanders’ operation orders that there were to be short periods of grace for hospital ships outside the English Channel and lower North Sea. However, as well as neutrals and unarmed Allied passenger steamers, for the first week or so in the War Zone even vessels of The Commission for Relief in Belgium were to be sunk without exception. This was to produce an initial terror, especially in the neutrals and it had the desired effect. Within weeks, a large percentage of neutral tonnage ceased sailing within the northern War Zone. Outside this zone, unarmed vessels were to be treated according to Prize Rules. Separately, the Mediterranean command was informed that most of this sea was to be ‘declared a restricted area in the same sense as the waters around England and France’. Although the United States Government had been informed on January 31st, the German Government did not announce this, publicly and in general terms, until the day the new unrestricted Handelskrieg campaign began.

     Incidentally, as of this year British merchant mariner Prisoners of War were treated by the Germans as combatants. So, even if they were suitable for repatriation over illness, injury or age, they were denied it. Officers were not being repatriated either, due to disagreement between the two warring countries’ governments.

      Within months there were some changes to what was already a larger War Zone than in 1915. As of February 1917, the North Sea that was split in two; went up and around the Shetland Isles; but missed out the Faeroe Islands; then went out into the Atlantic to the 20° Meridian; and curved back to northwest Portugal: encompassing all waters within. A new zone was declared in March for the Barents Sea. Others were slight amendments, such as one in order to aid Dutch shipping to travel coastwise. By then Dutch trade with Great Britain had ceased and this can be seen as a way of potentially increasing trade to and from German ports. This pronouncement was couched in terms of Germany being the defender of the neutrals’ rights! Incidentally, the vessels of the Commission for Relief in Belgium were also expected to use this Dutch coastwise route.

    Of note, hospital ships within the English Channel were to be given no quarter. However, they were not to be subject to this serious breach in international law if they operated away from a line west of the English Channel and north of another line in the North Sea. Numerous attacks on and sinkings of hospital ships within the English Channel followed.

        The loss of Allied and neutral tonnage that remained in the northern War Zone, as well as the death and injury, from February to April were utterly dreadful. The destruction lessened somewhat in May, largely due to an operational pause created by the requirement for equipment maintenance and rest for the submarine crews.

    Ashore in the U.K., there had already been changes in Britain’s executive authorities, due to the new Coalition Government formed in early December 1916. Sir Joseph Maclay, Bart. was appointed the Shipping Controller, initially of the Shipping Control Committee that added to, became the Ministry of Shipping the following spring. The staff of this new organisation was extremely important in the subsequent introduction of ocean convoys.  So too was Commander Reginald Guy Hannam Henderson R.N. that had been placed on temporary duty with the Naval War Staff and was effectively, the brain behind this scheme that saved Great Britain and Ireland from starvation and submission. The negative attitude fostered by the war staff that large convoys for commercial tonnage were too difficult to operate and bolstered by their ignorantly faulty analysis of data on shipping movements was rejected by Commander Henderson.

     Apart from past experience of their effectiveness as shown by Rear-Admiral Philip Howard Colomb R.N. in his 1891 work entitled Naval Warfare: Its ruling principles and practice historically treated, convoys had been operated routinely from the beginning of the war for some types of transports. Also, from mid-1916 there had also been schemes such as for the French coal trade that had, in effect, been convoys: referred to as ‘controlled sailings’. Another related to a route between Britain’s east coast and points north of the Shetland Isles, generally termed the ‘Scandinavian convoys’.

     By the time of Germany’s latest full-scale assault on Allied and Neutral shipping, the Admiralty had introduced a system of routing for inbound and outbound vessels on short-sea and ocean-going voyages. The aim of this scheme was to concentrate defensive forces into four cones that the shipping was routed through. Described as a ‘deathtrap’ in one non-naval departmental monograph, the only practical improvement was that the survivors from merchantmen sunk in these areas of concentration had a better chance of rescue by the patrol forces.

    Thankfully, on May 2nd the War Cabinet was told that there were to be two experimental homebound convoys – one from Gibraltar and the other from Newport News, in the United States. The former sailed from Gib on May 10th and arrived without having incurred any losses. The latter convoy from Hampton Roads, sailed on the 24th. Two of the vessels could not keep up: one was sunk, but the other managed to complete the voyage independently.

     Meanwhile, an Admiralty committee, headed by Commander Henderson was appointed on May 17th. Consequently, a detailed report was submitted to Their Lords of the Admiralty on June 6th and approved by the First Sea Lord, Admiral John Jellicoe R.N., eight days later: seemingly through gritted-teeth.

     This complete change forced on the naval establishment, of course, required significant organisation: both ashore and afloat. This, obviously, took time and effort to sort out.

     The Assistant Chief of Naval Staff, Rear-Admiral Alexander Duff R.N., was also the Sea Lord in charge of convoys. Few additional naval escorts were to be provided and these were not enough, so other options were also utilised through this officer.

     Scrolling back briefly to earlier in the year, otter mine protection gear that was a variation on the naval paravane, had begun to be fitted to merchantmen that initially, were on government service. Manufactured by Vickers Ltd., vessels needed to have draughts aft of twelve feet or over and were to be deployed at speeds less than eighteen knots. The first known German contact mine located by such gear, by a merchantman, occurred on May 30th. The Clewbay, a transport carrying ammunition was five miles seaward of the Royal Sovereign Lightvessel off Hastings, Kent. Having severed the mine’s tethering cable, it floated away and struck another transport following in her wake. In the Lisbon’s sinking, one mariner was killed. (This mine was part of two barrages laid by UC64 five days before.) None of any subsequent reports relating to this apparatus resulted in casualties, but post war claims of the effectiveness of it cannot be justified in fact. (It is known that there was resistance to the fitting of this gear by some ‘shipowners’ that resulted in it being made mandatory through the Defence of Realm Regulations in March 1918. As yet it has not been discovered whether many masters actually deployed otters though.)

     Returning to the war on a larger scale, the North Atlantic convoys proper began in July, from Hampton Roads New York and Sydney, Cape Breton, the ocean escort was to be a cruiser with the aim of seeing off any German raiders that had broken out from the Fatherland. Due to the United States’ entry into the war, cruisers and A.M.C.s from the R.N.’s North American and West Indies Squadron were used. In time destroyers of the United States Navy joined these ocean escorts. As a stopgap some fast cargo steamers were requisitioned, commissioned and armed with six-inch guns (while still also carrying out commercial trade). On reaching points of rendezvous outside the War Zone, the ocean escorts would then turn over the convoys to destroyer escorts for the run into coastal waters, where the merchantmen would then proceed as required: under the normal protection of the local flotillas. At first, the term ‘destroyer’ had been something of a misnomer though, since these escorts had almost entirely been made up of small patrol-craft. Pressure from the Ministry of Shipping that summer had wrung some destroyers, sloops and new ‘P’-boats out of naval commands though.

    Flying-boats and airships also patrolled coastal seaways, the English Channel and the Southwest Approaches: providing two differing forms of air cover. The former aircraft were offensive weapons, whereas the latter were purely defensive – but could still keep U-boats deep because of their presence. And, again using flying-boats centred on the Hinder Lightvessel, a ‘Spider Web’ patrol system had been developed offensively against U-boats in the southern North Sea.

    The homebound convoys from Gibraltar that also began running as of that July never had an ocean escort comprising a cruiser – in spite of being in the War Zone almost the entire time. Instead, armed-trawlers might occasionally be backed with a British destroyer or American gunboat, but usually only by a British Q-ship.

     In August, the first homebound convoys from the South Atlantic began. Vessels from the Far East, the Antipodes and Indian Ocean that had been routed via the Cape of Good Hope, as well as from South America had to congregate off Dakar, in French Senegal, for this service. As of late September, there were also South Atlantic homebound convoys from Sierra Leone.

     As might have been expected, when the Germans sent submarines northwards during the summer months, there had been heavy losses of the unescorted transports off Norway’s North Cape on the run to and from Imperial Russia. So, in September merchantmen outbound from the U.K. were instructed to proceed (presumably after dispersal from the Scandinavian convoys) to and along the Inner Leads (within Norwegian territorial waters), to be met by Auxiliary Patrol craft at Vardo, or Kirkenes. Once there, they would be convoyed to the Archangel Bar. The return legs were not dissimilar. However, as of October the routines were loosened somewhat, but after the loss of three merchantmen, convoys were reinstated.

     Practical handling lessons were learned, not just by the merchant masters, but also the naval administration. Consequently, many changes were made to allow for differing speeds and much else. It is worth noting that Allied and neutral vessels were also brought into the British convoy system – in order to support the international trade (outside the Baltic) that Germany was trying so hard to extinguish.

      Reference to the German official history on the operations of the Hochseeflotte submarines over the summer should be made. The convoys between the Shetland Isles and Norway that had been part of the ‘controlled sailings’, as well as shipping using the East Coast War Channel that was being escorted, reduced the scope for attacks. Accordingly, even ocean-going boats were tasked to operate in the upper Northern Sea in trying to stop this trade. Some boats, however, were still despatched to England’s South West Approaches and it was not until mid-July that the first homeward bound ocean convoy was found. By mid-September thirty convoys had, apparently, been located, with only eight successful attacks. Notably, within the submarine commanders’ patrol reports were reflections on the discipline, defensive tactics and better gunnery of the merchantmen, as well as improved performances of the escorts that made attacks considerably more difficult and hazardous. Counter-attacks using depth-charges were regarded as inevitable, although this was something of an exaggeration when considering the makeup of the escorts and how they were then fitted. (Although even patrol trawlers were being fitted with one depth-charge, these could be more of a hindrance than a help. But, sinkings of small-craft escorts by torpedo became relatively common.) And, damaged vessels had a better chance of reaching port, as the submarines were less able to finish them off.

     As an aside, although not mentioned in the official history, there were experiments by Hochseeflotte submarines in intercepting and decoding low-grade Allied wireless traffic at sea, to find targets.  The first, by U66, was conducted approximately 150 nautical miles west of Ireland during a patrol from May 23rd to June 16th. The processed decrypts were then relayed, seemingly as enemy reports, back to Germany and then broadcast to the boats at sea from there and Belgium. Four further boats acted similarly as seagoing interception stations through to early August. In spite of difficulties significant success was claimed. Nevertheless, it is interesting that this was dis-continued, said to have been due to resistance by the Admiralstab (Admiralty Staff) in that it refused to task boats in concentrations. It was noted in the German source for this information that Allied wireless traffic had also tailed-off dramatically. Of course, with the Royal Navy’s signals intelligence operation based on the Admiralty’s Room 40 by then efficient, it is likely that the re-transmitted reports were intercepted and suitable action taken – even if nothing is shown in the relevant daily diary of intercepts. And, N.I.D. analysis of U-boat operations for earlier in the year for U66 is fascinating. This detailed successful investigations off the North Channel seeking Allied merchant traffic routes. So, this alone would have made it sensible for the British to curtail wireless traffic.

     The idea of concentrating German submarines was, however, still seen as a way of countering Allied strength in convoys: especially within the Admiralstab. Although the original keen advocate of ‘group’ operations, Fregattenkapitän Hermann Bauer, had been replaced by Kapitän zur See Andreas Michelsen, with a new title, Befehlshaber der U-Boote (Commander of the submarines) in early June, orders were issued at least paying lip service to this concept: with more senior officers also backing it. However, ‘group’ operations were not really taken up, although several boats were deployed between the Shetland Isles and Bergen   occasionally – with disappointing results.  

     Meanwhile, life was becoming more difficult for the UB and UC boats of the Marinekorps Flandern. Overwhelmingly, attacks on the convoys proved unrealistic, but there were still many single targets left to find in coastal waters and the carnage continued.

     Returning south, another international naval conference was held on Corfu in April. In practical terms little, if anything, was attained in the defence of merchantmen in the Med though. (Separately, Japanese destroyer reinforcements began to arrive at Malta in April and proved to be skilled escorts.) According to a Ministry of Transport monograph, merchantmen were to then ‘make use of coastal patrol routes and neutral territorial waters as far as possible’. In areas where submarines were known to be operating, if possible, merchantmen were to ‘navigate only by night’ and if they had to use ‘open sea routes’ vessels were to be ‘escorted singly, or sometimes, in certain areas, in groups of two or three’ as far as local conditions would allow. Confusion and delays reigned supreme, since international cooperation was negligeable and would have been highly complex anyway – even if organised competently.

     Back in British waters, predictably, as losses of inbound ocean-going merchantmen lessened, the U-boats hit other tonnage in the cones – the outbound. So, as of late August, an outbound ocean convoy system began to be developed. Excepting those to Gib, ‘destroyer’ escorts took the merchantmen from their areas of concentration out to dispersal points outside the War Zone, where the merchantmen went on their way independently. While the risk on the open-oceans was not nil, due both to the new long-range U-boats and also occasional surface raiders, it was much reduced. On completion of these duties, the escorts then steamed to rendezvous with inbound ocean convoys. The wear and tear on escorts and their crews was heavy.

     It was not until July that there was any improvement in the Med. Vice-Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss R.N. was appointed Commander-in-Chief Malta, with responsibility for Allied anti-submarine operations and also the presidency of a newly-formed Commission de Malta. Wemyss was superseded by Vice-Admiral Hon. Sir Somerset Gough-Calthorpe R.N. soon after.

     Exploratory staff work for organising inter-Mediterranean convoys was conducted in London, but as with the Atlantic and Gib convoys, apart from similar R.N. attitudes and less information to hand, there were further difficulties: such as in the Italians refusing to pool escorts. Another snag was that transports, such as those supporting the Salonica, Sinai and Palestine military operations, continued to have priority over commercial traffic. In an atmosphere of political and naval non-cooperation, the first British inter-Med and through-Med convoys began in October. As usual, escorts might be more in name than anything else though. The latter convoys were important commercially, as the long-distance routing via the Cape was becoming problematical and the shorter and quicker voyages through the Med were wanted in powerful quarters.

     Following experiments in the summer and early autumn, dazzle-painting of larger merchantmen and transports began soon after. An interesting concept in producing confusion, this was, apparently, favoured in the Mercantile Marine, but less so by the naval establishment. While there is certainly evidence that it had the desired effect in some conditions, it does not appear that commanders of dived submarines attacking with torpedoes had all that many problems – since they assessed bridge heights and mastheads in taking periscope bearings of their targets.

     Operationally, during mid-autumn German submarines shifted generally into British coastal waters and the Irish Sea: attacking all sorts of vessel, mercantile, fishing and naval. However, in October the ocean-going submarines of the Hochseeflotte bound for Great Britain’s south western coasts via the north of Scotland had a hard time: giving some respite to merchant and other mariners in these areas. Having struggled through storms to get to their patrol areas, the weather was often too heavy to use torpedoes and on return the boats were damaged, their crews exhausted and little had been attained. So, in order to cut the winter transit times and maximise their time on patrol, a command decision by the head of the U-boat arm was taken on November 1st for these boats to make their transits, if possible, via the heavily defended Eastern English Channel. Also, although utilising small groups of submarines operating together was not agreed upon, joint attacks were to be encouraged if submarines happened on the same targets. There was also to be more operational oversight, in shore commands directing shifts in the boats’ patrol areas by wireless. Of course, with Room 40’s product and other intelligence from sightings, there was scope for warning British local area commanders of the German submarine movements.

    Conditions for those in the small UB and UC boats of the Marinekorps Flandern had become even worse. Apart from poor weather, one of the main reasons was in the new technically proficient mines and other obstructions that the British were using to improve their sea defences in the Eastern English Channel. While in these waters the boats were kept deep for long periods, due to Allied air patrols, thereby running down their batteries. Incidentally, according to interrogations of prisoners, this also caused health problems through the cold and intensely damp atmosphere. Once free of these, even the newer boats did not have the speed for effective attacks on convoys though and so few were successful. And, the older surviving boats were put on coastal defence patrols: with the only ‘victory’ for all their efforts being a forty-ton fishing boat. Of course, the German mines still had the potential for taking vessels of all kinds.

    Allied losses of merchantmen in the Med dropped dramatically in the last three months of the year. Four of the older ocean-going U-boats and two UB-boats were completely out of action, through poor maintenance at Pola and Cattaro. Of those still in a fit state to sail, the larger-boats operated in the ‘target rich’ western Med and also west of Gib (outside the War Zone); while the smaller UB and UC boats were in the central and eastern Med.

     On November 22nd the German Government expanded the northern War Zone considerably westwards of the British Isles from the 20° to 30° West Meridians. There was also a new, large War Zone around the Azores that still left a sort of ocean-channel that technically, should have been safe. Since Greece had come into the war on the Allied side earlier in the year, a neutral channel their waters was also included in the Med War Zone. All this, was said to be due to the Allied intensification of the ‘Starvation Blockade’. While the Allies had, indeed, through hard negotiation and downright pressure restricted the neutrals’ seaborne imports, to limit their businessmen re-exporting them to the Central Powers, as well as seizing some neutral tonnage. The German tone, nevertheless, was of extreme outrage in the defence of these same neutral nations’ trade that their own submariners were physically destroying at sea. 

     And... among the ‘controlled sailings’ had been partly-escorted convoys between the Shetland Isles and Norway. One of these, consisting of five neutral vessels and one Briton was attacked successfully by four German destroyers on December 14th. Not only were all of the merchantmen sunk, so too were five of the six escorts. Unsurprisingly, reorganisation of these convoys followed.

 

1918

 

     The long, hard slog continued. On 4th January 1918 H.M. Hospital Ship Rewa was torpedoed and sunk in the Bristol Channel - outside the declared danger area for these vessels. Miraculously, there were only four deaths, but probably only because the attack was botched. The perpetrator of this and other war crimes was Kapitänleutnant Wilhelm Werner commanding U55.

     On January 11th the Germans expanded their War Zones even further.  One was along the eastern seaboard of North America. The prohibited zone around the Azores was extended eastwards to cover the island of Madeira, with a new one straddling the sea routes from the Cape Verde Islands eastwards to Dakar on the African coast. This was to allow the long-range U-cruiser boats to operate to advantage. These were very heavily-armed boats when deployed against civilian vessels and their primary armament consisted of two 15-cm. guns.

     One day before, H.M. Government’s Minister for Reconstruction, Christopher Addison, had met with a deputation from the National Sailors’ and Firemen’s Union that wished for the post-war continuance of the government’s National Maritime Board. They were assured that the ‘British Government, and indeed the British public, would never allow its seamen to be forgotten, more especially as they had so signally proved their patriotism during the War’.

     Anyway, back at sea in the early months mercantile losses continued to be very heavy, but not quite as grievous as in the year before and due to many attacks occurring in coastal waters, far more damaged vessels could be repaired – or salvaged. February was the worst month for sinkings though. Due to a concentration of U-boats in the Irish Sea, ferry services were suspended, with the North Channel abandoned temporarily and all convoys routed through the Southwest Approaches. Also, more oceanic trade had been routed to the west-coast ports than usual so as not to subject them the onslaught of navigating the English Channel. Unfortunately, U-boat activity in these waters was also high, requiring further re-organisation of convoys there.

     By this time Britain’s ocean-going mercantile fleet had been depleted seriously and even although under government control, the shipbuilding industries had not yet managed to match the losses. Consequently, apart from the home agricultural industries having been increasing their outputs to help meet the peacetime high level of imported food and brewing being curtailed; imports generally were reduced to the sheer essentials; along with other practices, such as the Allies chartering much more neutral tonnage. Interestingly, not inconsiderable amounts of oil fuel were also being shipped home in the double-bottoms of larger merchantmen.

     January was to see the beginning of coastal convoys in British waters, along the East Coast. These linked the Humber with the Tyne and Methill, on the northern side of the Firth of Forth. Entirely different from the ocean convoys that utilised the vastness of the sea, these must have been limited to the War Channel.

     Meanwhile, in the South Atlantic a few German surface raiders and U-cruisers were instructed to intercept inbound grain carriers and had created more threats to international shipping. So, with more escorts having become recently available, a new convoy system from Rio-de-Janeiro, Brazil, was instituted as of mid-March, as well as re-organisation of the convoys to and from West Africa. The losses were low, but not non-existent, on these routes. Even so, there was a certain amount of concentration of the cruiser-boats, using wireless and two of these could bring a devastating fire-power even on a heavily-armed decoy ship.

     As might be expected, problems remained in the Med though. One was long running - over the supply of coal to Italy. Another was that of attacks on the slow convoys from Port Said. In April relatively heavy losses from the Through Convoys brought naval lobbying for their abandonment, but this was not done: on economic grounds. Also, there was congestion in Med ports due to limitations in bunkering ports.

     Notwithstanding all these and many more difficulties, the proverbial tide was starting to turn in the Allies’ favour. April was the last month when more than 200,000 tons was lost. (The claimed German figure for the same period was over 300,000 tons.)

     The fighting between merchantmen and submarines was by then also beginning to become rather less one-sided. In purely defensive terms, smoke apparatus is known on occasions to have been used effectively in getting away from their attackers. In returning violence for violence though, as well as handling their guns more efficiently, at least some merchantmen had received howitzers for firing depth-charges. Crews are on record as having made good use of these weapons.

     Of course, this improvement in the Allies’ fortunes was not understood at the time. The Bolshevik Revolution in late 1917 and the resultant Brest-Litovsk Treaty had taken Russia out of the war and released German troops for service in the West. Consequently, around 50 divisions were transferred, although operations continued in the East. The hope there was in getting access to the great grain-growing regions of Roumania and Ukraine that never materialised in reality. Since the food situations in both Germany and Austria-Hungary were by then precarious, the first of four planned, last-ditch German offensives of 1918 in the West, Operation Michael, was launched on March 21st. Breaking through immediately, the aim was to take the Channel Ports supplying the B.E.F. and knock Great Britain out of the war, before the American buildup became too strong. A separate peace with France was to be negotiated. Reeling, the Allied armies fell back a considerable way and took heavy losses in equipment, munitions and men, but the offensive culminated on April 5th and the Germans failed to get to the Channel Ports.

     The shipping of the American Expeditionary Force across the Atlantic to Britain and France that the German high commands were so worried about also created further pressure on British tonnage, in the form of fast liners: some of which were said to have been taken from commercial oceanic trade. Also, further reorganisation of the Atlantic convoy system was required and these new troop convoys began running in April and May.

     Shore bombardments of German naval facilities on the Belgian coast had long been carried out by shallow-draught monitors, but more was required to curtail German naval operations from there. Therefore, determined efforts were made by a British naval force in late April and early May to block the ports of Ostend and Zeebrugge: thereby denying use to the surface and submarine forces of the Marinekorps Flandern. Unfortunately, these very complex and difficult operations failed to do much more than cause some inconvenience. Repeated bombing of the ports by the Royal Air Force was more successful, along with the increased destruction of the U-boats at sea and all the pressure contributed to the increasing weakness of the German naval position in Belgium.

     Germany’s armies in the West also resurrected Operation Michael in late May, against the French this time - with the aim of getting to Paris. It nearly succeeded, but the French, with American, British and Colonial support counter-attacked massively in mid-July – producing a German retreat that could not be recovered from. 

     To all intents and purposes denied access into the English Channel and through the then extremely strong British defences, by early summer the surviving boats of the Marinekorps Flandern were active in the southern North Sea and East Coast of England. However, even with increasingly large elements of the Northern Mine Barrage having an effect (even if nowhere near as great as intended), the boats of the Hochseeflotte were still inflicting heavy losses on merchant vessels up Britain’s East Coast and some in the U.K.’s western waters.

     Even if the number of sinkings continued to lessen, the loss of life could still be shocking. On June 27th H.M.H.S. Llandovery Castle was out in the Atlantic well west of Fastnet and so, out of the ‘War Zone’ for this class of vessel.  She was torpedoed without warning by Oberleutnant zur See Helmut Patzig, in command of U86. This was a truly horrific attack, with most of the survivors in lifeboats shelled and of the 286 persons onboard only 24 survived.

     In October 23 merchant vessels had been lost, but in November there were only two. These were the steamers Surada and Murcia that were part of a convoy leaving Port Said on November 2nd. UC74 had already laid a minefield across this convoy’s path that had been swept. So, they and the War Roach were torpedoed: the latter that was only damaged. Incidentally, an attempt was also made by this boat two days later to mine another steamer off Alexandria and finally, a tiny, unnamed Italian sailing vessel was sunk by gunfire on November 5th.

     It is worth pointing out that although Germany’s position was becoming utterly desperate, there were, nevertheless, plans to develop ‘group’ submarine operations further. Kapitänleutnant Hans Rose that had commanded a large ocean-going boat, U53, very successfully indeed, had also lobbied heavily for concentration of force. Appointed as a staff officer ashore as of August, he was due to take command of a brand-new cruiser-boat in December. Along with two more fast and capable boats under his tactical direction, they were to carry out ‘group’ warfare in the Atlantic according to his ideas. 

     Finally, in spite of the ever-present privations and frustrations for those in captivity that must have told on the internees in Ruhleben, contrary to what has been made out even by some internees themselves, morale can be seen to have improved markedly towards the end. On Trafalgar Night (October 21st), the debating and literary society put on a show. As well as singing two songs that had previously been banned, ‘Rule Britannia’ and ‘Hearts of Oak’, there was also a reading. It might have described that year’s attempted blocking of Zeebrugge, had it not been from the Life of Nelson about an earlier daring but failed British naval exploit – during the Battle of Santa Cruz de Tenerife in 1797. Interestingly, the release of sick internees through the Netherlands continued almost to the Armistice. Following the early days of chaos of the Revolution in Germany, some of which was witnessed by the internees that had gone into Berlin as ‘tourists’, they were repatriated later in November.

 

     Assessing the destruction and loss through capture of vessels during the Great War numerically is reasonably straightforward. Even this can only be approximate though, as figures in official and semi-official sources are not directly comparable and some, such as relating to attacks by aircraft, do not tally at all. There were also further complexities not addressed in these official returns. As an example, it was not unknown for sinkings through collision in convoy to be regarded purely as commercial accidents and in another, at least a few vessels are missing entirely from British records, even if mentioned in German ones. Nevertheless, according to the official government lists, 2,479 merchant vessels were lost by surface ships, submarines and aircraft: with a gross tonnage of 7,759,090.

     Lloyd’s of London also kept a list of vessels destroyed by mines through to 1925. Comparatively few were British overall and of these, few were merchantmen.

     The number of merchant mariners killed is even more difficult to assess accurately. According to the official lists as published in 1919, the total of ‘lives’ lost from attack by surface forces, submarines, mines and aircraft was 14,287. A minute sheet, possibly written by a Board of Trade official and attached to a copy of the roll of the dead on the Imperial War Graves Commission’s Memorial on Tower Hill, London stated that the ‘finally reconciled’ figure in 1932 was 13,942 for the Mercantile Marine. This may well have only reflected this memorial for those with no grave but the sea though and coastal cemeteries around the British Isles and elsewhere occasionally contain the graves of merchant mariners from this war washed ashore: whether identified, or not. Closer to the official 1919 lists, a work produced by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace gave the figure for merchant mariners killed as 14,661, plus all those in the reserves. It is also known that some merchant mariners died through the effects of the war in foreign ports and were buried ashore there. And, there were all the others that were shattered physically and mentally that have never been counted.   

 

Post War...

 

     Even although the Admiralty was incredibly rapid in allowing independent sailings from the U.K. as of the Armistice and running down the home-bound convoys, it took a considerable time to return trade to a peacetime footing. Although transports were released for commercial service as soon as possible (with an increased emphasis from February 1919), apart from all the martial commitments abroad that required continued supply, gigantic numbers of troops and Prisoners of War had to be repatriated. Also, with later Allied wartime cooperation, many economic aspects remained in governmental control of necessity. Having shifted the highest priority in the shipping of munitions to foodstuffs, tonnage was diverted to this latter end, with the immediate aim of returning import levels of these and raw materials to those before 1917.  Nevertheless, vast amounts of business had been dislocated and ultimately, Britain lost much trade to new competitor nations, such as the United States and Japan.

      Even during the perceived investment-led economic post-war boom of 1919-20, there were strains for merchant mariners through unemployment. Post-war racial tensions between demobilised armed servicemen and Arabs ashore are known to have turned into violence in South Shields, as early as February 1919.  Subsequent rioting was said to be much worse in other ports, especially Liverpool and Cardiff. In the case of these Arabs, theoretically they were Adenese, had been signing onto British merchantmen for decades and had first settled in the Tyne around twenty years before. The reality was that most had come from the Arabian interior and so, had actually been from the Ottoman Empire. Complicating this already tricky subject even further, a proportion had originated from across the other side of the Red Sea. Similarly to non-whites from West Africa and the Caribbean, there had been greatly increased wartime recruitment that resulted in larger numbers of these mariners living ashore in some of the major ports.  The Aliens Order of 1920 was an attempt to stop non-white mariners landing in the U.K., but was ineffective for a number of reasons: including determined and continued illegal entry. Whatever the merits, or otherwise, of recruiting non-British mariners post-war, especially during the severe recession that followed the short boom, masters on instruction from shipping managers continued to ship them.

     Also, largely through three-way wartime negotiation, merchant mariners’ pay had basically doubled. Although war risk pay will have probably have ended in November 1918, one study states that monthly pay immediately post-war had been £14 10s – presumably for firemen (with able seaman at ten shillings less).  In spite of many from the ship-owning classes having made vast fortunes from the increased wartime freight rates (those on government service, on ‘blue book’ rates, did not do so well), as soon as the economic down turn kicked in, mariners’ pay was cut and continued downwards. In May 1921, they were reduced by £2 10s. per month. In a year there were two more reductions of £1 10s. and another 10s.: the latter in May 1922. This trend continued, with yet another £1 lopped off in May 1923. Relenting somewhat the following year, rates were increased by £1 monthly. However, the removal of this at the end of July 1925 resulted in a seamen’s strike in U.K. ports. In time it spread to the Antipodes and South Africa. Intensely bitter struggles, especially as the National Sailors’ and Firemen’s Union sided with the shipowners, after months the mariners were forced back at the reduced rates. Having had no support from the unions in the U.K., when the General Strike was called the next year, there was little interest from mariners. It is well worth pointing out that the 1925 mariners’ strike also cost the capitalist system dearly.

 

     Even if they did not have any work, at least in July 1919 they learned that merchant mariners could be entitled to the British War Medal and the Mercantile Marine War Medal. Unlike those in the armed forces, potential recipients had to apply to the Board of Trade personally and the ribbons began to be issued that same year: although the actual medals were not manufactured and issued until 1922. Seemingly, the title ‘Merchant Navy’ was also bestowed on the Mercantile Marine by King George V sometime this year: even if this term was already in common usage by then. Anecdotally, at least some merchant mariners have been said to have objected strongly to this honour though, reckoning that they had been abandoned largely by State during the war. Essentially, they wanted nothing to do with any ‘Merchant Navy’...

 

 

 

 

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